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Abstract. 
The Campaign for Democratic Socialism 1960-1964. 
In early 1960 it seemed likely that the official Labour 
Party defence policy would be defeated by a unilateralist 
resolution at the Scarborough Conference. In response to 
this possibility the Campaign for Democratic Socialism, 
or CDS, was established. 
The CDS projected the image of a grass-roots movement 
inspired by Gaitskell's "fight and fight again" speech. 
But it was run by a Campaign Committee which included 
leading members of the Party like Tony Crosland, Roy 
Jenkins and Patrick Gordon Walker, as well as less well 
known members like Bill Rodgers, Dick Taverne, Philip 
Williams, Brian Walden, Denis Howell and David Marquand. 
This highly talented group launched an elaborate and 
successful lobbying, publicity and briefing operation 
which was influential in overturning the unilateralist 
vote at the Blackpool Conference of 1961. After Blackpool 
the Campaign helped many of its leading members find 
seats in the House of Commons while continuing to put the 
"revisionist" case through its newspaper Campaign. 
The importance of the CDS in the history of the Labour 
Party is, primarily, as the first internal pressure group 
organised by the right of the Party. It was also the 
first internal Party group to use such sophisticated 
lobbying techniques. Moreover, the subsequent careers of 
the leading members of the Campaign influenced the 
development of the Labour Party. The CDS was an important 
formative political action for many of them. Finally many 
of the CDS supporters set-up or joined the SDP when it 
was launched. 
Introduction. 
Bill Rodgers, the secretary and main organiser of the 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism, wrote in a brief 
history he drafted of the Campaign at the time of its 
close in 1964, that the CDS deserved a "chapter in the 
history of the Labour Party. "1 Within five years of this 
being written three studies of the Campaign had been 
completed. In 1966 two chapters appeared in Lord 
Windlesham's study Communication and Political Power; 
2 in 
1968 an unpublished MPhil was completed by Patrick Seyd 
on "Factionalism in the Labour Party: A Case Study of the 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism" and in 1969 Stephen 
Haseler published The Gaitskellites, which contained a 
chapter on the CDS. 
In the twenty-two years since the appearance of Haseler's 
study the historical significance of this right-wing 
pressure group has steadily increased. In the 1970s the 
increasing isolation of the Gaitskellite group of Labour 
MPs, especially those who were strong advocates of the 
European Community, made the earlier struggle, and its 
breakdown over the Community, of renewed interest. In the 
late 1970s the resurgence of the unilateralist pressure 
group, CND, as a national force in Labour Party politics 
and their resounding successes at Labour Party 
Conferences, brought the unilateralist question back to 
the centre of Labour politics. These controversies 
combined after the defeat of the Labour government in 
1979 to produce the formation of the SDP in 1981. There 
-------------------- 
1. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 20. 
2. Lord Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, Cape London 1966, Chapter 4, "The 
Springboard" and Chapter 5, "The Campaign". 
1 
were those who, at the time of the launch of the SDP, saw 
a direct link to the stand the CDS had taken in the early 
1960s. 3 Moreover, the leading figures of the SDP went out 
of their way to identify themselves with the memory of 
Hugh Gaitskell. Following election defeats in 1979,1983 
and 1987 the Labour Party launched a fundamental rethink 
of its policy. It adopted this revisionist stance in the 
face of defeat, dropped unilateral nuclear disarmament 
and opposition to membership of the EC and embraced 
aspects of the market economy. Each of these changes can 
be seen as extensions of the broad policy stance of many 
leading revisionists but more importantly the process of 
modernising policy options was in tune with the 
objectives of the Gaitskellite revisionists. Thus 
parallels with the pre-1964 period can be drawn on a 
number of different levels. 
The main previous studies of the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism were completed before the end of the 1960s, in 
fact before the Wilson Government was defeated in 1970. 
Patrick Seyd's MPhil thesis was a broadly hostile left- 
wing analysis concerned with describing the way a 
right-wing faction operated within the Labour Party and 
was in general dismissive of the Campaign's influence. 
Lord Windlesham, from whom both Seyd and Haseler drew 
widely, outlined the basic shape of the CDS and was 
concerned with showing the way the Campaign used modern 
techniques of political communication to further its 
cause. Haseler included his chapter on the CDS in a 
generally sympathetic study of the Gaitskellites. Each 
offered some new factual material, as well as analysis of 
the influence of the CDS; however, each was written close 
to the events and the writers could have had no way of 
predicting the subsequent troubled history of the 
Gaitskellite MPs. 
-------------------- 
3. Rodgers in interview with author, and see Hugh Stephenson, Claret and Chips. The Rise of the 
SDP, p 31. 
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Building from the work of these previous writers, the 
current thesis is based on interviews with the main 
actors in the CDS story who are still alive. These were 
complemented by the circulation of a questionnaire to the 
surviving MPs and other supporters of the Campaign4 and 
another questionnaire to members of the "Group", 5 a 
debating society which preceded the Campaign proper. In 
addition Bill Rodgers granted unrestricted access to the 
office records of the Campaign. These amounted to some 56 
files and covered the story of the Campaign from the 
first tentative meetings in the spring and summer of 1960 
to the complications over the lease of the office and the 
balance remaining in the bank account, which continued 
into 1966. To complement the primary written and oral 
material. use has been made a number of important 
-------------------- 
4. The Questionnaire asked the following questions: Who did you support in the leadership 
election of 1955? In the period before the 1959 election, how did you feel about left-wing 
organisations like CND and the Bevanites? Did you take part in any groups that opposed the 
activites of the Bevanites or CND? Could you describe the actions of these groups? During the 
period 1955-1959 did you feet that the leadership was out of touch with its supporters in the 
rank and file? Did you feel at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the left wing of the party? What did 
you see as the main reason for Labour's defeat in 1959? Please describe the performance of the 
leadership, especially Gaitskell, in the 1959 elections? When did you join the CDS, did someone 
canvass for your support or did you apply to join? What were your reasons for joining the 
Campaign? Did you have any knowledge of the way the Campaign was financed? How far did you feel 
that you had a role in the formation of the Campaign's policy? If you were an active member of 
the CDS please describe the kind of activity this involved? Specifically did you a) Canvass for 
Trade Union support after Scarborough in 1960, b) If so, which unions were your main targets 
and how successful were you in this activity, c) Work for the adoption of Parliamentary 
Candidates who were sympathetic to the aims of the Campaign? If so, which candidates in which 
constituencies did you help? The individuals listed below played a role in the CDS, could you 
give an assessment of their relative contributions to the Campaign's organisation, propaganda 
and ideology, Tony Crosland, Patrick Gordon Walker, Denis Howell, Frank Pickstock, Bill 
Rodgers, Philip Williams? Which other individuals do you feel played an important role in the 
CDS; could you name them and outline the role they played? Did you witness GaitskeLL's "fight 
and fight and fight again" speech at Scarborough in 1960? Did this speech change your 
perceptions of Gaitskell in any way? Can you assess the impact that the CDS had on the outcome 
of the vote on unilateralism in Blackpool in 1961? A stated aim of the Campaign was to educate 
the party in the ideas of revisionism, did you agree with this aim and could you assess what 
success the Campaign had in realising this objective? Please describe your attitude to the 
attempt by Macmillan to bring the UK into Europe? How did you react to Gaitskell's position on 
the European questions? What caused the decline of the Campaign after 1962? Do you own any 
papers relevant to the Campaign which you would allow the researcher to examine and If so, 
could you give a brief description of their contents. The questionnaire was returned by Austen 
Albu, Alec Grant, Jim Boyden, Jeremy Bray MP, Lord Diamond, Roy HattersLey MP, Dick Leonard, 
Lord Mayhew, Lord Mellish, Lord Jay, Dick Taverne, Alan Thompson and Justice Waterhouse 
5. The Group questionnaire asked a series of questions designed to establish who attended 
meetings and who spoke; other questions included: Were you a supporter of CDS? If so what role 
did you play? How have your views changed on unilateralism, the European Community and Public 
Ownership? Which political parties have you belonged to and Please assess your own contribution 
to the Group. The questionnaire was returned by Ivan ALexander, Gordon Borrie, Tyrell Burgess, 
Conrad Dehn, David Donnison, Bruce Douglas Mann, Ben Hooberman, Oleg Kerensky, Keith Kyle, 
David Lane, Ivor Lucas, Colin McIntyre, Bryan Magee, David Vaughan Williams, Ronald Waterhouse. 
3 
secondary works and diaries which have been published 
since 1969, including Philip Williams' monumental 
biography of Hugh Gaitskell, 6 the Backbench Diaries of 
Richard Crossman, 7 Eric Shaw's study of the central 
party organisation8 and Susan Crosland's highly personal 
biography of Tony Crosland. 9 
The wealth of new material that has become available 
since 1969 provides the basis for this new study of the 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism. 
-------------------- 
6. Philip Williams, Hugh Gaitskell A Political Biography, Cape, London 1979. 
7. Janet Morgan, (editor), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, Hamish Hamilton and 
Jonathan Cape, London 1981. 
8. Eric Shaw, Disci line and Discord in the Labour Part : the Politics of Managerial Control in 
the Labour Party 1951-1987, Manchester University Press, 1989. 
9. Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland, Cape, London, 1982. 
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Chapter 1: 
The Labour Party in Opposition 1951-1959. 
The creation of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism' in 
1960 was the culmination of a process of internal Labour 
Party conflict which had developed over the 1950s. To 
appreciate the significance of the launch of the CDS, it 
is necessary to outline the main features of Labour Party 
history in the 1950s. Labour Party politics in this 
decade were largely dominated by internal conflicts which 
in turn were influenced by the unfolding of the legacies 
of the 1945-1951 Labour Governments. The decade was 
dominated by internal politics, rather than wider issues, 
for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the nature of the Labour Party itself tended to 
expose internal disputes. There have been a number of 
different explanations of this. For Mark Jenkins2 the 
Party was divided between the "apparatus" and the 
"movement". The Party apparatus gained its legitimacy and 
-------------------- 
1. CDS or the Campaign are used throughout to denote the Campaign for Democratic Socialism. 
2. Mark Jenkins, Bevanism, Labour's High Tide and the Democratic Mass Movement, Spokesman 
Books, London 1977, pp 13. 
5 
Power from the movement, but remained separate and in 
some way compromised by its association with the state. 
In contrast, H. M. Drucker3 saw the Labour Party as more 
difficult to classify because it was not simply an 
instrument for acquiring votes and using power, it was 
both a party of government and a protest movement. The 
problem for the British Labour Party was not a careerist 
leadership, which Drucker identified as the main problem 
for the German SPD, but an inability to define what the 
"implementing of socialism" would actually mean. In the 
place of a definition of socialism, the Labour Party 
produced a series of manifesto promises on individual 
issues. 4 This lead to a continual reappraisal of party 
policy and a conflict between different sections of the 
Party as to what should constitute policy. A combination 
of the Party's structure and its self-image as a 
socialist (or social democratic) party, which did not 
define exactly what socialism would be, produced a marked 
tendency for internal party strife. 
The second reason for this concentration on internal 
party politics was the feeling of impotence caused by a 
long period of opposition. A political party in 
opposition, without the power to implement its policies, 
has very limited outlets for its collective energy. For 
the Labour Party this has tended, in periods of 
opposition like 1951-1954,1959-1961 and 1979-1983, to 
find an outlet in self-destructive division. 
There was nothing inevitable about the internal struggle. 
The Party's structure, the legislative programme of 
1945-1951 and the competition between opposing doctrines 
did not make inevitable the prolonged and electorally 
devastating divisions of the 1950s. The Party in 1951 
could have adapted to the post-war era without facing up 
-------- ----------- 
3. H. M. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party. George Alten and Unwin, London 1979, 
p 1. 
4. Described by Drucker as manifestoism in Drucker 1979, pp 91-94. 
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to the fundamental questions of its own identity. It 
could have become a basically social democratic party 
which would not have entered into a debate about the new 
direction for socialism but would have simply continued 
the process of consolidation. 
The fact that it did not do this was in large part due to 
the Bevanites. Their consistent critique of policy and 
their refusal to accept the domination of the Party by 
the right, meant that the underlying problems faced by 
Labour in 1951 came out into the open. Once exposed, the 
structure of the Party and the tendency for policy 
formation to be dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, or 
through "manifestoism", compounded the image of disunity. 
In the Labour Party's 1951 election manifesto an 
"elaborate 'then' and 'now' contrast was made between 
pre-war misery and present prosperity"5 and the clear 
contention was that a vote for the Conservatives was a 
vote for a return to the bad old days: "Forward with 
Labour or backwards with the Tories". Gaitskell did not 
share this view; he recorded his own analysis in his 
diary: "What the intelligent Tories will, of course, want 
to do is be able to say to the electorate when the 
election comes, 'No war, no unemployment, no cuts in 
social service, just good government. "'6 
The success of the Conservative administrations in 
fulfiling Gaitskell's prediction contributed to the 
tendency of the Labour Party to turn inwards, expending 
energy on arguing over what was the correct path the 
Party should take to defeat the Conservatives and 
intriguing over the successor to Attlee as leader. The 
-------------------- 
5. David Butler, The British General Election of 1951, Macmillan, London 1952, p 48. 
6. Philip Williams, (editor), The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell, Cape, London 1983, entry for Friday 
November 23 1951, p 307. 
7 
two issues of the Party leadership and the future of 
socialism were interrelated because whoever led the Party 
would have a large say in the direction it was to take.? 
They were also issues which provoked a great deal of 
emotion at all levels of the Party. The Labour Party of 
the Morecambe Conference in 1952, described by Michael 
Foot as "... rowdy, convulsive, splenetic; threatening at 
moments to collapse into an irretrievable brawl", 8 was an 
organisation where fraternal fellowship among comrades 
was often hard to detect and animosity between 
individuals was often bitter. Two examples of this were 
Bevan's description of Gaitskell as "nothing, nothing, 
nothing", 9 which was reciprocated by Gaitskell's 
comparison of Bevan with Hitler. 10 
These Party conflicts were not simply disagreements among 
colleagues. Although the debates were fuelled by 
individual ambition there was a sense, somewhere in the 
morass of endless bickering, that what was at stake was 
the future direction for socialism and the possibility of 
a great national party achieving power. Christopher 
Mayhew recalled those "battles in Committee Room 14 or in 
the Grand Committee Room with some pride. The debates 
were conducted on both sides with skill and the votes 
were sometimes extremely important, capable of decisively 
changing the policy of the Party or the stature of the 
responsible party leader... Sometimes our party seemed to 
be performing the function of a two party system all by 
itself 
. "11 
-------------------- 
7. Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party, Manchester University Press, 1988, pp 
31-51. 
8. Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan Volume 2,1945-1960, Davis Poynter, London 1975, p 379. 
9. Foot 1975, p 295. 
10. Janet Morgan, (editor), The Backbench Diary of Richard Crossman, Hamish Hamilton and Cape, 
London 1981, entry for Thursday March 24 1955, p 410. 
11. Christopher Mayhew, Party Games, Hutchinson, London 1969, p 102. 
8 
The depth of personal rivalry and competition during the 
1950s was to have an over-spill in the 1960s which was 
reflected by the CDS. The Campaign was not primarily 
about the fighting of old battles, but the Gaitskellites 
did learn a number of lessons from the battles of the 
1950s which affected the way they fought unilateralism in 
the 1960s. The scope of right-wing organisation developed 
as the decade developed - from an early tentative 
Parliamentary organisation and the use of the Party 
apparatus, to the overt sectional organisation of the CDS 
years. 
The first five years of the decade were a period of new 
and developing areas of conflict, the second five were 
ones, at least among the party elite, of an attempt at 
accommodation. It is more difficult to generalise about 
what the decade was like among the rank and file. With 
the battle for the leadership lost by Bevan in 1955 the 
left wing of the membership tended to involve itself 
increasingly in extra-Parliamentary activity, for example 
CND. 12 For rank and file members who supported the 
leadership the power wielded by the block vote tended to 
minimise the scope for activity. The CDS was an attempt 
to mobilise these members when the power of the block 
vote began to move in favour of the left after Frank 
Cousins became leader of the TGWU. Throughout the 1950s 
however they were disadvantaged in the face of the 
greater motivation of the left, who tended to highjack 
meetings. 
13 
In his Conference speech before the 1951 election Bevan 
stated bluntly that: "Labour has no sense of defeat". 
14 
Even after the election there was a feeling of confidence 
-------------------- 
12. CND was not actually founded until February 1958 but other organisations had been opposing 
the bomb, by February 1957 100 Local groups associated with the peace pledge union existed, see 
John Minnion and Philip BoLsover, (editors), The CND Story, Allison and Busby, London 1983. 
13. Gaitskell 1983, entry for Saturday April 23 1955, pp 396-397. 
14. John Campbell, Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London 1987, p 267. 
9 
in the Labour movement, with membership rising and, even 
while being defeated, Labour achieved its highest ever 
vote. 
For Mark Jenkins15 the achievement of the record vote in 
1951 was despite and not because of the Labour 
Governments record: 
Labour's record 1951 vote was achieved despite 
austerity, consolidation, rationing, the use of troops against strikers, imposition of charges on the health service, higher national service to 
prosecute colonial wars, involvement in Korea, the 
biggest jump in the retail price index for 10 years 
and a series of splits at cabinet level. 
A list of the achievements of the Labour Governments can 
be set against this list of failings: 
We did what we promised to do... to nationalise the 
Bank of England, the fuel and power industries, 
inland transport and the iron and steel industry; 
and this we did in 7 major Acts. We promised a vast 
development of social services; and faithfully 
provided, or extended sickness, unemployment and 
retirement benefits, maternity grants, widow's 
pensions and death grants. Free, comprehensive 
medical service was established. 16 
One can add to Christopher Mayhew's list the 
demobilisation of the army, the housing programme and the 
independence of India. Most of the achievements came 
between 1945 and 1950, most of the failings in 1950 and 
1951. The Party's vote increased over the troubled period 
1950-1951, by nearly 700,000, to reach a total of 
13,948,605 and individual membership reached over one 
million in 1952. The Party was defeated by the electoral 
system, achieving a plurality of votes which, piled up in 
traditionally Labour areas, produced a minority of 
seats. 
17 
-------------------- 
15. Jenkins 1977, p 115. 
16. Mayhew 1969, p 42. 
17. Figures quoted from David Butler and Gareth Butter, British Political Facts 1900-1985, 
Macmillan, London 1986, p 152. 
10 
Nye Bevan's assertion that the Party had no sense of 
defeat was based on the hope that the Conservatives would 
fail in the post-war challenge and not on Gaitskell's 
view that the Tories knew what to do to hold power. 
Overall the mood of the Party was confident and the 
political conflict was in the context of their 
expectation of a rapid return to government. 
The Labour programme had been largely implemented and the 
Party had proved that it was fit to govern. What should 
now be the policy of the Labour Party? This formed a key 
electoral dilemma for the Labour Party in the 1950s, and 
the search for a policy direction was repeated to an 
extent in the 1980s, although the later period the legacy 
was of a much less successful Government and the problem 
was a perceived failure of the Party in Government. 
The dilemma on policy, in the aftermath of the Attlee 
Governments, was central to the historical development of 
the Party. Labour-based movements from the late 19th 
century onwards have suffered from a basic division, with 
varying degrees of seriousness, between maximalists and 
minimalists, defined in different ways. In the British 
context, the Labour Party began as an extension of the 
trade union movement with a corresponding group of middle 
class radicals attached to it and to the Independent 
Labour Party: 
The Labour Party has always been divided. Whilst 
intrinsically a creation of the trade union 
movement, seeking repeal of restrictive legislation, 
other groups involved in its formation conceived it 
to be the institution through which a socialist 
Commonwealth, of whatever kind, might be built. 
18 
-------------------- 
18. Alan Warde, Consensus and Beyond. The development of Labour Party strategy since World War 
Two, Manchester University Press 1982, p 1. 
11 
Tony Crosland, the leading theorist of the radical right 
of the Labour Party, gave a concise summary of the 
different doctrines which emerged from these two main 
founding groups and concluded that what emerged from this 
"brief catalogue" is the "variety and heterogeneity" from 
which the modern Labour Party was born. 19 Crosland goes 
on to conclude that: 
It is not even surprising that different doctrines 
should be supported at the same time - Owenism and 
Chartism, Marxism and Christian Socialism, Fabianism 
and Guild Socialism. There must always be divergent 
views on the right emphasis and order of priorities, 
and these will prevent a uniformity of thought. The 
trouble is that some of the divergences are not a 
matter simply of emphasis or the right priorities. 
They are fundamental, and the doctrines are mutually 
inconsistent. 20 
From these divergent and inconsistent theories, there 
emerged a political party with a political programme. The 
British political system itself and the need to be 
electorally viable tended to reduce the utopian and 
accentuate the practical. The 1945-1951 Governments 
exaggerated this process by instituting what Dalton 
called "Practical Socialism", thereby defining socialist 
doctrine in terms of Morrison's maxim that socialism is 
what the Labour Government does. 21 The result was to 
leave the left of the Party stranded in support of the 
movement for traditional values and the mouthing of 
"sacred texts", most notably Clause Four, but without a 
clear link to any socialist past. Another consequence was 
that the mixture of doctrines and their emergence in the 
policy of the 1945-1951 Government, left the Party as a 
whole rather directionless once it lost power. This 
-------------------- 
19. C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism , Cape, London 1956, p 45. 
20. Crosland 1956, p 87. 
21. According to Professor George Jones of the London School of Economics, Morrison used this 
phrase at a LSE Government Department Seminar chaired by Robert Mckenzie in the 1950s. I am 
grateful to Professor Peter Hennessy for giving me the source of this quote. 
12 
opened the way for the "revisionists" to claim that an 
appeal to the past was no longer enough and what was 
needed was a new doctrine for the future. 
For Gaitskell the policies of those who wanted to move on 
to the next stage of socialism and those who were 
dissatisfied with the achievements of the first 
instalment were electoral suicide. This argument was most 
clearly stated by Gaitskell's closest ideological ally, 
Tony Crosland, in The Future of Socialism which was 
published in 1956. For Crosland, the experience of the 
war and the post-war Labour Governments had discredited 
the popular assumptions of pre-war Marxists: 
The belief that the inner contradictions of 
capitalism would lead to first a gradual 
pauperisation of the masses and ultimately to the 
collapse o52the whole state, have by now been rather 
disproved. 
In contrast the left of the Party, at least those who 
were not Communist or fellow travellers, which was the 
vast majority, tried to spell out a socialist alternative 
that would radically change society, to build on rather 
than consolidate the achievements of 1945-51. For Bevan 
and the left the conflicts in society between property, 
poverty and democracy were not changed by the war. 
Bevan's book, In Place of Fear, expressed a belief in the 
power of planning and the need to use the state to 
control the market so that "effective social power" will 
"pass from one order of society to another". 
23 This 
watered down version of the class war was supported by a 
strong emphasis on the need for participation. "The 
ordinary man and woman is called into consultation and is 
asked to decide what he himself would put first in the 
national order of things". 
24 Bevan and the left saw state 
-------------------- 
22. Expanded on in "The transition of Capitalism" in Richard Crossman, (editor), New Fabian 
Essas Turnstile Press, London 1952. 
23. Foot 1975, p 371. 
24. Warde 1983 p 79, quoting Nye Bevan, Democratic Values, Fabian Tract 282, London 1950, p 
11. 
13 
ownership rather than demand management as supplying the 
answer to the problem of full employment, but to 
Crosland, growth in the economy and demand management 
meant that prosperity was assured and the Labour Party 
could now turn to more social questions. 25 The left also 
maintained its faith in public ownership, with 
modifications to make it more accountable, as a form of 
extending equality, while for Crosland extending public 
ownership in the already mixed economy was redundant 
unless it was in the form of competitive public 
enterprise or government share ownership. 26 The left 
could not really match the detailed analysis offered by 
the "New Thinkers" on the right. 
Bevan's fundamentalist formulas prevented him from 
seeing that the range of possible alternatives to 
free-market capitalism was now much broader than an 2 overnight transition to socialism. 7 
The basis of the argument, stressed more by right-wing 
writers than left, was the electoral viability of the 
Labour programme. Although the vagueness of the left's 
analysis tended to weaken their arguments on an 
intellectual level, the appeal of left-wing leaders like 
Bevan was not primarily intellectual anyway. In contrast 
the right-wing writers had little popular appeal in terms 
of inspiring the faithful: 
28 
What is the common factor which Labour people share 
and which sharply distinguishes us from the Tories? 
It is Socialism. If it is not that then there is 
nothing... the more we play it down, the less we 
-------------------- 
25. Crosland 1956, especially in the section "Liberty and Gaity in Private Life: the need for a 
reaction against the Fabian tradition", p 521. 
26. Crosland 1956, pp 487-497. 
27. Campbell 1987, p 266. Patrick Seyd in The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left, Macmillan 
Education, London 1987, p 13, supports this view: "but lacking any extensive research of the 
structural changes in the British economy [the left] tended to react to initatives from the 
right of the Party. General slogans rather than detailed polices became the norm for the Labour 
left on economic issues. " 
28. Another Lesson for the CDS in the form of the failure of the leadership to impress the rank 
and file. 
14 
differ from our opponents and the less reason there is fg people to vote for us to get the other lot 
out. 
Appeals like the one quoted above were guaranteed to fill 
halls with the faithful, but the content of the left-wing 
critique had a basic failing which Gaitskell summed up, 
rather harshly: "Can anyone honestly say that if the 
Labour Party had chosen a policy which reflected more or 
less the line of the Communist Party we should have 
received a larger vote? "30 Even though Gaitskell took his 
anti-Communism to its height in a speech at Stalybridge, 
in September 1952, in which he warned of the dangers of 
fellow travellers, 31 the battle between the opposing 
domestic doctrines was less bitter than that conducted 
over foreign policy. It is interesting to note that it 
was foreign policy which tended to dominate the internal 
battle rather than domestic policy. This leads support to 
Drucker's contention that the Labour Party never really 
faced up to the question of what, after 1945-1951, 
implementing socialism meant in practice. The Party 
became in a sense trapped by its own consensus building 
achievements and without an effective alternative to 
competent Tory rule. 32 It struggled with itself to come 
up with a distinctive alternative which could outflank 
the Conservatives and appeal to the electorate now living 
in relative peace and prosperity. 
This formed the basic electoral problem which the Party 
has faced ever since. The view of fundamentalists was 
that if the electorate were offered a fully socialist 
programme based on an enlightened form of public 
-------------------- 
29. Bevan, Tribune, December 3 1954. 
30. Gaitskett, Tribune, June 24 1955. 
31. In comparison with the United States there was not that much cold war rhetoric in British 
politics at this time and Gaitskell himself admitted that he was a little extreme at 
Stalybridge. Gaitskell 1983, entry for October 1952, pp 331-332. 
32. Even when the Conservative Government was incompetent as over Suez the Labour Party could 
not sustain the attack and turn it into an election victory, see Leon D Epstein. British 
Politics in the Suez Crisis. Pall Mall Press, London 1969, pp 67-77. 
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ownership and a profound restructuring of society, it 
would vote for it. The view of the revisionists was that 
the electorate would not vote for radical change and that 
anyway society was so changed by the Second World War 
that the Labour Party working within the mixed economy 
could fulfil a substantial programme of social reform and 
ensure ever increasing living standards for the people. 33 
These differing opinions underpinned the Party divide. 
The fundamentalist view came to be associated with the 
Bevanites. 
The Parliamentary Bevanites34 formed a challenge to the 
domination of the Labour Party by the axis of moderate 
leadership, big trade unions and right-wingers. The 
challenge took the form of persistent criticism of the 
direction of the Party after the fall of the Attlee 
Government. The group was not organised primarily as a 
factional bid for the leadership. Foot's biography of 
Bevan, Campbell's book on Bevan and the Mirage of British 
Socialism and the Grossman diaries, 35 all refute 
-------------------- 
33. Patrick Seyd, 1987 p 22, offers an alternative view which has the division in the party 
between socialists and social democrats summed up thus: "Socialists are committed to the 
transformation of property relationships and social democrats are committed to the modification 
of property relationships, 'Managing Capitalism set against replacing Capitalism. " 
34. There are a number of different ways of measuring Bevanite Parliamentary strength. The 
range goes from 25 hard core members, estimated by Ben Pimlott in The Political Diaries of Hugh 
Dalton, 1918-1940,1945-1960, Cape, London 1986, p 563, which rose to a maximum of 57 over the 
1952 defence debates, Hansard 5th Series Vol. 497 Col. 559-560, to 47 floating members listed 
by Jo Richardson, the group's secretary, and quoted in Jenkins 1977 pp 309-311. The membership 
of the group, Pimlott's 25, seems the best guide rather than Jenkins' figure, which includes 
all Labour MPs who voted against the whip. Jo Richardson's list includes some Keep Lefters but 
excludes others; it also excludes those pacifists who voted with the Bevanites in 1952. The Jo 
Richardson list is broken down here into leading members, following Bevan's phrase after the 
group was disbanded, "those of us who really matter" and the other less vocal Bevanites. The 
leading members are in turn broken down by those who gradually stopped being Bevanites and 
voted with Attlee in the March 1955 H-Bomb debate and those who remained largely loyal. 
a) Voted with Attlee: Richard Crossman; John Freeman; Tom Driberg; Stephen Swingler; Hugh 
Delargy; Leslie Hale; Bob Stross and A. J. Irvine. Gradually stopped being open Bevanites: 
Harold Wilson; Geoffrey Bing and Desmond Donnelly, (who attacked Bevan at conference in 1954). 
b) Did not vote with Attlee: Michael Foot; Jennie Lee; Ian Mikardo; Barbara Castle; Harold 
Davies; J. P. W. Maltalieu; and Emrys Hughes. 
c) Other members: Donald Bruce; George Craddock; F. E. Jones; Archie Manuel; Elles Smith; John 
Timmons; Tudor Watkins; Edward Yates; Will Griffiths; George Roberts; Richard Acland; Marcus 
Lipton; Thomas Williams; Geoffrey Roberts; Cecil Poole; Julian Shaw; David Weitzman; Maurice 
Orbach; Julius Silverman; John Baird; C. R. Bence; Fenner Brockaway; J. Carmichael; Ernest 
Fernyhough; Malcolm Mcmillan; John Rankin and Walter Marlow. 
35. Foot 1975, p 367: "But what was false was the suggestion that all his moves, manoeuvres, 
protests, resignations, attacks were calculated however ineptly to further his personal 
ambition: the Deakin/Dalton caricature". Foot can to an extent be expected to play down his 
leader's personal ambitions, but Campbell 1987, generally more hostile to Bevan also notes his 
growing disillusionment with politics, pp 284-285, the different advice he was recieving from 
his friends, pp 303-304, and the overreaction of the Dalton/Deakin caricature, p 255. see also 
Crossman 1981 p 63 and p 290. 
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Gaitskell's belief, expressed to Crossman, that Bevanism 
was above all a conspiracy to gain the leadership for 
Bevan. 36 
The left's opposition to the Attlee Government had been 
focused on the foreign policy of Ernest Bevin, not the 
leadership of Attlee. 37 The basis of the "Keep Left" 
argument was that the government had been too ready to 
abandon the idea that "left can talk to left", in favour 
of the Cold War. This opposition was neither fully 
organised nor based on a spontaneous grass roots 
disillusionment with the Attlee Governments. The 
development of left-wing opposition into the Bevanite 
group did not materially change its outlook or its 
organisation, but did enhance its credibility by 
improving the calibre of its members. 
The Bevanite group was not a direct challenge to the 
leadership but rather an attack on the complacency of the 
Labour Front Bench in the period 1951-1955, and a 
blueprint for left-wing activity in subsequent decades. 
For the Labour leadership it was insidious because it was 
unpredictable and a challenge because it was articulate. 
However, the Bevanites have tended to be vastly 
overrated, both at the time and since, because of their 
symbolic value and journalistic prowess. 8 3 
-------------------- 
36. Crossman 1981, entry for January 21 1952, p 63 felt that Nye was a reluctant Bevanite, 
which is hardly consistent with a conspiracy theory, and that after October 1952 he avoided 
meetings, Crossman 1981, entry for March 3 1954, p 290. He also quoted Gaitskell's view that 
Bevan was making a bid for power, Crossman 1981, entry for March 24 1955, pp 409-410, but 
ruining it by his inability to play on the team until the period 1957-1960 when any hope of the 
leadership had disappeared. What emerges from this is the development of Bevan's ambitions over 
the period; a factional attempt to seize the leadership does not. The real change comes in 1955 
with the leadership election and the removing from the Bevanites of the tantalising hope of 
Bevan's leadership. Gaitskett according to Crossman said: "Bevanism is and only is a conspiracy 
to seize the leadership for Aneurin Bevan. It is a conspiracy because it has three essentials 
of conspiracy, a leader in Bevan, an organisation run by Mikardo and a newspaper run by Foot", 
Crossman 1981, entry for March 24 1955, pp 409-410. 
37. See Geoffrey Wakeford, The Great Labour Mirage: An indictment of Socialism in Britain, 
Hate, London 1969, and Jonathan Schneer, Labour's Conscience: The Labour Left 1945-1951, Unwin 
Hyman, London, 1988. 
38. Driberg wrote for Reynolds News, Crossman for the Daily Mirror and Sunday Pictorial, 
Crossman and Freeman for the New Statesman and Mikardo and Foot for Tribune. 
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The first public schism of the Attlee governments 
represented the first dent in the New Jersalem. 39 The 
resignation of Bevan, Wilson and Freeman over the effects 
of the cost of rearmament on the health service could 
40 hardly have been more public. 
The issue of the Gaitskell budget and its demand for 
charges on the health service marked the beginning of 
post-war Bevanism. The rearmament programme was also a 
rather symbolic failure of the Attlee Government to be 
properly socialist by "attacking" its most central 
achievement, the health service. The fact that the cuts 
were contained in the same budget which laid out plans 
for increased rearmament, a three year £3,400 million 
programme, seemed to the Bevanites to compound 
Gaitskell's sin. 
The economic crisis of 1951 was caused, according to 
left-wing critics of the Government, who formed the Keep 
Left group, 41 by the rearmament programme. Gaitskell 
summarised this view in a memorandum presented to the 
Parliamentary committee of the Labour Party in November 
1951 as follows: 
... the views of Messrs, Foot, Crossman and their friends may be summarised as follows: We have a 
dollar crisis which is caused by rearmament. It is 
now suggested we should be granted and accept dollar 
aid so as to enable us to go on with rearmament. 
This would be wrong because if we accept dollar aid 
we shall be dependent on the U. S. A. We must 
therefore refuse the dollars and solve the economic 
problems by cutting our defence programme. 
-------------------- 
39. Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips, Macmillan, London 1968, lists 8 domestic and 31 
foreign revolts during the Attlee governments. These were unorganised, Stephen Haseler The 
Gaitskellites Macmillan, London 1969 pp 19-20. 
40. A distinction should be made between the reasons for the resignations. Wilson's stance was 
more limited than Bevan's, and Wilson did not follow Bevan's lead when Bevan used his 
resignation speech substantially to widen the area of dispute from the imposition of charges on 
the health service to the general thrust of the government's foreign policy. 
41. Kenneth Harris, Attlee, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1982 p 306. 
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He goes on to state that the crisis was not caused by 
rearmament: 
The dollar deficit was caused by heavier purchases 
by the whole sterling area of dollar goods, higher 
prices for these goods, lower prices for the main 
sterling area matciials, the loss of Persian oil and 
capital movement. 
The position of Foot and other "Keep Lefters"43 was that 
the crisis was caused by the excessive demands of the 
£3,400 million rearmament programme, summed up in the New 
Statesman Parliamentary column by Tom Williams as "Rearm 
we must, if we bust we bust". 44 The alternative positions 
taken over rearmament were to be a recurring theme over 
the decade. The debates of July 1952, March 1953, April 
1954 and March 1955, ran over the same themes with the 
different positions of Labour members having changed 
little. 45 
A similar split could be observed over the rearmament of 
Germany. The partition of Germany and the permanence of 
the Iron Curtain could not be taken for granted in 1951. 
The four power occupation of Germany had turned into a 
combined occupation of two opposing camps and the West 
was moving towards making the Western half of the country 
a cohesive unit, while in the Eastern Sector the Russians 
crushed all opposition and failed to hold any free 
elections. The left of the Labour Party felt that not 
enough effort had been made to reach an agreement with 
the Russians, that Britain was following too closely the 
cold war policies of the United States. The American 
-------------------- 
42. Gaitskell 1983 pp 293-294. 
43. The 1950 pamphlet "Keeping Left" highlighted the issues that were "to become the great 
divisive issues of the fifties, the scale of military expenditure, German rearmament and 
nuclear weapons. " See Hugh Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1945-1955, 
Peragmon Press, oxford 1973, p 84. 
44. New Statesman, July 14 1951. 
45. These debates were as follows, all Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, Hansard: July 9 1952 
Debate on the Economic situation, volume 504, columns 1272-1405 and columns 1691-1694, March 5 
1953, Debate on Defence White Paper, volume 512, columns 567-690, April 13 1955 Debate on SEATO 
volume 537 columns 970-975 see also Crossman 1981 p 
312, March 1 and 2 1955 Defence Debate 
volume 537, columns 1893-2012 and 2066-2190. 
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alliance was so central to the world view of the 
Gaitskellites that it seemed necessary to take a full 
role in the creation of a rearmed and economically viable 
West Germany, which would be able to take its full role 
in the reconstructed Europe, because this was central to 
American foreign policy. The issue of German rearmament 
created a strange and temporary alliance between the 
Bevanites46 and Dalton, and enabled them to achieve their 
most important foreign policy success when the Labour 
Party adopted Dalton's NEC statement of May 1952 which 
seemed to move the party policy towards opposition to 
German rearmament. 47 The Paris Agreements on German 
rearmament were eventually passed by the House with only 
six pacifists voting against. 48 For the Bevanites 
opposition to German rearmament was based on the economic 
consequences of rearmament and the mistaken policy of 
Communist containment, while for Dalton it was based on a 
fundamental mistrust of the Germans. 49 
The issues which underpinned the disputes over rearmament 
were world issues: the Cold War; Communist containment; 
the restructuring of Europe; European unity and the 
British "special relationship" with the United States. 
They tended to dominate the thinking of leading Bevanites 
and overshadow domestic issues, such as public ownership, 
especially after the official disbanding of the group in 
1952. It is ironic to note that the issue of 
nationalisation was an increasingly non-controversial one 
as the divisions on defence and foreign policy 
deepened. 50 
-------------------- 
46. Although the Bevanites were not united on this issue, see Berrington 1973 pp 102-106. 
47. Ben Pimlott, (editor), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-40,1945-60, Cape, London 
1986, entry for Friday May 2, pp 585-586, and Crossman 1981, entry for Thursday May 
1 1952, p 
102-103. 
48. Gaitskell 1983, entry for November 12 1954, pp 348-349. 
49. Dalton 1986, entry for Monday June 30 1952, pp 592-597. 
50. New Left Review, November-December 1964. 
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It is perhaps a little misleading to talk of the 
Bevanites as a group in such self-conscious terms. A 
group definitely existed which held regular meetings in 
Parliament and, after the Party meeting of October 23 
1952,51 private lunches. The group had officers, it 
organised in the constituencies mainly through Tribune 
Brains Trusts and it had a propaganda operation in the 
form of Tribune. It was recognised as a group by the 
officials of the Labour Party and by the press. The 
membership of the group included individuals of widely 
different political outlooks. It was at the time and has 
been subsequently seen as a party within a party, whereas 
it was more of an association of politicians who were 
critical of Labour foreign policy and generally took 
interventionist stances on domestic issues. This group 
came to represent, for many activists in the 
constituencies, an articulate and appealing form of 
socialist fundamentalism. 
This faith was expressed through elections to the NEC's 
constituency section. All 28 members of the NEC, with the 
exception of the leader and the deputy leader, were 
elected annually at the Labour Party Conference. 
Conference was dominated by the Big Six unions: Transport 
Workers, Mineworkers, Engineers, General and Municipal 
Workers, Shopworkers and Railwaymen, who between them 
controlled 3,029,000 out a total trade union vote of 
4,407,000 and a total Conference vote of 5,444,000 
votes. 
52 Therefore although conferences in the 1950s 
could have had the atmosphere described by Michael Foot 
above, 
53 so long as the leadership controlled the block 
vote they were more important as a forum for debate than 
as a decision making body. 
----------------- 
51. Haseler 1969 p 19, quotes resolution: "The P. L. P... calls for the immediate abandonment of 
all group organisation within the party". 
52. Lewis Minkin, The Labour Party Annual Conference, Allen Lane, London 1978, p 24. 
53. Foot 1975, p 379. 
21 
The NEC had 4 sections: 
1. A trade union section in which twelve members 
were nominated and elected by the affiliated trade 
unions. 
2. A constituency organisations section in which 
seven members were nominated and elected by 
affiliated Constituency Parties and Federations of 
Constituency Parties and Central Labour Parties in 
divided Boroughs. 
3. A women's section in which five women were 
nominated and elected by the whole Conference. 
4. A Socialist, Co-operative and professional 
organisations section in which one member was 
nominated and elected by the socialist /Co-operative 
and professional organisations affiliated to the 
Party. 
In addition the Party Treasurer was nominated and elected 
by the votes of the whole of Conference. 54 The only 
section not dominated by the block vote was section 2, 
the Constituency Labour Parties. The Bevanites were 
successful in staging a coup in this section at the 1952 
Party Conference. Barbara Castle successfully transferred 
from the Women's section, two of the resigning ministers 
Bevan and Wilson won places along with the journalists 
Crossman and Mikardo, and Tom Driberg completed the 
Bevanite team. Each was a well-known member and Minkin 
has stressed that this was a key criterion for election 
for this section. 55 A combination of the left-wing 
activism of the constituency sections, the candidates' 
high profile and some organisation, although by no means 
the amount feared by the right, allowed these Bevanites 
to replace the ex-ministers Shinwell, Dalton and 
Morrison. Bevan himself attempted to challenge the 
strength of the block vote further by contesting the 
Treasurership. He was unsuccessful against Hugh Gaitskell 
in 1954 and 195556 but defeated three right-wing 
57 candidates in 1956. 
-------------------- 
54. Minkin 1978, p 243. 
55. Minkin 1978, p 244. 
56. Foot 1975, pp 438-439. 
57. In 1954 Gaitskell beat Bevan by 4,338,000 to 2,032,000, Gaitskell 1983, entry for Summer 
and Autumn 1954, p 334. In 1955 he beat Bevan 5,475,000 to 1,225,000, Crossman 1981 entry for 
Saturday October 7 1955, p 448. In 1956 in a four way split Bevan finally won. Bevan 3,029, 
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According to Minkin organisation was not decisive in the 
constituency section elections: "The Constituency Labour 
Parties were not impervious to organised influence, but 
the results of the election to the section were a complex 
product of inertia, spontaneity and custom as well as 
organised stimulation". 58 
The difficulties of organising in the constituencies 
which the left experienced, even with the resources of 
Tribune, were another lesson the 1950s held for the 
CDS. 59 While the leadership effectively controlled the 
elite of the Party, and the policy apparatus, with the 
exception of occasional upsets at Party meetings, 60 they 
could not seem to muster the enthusiastic rank and file 
support of the annual Tribune rally. The Socialist 
Union61 and the Fabian Society62 attempted to motivate 
the rank and file, but in the 1950s could not rival the 
left. It was in part the very power which the right of 
the Party controlled that made their rank and file 
supporters difficult to motivate. They did not need to 
muster every available member for votes as they could 
rely on the block vote. There was also perhaps an 
arrogance of power which reduced the time ex-ministers 
spent looking after and paying attention to the rank and 
file. Finally the issues tended to favour the left in 
terms of "crowd appeal" and excitement. 
-------------------- 
000, Brown 2,755,000, Pannell 644,000 and Rhydderch 44,000, LPACR 1956 p 112. He did not 
achieve an absolute majority and might have been defeated if there had been a single right-wing 
candidate. 
58. Minkin 1978, p 245. 
59. Ian Mikardo in interview with author. 
60. See RK Alderman, "Parliamentary Discipline in Opposition: The Parliamentary Labour Party 
1951-1964", Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 21,1968, pp 124-136. 
61. Reg Freeson in interview with author. 
62. The Fabian Society was not overtly right-wing but was designed as a debating forum and 
think tank for the whole Party, Bill Rodgers in interview with author. 
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This was especially the case later in the decade when 
unilateral nuclear disarmament become a popular cause for 
rank and file members and offered the politically 
committed plenty of action in the form of the Aldermaston 
marches and rallies in Trafalgar Square. This might at 
first sound like a factious point but it should be 
remembered that those individuals in society who take 
part in political activity are a tiny minority and that 
their motivation can quickly evaporate if they are only 
offered boring meetings through which to express their 
enthusiasm. This danger was particularly acute during a 
period of opposition when the Party at Westminster was 
largely impotent. The CDS organisers learnt from the 
1950s that it took more than General Elections to keep 
the faithful motivated; the very second paragraph of the 
CDS manifesto states clearly the awareness of the 
signatories of the failure of the right to motivate the 
rank and file: 
This is the culmination of a long period in which 
the voice of moderate opinion in the Labour Party 
has been drowned by the clamour of an active and 
articulate minority. . . we seek to assert the views of 
the great mass of Labour sup 3rters against those of 
doctrinaire pressure-groups. 
After the 1952 Conference the strength of the Bevanites 
in the constituency section did not decline, but the 
radicalism of the constituency section in comparison to 
other sections was less noticable because the 
ex-ministers had lost their seats and the Bevanites' 
position became secure. 
The organisation of Conference resolutions was important 
in policy terms. The domination of the platform in the 
early 1950s was enhanced by the tendency of the committee 
which decided on resolution-compositing to choose for 
debate the most extreme left-wing resolution. The 
-------------------- 
63. CDS Papers: Origins File, A Manifesto Addressed to the Labour Movement. 
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Bevanites therefore attempted an early distinction 
between hard and soft left when they tried to get 
moderate left-wing resolutions accepted, resolutions that 
would appeal broadly. The Bevanites also tried to 
influence the wording of composites in favour of motions 
which at least stood a chance of a decent vote. 64 This 
and their activity on the NEC and at Party meetings was 
generally more successful on domestic than on foreign 
policy issues. 
In a sense this was due to the "Clause Four factor" which 
made more radical domestic policy propositions harder to 
oppose than foreign policy. Moreover the Labour Party as 
a whole was more open to left-wing initiatives on the 
domestic front. Generally in fact the Party was more 
left-wing than the revisionists would have liked. The 
foreign policy critique of the Bevanites continued after 
their gradual decline as a Parliamentary group. Indeed it 
was foreign and defence policy, in the form of the 
H-bomb, which caused the break between the leading 
Bevanites, Crossman, Driberg, Freeman and Swingler, and 
ultimately Bevan himself, and the rest of the left. 
The Bevanites did not seek to take over the Party but 
were fighting to push it in the vague direction its 
leading members favoured. In fact the Bevanites were 
operating in a similar way to the right of the Party, but 
the key difference was that the right controlled the 
block vote while the Bevanites had more influence in the 
constituencies, although Bevanite influence in the 
Constituency Labour Parties should not be exaggerated. 65 
The right's control of the block vote and influence over 
the apparatus of the Party meant that it saw itself as 
acting in the interests of the whole Party, whereas their 
-------------------- 
64. Crossman 1981, entry for Saturday September 27 1952, pp 144-145. 
65. A measure of Bevanite support is given by Jackson 1968, p 119 and p 123. Support for Bevan 
recorded by Gallup among party members between September 1952 and October 1952 showed a 11% 
drop, this had fallen a further 11% by April 1954 to stand at 24% against 54% for other party 
leaders. 
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power base in the local parties meant that any action by 
the Bevanites appeared as schism, and by extension as a 
challenge to the central establishment. 
The Bevanites functioned both as left-wing critics and as 
a source of considerable irritation to the right-wing 
leadership in the Parliamentary Party and in the Unions. 
They came to represent, for the rank and file, the 
leadership and values of socialism which many felt had 
declined as the Party experienced power. But the 
Bevanites themselves, for example Crossman in his 
diaries, stressed the difficulty they had in organising 
in any coherent way. 
The fact is that Bevanism and the Bevanites seem 
much more important, well-organised and 
Machiavellian to the rest of the Labour Party, and 
indeed to the USA, than they do to us who are in the 
group and who know that we are not organised, that 
Aneurin can never be persuaded to have any 
consistent or coherent strategy and that we have not 
even got to the beginning of a coherent, 
constructive policy. What we have, and it is very 
important, is a group of MPs who meet regularly, who 
know and like each other and who have come to 
represent "real socialism" to a large number of 
constituency members. This produces an extraordinary 
bitterness among those who take the Gaitskell 
line. 66 
This "extraordinary bitterness" was represented by, for 
example, Gaitskell's Stalybridge speech in September 
1952, in which he described the Bevanites as "frustrated 
journalists", and later, in March 1955, to Gaitskell's 
campaign to have Bevan expelled from the Party. At times 
the right's obsession with Bevanism reached paranoid 
proportions and it was the centre of the Party, the "Keep 
Calm" group which pulled it back. 67 Campbell, for the 
-------------------- 
66. Crossman 1981, entry for Tuesday December 4 1951, pp 47-48. 
67. On the backbenches George Strauss, Michael Stewart and John Strachey organised the Keep 
Calm Group to try and maintain unity; see Hugh Thomas, John Strachey, Eyre Methuen, London 
1973, p 269, Foot 1975 p 392, Crossman 1981, entry for Thursday January 29 1953, pp 196-197 and 
Gaitskell 1983, entry for November 12 1954, p 349. 
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most part critical of the Bevanites, agrees that "the 
right overreacted in its conviction that Bevanism was a 
cancer". '68 
The Bevanites' constituency support did more than feed 
their socialist faith, it also furnished them with places 
on the NEC. As the decade progressed, the activists 
perception of leading Bevanites' and their perception of 
themselves tended to diverge. The divergence between 
leading Bevanites actual roles in the Party elite and the 
party activists' perception of that role, was most 
pronounced in the cases of Harold Wilson and Richard 
Crossman, who came to occupy an awkward middle ground. 
The final disillusionment for the rank and file was when 
Bevan himself supported the leadership, of which he was 
by then again a part, in the H-bomb debates of 1957.69 
The rearmament issue extended into the debate on the NATO 
and SEATO alliances and into the general nuclear debate 
which came increasingly to the fore after 1957. However 
the issue of German rearmament was different to that of 
nuclear power. The failure of Bevan to give the lead over 
nuclear disarmament that he gave over the German question 
and the Cold War must be understood in this context. 
Bevan's break with the left over the bomb was not just 
connected with the difference in his position in the 
Party, and his changed attitude to politics. 
70 The nature 
of the unilateralist case was different. It was not 
primarily based on "realpolitik" considerations but on a 
moral and pacifist analysis of the bomb, whereas the 
other issues of foreign policy had been "conventional 
political issue[s]". 
71 Bevan had shown in the debates of 
-------------------- 
68. Campbell 1987 p 255. 
69. Foot's highly emotional account of the debate, Foot 1975 pp 572-577, gives a full picture 
of feelings on the left, but he also quotes one right-wing MP: "When Bevan sat down, I had to 
get up and go away. I couldn't stand it any more. I felt as if I had been present at a murder, 
the murder of the enthusiasm that has built the Labour movement" p 577. 
70. Foot 1975 pp 440-443. 
71. New Left Review, November-December 1964. 
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1955 that he had grave doubts about the first use of the 
weapons but he believed that Britain should have them if 
it was to maintain its place as a leading nation. 
The eventual outcome of the Bevanite challenge belied the 
intensity with which the conflict was conducted in the 
1950s. The domestic differences were largely ironed out 
and the Labour Party under the leadership of Wilson 
returned to the centralist, balancing of interests path 
of Attlee. However the issue refused to disappear. The 
maximalist versus minimalist controversy surfaced again 
in the governments of Wilson and Callaghan. The symbolic 
stance of the Bevanites was represented in the person of 
Foot as leader and in the Labour manifesto of 1983, the 
first time a maximalist programme had been presented to 
the electorate, and the electorate resoundingly rejected 
it. 72 Following this defeat Neil Kinnock was elected 
leader of the Labour Party. Kinnock's style of leadership 
was not unlike that of Hugh Gaitskell - he led from the 
front. He also engaged in an extended battle with a 
maximalist group in the Party, the Militant Tendency. The 
comparison can be taken one stage further. In the same 
way that Hugh Gaitskell tried to dominate his Party by a 
speech at Conference, so Neil Kinnock asserted his 
authority over the Party at the 1985 Bournemouth 
Conference. In so doing he aligned himself with 
Gaitskell's view that the priority for the Labour Party 
should be the pursuit of power and compromise on policy 
was a necessary expedient in winning power. 
73 
The election year of 1955 started with the leadership 
divided but ended with the foundations laid for the unity 
which characterised the closing years of the decade. This 
-------------------- 
72. See Austin Mitchell, Four Years in the Death of the Labour Party, Methuen, London 1983. 
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unity was ensured by the final break-up of the Bevanites, 
which allowed an accommodation to be devised between 
Bevan and Gaitskell over the period 1955-1956 which 
culminated in the Gaitskell-Bevan axis of 1957-1959. This 
unity at the top of the Labour Party was generally 
reflected, in the movement as a whole, in the honeymoon 
period after the leadership election. However, vocal 
criticism of Party policy, from the inside and the 
outside of the Labour Party itself, continued in the late 
1950s through "Victory for socialism", a revival of 
Bevanism, and through the CND. Thus at no time in the 
1950s was the Party lacking some form of left-wing 
organisation which was more or less hostile to Gaitskell 
and the Gaitskellites. 
The Labour Party did not suffer from a lack of popularity 
in Gallup polls in the Parliament leading up to the 
election of 1955. Out of the 42 months between November 
1951 and May 1955 the Labour Party held the lead in 28 
months ranging from 10% in July 1952 to 0.5% in October 
1954 and held a virtually unbroken lead until January 
1955. Even at the height of the Bevanite controversy, 
during 1952, the Labour Party held an average lead of 
6%. 74 It also had a Front Bench team comparable in 
experience, quality and profile to the Conservative Front 
Bench. The record membership figures and increases in the 
level of trade union affiliation in the early 1950s 
provided sound, if not exactly flourishing, finances. 
75 
In the early 1950s a certain amount of complacency 
developed in administration of the Party. Gaitskell was 
to comment when elected Treasurer that the job had not 
really been done for 10 years, 
76 which meant that the 
Labour Party's organisation was poor and inefficient. But 
------------------- 
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this should not be exaggerated, the Labour Party was not 
in bad shape, it did not even suffer in the main from its 
recent record of internal division and strife. 
Nevertheless the Conservatives started the 1955 campaign 
with most of the advantages and few handicaps. Eden had 
taken over from Churchill and made only minor changes in 
the Cabinet. The Churchill and Eden Governments gave the 
Conservatives a powerful domestic legacy to exploit in 
the General Election. The Governments had not introduced 
a full-blooded capitalist economy and could therefore put 
themselves forward as one nation Tories. Their key 
advantage was the generally favourable economic 
conditions, "the economy was run at full employment with 
a minimal rate of wage or price inflation; without, after 
1952, balance of payments difficulties, and in the 
absence of a wages policy. "77 Although problems of over 
stimulation of the economy were to occur in the summer, 
for the election in May the economic picture was sound. 
Moreover, the Conservatives had not returned to 
confrontation with the Unions but had reached a state of 
industrial harmony with Walter Monckton dealing with the 
trade union leaders. Most of the Union trouble was with 
unofficial strikes and there were a number of these 
through the election period. These were strikes over 
differentials and other industrial issues associated with 
affluence. The Observer commented at the time of the 1955 
election: "In the economic field Britain is very 
prosperous, the prosperity is widely diffused, with full 
employment and higher wages than ever before. "78 The 
welfare state and social services had been left untouched 
and even expanded in some areas. Macmillan was highly 
successful in his house building programme. The 
Chancellor, Rab Butler, introduced a give away budget 
before the election which caused many problems later but 
-------------------- 
77. Seldon 1981, p 177. 
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provided a surplus of £134m to be distributed by reducing 
the base rate of income tax and by increasing personal 
allowances. 79 The Conservative Governments did nothing to 
weaken their electoral chances. 
Labour continued until a month before the election to 
shoot itself in both feet. As the Opposition to a 
Government that had pursued a successful domestic policy, 
the Labour Party had a very difficult task and the 
election was fought and won by the Conservatives on 
domestic issues. The Labour Party could have adopted 
various electoral tactics and these alternatives formed 
the basis for much of the debate after a further 
electoral defeat in 1959. They could have attempted to 
make the election a choice between individuals rather 
than policies, to promote an efficient team able to run 
the country better than the Conservatives. They could 
have challenged Conservative policy and offered either 
radical or moderate alternatives to set the agenda for 
the campaign, putting the Government on the defensive and 
mobilising discontent. They also needed their share of 
luck or gaffes from the Government. 
The Labour Party in 1955 managed to achieve few of these 
objectives. It was difficult to promote a team when a 
leading player, Bevan, organised his own meetings and 
failed to keep in touch with Transport House, the Party 
leadership having just tried to expel him. 80 The Labour 
Party came up with a programme that was neither 
distinctive nor original, "a rehash of an indigestible 
dish" was Hunter's description81 of the manifesto. In 
policy terms the Party suffered from the skill with which 
the conservatives had stolen the Attlee Government's 
clothes. Eden was highly successful at playing down the 
-------------------- 
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election and thereby keeping Labour's full electoral 
strength away from the polls. There was also the 
overwhelming problem that most people thought the result 
was a forgone conclusion: "the absence of doubt about the 
outcome may have been largely responsible for the 
tranquillity". 82 A low turnout in an uninteresting 
campaign produced the expected Tory victory. 
With the defeat of Labour in 1955, which was a 
disappointing and disorganised campaign, the attention of 
the Party became focused on Attlee's retirement. Attlee 
received little blame for the defeat; as an elder 
statesman, the Party campaign had in fact focused on his 
experience, with an election poster carrying the message 
"Four Power Talks. Send Attlee". The pipe and cherry 
cottage may not have looked particularly impressive on 
television, but the post-mortem of 1959 was not 
foreshadowed in 1955. The post-election analysis, such as 
it was, tended to blame division within the Labour Party 
and the Conservatives' success with the economy. 83 
Gaitskell ranked causes of defeat as the economy, 
dissension and organisation. 84 Wilson's report on the 
Party echoed this, but Attlee gave the clearest 
explanation of defeat: "The Tories had won because they 
had taken over as their own policies that which Labour 
had preached and practised from 1945 on". 85 
After the election defeat the attention of the Party 
turned to the leadership of Attlee. The prelude to the 
1955 leadership contest had been long and often bitter. 
The general expectation before the 1955 election was that 
Morrison, after 20 years of service to the Party, would 
step into office for a short time and then be superseded 
-------------------- 
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by a younger leader. The prospect of Bevan leading the 
Labour Party after the expulsion crisis of March and the 
Parliamentary row of April 1955, was remote. 
However the possibility of winning the leadership 
concentrated Bevan's mind and although he was torn 
between the role of romantic rebel, the course favoured 
by his wife Jennie Lee, and respectable leader, the 
course favoured by other Bevanites, he knew that if he 
was to stand a chance of winning the leadership he had to 
delay the contest until the memory of the expulsion 
crisis had receded. 
In the week after the election the expected leadership 
contest opened when Dalton published a letter to the 
press urging the older members of the shadow cabinet to 
resign. 86 Dalton excluded Attlee from his appeal but 
Attlee was ready to retire and, at the first shadow 
cabinet meeting and the first Party meeting, he offered 
to resign. Bevan, seeking to delay the race, was the 
first and most vocal voice to call on him to stay on, 
while Morrison was silent. Attlee agreed to stay on and 
recorded in his diary that night "this is almost 
certainly the end of Morrison". 87 The delay was bad for 
Morrison because his age counted against him and he 
therefore needed a quick election before the effects of 
the generational changes caused by the Dalton letter 
could be felt. The initially-delayed departure of Attlee 
was further put off because the Parliamentary session was 
extended. In August 1955 Attlee had a stroke and in 
September in an interview with Hugh Cudlipp, just before 
the Party Conference, he restated his desire to retire 
-------------------- 
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and specified that his successor should be neither 
Morrison or Bevan by indicating that he did not want a 
"Victorian, or a futile left-winger-1,88 
Both Gaitskell and Morrison did well at the Margate 
Conference of 1955 but more importantly Gaitskell was 
able to score heavily in the Parliamentary debates on the 
Finance Bill which repudiated much of the give away 
budget that had preceded the election. 89 As the Labour 
leader was elected solely by the Parliamentary Labour 
Party at this time, this success and his gradual 
destruction of Butskellism, counted for more than his 
"Why I'm a socialist" speech at the Conference. As 
Wilfred Feinburgh writing in the New Statesman, had put 
it before the election: "After Hugh Gaitskell had replied 
to Butler there remained little to be said about the 
budget. Gaitskell did more than disturb the equanimity of 
the Chancellor, which is in itself a feat: he also 
disposed of Butskellism. "9° 
According to Attlee's biographer the old leader was not 
particularly close to or keen on Gaitskell as leader and 
would perhaps have wanted Bevan if he had played more 
effectively on the team. 
91 Attlee certainly did not want 
Herbert Morrison and as loyalty was the virtue he 
favoured most he was perhaps moderately in favour of the 
arch loyalist Gaitskell. Attlee certainly felt that 
Gaitskell would win. All the signs before the actual 
election were in Gaitskell's favour. Perhaps the most 
significant challenge was the one originally favoured by 
-------------------- 
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Dalton, that of Jim Griffiths, himself something of a 
veteran MP and former Colonial Secretary, as a stop gap 
leader. 92 Dalton became disillusioned with this option 
when it became clear that Griffiths was himself too old 
and that Gaitskell had a chance of winning in his own 
right first time. 93 Jay identified in December 1955 a 
landslide in favour of Gaitskell in the Parliamentary 
Party, due to his performance in the House. 94 Attlee 
resigned on December 7 sure that the Labour Party was in 
good heart and that his resignation would unleash no new 
divisions. 95 With a keen group of supporters ranging from 
young members, to the wily old Dalton, Gaitskell was in a 
commanding position. 
Gaitskell seems to have been a little ambivalent about 
his success or failure, 96 he knew that if he failed this 
time he would still be in the running in the future, 
especially if Morrison was to win. As a professional 
politician he knew he had to stand and, despite this hint 
of ambivalence, he wanted to win. The election campaign 
had only one really interesting event, the attempted 
combination between Morrison and Bevan, which not even 
Foot could defend either in Tribune or in his biography 
of Bevan. This intrigue had been hatched, according to 
Williams, before Attlee's retirement had even been 
announced. Jay initially thought it was a very clever 
move but opinion turned against such a cynical manoeuvre, 
especially when on the Thursday afternoon, with 
nominations due to close the next day, Bevan announced he 
would withdraw if Gaitskell agreed to do the same, giving 
Morrison a free ride and presumably Bevan the deputy 
leadership. The alliance between the old and bitter 
-------------------- 
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rivals achieved nothing, except perhaps a slight increase 
in Gaitskell's support; the end result was a substantial 
victory for Gaitskell. 97 
The celebrations were played down by Gaitskell as he 
attempted to keep Morrison as deputy leader, but Morrison 
refused and resigned. This, combined with earlier 
resignations, meant that between May and December 1955, 
Attlee, Morrison, Dalton, Ede, Shinwell, Hall, Soskice 
and Whiteley had all disappeared from the shadow 
cabinet. 98 The period also saw the final break up of the 
Bevanites, with Crossman, Castle and Wilson furious with 
Bevan for his intrigues with Morrison. The leadership 
election closed the Bevanite schism, marked the change of 
generations and provided the basis for a period of 
relative calm and unity within Labour ranks as the 
Conservative Party faced its profoundist crisis since 
taking office in 1951, the Suez invasion. 
Suez was in many ways very good for the Labour Party in 
that it proved that the leadership could work together 
and that Gaitskell could be an effective leader of the 
whole Party. In the Parliamentary debates Gaitskell and 
Bevan worked well as a team99 and despite the charges 
levelled at Gaitskell that he was playing a party 
line, 100Williams101 shows that he was consistent in 
opposing the use of force against Nasser unless the 
United Nations approved it. Foot gives rare praise to 
Gaitskell in his description of the Suez debates: 
-------------------- 
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Indeed, the speeches of Gaitskell and Bevan throughout the crisis - the combination of Gaitskell's relentless, passionate marshalling of the whole legal and moral case against the 
Government's expedition to Suez and Bevan's sardonic 
and reflective commentary upon it - complemented one 
another and constitute together the most brilliant display T82 opposition in recent Parliamentary 
history. 
But the Suez debates did not dispel the feeling among the 
left of the Party that Gaitskell was too closely 
associated with the right. Moreover, for Gaitskell the 
concept of leadership was not simply to reconcile the 
opposing sides but to educate the Party by force of 
argument. Dalton, in the last years of his life warned 
Gaitskell against too close an association with a 
particular group in the Party even if such a group was 
necessary to a leader who was trying to command from the 
front and urged him to widen his contacts with the 
backbenches. 103 
The Suez period and the years leading up to the General 
Election of 1959 saw the blurring of the internal party 
lines which had characterised the early years of the 
decade. Frank Cousins, (the new General Secretary of the 
TGWU), Bevan and Gaitskell combined over the policy 
document Industry and Society opposing Morrison's 
commitment to a shopping list of industries that Labour 
would nationalise. The Morrisonian concept of the 
shopping list of nationalised industries was to be 
superseded by forms of social ownership which were 
flexible and essentially economic rather than social 
policy. The concept of nationalisation envisaged before 
the Second World War was gradually eroded as the Party 
attempted to meet the challenge of Tory affluence. 104 
-------------------- 
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In the foreign and defence field the old alliances broke 
up as Bevan bitterly parted from his rank and file 
supporters over the unilateralist debates of the 1957 
Conference. Crossman105 described the 1957 Conference as 
a monumental success for Gaitskell. Although the 
Bevan-Gaitskell axis had been developing over the 
Industry and Society policy, its flowering, such as it 
was, dates from this Conference. The axis between the two 
leaders did not mean that either abandoned their 
respective styles or that they became particularly close; 
it did however provide a united front in the House of 
Commons and in the country. 106 
Bevan still criticised Gaitskell's leadership, but only 
in private107 and the public schism between the two was 
not repeated. Immediately after his election, Gaitskell 
enjoyed a honeymoon with his party and even with the Tory 
press. This honeymoon was ended over the Suez crisis and 
the animosity for Gaitskell in the Conservative Party, 
caused by his opposition to the use of force, meant that 
he never really recovered the dubious Butskell label. The 
press and the Conservative Party became increasingly 
critical as Gaitskell worked hard at maintaining the 
unity of his Party and he was charged with being prepared 
to lead Labour wherever it wanted to go. 
108 
For Gaitskell the honeymoon with his own party was 
equally short-lived as the problems of leading it in the 
second full Parliament of opposition became apparent. 
Gaitskell's assessment of himself as leader, and of his 
very rapid rise to the top was simple: 
-------------------- 
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The leadership came my way so early because Bevan 
threw it at me by his behaviour. Ask yourself about the Labour Party now - if not me then who? 
Qualities? Perfectly ordinary ones - intelligence, hard work, capacity for getting on easily with 
people-and-some moral courage. Of course there are 
great weaknesses -ýon't I know! But the whole 
subject is boring. 1 
Gaitskell himself suffered from the ever present need to 
keep the Labour Party united and balance the needs of 
effective opposition with party political gain. He was 
handicapped by the constraints of continued opposition 
which made the last years of the 1955 Parliament dull, 11° 
and by Mikardo's and Foot's attempt to revive Bevanism in 
a new grass roots organisation, "Victory for Socialism". 
Gaitskell's reaction was to meet Victory For Socialism 
head on: "Gaitskell was determined to stamp out any 
factional organisation in the constituencies, and wanted 
to warn local parties that it would be unconstitutional 
to associate with VFS. ""111 
The internal state of the Party was not helped by the bus 
strike of July 1957. The dispute, like the strikes at the 
time of the 1955 election, tended to reflect badly on the 
Labour Party, and to accentuate a problem of image: "In a 
time of prosperity, Labour was still blamed for post war 
austerity, still seen as doctrinaire, still suspected of 
anti-British instincts. "112 Even a sympathetic account of 
the strike, by Frank Cousins' biographer, acknowledges 
the skill with which Macmillan used the dispute against 
the Labour Party. 113 
-------------------- 
109. Williams 1979, p 371. 
110. They were also quieter in terms of revolts inside the Labour Party. There were 15 revolts 
recorded in the House of Commons between 1951-1955 as against 9 in the 1955-1959 Parliament. 
Recorded in Jackson 1968, p 114 and p 152. 
111. Williams 1979, p 477. 
112. Williams 1979, p 472. 
113. Geoffrey Goodman, The Awkward Warrior, Frank Cousins, His Life and Times, Davis-Poynter, 
London 1979, pp 177-191. 
39 
Events like the bus strike highlighted the extent to 
which the right's paranoia of the Bevanite years had been 
replaced by a paranoia about any schism returning. This 
was exaggerated from January 1958 onwards by the 
knowledge that a General Election had to be held soon. 
The fact that Macmillan shrewdly held out until October 
1959 was in effect devastating for Labour's chances. The 
period between January 1958 and the election was 
characterised by foreign travel by the leadership and a 
general lack of excitement. In the country this was 
reflected as left-wing activists turned to CND, which was 
launched in January 1958, and by the leftward swing of 
the TGWU under Cousins. In the same period the 
Conservatives, "engaged in a public relations campaign on 
a scale that was altogether new to British politics1". 114 
In effect the Government fought a twenty-seven month 
election campaign, spending around £500,000 during the 
period June 1957 to September 1959 on nation-wide poster 
campaigns. The Labour Party in contrast spent only 
£102,000 from late 1958 to the spring of 1959.115 The 
party images also provided a contrast. For the 
Conservative-inclined sections of the press the new 
bogeyman on the left was Frank Cousins, who, after 
initially working with the Bevan-Gaitskell axis, began to 
move in his own direction after January 1958 and with 
increasing militancy. 
The Conservatives successfully weathered an economic 
storm, abandoning deflation as the election approached. 
For the Labour Party the period between the 1958 budget 
and the election saw the opening moves in the unilateral 
disarmament dispute. The crisis in Labour defence policy 
was caused by the formation of CND as a pressure group 
dedicated to the unilateral renunciation of nuclear 
weapons, and by the Sandys defence White Paper which 
-------------------- 
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moved British defence policy towards an increasing 
reliance on nuclear rather than conventional weapons. 
These twin pressures made precarious the delicate 
compromise on defence policy devised after the 1957 
Conference. Cousins and other Union leaders supported 
unilateralism and in July 1959 the TGWU delegate 
Conference adopted a defence policy which was largely 
opposed to the official Labour Party policy of the 
non-nuclear club. 
Gaitskell replied to the open challenge from Cousins116 
and illustrated his inner stubbornness and schoolmasterly 
tone in a speech at Workington on July 11 1959: 
The problems of international relations... will not 
be solved by slogans, however loudly declaimed, or 
by effervescent emotion, however genuine. [but by] 
very hard, very clear, very calm and very honest 
thinking... our Party decisions on these matters are 
not dictated by one man whether he be the Leader of 
the Party, our spokesman on Foreign Affairs, or the 
General Secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers Union. They are made collectively. 
In the same speech he stated his view of Conference 
sovereignty and its limitations, identifying over a year 
before the "fight and fight again" speech, which was 
claimed to be the the official inspiration for the CDS, 
his willingness to campaign openly to reverse decisions 
of Conference: 
... we should argue out and settle ultimately 
in our 
Conference the great issues of policy. But it is not 
right that a future Labour government should be 
committed by Conference decisions one way or the 
other on every matter of detail for all time ... A 
Labour Government will take into account the views 
of Conference... but Annual Conference does not 
mandate a Government. 
117 
-------------------- 
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The speech and the approaching General Election tended to 
defuse the first wave of Cousins' new muscle-flexing. 
Crossman found Gaitskell invigorated by the contest and 
was impressed by Gaitskell at this time: "The whole talk 
was that of a man who is rather rapidly growing up, 
growing tougher and growing stronger. ""118 
The Labour campaign of 1959, for all the criticism which 
was heaped on it after the result, was a better 
organised, financed and fought campaign than 1955. The 
Conservatives initially attempted to keep the campaign 
quiet as they had done successfully in 1955, but the 
Labour Party, the leadership and the membership, fought a 
vigorous campaign which demanded a response. Gaitskell, 
appearing in all the television broadcasts and in an 
exhausting national tour, spearheaded the campaign. 
Crossman headed a campaign committee which co-ordinated 
the effort by taking charge of "the Research Department, 
which issues campaign notes, and of the television and 
radio and the leaflets, as well as trying to impose the 
general policy direction on the campaign. ""119 
Despite the efforts of the Labour Party the dominant 
issue was, from the outset, economic well being. The 
Conservatives were not seriously challenged as the party 
of affluence. 
120 Gaitskell was the best Labour campaigner 
but he was also responsible for the worst gaffe of the 
campaign when, in pledging not to raise income tax, he 
gave the Tories the opening they needed for their counter 
attack. From this point the Conservatives regained the 
advantage for the last week and after a campaign 
dominated by long term views of economic well being, the 
Conservatives recorded their biggest victory since the 
war, increasing their majority to 100.121 
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The decade of divison which closed with this election 
defeat had seen the Labour Party lose three general 
elections in a row. After the defeat of 1951 there had 
been an expectation that power would be regained at the 
next election. After the defeat of 1955 attention had 
focused on the leadership of Clem Attlee. There was 
nothing to distract the Party after the defeat of 1959 
and a period of bitter internecine warfare followed. In 
the course of this warfare both sides organised campaigns 
to pursue their favoured policies, and for the first 
time, the right-wing of the Party took the battle to what 
had been traditionally been seen as the stronghold of the 
Labour left - the Constituency Labour Parties. 
-------------------- 
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Chapter 2: 
From Election Night to Party Conference. 
In the middle of the 1959 campaign Gaitskell "told Roy 
Jenkins he expected to win. "1 The result was therefore a 
crushing blow and defeat launched Labour on another 
bitter period of internal strife. The Party had failed to 
overcome the image of Tory affluence despite having 
unity, an agreed programme and the enthusiastic support 
of Party workers. Although Crossman was more positive in 
his summing up of the result: "The image we presented was 
quite right. The policies were quite interesting and all 
we were dogged by was the simple truth: Tory voters are 
far more afraid of another Labour Government than Labour 
2 
voters are afraid of another Tory Government". 
-------------------- 
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It was the third Election defeat in a row and the fourth 
in which Labour had seen their number of seats reduced. 
Gaitskell conceded defeat on television at lam in the 
morning: "it is obvious there will be a Conservative 
Government. "3 Williams summed up the effect on the Labour 
leader: "It was the worst disappointment of Gaitskell's 
public life, a profound shock very deeply felt. "4 
In his diary Hugh Dalton records that on Friday October 9 
Gaitskell rang him and said "Come round on Sunday Morning 
and I'll try to get some of the intelligent young men 
along". So at 11am on Sunday October 11 1959 a 
"post-mortem" meeting was held at Gaitskell's house at 18 
Frognal Gardens. 5 Present at the meeting were Hugh 
Dalton, Tony Crosland, Patrick Gordon Walker, Douglas 
Jay, Roy Jenkins, Herbert Bowden and John Harris. 6 In the 
evening Gaitskell was given dinner by Woodrow Wyatt and 
Tony Crosland, 7 and during the day Douglas Jay and Tony 
Benn visited the House. 8 Interestingly, "Nye Bevan was 
invited but didn't come"9 so the accidental impression 
was created of a meeting of the right to plan a response 
to the election. 10 
-------------------- 
3. Williams 1979, p 529, Bevan hated his use of television, Foot p 627, Daily Herald, October 9 
1959, Front page. 
4. Williams 1979 p 529. 
5. Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland, Cape, London 1982 p 92 and Williams 1979, p 538 call it a 
farewell dinner for Dalton, Lord Jenkins and Lord Jay in interview with author deny it was a 
dinner for Dalton, Pimlott, Dalton, Macmillan, London 1985, p 633, mentioned the meeting but 
not as dinner for Dalton. In fact it was unlikely that a dinner for Dalton would have been 
held so long after he actually gave up his seat for Jim Boyden and Dalton makes no mention of 
it. Dalton 1962, p 467 and the account in his dairy is specific, Ben Pimlott, (editor), The 
Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, Cape, London 1986, entry for October 11 1959, p 694, that the 
meeting took place on the Sunday. 
6. Pimlott 1985, p 633 does not mention Harris but Williams 1979 p 538 and Dalton 1986, entry 
for October 11 1959, p 694, do. 
7. Crossman 1981, entry for Monday October 19 1959, p 788. 
8. Williams 1979, p 539. 
9. Foot mentions Gaitskell's visit to Bevan, Foot 1975, p 628, but does not mention the 
invitation of Frognal Gardens. 
10. Lord Jay in interview with author. 
45 
This impression of the meetings was later dismissed by 
Williams: "It was neither a group of friends meeting at 
random nor the planning session for grand political 
strategy assumed by the left who, like the press, learned 
of it at once... The participants were too punch drunk by 
the campaign, far too close to the result, and far too 
individualistic in their reactions for that. " Things 
would perhaps have been clearer if Gaitskell had taken 
charge and organised the response of his supporters to 
the defeat. 11 Michael Foot's account of the way the 
meeting was perceived on the left made clear that the 
detailed questions as to what precisely occurred at the 
weekend meeting, were beyond the scope of the biographer 
of Bevan, "but it is indisputable that a bold initiative 
was set in motion by the right wing of the Party, and it 
does appear that the lever which helped to let it loose 
was pulled at that Sunday night meeting in Frognal 
Gardens. "12 He goes on to say that "the idea was to erase 
the working-class image of the Party, to remove the 
'danger of fighting under a label of a class that no 
longer exists'; to seize the moment to carry forward the 
revisionist ideas of recent years no longer solely by 
relentless pressure but by a coup d'etat. ""13 
If such a calculated strategy had been planned, and it 
seems unlikely that it was, then it singularly failed to 
materialise. Gaitskell's failure to control the response 
of his friends to the defeat meant that their views 
emerged piecemeal in the weeks that followed. Ironically 
this lack of control actually contributed to the 
impression, in left wing circles, among trade union MPs 
and Labour Party officials, 
14 that what was going on was 
an organised response, which had as its object the 
-------------------- 
11. Williams 1979, p 538. 
12. Foot 1975, p 630. 
13. Foot 1975, p 632. 
14. Crossman 1981, entry for October 23 1959, p 796. 
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fundamental reform of the Party. This was highly 
detrimental to the chances of success for Gaitskell's 
more considered response to the defeat which centred on 
the revision of Clause Four. The whispering campaign by 
the left, especially about the proposal to break links 
with the trade unions, turned many in the Labour Party 
against any form of substantive change. 
What had actually occurred during the weekend has tended 
to be obscured by what was thought to have been 
happening. The conversations which took place over the 
weekend were "rambling" and "punch drunk". 15 A number of 
issues were touched on and Douglas Jay said he was 
thinking about writing an article for Forward. 16 Among 
the other things discussed were nationalisation's effect 
on the result, a Lib-Lab Pact and Clause Four. Dalton 
summarised the conversations in his diary: "Party 
constitution might be revised, some new formula on public 
or common ownership substituted for the 1918 text. Party 
constitution might also be changed by having National 
Executive elected by Unions, local Parties regrouped 
regionally and Parliamentary Party with shift of 
authority towards Parliamentary leadership... Hugh very 
wisely listens more than talks to groups like this. "17 
Crosland warned Gaitskell against touching Clause Four, 
while Woodrow Wyatt was rather in favour of its reform. 
There was no mention of the role of the unilateralists in 
the discussion. The nuclear debate seemed to have little 
relevance for the "Hampstead Set's" deliberations at this 
stage. 18 
-------------------- 
15. S Crosland 1982, p 92 and Williams 1979, p 538. 
16. Lord Jay in interview with author. 
17. Dalton 1986, entry for October 11 1959, p 695-696. 
18. Williams 1979, p 539. 
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Lord Jenkins has described the weekend19 as an informal 
inquest as to why the election had been lost: 
A general consensus among those who were present was 
that there were about four reasons for it. One of 
which was the unpopularity of nationalisation, one 
was the unpopularity of trade unions, one was the 
unpopularity of Labour local councils and the Party 
was slightly too stuck in an old fashioned 
proletarian grove. A certain amount of germination 
of ideas that lead on to the Clause Four battle took 
place. The whole debate was conducted much more 
casually than conspiratorially. 
This "rambling", "casual" and "punch drunk" set of 
weekend meetings nevertheless created the impression 
among critics of Gaitskell that he had devised an agenda 
for revising the Labour Party's basic ideological shape. 
This was to be achieved by abandoning the commitment to 
nationalisation, breaking the links with the trade unions 
and even forming an alliance with the Liberals. While all 
these possibilities were discussed during the weekend 
they did not form part of an agreed agenda. Gaitskell was 
not organised enough in his own thinking in the 
post-election period to have come up with such an agenda, 
as is shown in his conversations during the week after 
the post-mortem weekend. The "break with the Unions 
plank" was largely discounted by Gaitskell who derived a 
great deal of his support from trade union leadership and 
trade union sponsored MPs. In any case the main source of 
this part of the "hidden agenda" was Ivan Yates's article 
in Reynolds News which appeared on Sunday October 11 
1959, and could hardly therefore be seen as a part of the 
conspiracy. 
Yates produced an analysis of the election which fitted 
the left's critique much more closely than Jay's, but his 
articles have been ignored in accounts of the 
controversy. 
20 Yates was a member of "the Group"21 and 
-------------------- 
19. Lord Jenkins interview with author. 
20. See Stephen HaseLer, The Gaitskellites. Revisionism in the British Labour Party 1951-1964, 
Macmillan, London 1969, p 158-171. Haseler ignored Yates completely. He was also mistaken in 
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had close associations with younger members of the Party 
but he was not a member of the Hampstead Set and had not 
2 been at Frognal Gardens on the post-mortem weekend. 2 
Yates wrote a political column in the Labour-friendly 
Sunday paper Reynolds News and his column on Sunday 
October 11 1959 was the first round in the controversy. 
Yates asked himself why Labour had lost the election, and 
stated, "to put it bluntly, because the electors did not 
like its face. They didn't like one thing above all, its 
close links with the Unions... The block vote and strikes 
official and unofficial. " To strengthen his case he 
pointed out that the left had been particularly critical 
of the block vote system at the height of the Bevanite 
rebellion. He claimed that a Tribune pamphlet of four 
years earlier, which had advocated the reform of the 
block vote system, had been printed but not published. 
As well as advocating a change on nationalisation, Yates 
called for a reform of the constitution and Clause Four. 
While the constitution is being looked at "the phrase 
committing the Party to the nationalisation of all the 
means of production, distribution and exchange should be 
scrapped. No one any longer believes in it literally". 
-------------------- 
a number of minor respects. For example he states that "Jay called 
for a total and complete 
ban on nationalised industries" when he had actually called for no new public monopolies 
but 
extensions of social ownership through the "Co-operative movement, municipal enterprise and 
public investment. " The difference is crucial because it was the right's main 
defence against 
the left. Haseler also states that "at no time during the whole Clause Four controversy 
did 
Gaitskell ask for the removal of Clause Four". The original constitutional amendment 
before the 
March 16 NEC meeting would have replaced Clause Four, Gaitskell compromised when 
he accepted 
the "Amplication of Aims" to run alongside Clause Four and was defeated when this was simply 
published by the NEC rather than being incorporated 
into the Party's constitution. 
21. An informal debating society which formed the social centre from which the London group of 
the CDS developed. See below, p 97-101. 
22. Although he did give a memorable description of the left's perception of this weekend: 
The 
picture posed... is of a coven of old Wykehamists converging 
in the dark of Mr Gaitskell's house 
in Frognal Gardens. We see them plotting round the fire where the cauldron 
bubbles merrily 
away. There is Woodrow Wyatt eating devilled kidneys off silver plate. 
Tony Crosland's in the 
kitchen boiling himself an egg. While in a corner of the sitting room Mr Gaitskell 
himself cuts 
a rug... I don't suppose its quite like that but Hugh Gaitskell 
does have his friends round and 
they did come round just after the election; they even, believe it or not, 
discussed politics 
and thought up some ideas. " Ivan Yates, Reynolds News, October 
18 1959. 
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The response to Yates' article was generally hostile. The 
editor of Reynolds News, William Richardson, stated in an 
editorial that he opposed breaking the link with the 
Unions. 23 Three hostile letters were printed alongside 
Yates' next article in which he made no apology but 
played down the idea of breaking of links with the Unions 
(which he had not overtly advocated but had hinted at) 
while stressing the need to revise Clause Four. 
After Yates' articles came the most important consequence 
of the weekend - the publication of Jay's article in 
Forward. However it was not under instructions from the 
"coven of Frognal Gardens"24 that the article appeared; 
in fact Jay had been asked by the editor of Forward, 
Francis Williams, to write a piece about the election. 
Jay's plan was to write up the impressions of his local 
Party workers in Battersea, and so on the Friday after 
the post-mortem weekend Jay visited his Party workers to 
find out what they thought. The article was a record of 
what "some people who had really canvassed felt about the 
election". Two things changed between the conversations 
with the Party workers and the publication of the 
article. First, Francis Williams persuaded Jay to put his 
name to the article. Because Jay was so closely 
associated with Gaitskell it was then widely assumed to 
be a kite for the leader. Second, Jay spoke to Eric 
Fletcher the Labour MP for Islington North. 
25 
It was Fletcher who persuaded Jay that nationalisation 
had been a major issue in the election. There is no 
suggestion that Fletcher attended any dinners at Frognal 
Gardens and he was not regarded as a member of the 
Hampstead Set. On October 16 Jay's article appeared in 
-------------------- 
23. Reynolds News, October 18 1959. 
24. See note 22. 
25. This account of the Forward article incident is drawn from Lord Jay Interview with author 
and Lord Jay Change and Fortune, Hutchinson, London 
1980, p 271-275. 
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Forward. The article questioned the future role of 
nationalisation in Labour's policy and suggested changing 
the Party's name to "Labour and Radical". 26 The notorious 
Forward article when it is re-read now does not appear 
so radical. Indeed, as Jay pointed out in his memoirs, 
many of the charges made against it at the time were 
false. 27 The article did not propose a break with the 
trade unions but it did propose moving Conference to May 
so that the appearance of Conference simply rubber 
stamping TUC proposals would be reduced. This criticism 
of the Labour Party/Union link seems rather mild; the 
link was unpopular for other and more profound reasons 
that Jay did not mention in his article, such as the 
block vote and the support of unpopular strikes. Nor did 
the article propose the abandonment of all forms of 
public ownership but it did propose that no new state 
monopolies should be created. The proposal to change the 
name of the Party was to add "radical" or "reform" to 
"Labour". These proposals now seem at most cosmetic 
public relations changes rather than the coup d'etat that 
the left tried to make them appear. The most 
controversial ideas were to leave steel nationalisation 
out of future Party policy and to change the nature of 
the NEC by making it a federal body, eliminating the 
section elected by the Labour Party activists. The 
article illustrated the poor co-ordination between the 
revisionists when it came to organised action. 
After the Forward article came out, Fletcher made a 
speech which supported Jay and was reported on the front 
page of the Observer: "Jay's diagnosis is correct. Talk 
of nationalisation lost us the election more than any 
other factor. "28 Shirley Williams was invited by the 
Sunday Times to give her view on the same day. She 
-------------------- 
26. Forward, October 16 1959 
27. Jay 1980, p 275. 
28. Observer, October 18 1959. 
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supported Jay on nationalisation: "nationalisation is 
probably the single most unpopular plank in Labour's 
policy", but she felt that "a break with the unions is a 
counsel of despair". 29 Jay had never advocated a break 
with the trade unions although the left charged that he 
did and the impression has remained to the present 
day. 30 
The other theme in the left's charge against Gaitskell, 
which had its main source in newspaper articles, was the 
possibility of a pact with the Liberals. In fact this 
story dominated the front pages of the Sunday Papers 
after the election and must have been discussed on the 
Sunday of the post-mortem weekend. The basic tone of 
these pieces was that the country needed a "union of 
radicals" and Grimond was prepared to do a deal. The 
Sunday People31 went so far as to report meetings at the 
highest level between right-wing Labour people and 
leading Liberals. Jay's suggestion that the Party change 
its name to Labour and Radical fed this speculation. 32 
Woodrow Wyatt who attended the post-mortem weekend 
advocated this course to Gaitskell, but Gaitskell 
3 rejected this option out of hand. 3 
The way the front bench reacted to the changing fortunes 
of Gaitskell over the following months contributed to the 
failure to support the leader that Rodgers and Taverne 
identified in an open letter to Gaitskell in February 
1960.34 The perception that the front bench had somehow 
failed to defend the leader was a key element in 
motivating the CDS organisers. 
35 The process of decline 
-------------------- 
29. Sunday Times, October 18 1959, p 10. 
30. Witness Seminar Transcript, Haseter. 
31. Sunday People, October 11 1959, Front Page: "Is it a Lib-Lab Deal? " 
32. Forward, October 16 1959. 
33. Williams 1979, p 540. 
34. Ronald Waterhouse Papers: Letter to Gaitskett. 
35. Rodgers in interview with author, Taverne in interview with author. 
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in Gaitskell's leadership began with his handling of the 
post-mortem on the 1959 General Election and only 
recovered fully after the Blackpool Conference of 1961. 
The period between the conferences of 1959 and 1960 are 
characterised by Gaitskell's slow climb back to the 
position he had enjoyed on October 8 1959: unassailable 
Party leader. 
In the week after the post-mortem weekend Gaitskell 
visited Crossman and proposed, in the course of a six 
hour conversation, a complete revision of the 
constitution, redefinition of aims and a federal 
structure; but he was against dropping nationalisation or 
breaking the links with the Unions. 36 During the rest of 
the week he held various meetings, including one with 
Bevan, and put forward schemes for reform of the Party's 
structure. It is intriguing that in these early 
conversations his emphasis seemed to be on elite 
structure, the NEC and the shadow cabinet, rather than on 
ideology. Bevan proposed that the shadow cabinet should 
be appointed by the leader rather than elected. Gaitskell 
was not at all keen on this idea. 37 On the Monday evening 
following the publication of the Jay article Roy Jenkins 
appeared on Panorama and again questioned the future of 
nationalisation and said that at the very least the Party 
should drop the idea of steel nationalisation. 8 3 
In the immediate post-election period the piecemeal 
appearance of various articles and statements simply 
fuelled the speculation. The fully worked out revisionist 
case that appeared during the early 1960s did little to 
alleviate the opposition of the left. 
39 
-------------------- 
36. Crossman 1981, October 19 1959, p 789. 
37. Williams 1979, p 541. 
38. Williams 1979, p 542 and Crossman 1981, entry for October 19 1959, p 789. 
39. The main works were: Douglas Jay, Socialism in the New Society, Longmans, London 1962 and 
C. A. R. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, A Radical Programme for the 1960's, Cape, London 1962. 
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Yates had said three things would come out of the meeting 
of the "coven": "One that Douglas Jay should write an 
article. Two that Roy Jenkins should take over from 
Harold Wilson as shadow chancellor. Mr Wilson becoming 
some sort of super organisation man and shadow leader of 
the House. Three that Dick Crossman should carry on in 
the future the work he did during the election in charge 
of Labour's campaign committee. ""40 
Jay's article, influenced by Fletcher rather than 
Gaitskell to attack nationalisation, had appeared and 
provoked Crossman to move back into his old role of 
troublesome rebel. 41 As far as Wilson was concerned, 
Gaitskell was questioning his future and this was 
stirred up by Crossman, who reported all the 
conversations he had with Gaitskell to Wilson. It was 
possibly Gaitskell's wife Dora, who Ian Mikardo described 
as "a great hater", who was scheming against Wilson. 42 
The important thing was that the rumours sparked off 
Wilson's fears and partially rekindled the Bevanite 
alliance of Barbara Castle, Harold Wilson and Dick 
Crossman. Wilson later claimed that but for this episode 
he would not have challenged Gaitskell for the 
leadership. 43 
Gaitskell's standing within the Parliamentary Party was 
not outwardly affected and on October 21 he faced his 
first Party meeting since the election and received a 
standing ovation. Douglas Jay's Forward article was 
denounced and Crossman felt this meant the Jay-Jenkins 
line had been defeated44. 
-------------------- 
40. Reynolds News, October 22 1959. 
41. Crossman 1981, October 21 1959, p 793-794. 
42. Ian Mikardo interview with author. 
43. Williams 1979, p 542, Wilson plotting, Crossman 1981, entry for December 9 1959, p 804. 
44. Crossman 1981, entry for October 21 1959, p 794, Crossman does not record who denounced Jay 
and Jenkins. 
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The controversy which emerged in the weeks after the 
General Election merged into the longer term debate about 
the future of the Labour Party. The wider debate, which 
Gaitskell tried to address in his Clause Four reform, 
centred on two main interrelated questions: What was the 
best way for the Labour Party to achieve power? and What 
was the best way of building on the achievements of the 
Attlee Governments? On the revisionist wing of the party 
the most influential responses to these questions came 
from Dr Mark Abrams45 and Tony Crosland46 who held the 
view that Labour had lost the election because it was 
still too left-wing and dated. 
Dr Abrams' analysis appeared through the summer of 1960, 
in Socialist Commentary under the title "Why Labour Has 
Lost Elections". His main conclusions seemed to support 
the contention that Douglas Jay had made in his Forward 
article, that relying on the working class was an 
electorally dangerous tactic. Abrams wrote "and the 
survey provides additional material to suggest that 
attachment to the Labour Party" on the grounds of 
standing for the working class was "a fragile bond... 
Already almost two thirds of the Labour Party's working 
class supporters consider themselves to be outside the 
working class (the outstanding identification mark of the 
Labour Party) and another quarter, while admitting their 
working class general status, distinguish themselves 
clearly from the Labouring classes. "47 Part 4 of the 
Abrams study concentrated on young voters who had come on 
to the electoral roll while Labour were in opposition. 
The study did not offer much more hope here: "If we 
ignore the 10% whose political views were so uninformed 
that they could not be described even as leaning towards 
any party, then it appears that 52% of young people today 
-------------------- 
45. Socialist Commentary, May - July 1960. 
46. Can Labour Win, Fabian Society 1960. 
47. Abrams, Socialist Commentary, May 1960, p 6. 
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are Conservatives, 43% are Labour supporters and 5% are 
Liberals. This Conservative lead has two sources; 35% of 
all working class young people are ready to identify 
themselves with the Conservative Party, and only 10% of 
middle-class young people support the Labour Party. "48 
Further, when the young people were asked what they most 
liked or disliked about the Labour programme, 47% of the 
18-24 age bracket didn't know, but of those who did 
express a dislike, 26% identified nationalisation. It 
should be stated that this negative image of 
nationalisation owed a lot to the powerful 
anti-nationalisation propaganda carried by newspapers, 
television and even in cinemas. 49 Abrams' conclusion 
concerning young people of the 1959 generation was 
straightforward, "there is among young people today a 
complex of barely conscious Conservative sympathies which 
have still not yet fully expressed themselves in overt 
Party affiliations. " 
This impression was reflected throughout the Party and it 
is significant that the opening debate at the post-mortem 
conference was designed to launch a new Labour Youth 
Movement. 50 The other main conclusion of the Abrams 
study, that nationalisation was unpopular, was disputed 
by the left-wing of the Party. However neither wing of 
the Party denied that the better-financed and longer 
Conservative campaign had undermined the Labour campaign 
from the start. Many newspapers51 mentioned the way the 
election campaign had been fought by the Conservatives 
for years before the election, whilst Labour had only 
really tried in the weeks of the campaign. The combined 
-------------------- 
48. Abrams, Socialist Commentary, July 1960, p 5. 
49. Butler and Rose 1960, p 17 and p 241-255, especially p 254 for the non-Conservative Party 
campaign against nationalisation. 
50. LPACR, 1959. 
51. For example Reynoids News, October 11 1959, p B. 
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efforts of Wilson's reorganisations52 and Crossman's 
campaign committee53 could not match the long term 
campaigning of the Conservative Party. Although Labour's 
campaign in 1959 was well received, the need for 
modernisation in both policy and presentation, the theme 
that was to recur throughout the history of the CDS, 
permeated the post-election debates on both the right and 
left. 
As far as the right was concerned the Abrams analysis 
supported their views on the need to adapt the Labour 
Party to the post-war world. The main prophet of this 
modernisation and the intellectual powerhouse of the 
revisionists was Tony Crosland; his views on the defeat 
were part of his ongoing analysis of British Socialism. 
He had already argued that there had been a change in the 
nature of capitalism: 
Such primary poverty as remains will disappear 
within a decade, given the present rate of economic 
growth; and the contemporary mixed economy is 
characterised by high levels both of employment and 
productivity and by a reasonable degree of 
stability. In other words the aspirations relating 
to economic consequences of capitalism are fast 
losing their 
5relevance as capitalism 
itself becomes 
transformed. 
Crosland believed that it was the affluence of the new 
society which had contributed to the defeat of a backward 
looking Labour Party and that if the Party was to win it 
had to stress modern visions of socialism, like social 
welfare, and not harp on about "nationalising the 
commanding heights of the economy. " 
-------------------- 
52. Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party, Manchester, MUP 1988, p 81. 
53. Crossman 1981, entry for September 15 1959, p 774. 
54. C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, Cape, London 1956, p 105. 
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The new society, brought about by the development of 
world markets in the 20th century and by the Second World 
War, had produced a new economic organisation. Crosland 
called this the mixed economy, to imply a mixture of 
state and private ownership and he was adamant that the 
Labour Party had to adapt its vision of socialism to this 
new situation if it was ever going to win power. 55 
The reaction of the left to the defeat of 1959 was also 
consistent with their developing analysis of the post-war 
British scene. The left through Tribune, in the General 
Election debate at the post-mortem conference, 56 and 
Michael Foot in the Daily Herald, 57 argued that Labour 
had lost by being too middle of the road and not radical 
enough. They also warned against accepting the 
revisionists' prescriptions. 58 In the Daily Herald Foot 
called the election a defeat for the country: "while 
placards on every hoarding were prophesying the doom 
which nationalisation would bring, while Labour leaders 
were lisping their much too mild peeps in favour of the 
principle of public ownership, a nationalised rocket hit 
the moon and another circled it. " This was to be the 
recurring theme of the left: the Labour Party had not 
lost because it was too left-wing but because it was not 
radical enough. Some on the left took this to the extreme 
of believing that the purity of the doctrine was more 
important than the winning of elections. This view was 
clearly expressed in the first issue of New Left Review 
by Ralph Miliband: "Nor in any case can election 
-------------------- 
55. This idea was not by any means confined to the revisionists of the Labour Party. It formed 
a central tenet of the pluralist view of society represented in the writings of Professor 
Galbraith and Professor Lipset. Ralph Miliband in his critique of these pluralist ideas sums up 
the post-capitalist argument: "This was a belief, not simply in the occurrence of major changes 
in the structure of contemporary capitalism, which are not in question, but in 
its actual 
transcendence, in its evolution into an altogether different system and, needless to say a much 
better one, ". Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, Quartet books, London 
1969, p 
11. 
56. For example Daily Herald, October 15 1959, reported the launch of a Tribune campaign for 
full-blooded Socialism and K Zilliacus, in the General Election debate LPACR 1959, p 128. 
57. For example Daily Herald, October 16 1959, p 4. 
58. For example Barbara Castle, "Still Socialist", New Statesman, October 17 1959, p 497-98 and 
RHS Crossman, "Stimulus of Defeat", New Statesman, October 17 1959, p 498-99. 
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prospects ever be the ultimate criterion of policy. In 
this respect the victory of 1945 has had very bad 
consequences in that it has so powerfully reinforced 
Labour's ministerial obsession. "59 This was echoed 
inside the Labour Party by left-wingers like Ian 
Mikardo. 60 
The left therefore greeted with suspicion the overtures 
from the right about the need for revising the part 
played by nationalisation in the Party's programme. It 
was feared that the leadership was planning an 
ideological revolution that would remove the 
"traditional" or "fundamentalist" planks of Labour Party 
policy. 
What Gaitskell actually wanted to do was to expand the 
basic aims of the Party to include the concerns which had 
emerged since the Second World War. This desire was based 
on the analysis of The Future of Socialism in which 
Crosland had made clear that the Attlee Government had 
produced something of a crisis in left-wing circles about 
the meaning of socialism in the affluent society: "Labour 
Governments have been in power and have found 
responsibility harsher and quite different from anything 
they expected, while full employment and social security 
have destroyed the rationale of much of the old emotional 
enthusiasm". 61 
For both working-class and middle-class activists the 
success of the Attlee Governments in fulfiling the 
demands of the 1930s created a psychological barrier to 
the acceptance of the need to change socialism. The 
experience of government, the very creation of a 
partially socialist society, meant that many of the old 
-------------------- 
59. "The Sickness of Labourism", New Left Review, Volume 1, Number 1,1960, p 8. 
60. Ian Mikardo interview with author. 
61. Crosland 1956 p 99. 
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dreams were dead. Crosland realised that revisionism, 
which pointed this out, was resented: "Now the certainty 
and the simplicity are gone; and everything has become 
complicated and ambiguous... 90% of resolutions at Party 
conference today are Quixotic tilts at objects still 
hopefully seen as 'outrageous giants of that detested 
race. ' Unfortunately there are too few Sancho Panzas to 
point out that they are really windmills. "62 He saw the 
way out of the confusion and the first step in 
re-establishing the agenda of socialism as the production 
of an exact definition of socialism. Gaitskell latched 
onto this when he asked for a revision of the Party's 
basic aims. Crosland believed that the only constant 
element, "common to all the bewildering variety of 
different doctrines which had been known as socialism", 
consisted of certain "moral values and aspirations"; and 
people had called themselves socialists because they 
shared these aspirations. Therefore a belief in the 
"possible future that designates socialism" rather an 
attachment to a particular set of means was what was 
important. 63 
The values which Crosland identified were as follows: a 
protest against the material poverty and physical squalor 
which capitalism produced; a wider concern for social 
welfare for the interests of those in need or oppressed 
or unfortunate from whatever cause; a belief in equality 
and the classless society and especially a desire to give 
the worker his just rights and a responsible status at 
work; rejection of competitive antagonism and an ideal of 
fraternity and co-operation and a protest against the 
inefficiencies of capitalism as an economic system. 
Gaitskell echoed many of these concerns directly in his 
-------------------- 
62. Crosland 1956 p 99-100. 
63. Crosland 1956 p 101. 
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"Amplification of Aims" and in his speech at the 
post-mortem conference. In this speech Gaitskell listed 
his view of what should have been socialist aims: 
... first, we express what G. D. H. Cole once called 'a broad, human movement on behalf of the bottom 
dog'... Thus, at home, our first concern is naturally 
for the less fortunate - the old, the sick, the 
widowed, the unemployed, the disabled and the badly 
housed; abroad, it is reflected in a deep concern 
for the well-being of peoples much, much poorer than 
ourselves, badly in need of help. Secondly, we 
believe in social justice, in an equitable 
distribution of wealth and income. Thirdly, we 
believe in a 'classless society' -a society without 
the snobbery, the privilege, the restrictive social 
barriers which are still far too prevalent in 
Britain today. Fourthly, we believe in the 
fundamental equality of all races and all 
peoples... we believe quite simply in the brotherhood 
of man. Fifthly, British Socialism has always 
contained an essential element of personal idealism 
- the belief that the pursuit of material 
satisfaction by itself without spiritual values is 
empty and barren and that our relations with one 
another should be based not on ruthless 
self-regarding rivalry but on fellowship and 
co-operation. Sixthly, we believe that the public 
interest must come before private interest. Finally 
we believe that these things must be achieved ýý'th 
and through freedom and democratic government. 
The most obvious omission from these very similar lists 
of values was the question of the "ownership of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange". Socialism was 
not defined in the Marxist terms of ownership so 
nationalisation was not a key criterion of socialism. 
Moreover simply as a means to an end, the end not 
specified, nationalisation, Gaitskell and Crosland 
argued, could be used to justify types of society which 
had little to do with British socialism. Ownership was 
not central to socialism but social welfare aspirations 
and equality were. It is hardly surprising that some 
writers, like Jay, took this to its logical conclusion 
and demanded a change in the Party's name. Gaitskell's 
speech at the post-mortem conference strongly echoed this 
-------------------- 
64. LPACR 1959, p 111. 
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implied reduction in the importance of the ownership 
question. Crosland advised Gaitskell against trying to 
revise Clause Four, 65 but on purely tactical grounds. In 
essence the replacement of Clause Four by a new set of 
socialist objectives, the basis of Gaitskell's 
constitutional reforms, was Croslandite to the core. 
Gaitskell's own contribution to the development of 
revisionism took three forms: inspirational, practical 
and theoretical. He was inspirational in terms of his 
personal relationships with revisionist writers and 
politicians, like Healey, Crosland, Jenkins and Jay, and 
in the way he led the Party at times of crisis like the 
Clause Four and the unilateralist debates. He was 
practical in his prolonged battle through Conference and 
the NEC to get revisionist policy accepted by the Party. 
His theoretical contribution was obviously limited by the 
time he had available for study and serious writing but 
in the form of propagandist literature and direct advice 
he influenced the work of all the revisionists. He did 
not however control their output or necessarily agree 
with all their opinions. Moreover, before the famous 
"fight and fight and fight again" Scarborough speech he 
was not necessarily the focus for the loyalty of younger 
members of the Party; 
66 Dalton had urged him to spend 
67 
more time cultivating the rising MPs and candidates. 
Gaitskell as a full-time politician did not have the 
opportunity to complete any major work of political 
thought. His published work is mainly propaganda material 
for his Party. He did however make the occasional 
intellectual excursion and one example is Recent 
Developments in British Socialist Thinking published by 
-------------------- 65. Susan Crosland 1982, p 93. 
66. Bill Rodgers, Daivd Marquand, Bernard Donoughue, Dick Taverne, Shirley Williams in 
interview with author. 
67. Pimlott 1985, p 631. 
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the Co-operative society in 1956. Gaitskell's view of the 
history of his Party, expressed in this book, is clearly 
one of a gradualist reforming political movement 
sometimes more "popular with the workers than the 
industrial wing sometimes being superseded in action. " 
But above all gradually shedding and rejecting all forms 
of Marxism and Syndicalism, "reason has been brought in 
to support instinct and British Socialist thought has 
become ever more democratic. i68 This process reduced the 
General Strike to "an emotional spasm" that the Party did 
well to stay clear of and this strike marked the triumph 
of the gradualist strain in the Party, it marked "the 
transition from the pioneering stage to that of 
responsibility and power. "69 For Gaitskell the seminal 
experiences of British socialism were the Attlee 
Governments. In the exercise of power through ministries; 
"the Party has the opportunity to actually achieve 
concrete reforms which improve real lives". This "power" 
orientated theory of the Labour Party was based on an 
acute sense of Labour's history, or at least on a 
particular way of reading that history. It was a view of 
the Labour Party that was widely shared in the CDS; the 
Campaign's organisers were not "opposition minded 
people". 7° They also shared Gaitskell's suspicion of 
transforming blueprints. They adhered to a gradualist 
approach to social change: 
In Britain the course to be followed was never 
charted too far into the future. "We'll see how we 
go" a favourite phrase of a highly influential 
socialist - Mr Herbert Morrison - reflects the 
general view that you can always look a little way 
ahead, but not too far, and that only as you move on 
will the picture become sufficiently clear to make 
plans which are realistic enough to be of value. 
This approach acquires special importance when the 
-------------------- 
68. Hugh Gaitskell, Recent Developments in British Socialist Thought, Co-operative Union, 
London March 1956, p 40. 
69. Gaitskell 1956, p 40. 
70. Bill Rodgers and David Marquand in interview with author. 
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Labour Party came to exercise the responsibility of 
government and was thus compelled to fare up to the detailed problems of policy formation. 
Gaitskell's major contribution to revisionism was not 
however theoretical. Even his most important contribution 
in this respect, the clear desire to achieve power and 
stances on political issues, like Clause Four, were 
organised around events and worked out in response to 
situations, rather than as abstract theory. Gaitskell's 
most important contribution was the practical. In this 
field there arose the most controversy and while he 
functioned in the service of his revisionist friends, for 
example finding Crosland his seat at Grimsby, 72 he got 
himself into further trouble with the left. A Labour 
leader should ideally, like Attlee, have no close 
friends. Gaitskell's period as leader, between the two 
"dealers" Attlee and Wilson, appears as a break in the 
Party's continuity and a period of brinkmanship 
leadership. The contrast with Attlee could not have been 
greater. HG Nicholas, in describing Attlee's 
electioneering at the time of the 1950 election, also 
sums up his style of leadership: 
(the electioneering style) was merely the natural 
expression of the Prime Minister's habits and 
personality, there can be no doubt that it was a 
tour de force of unassuming advertisement. The 
family car, pre-war and far from de luxe, Mrs Attlee 
at the wheel no entourage beyond the indispensable 
detective, the road side stops ahead of schedule, 
Mrs Attlee would catch up on her knitting and Mr. 
Attlee would do a crossword. 
73 
"Gaitskell was a sharp contrast to Attlee - both far more 
gregarious and far more willing to give a strong and 
early lead. When the second habit brought him under 
-------------------- 
71. Gaitskell 1956, p 2. 
72. Susan Crosland 1982, p 88: "Kenneth Younger, decided very reluctantly not to stand again 
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regret before asking Younger whether he thought the seat could be won 
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furious attack and he fell back on the few friends he 
could trust, he acquired a much exaggerated reputation 
for cliquishness. "74 
Before and after he became leader he attempted to form an 
organisation to rival the left. This had not amounted to 
very much outside Parliament, but inside the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and in the House of Commons 
they seemed to have had some success. The main targets of 
these organisations were Bevan and the Bevanites, in the 
House. Gaitskell recorded the first meetings of this 
group in his diary in March 1952: 
At the next Party meeting there was a discussion on 
foreign policy, and again they scored some success; 
so much so that Woodrow Wyatt and one or two others 
came to me and urged that we should really try and 
organise some kind of effective opposition. Then we 
had a meeting in Woodrow's flat. Chris Mayhew, Tony 
Crosland, Roy Jenkins, Arthur Allen, Alf Robens, 
Woodrow and myself. We decided that we must get 
people who could speak well to do so at the Party 
meetings, especially on defence and foreign affairs. 
We also tentatively thought of compiling a pamphlet 
which would contain the answer to Bevan's point of 
view. The struggle at the Party meetings has 
continued, with an interval on account of the king's 
death, ever since; but on the whole the 
anti-Bevanites have done a lot better, largely owing 
to the fact that better speeches have been made as a 
result of urging the right people to make them. 
Chris, Woodrow, Tony and Roy have all done well, 
especially the first, and thus set an example to 
others. 
Gaitskell's records of these early factional schemes, as 
recorded in his diary, are interesting in a number of 
ways. First, they show that as early as 1952 there 
existed a group which was revisionist and supportive of 
Gaitskell and, if not self consciously aping the 
Bevanites, then at least something of a reaction against 
them. Second, the entry showed the underlying political 
-------------------- 
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nature of the revisionists to the extent that the desire 
to change the Labour Party was expressed in action, 
however tentative, as well as in theory. Thirdly the 
style of the meeting, informal, held in a flat and 
unreported, tended to minimise its exposure but maximise 
its effectiveness within its limited objectives and was 
similar to early CDS meetings. The effectiveness of this 
early organisation was rather short term because 
Gaitskell's winning of the leadership election did much 
more to isolate and defeat the Bevanites and his careful 
playing down of factions in the first years of his 
leadership did much to unite the Party before the 1959 
election. That this unity did not last and that the 
accusations about factions re-emerged after the election 
tends to suggest that Gaitskell did not stop relying on 
his friends in private. 
Two years later, to counter the influence of Tribune, 
Gaitskell was influential in the transferring of the 
magazine Forward from Scotland to London, with Francis 
Williams as editor and John Harris and George Thomson as 
the only paid members of the board. 76 This magazine was 
to be a platform for the views of the revisionists and 
allowed them a limited access to the constituencies, 
though it never matched the circulation of Tribune. 
There were other organisations which supported Gaitskell. 
The Socialist Union, a commune of Eastern European exiles 
based in Queens Park, published Socialist Commentary, a 
quarterly journal of revisionist ideas. Rita Hinden, the 
editor of Socialist Commentary, was later an active 
member of CDS and a member of the editorial board of 
Campaign. 77 The revisionists also had access to 
semi-official Party publications like the Fabian 
Pamphlets and many sympathisers within the Fabian Society 
-------------------- 
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William Rodgers, the secretary of the CDS, was General 
Secretary of the Fabian Society for much of the 1950s. He 
was replaced by Shirley Williams as General Secretary in 
1960. The post was designed to be filled by a Party civil 
servant and access to publication was open to both left 
and right. However the ethos of the society was more in 
tune with the revisionists than with the 
fundamentalists. 78 
These tentative organisational efforts were based on 
personal friendships and were further enhanced during the 
leadership election. The people involved tended to match 
David Howell's view of the stereotyped revisionist, 
"Oxbridge educated and with a life-style far removed from 
typical Labour voters. "79 The personnel was also 
remarkably consistent but lacking, until the issue of 
Europe came to the forefront, the schisms which occurred 
in the Bevanites. Through the 1950s and early 1960s the 
revisionists maintained both unity and discipline. 
The nature of the practical help which Gaitskell gave his 
friends is revealing. If there was no single and 
consistent organisational expression of revisionism 
before the creation of the CDS then there was most 
certainly a champion for the cause ready to fight at any 
opportunity. In so appearing he perhaps undermined his 
effectiveness as a non-partisan leader above the fray and 
representative of all sections of the Party, but he was 
being more consistent with his style of politics at 
normal times like these than in the honeymoon period of 
conciliation before the 1959 election. 
The practical support of Gaitskell for the revisionists' 
ideas helped them gain widespread credibility, to the 
extent that Stuart Hall could write in the New Left 
-------------------- 
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Review in 1960: , The ideological battles have long since 
been joined and won. First Gaitskell assented; and then, 
one after another, the up and coming intellectuals in the 
leadership... By the time Industry and Society appeared at 
Brighton in 1957 the picture of reformed capitalism, the 
managerial revolution and applied Keynesian economics 
which Mr Crosland described had already began to be 
extended across the face of official policy. "80 
It was in this background, amid cross currents of debate, 
that Gaitskell planned his speech for the post-mortem 
conference. The particular tactical choice of Clause Four 
was Gaitskell's own. He did not want to abandon the 
emotional force of the old formulation but he did want to 
remove the uncertainty about the extent to which the 
Party was dedicated to large scale nationalisation. In 
1950,1952 and 1955 he had attacked or agreed with 
attacks on Clause Four, 81 so after a long period of 
consultation and prompted by Ivan Yates and others he 
chose his own ground. He had not stopped and rested since 
the election and had spent his time collecting opinions 
from key figures in the Party. He decided that he would 
use his speech at the post-mortem conference to outline 
his plan for constitutional reform. 
Despite his talks with left-wingers he settled on Clause 
Four as the key issue. In deciding on Clause Four 
Gaitskell had underestimated the romanticism of the Party 
while overestimating the force that logical argument 
would have in persuading them of the merits of his case. 
He also suffered from the fact that word of his intention 
had leaked out. On November 12, Charles Pannell, Sam 
Watson and Bill Webber warned Gaitskell that trade 
unionists would not accept a change to Clause Four. 
82 Of 
-------------------- 
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his close friends Jay, Jenkins, Crosland, John Murray and 
Dora all opposed the change; only Gordon Walker supported 
it. 83 
On November 14, in a private meeting at Oxford, 84 he 
tried out his ideas on Marcus Lower, an oxford city 
councillor, Ron Owen a member of the University's 
Extra-Mural Department, Brian Walden, also at the 
Extra-Mural department and Mrs McNeal, Gaitskell's 
secretary. They gave the ideas a cautious but not 
hostile reception. It is interesting that two members of 
the CDS steering committee, Owen and Walden, were 
brought into Gaitskell's confidence at such an early 
stage. 85 Four days later Dalton wrote to Gaitskell: 
"Jay's Forward article gave it all a bad start, and 
struck the tuning fork for all the Gregorian Chants of 
the Old Believers. " Most of Gaitskell's friends were now 
warning him that the events since the election made the 
possibility of change very remote. The trade unions were 
hardening in their opposition to any change in the 
constitutional settlement of the Party. The "kites" had 
so outraged the left and the trade union MPs that other 
reforms suffered guilt by association. On November 24, 
Charles Pannell urged Gaitskell to drop the whole thing86 
or at least to show the speech to Bevan before he 
delivered it. The night before he was due to give the 
speech he showed it to John Harris and Nye Bevan, Harris 
then showed it to Jay. Jay said it would cause trouble 
but Bevan did not raise a single objection-87 Gaitskell 
was determined to bring about a change: "If he provoked a 
storm it was not for lack of warning". 
88 
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On Saturday November 28 Gaitskell delivered the speech to 
the post-mortem conference in Blackpool. His position was 
very unhopeful. There was no platform position, he spoke 
for himself alone. Even his initial procedure decision to 
push the reforms through Conference was probably 
mistaken. 89 Over defence he could challenge Conference 
sovereignty by advocating a policy which had joint 
TUC-NEC backing and which isolated his opponents. On 
Clause Four there was no platform lead because NEC 
investigations into the constitution, promoted as much by 
Morgan Phillips as by Gaitskell himself, only began after 
Conference. He was facing a hostile Conference without 
the protection of the block votes of other sections of 
the leadership. Moreover, Crossman's opposition, coupled 
with the alleged plot against Wilson, had revived 
factionalism within the Parliamentary Party. 90 
The key section of his speech ran: [Clause Four] standing 
as it does is obviously inadequate and "lays us open to 
continual misrepresentation... It implies that we propose 
to nationalise everything, but do we? Everything? - every 
little pub and garage? Of course not. We have long ago 
come to accept... a mixed economy... the view... of 90% of 
the Labour Party - had we not better say so instead of 
going out of our way to court misrepresentation? " There 
were hostile interruptions from the floor. 
91 From the 
platform there was muted applause from Crossman, Driberg 
and Bevan, none from Greenwood, Gunter, Mikardo and 
Eirene White. 92 
-------------------- 
89. Williams 1979, p 547, states that Charlie Pannell had urged Gaitskell to use his standing 
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The speech which followed Gaitskell's contained a bitter 
attack and included the memorable finale: "We have a 
capitalist economy, and where is this tripe getting us 
about a mixed economy which is non-existent? Engels many 
years ago wrote 'Nothing is; everything is becoming. ' 
What kind of tripe is a mixed economy? Where he is going 
at the end, I do not know. I hope I am not there when he 
is.  
The rest of the debate was by no means completely 
hostile; Dick Taverne, Denis Howell and Douglas Jay, all 
involved in the CDS, each made speeches in defence of 
the leader. 94 Taverne was the only speaker specifically 
to support Gaitskell on the reform of the constitution. 95 
The feeling that it was sacrilege to touch Clause Four 
was plain and the "antediluvian"96 opponents of change 
received the better receptions. The Observer described 
Gaitskell's own reception as confused, 97 a feeling echoed 
by Jay about his own speech, 98 while Michael Foot seemed 
"to inspire the hall" and was cheered. 99 In contrast 
Ivan Yates gave Gaitskell a much better press, 
describing considerable cheers at the end, ignoring 
Castle's speech as Chairman and claiming that Foot was 
the only openly critical speaker. 
100 Of the other 
speakers, Yates singled out Shirley Williams, Denis 
Healey and Tony Benn. Harold Hutchinson also commented on 
Williams' speech in the Monday edition of the Daily 
Herald and strongly backed Gaitskell. Aside from this, 
Yates' coverage was untypical. Tom Driberg described it 
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as the worst conference since Morecambe in 1952 and 
attacked Gaitskell's speech: "No socialist has ever 
suggested that this [Clause Four] means state ownership 
of everything down to every home, car, TV set and 
toothbrush, and if the Tories misrepresent it as meaning 
that they will misrepresent any formula we devise instead 
Of it. +" 101 
Gaitskell had chosen the ground he wanted to fight on and 
he had chosen badly. On November 29 Bevan spoke of 
challenging Gaitskell and Wilson was actively 
plotting. 102 Reaction was almost universally hostile, 
mostly questioning Gaitskell's tactics. Healey, George 
Brown, Strachey, Freeman and Jenkins (who called them 
appalling), all told him in no uncertain terms that he 
had been wrong. 103 
In response Gaitskell changed tack a little when he 
appeared on Panorama: 
... if you were to say to me ".. really we've got to 
accept the colour bar, because you'll never get into 
power if you don't, " I should say, "well, in not 
very polite language, Go to hell... that's absolutely 
against my principles"... But if you say to me "I 
think your argument for nationalising the machine 
tool industry is rather weak, " I would say "Well 
I'll discuss that with you". 
In February 1960 facing a bitterly hostile campaign by 
Tribune Gaitskell continued to fight back. On February 13 
in a speech at Nottingham he restated his view that 
Clause Four needed revision, and he attacked the "small 
professional anti-leadership group" but he also stressed 
that he supported public ownership. 
104 Tribune welcomed 
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the speech as the "most important declaration of his 
life" under the headline "Mr Gaitskell changes his 
tune". 105 The Spectator called the speech a "withdrawal 
from his Blackpool position" which would "only make his 
task of rallying moderates behind him even more 
difficult. ""106 The Times carried the headline "Mr 
Gaitskell calls for more Public Ownership". 107 This 
provoked a future CDS manifesto signatory to rejoin in 
the letters column of the Spectator: "Mr Gaitskell does 
not want to scrap common ownership, all he wants to do is 
reassess its position in our range of socialist aims. ""108 
After the Nottingham speech the left stopped frontal 
assaults, as some MPs and trade unionists came out in 
support of the beleaguered leader. There was a marked 
silence from much of the front bench in this period. This 
silence and the lack of co-ordination by Gaitskell's 
supporters inspired Taverne and Bill Rodgers to organise 
a letter of support. Rodgers recorded in his unpublished 
"History of the CDS'"; 109 "During the whole of the Clause 
Four dispute leading members of the Parliamentary Party 
who supported Hugh Gaitskell had made weekend speeches 
without telling... either Hugh or each other". Nobody in 
the Parliamentary Party had tried to "mobilise 
sympathetic opinion in the rank and file. " Rather than 
being asked to undertake this organisation, the 
initiative came from Rodgers himself and he recruited 
Taverne as co-sponsor. They tapped into the network 
provided by the Group and other contacts to produce a 
list of fifteen candidates all under forty. 
110 
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Encouraged by signs of support but still hampered by 
vocal opposition Gaitskell gave more ground. The original 
idea had been to replace Clause Four with a new statement 
of aims which would include such things as colonial 
freedom and racial harmony but would not have a specific 
aim of widespread nationalisation. On March 3 Gaitskell 
told Sam Watson that although he would have preferred to 
have the statement of aims replace Clause Four he was 
prepared to see it along side the existing Clause, as an 
amplification. "' 
Gaitskell accepted a series of amendments in a second 
reading style debate at the NEC meeting on March 16 to 
discuss constitutional reform. 112 Morgan Phillips made it 
clear that he thought the time had come to rewrite the 
constitution. He circulated a document which he thought 
would bridge the gap between Clause Four and the new 
"Amplification of Aims" presented by Gaitskell. 113 Jenny 
Lee moved the key amendment which changed Gaitskell's 
phrase "... it believes that further extension of common 
ownership should be decided from time to time... according 
to circumstances", to read "through an expansion of 
common ownership substantial enough to give the community 
power over the commanding heights of the economy". The 
amended clause was accepted by 22 votes to 1. This same 
meeting of the NEC received 63 resolutions from 
Constituency Labour Parties protesting against any 
amendments to Clause Four. 
114 The new statement was 
adopted with only one vote against. This result would 
have been a draw115 and the "old" and the "new 
testaments" would have come into being, however for the 
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constitutional change to be ratified it was necessary to 
have Conference approval. In the following months it 
became clear that the trade unions, as well as many 
Constituency Labour Parties, would oppose revising the 
constitution and the new testament would become simply a 
statement of aims which would be published by the NEC. 
This was much more of a defeat than a draw. 
At the trade union Conferences votes began to swing 
against the leadership, and the prospect arose of the 
leader being defeated on both his constitutional reform 
and on his defence policy. The question this posed to 
Gaitskell's supporters was clear: How long could the 
leader last? 
The debate on nuclear weapons had a different background 
to the Clause Four debate. The ideologies of 
modernisation and revisionism contained little analysis 
of Britain's role in the world. The Future of Socialism 
was basically a domestic economic analysis. 116 In fact 
there was a difference of emphasis between the 
Gaitskellites on foreign policy. For Jenkins, the 
developing unity of Europe was central; in contrast Jay 
opposed Britain's involvement in the European Economic 
Community. However, on defence matters the right of the 
Party was in general agreement about the importance of 
the Western alliance. Indeed, some of Gaitskell's close 
associates were very anti-communist. For example 
Christopher Mayhew had worked in unison with the Foreign 
Office to close down the Anglo-Soviet Friendship 
societies117 and others, like Patrick Gordon Walker, 118 
-------------------- 
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supported the retention by Britain of the independent 
nuclear deterrent despite the cancellation of Blue 
Streak. 119 All the Gaitskellites were united on the 
need to retain nuclear weapons within NATO until they 
could be negotiated away multilaterally. 
The unilateralist120 case was rejected not because it was 
outdated but because it was seen as being unrealistic. 
Some of the Gaitskellites had felt sympathetic to the 
Bevanites and now understood the passions of CND121 but 
believed that the natural conclusion of unilateralism was 
neutralism. 122The foundation for this rejection of 
unilateralism was a belief in the Atlantic alliance and 
collective security. The pro-Americanism of Crosland, 
Gaitskell and the younger supporters of Gaitskell was 
based on their experience and interpretation of the Cold 
War and was compounded, after November 1960, by the 
election of the young and dynamic President Kennedy. 123 
The depth of Gaitskell's pro-Americanism shocked Healey 
in 1962 when Gaitskell said that the US had as much right 
to prevent a Soviet base in Cuba as the UK would have if 
it had been in Ireland. 124 Events, like the Cuban 
missile crisis, which were to encourage the 
unilateralists in their convictions that what was needed 
-------------------- 
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was disarmament, served for the modernisers to stress 
instead the need for strength. In this sense the 
rejection of unilateralism could be presented as being in 
line with the objectives of modernisation. One side in 
the debate between multilateralist and unilateralists 
felt that the only possible consequence of the possession 
of nuclear weapons was genocide. The other felt that by 
surrendering these weapons the consequence would be world 
domination by a repressive Soviet system. It was hardly 
surprising that the debate was conducted in a highly 
emotive way. Bill Rodgers, looking back after thirty 
years, summed up the way Party meetings on defence went 
like this: "... quite often the motions on unilateralism 
had been carried because someone had stood up in a 
meeting and said 'I want to say Mr Chairman that I think 
nuclear weapons are awful and for the sake of my children 
and my grandchildren I propose we vote against nuclear 
weapons' and the Chairman said 'Anyone against? '""125 
Conversely, the multilateralists would attack CND for 
being neutralist, pacifist and communist. Mayhew later 
described it as a fellow travelling organisation. 126 They 
maintained that if Britain were to disarm unilaterally 
she would have been defenceless against the Soviet Union. 
These two entrenched positions tended to obscure the 
areas which were available for compromise. Richard 
Crossman, 127 and later Walter Padley, 128 tried to find 
forms of words that would be acceptable to both sides. 
The future of Britain's independent deterrent was the 
area of the defence debate which was most open for 
compromise. 
-------------------- 
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In April 1957 Duncan Sandys had published his defence 
White Paper. 129 The task Sandys set himself was to reduce 
the size of Britain's defence spending by increasing her 
reliance on nuclear rather than on conventional 
weapons. 13° The original commitment to the bomb had been 
made by Attlee and Bevin in 1947, despite the arguments 
of Dalton and Cripps that Britain could not afford the 
expense of development that the McMahon Act would force 
on them. 131 The Prime Minister had been adamant: "It had, 
in theory at least, an overriding claim to the physical 
and human resources at the disposal of central 
government. "132 The development of the bomb between 1945 
and 1958 illustrated perfectly the powerful dynamic of 
the arms race: "In October 1952, British nuclear 
capability was, roughly speaking, where the Manhattan 
Project had been in July 1945 and Kurchatov's team in the 
Soviet Union in August 1949. Within weeks of Monte Bello, 
the Americans tested a thermonuclear device. In the 
summer of 1953 the Soviets exploded a device in the 
megaton range. ""133 The British scientists were off again 
chasing the H-bomb, which they succeeded in exploding in 
1957. This opened the way for "co-operation with the 
Americans", which in turn became "purchasing from the 
Americans". In the end Cripps and Dalton were right: 
Britain could not afford to join the race. The cost of 
the capability of dropping the bombs on their targets had 
mushroomed. 
The purpose of the British bomb was "to bolster the 
nation's political power". 134 Rearmament was demanded by 
the USA as Britain's part in the United Nations 
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129. Defence: Outline of Future Policy, , HMSO, Cmnd 124, London April 1957. 
130. Michael Dockriff, British Defence since 1945, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988, p 65-81. 
131. Kenneth Morgan, Labour in 'Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1984, p 280-284. 
132. Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, Fontana, London 1990, p 716. 
133. Hennessy 1990, p 772. 
134. Morgan 1984, p 284. 
78 
intervention in Korea. Gaitskell's role in the 
maintenance of Britain's world role started as Chancellor 
when he held out for the imposition of charges on the NHS 
to provide a small part of the rearmament package in 
1950.135 The sums raised by such charges were so small, 
twenty-three millions pounds, that it made no difference 
to the rearmament programme in the end, but the event was 
a sigificant symbol of the Labour Party's priorities in 
government. 136 The relegating of free health provision 
below rearmament neatly exemplified the Labour 
Government's adherence to Britain's grand role in the 
world. 137 Between February 26 1960 and early April the 
whole debate was reopened when the Government cancelled 
the Blue Streak missile. 
The debate on nuclear weapons involved a series of 
initial questions: Should nuclear weapons play a role in 
British defence policy? If the answer was no, then was 
Britain to have a "hawkish" level of conventional weapons 
spending? One of the chief reasons Sandys put forward for 
the nuclear defence policy was that it would save money. 
This did not prove to be the case but the unilateralists 
rarely advocated increases in conventional weapons 
spending. 138 If the answer was no, did this mean a 
reworking of British treaty commitments? Bevan clearly 
felt that it did and he rejected this option, 139 whereas 
Frank Cousins was prepared to follow it through140 and 
some of unilateralists were openly advocating withdrawal 
from NATO and a move to neutralism. 
141 
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If on the other hand the answer to this question was yes, 
then should Britain have developed its own weapons and 
produced its own enriched uranimum? As has been said some 
of Gaitskell's associates wanted to maintain the British 
deterrent. If Britain was not going to develop its own 
weapons then should it have purchased them from the US? 
In June 1960 after the cancellation of Blue Streak the 
British Government undertook to purchase 100 Skybolt 
missiles when their development was completed by the 
United States. 142 Unfortunately for the British 
Government the Americans then decided to cancel Skybolt, 
without realising the repurcussions in Britain. 
Skybolt. It was an absolute pile of junk, paid for 
by the way, the development of which had been paid 
for 100% by the US - the British hadn't put in a 
dime - but they had an agreement that if we ever 
went forward with it, they would have a free ride, 
they could buy them... We had no obligation, or at 
least we thought we had no obligation, to produce a 
pile of junk. . . what we didn't understand was an ill-defined but very very real political requirement 
in Britain. So when we cancelled the weapon all hell 
broke losse and the agenda for Nassu was totally 
scrapped and we didn't talk about a damn thing at 
Nassu except Skybolt and what to do to replace it in 
the British inventory to permit them to maintain 
their in123endent deterrent, which ultimately became 
Polaris. 
Whether Britain developed its own system or merely 
purchased one, the question arose of whether or not it 
should have been tested? The issue of British testing of 
nuclear weapons had been debated throughout the 1950s 
since the first test at Monte Bello in 1952. Opponents of 
the tests saw them as an unnecessary increase in the 
amount of radiation in existence and a threat to human 
and wild life. Moreover they were relatively easy to 
oppose if the system was to be purchased from the United 
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States because the United States rather than the British 
would have to carry them out. These and other related 
questions were debated at the annual conference in 
motions which either broke the questions down or put them 
together. 
A resolution, in general, was a motion moved at a 
conference from the floor that was on a single issue or 
at least was drafted by a single affiliated body. A 
composite on the other hand was a longer motion which 
might couple together a number of different issues and 
resolutions from a number of different organisations. 
This was where the problem arose for Gaitskell when 
dealing with Conference. Motions calling for multilateral 
disarmament usually also called for a worldwide effort to 
end wars, this was perfectly acceptable because it 
committed the Party to nothing. There were also 
resolutions which called for unilateral disarmament or 
for a pacifist defence policy. It was relatively 
straightforward for Gaitskell to oppose these. When the 
compositing process came in, the problems really arose. 
Opposition to nuclear weapons could be advocated through 
asking for an end to manufacture and testing of nuclear 
weapons, through banning the use of British air space for 
overflying by planes carrying nuclear weapons or through 
not stockpiling the missiles. These calls would be 
coupled with a demand that China be included in the UN 
and conscription be restricted. Gaitskell could agree to 
the ending of testing, to including China in the UN and 
to the ending of conscription but was bound to oppose an 
end to the manufacture of the weapons and air space 
restrictions because he was still committed to the 
British bomb and the NATO alliance. Allowing China into 
the UN was carried regularly between 1955 and 1961144 
when part of a general resolution but was defeated 
between 1955 and 1959 when part of a unilateralist 
-------------------- 
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motion. Moreover resolutions which if they had been 
carried into effect by a Labour Government would have 
meant virtual unilateralism were passed before 1960. A 
resolution demanding an end to testing and manufacture, 
passed every year from 1956, when coupled with a demand 
for a decrease in defence spending and a call for 
"progressive" disarmament(1957)145 would have amounted to 
the dismantling of much of British nuclear defence. 
These were issues loaded with symbolism and decisions on 
voting were based on a great deal more than simply the 
wording. Even the person introducing the motion or 
composite could make a difference on the platform's 
attitude, as it did in 1960 when Frank Cousins moved the 
TGWU resolution. 146 
Labour went into the 1959 General Election with 
resolutions having been passed by Conference advocating a 
nuclear defence policy based on opposing the testing of 
the weapons, calling for worldwide disarmament, for 
reductions in defence spending and reductions in the 
period of conscription. 147 The unilateralist motion of 
1958 was defeated by 4.5 million votes and there was no 
full conference in 1959.148 A year later the official 
defence policy was defeated and two unilateralist 
resolutions were passed. The way these resolutions came 
to be passed can be traced back in part to the election. 
The defeat itself did not affect Gaitskell's position, in 
fact he was considered unassailable after the campaign, 
which had been a personal triumph. However, as has been 
described, his handling of the post-election period had 
stirred up considerable opposition to his proposed 
-------------------- 
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constitutional reforms. His perceived reliance on the 
Hampstead Set revived charges by the left that he was a 
factional leader. 149 Both reduced his authority in the 
Party and forced his supporters to fight on two fronts. 
The trade union Conferences which took place between 
Easter and August 1960 had two main questions before 
them. The first was the revision of the constitution and 
the second was disarmament. These conferences passed 
resolutions which then mandated their delegations to 
Labour Party Conferences150 to vote on resolutions in a 
particular way. It was a system which was wide open to 
abuse. Bill Carron, the leader of the AEU, was famous for 
casting his vote at Conference in contradiction of the 
way he was mandated, by claiming a wider mandate from the 
membership or for casting the AEU vote twice for opposing 
resolutions. 151 Frank Cousins cast the TGWU vote for 
unilateralism in 1960 with no mandate from his Union to 
do so. 152 The NUR delegation which cast 272,000 votes at 
the 1960 Conference was swung unilateralist by 1 vote on 
its executive-153 All sides of the Party agreed that the 
system was unfair, unrepresentative and outdated but 
would only say such things when suffering defeats. The 
Bevanites had attacked the block vote in 1952 and now 
many of them would defend the system. 
154 Whereas during 
the period 1955 to 1959 (when the platform did not 
sustain a single defeat) Gaitskell never demurred, yet at 
Scarborough he called the system unrepresentative. 155 
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The main difference between the two sides in the debate 
was that despite Gaitskell's attempts at organisation, 
one had a national organisation putting its case, CND, 
and in Tribune a weekly newspaper spreading the word. CND 
also organised model resolutions for Constituency Labour 
Parties to put forward and collaborated on compositing of 
resolutions so that they could concentrate their efforts 
on one or two key votes. 156 There was no equivalent 
organisation pushing multilateralism. 157 
The undermining of Gaitskell's position by opposition to 
his reform of Clause Four was compounded by the stirrings 
of revolt on unilateralism. Early in 1960 twenty-four 
Labour MPs signed a unilateralist motion in the House of 
Commons. 158 On March 1 forty-three led by Crossman and 
Wigg abstained on an official Labour defence motion. 159 
Gaitskell was being attacked for not responding more 
quickly to the news, which was leaked on February 26, 
that the Government was going to cancel Blue Streak. In 
private Gaitskell gave only tentative support to the 
British bomb and had misgivings about it on financial and 
technical grounds, but he was reluctant to say so in 
public. 160 This reluctance meant that the Labour Party 
was in danger of supporting a deterrent that the 
Government might have abandoned. This combined with the 
coincidence of the meeting of trade union Conferences 
with the Aldermaston march and opinion polls showing a 
rise to 33% of support for CND which was as high as 41% 
among Labour voters. 161 The Communist Party had belatedly 
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leapt on to the unilateralist bandwagon and its influence 
swung the ETU's 140,000 votes against the official 
policy. 162 
On March 1 Gaitskell asked questions in the House on 
rumours that Blue Streak was to be cancelled. 163 He said 
that unilateralism would mean withdrawal from NATO and if 
this did not lead to a break up of NATO it would result 
in a NATO dominated by Germany. He did not repudiate the 
British system completely, because he felt that this was 
a dishonest thing to do when in opposition without the 
full information. He also knew it was not popular and he 
was scared of the Conservative Party playing the 
anti-patriotic card against Labour. The period after the 
debate was a critical time, but he was exhausted and on 
April 1 he left on vacation and to attend a Socialist 
International conference, thereby missing the full debate 
on Blue Streak, for which he was roundly condemned. 164 
This also illustrated a underlying concern that Gaitskell 
had a certain ambivalence on critical issues165 until he 
had decided on his course or was faced with a crisis. For 
those who campaigned on disarmament issues throughout the 
1950s this caused some disquiet. Philip Noel-Baker, the 
leading multilateralist campaigner of the period, 
expressed his frustration at Gaitskell's attitude to 
James Meade: 
I have never been able to make Hugh Gaitskell take a 
real interest in disarmament. Whenever I say to him 
that the only way out with the unilateralists is by 
running multilateral disarmament very hard he always 
says "Yes", and then has a perfunctory half sentence 
or half paragraph in the next speech. But when I 
-------------------- 
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have tried to urge debates in the House in which he 
and Healey shox]IJ take part he always says "What is 
there to say? " 
While Gaitskell was away, the Easter trade union 
conferences were held and the Co-operative Party with a 
"growing Communist influence" voted unilateralist by 3 to 
1.167 USDAW emulated the Carron technique by passing an 
orthodox motion by 62,000 and a unilateralist one by 
19,000. Walter Padley, the General Secretary, thought he 
could have swung the vote but had to speak in the Clause 
Four debate instead, USDAW had 329,000 votes at 
Conference. 168 
In the debate in the House of Commons on the cancellation 
of Blue Streak, George Brown and Harold Wilson, without 
consulting Gaitskell, moved towards a rejection of the 
independent nuclear deterrent. The debate was a censure 
motion calling on the Government to hold an enquiry into 
the "circumstances surrounding the initiation, 
continuance and cancellation of Blue Streak. " George 
Brown laid into the government in general, and Duncan 
Sandys in particular: "I do not believe it is unfair to 
say that the decision to go forward with Blue Streak must 
be a blunder of an unprecedented size. ""169 He was careful 
to concentrate his fire on the particular type of system; 
"fixed site liquid fuelled rockets", rather than the 
principle of Britain's deterrent. Nowhere in the speech 
did he mention the V-bombers. The passage which caused 
the problem ran: 
I fear that a gap, during which we shall not have a 
credible means of delivering an independent British 
deterrent seems now to be inevitable. We must 
remember that it is the credibility outside that 
-------------------- 
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matters and not the self delusion in which we engage 
inside. The argument for maintaining an independent 
British deterrent for basic political reasons is one 
thing when you have it... the argument for going back 
into the bi ness once we are out is altogether 
different. 
Strictly speaking all George Brown was saying was that 
once the system was cancelled the arguments changed. He 
ignored the existence of the V-bombers and their free 
fall H-bombs, so his contention that the deterrent was 
inoperative was actually false. The impression was 
created however, especially in an atmosphere that was 
increasingly hostile to the weapons, that the Labour 
Party was moving towards the repudiation of the British 
bomb. Wilson's knock-about summing up of the debate added 
to the impression: "Like so many other rather pathetic 
individuals whose sense of social prestige outruns their 
purse, he is left in the situation at the end of the day 
of the man who dare not admit he cannot afford a 
television set and who puts up the aerial instead. That 
is our situation, because without an independent means of 
delivery, the independent nuclear deterrent, the right 
Hon Gentlemen's short cut to national greatness, is an 
empty illusion. 171 
On May Day, the AEU, with Carron this time outmanoeuvred, 
voted unilateralist by 38 to 14, taking another 697,000 
votes away from Gaitskell. 
172 George Brown as official 
defence spokesman was trying, with Crossman, to find a 
form of words that could form a compromise. Gaitskell 
told a meeting of close supporters that a unilateralist 
resolution was bound to be passed at Conference. In 
contrast Frank Soskice, Patrick Gordon Walker, Roy Mason 
and Michael Stewart held out for the British deterrent. 
173 
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On 31 May the TUC and NEC each appointed drafting 
committees of four. At the end of the first meeting which 
discussed a draft by Crossman, Brown, Healey and and 
Morgan Phillips, Gaitskell got himself added to the 
committee. Crossman felt that without Gaitskell present 
they could have got Frank Cousins to accept the 
compromise. 174 Brown and Crossman produced a draft that 
Cousins could accept but which made no reference to 
nuclear weapons within NATO - it fudged the key issue. 
Gaitskell opposed this and the trade unionists "exposed 
[Crossman's] semantic shams as hopelessly fragile"175 or 
as Crossman put it: "Every word, every comma, was niggled 
at and disputed, either for minutiae of drafting points 
or, more often, in demand for a more nuclear-warrior-like 
presentation. 176 
During this debate Cousins made it clear to Bill Webber 
that he felt that NATO should have no nuclear weapons at 
all. Cousins was isolated in his opposition and the draft 
was accepted: "All those four hours rowing, wrangling, 
for nothing except to make sure that Frank Cousins was 
against us. "177 The policy already pledged the Party to 
no further British tests and no first use, no joint 
European deterrent; Britain would in future contribute to 
defence through conventional means as it would cease to 
be an independent nuclear power and as a result of this 
meeting phrases were added about loyalty to NATO and 
political control of nuclear weapons. 
Gaitskell was now armed with a policy statement endorsed 
by the TUC and the NEC and he made a series of speeches 
pleading his case. His speech at the NUGMW Conference on 
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May 23 was acclaimed as his best outside the House. He 
stressed three issues of principle: support for defence, 
for staying in NATO and for NATO's retention of nuclear 
weapons while the Russians had them. 
He succeed in bringing the NUGMW, with 650,000 votes, on 
to his side as it voted against unilateralism by 260 
votes to 80, and the Post Office Workers [160,000] gave 
him victories on both defence and on Clause Four. The 
Railway Clerks and Woodworkers also came out in support 
of the platform and the Yorkshire miners voted for the 
TUC-NEC policy by 75 votes to 19. 
On Clause Four the tide was turning the other way; USDAW 
had accepted the statement of aims but not as an 
amendment to the constitution; NUGMW had accepted it, but 
by a much smaller majority, 204 votes to 132. AEU and the 
Yorkshire miners both voted to retain Clause Four. This 
was followed in early July by the rest of the miners 
voting against changing Clause Four but for Gaitskell on 
defence; the NUM voted against a change in Clause Four by 
354,000 votes to 326,000, and were anti-unilateralist by 
470,000 votes to 201,000. The railwaymen went with the 
left on both, by 66 votes to 11 and by 39 votes to 38, 
carrying 272,000 votes with them, as did the Building 
Workers, Boilermakers and Electricians. 
178 
There was by July a mandated majority of 1,700,000 trade 
union votes against reforming the constitution. 179 On 
July 13 the amending of the constitution was dropped at a 
special meeting of the NEC and it was agreed that the 
Amplification of Aims would simply be published. This was 
bowing to the inevitable but it also avoided the 
possibility of the platform being defeated on both 
defence and on the constitutional reforms. Rather than 
-------------------- 
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take a similar course on defence, Gaitskell ensured there 
would be a confrontation. This turned the debate into a 
"Who runs the Party" debate. During the period between 
the mandating of the votes and the debate itself 
Gaitskell was helped by the cancellation of the Summit 
which increased the uncertainty of the international 
situation. His speech to Conference was also very 
important in swinging the unmandated votes to the 
platform. Estimates before the conference gave a one 
million majority among union votes and one million 
majority among Constituency Labour Parties for 
unilateralism. The Daily Mail gave Gaitskell a 50% chance 
of surviving Conference. 180 
As Conference convened everyone 
time the leadership was to face 
October 2 the NEC voted 17 to 4 
Cousins and 13 to 7 to oppose t 
Cousins persuaded his own union 
mandate, for unilateralism. 182 
felt that for the first 
a major defeat. On 
against compromise with 
he TGWU resolution-181 
to vote, without a 
The debate on Foreign Policy and Defence opened with the 
presentation of the joint TUC-NEC, "Policy for Peace" by 
Sam Watson of the NUM and the NEC. He attacked the 
attempts by Crossman and Brown to paper over differences 
and made it plain from the outset that any victory for 
unilateralism would be hollow and bluntly stated that: 
"The final arbiters of the future of this Party do not 
sit in this conference, but are the British electorate 
and the British people. "183 The main thrust of this and 
the other speeches on behalf of the platform were that 
the differences between the two sides were not minor ones 
but that they boiled down to whether Britain should leave 
-------------------- 
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NATO if it refused to disarm unilaterally or whether 
Britain should stay in NATO but without its own nuclear 
weapons. The debate then took a curious turn with a 
resolution from ASLEF, which was eventually remitted, 
opposing the training of German troops in Britain. 184 
The AEU resolution was then introduced and seconded by 
Ian Mikardo and things started to warm up. In a short 
emotive speech Mikardo made clear the basis of the 
unilateralist case, which echoed throughout the debate; 
an emotional appeal based on the destructive power of the 
weapons followed by doubts about the aggressive intent of 
the USSR and attacks on the theory of deterrence. 185 
Mikardo was followed by Cousins who introduced the TGWU 
composite resolution. He added to the Mikardo case the 
view that as the Labour Party had lost three elections in 
a row the presentation of a new policy to the British 
electorate would actually help the Labour Party 
electorally. 186 
After the presentation of resolutions, Conference moved 
to a general debate, which was opened by Philip 
Noel-Baker. Noel-Baker's speech was one of the most 
powerful, not the less effective because he had just 
received the Nobel Peace Prize. The case he made for 
multilateral disarmament carried a great deal of 
authority. 187 George Brown followed with a forthright 
defence of the executive's position: "Britain has to be 
defended in the conditions which exist today and not 
those which we wish existed today. "188 
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Back came the unilateralists with Michael Foot 
introducing the question of control, in a sharp 
passionate speech: "We were told of one of the most 
disgraceful incidents in British History, when an 
American Secretary of State in Paris, at a critical 
moment in world affairs was willing to give orders about 
planes flying over these Islands without consulting the 
British Prime Minister. We all might have been blown up 
to pieces by that monumental folly. "189 Foot was only 
warming up and he went on: "Is there any lady, mother or 
grandmother who can step to this microphone, who can take 
part on the platform, who can listen peacefully in the 
galleries and not be fully conscious that when the die is 
cast today, irrespective of whether we have a Labour 
Government within the next four years or not, human 
destiny is being decided? " The atmosphere built up in 
this debate was extremely intense and the balance of the 
argument was even. The unilateralists used emotive 
language and extravagant argument to put their case. The 
multilateralists countered with logic and with what, like 
Denis Healey, they saw as the fallacies of the 
unilateralist argument: "The unilateralists are 
saying... that we have got to give a lead. The question I 
ask you is: if we give a lead, who is going to 
follow? "190 
Gaitskell was the last to speak and he started by 
praising the debate: "This has been a magnificent 
debate". 191 He then listed all that the two sides agreed 
on, which was much, before changing tack and launching 
into his attack on unilateralism and his advocacy of the 
"Policy for Peace". He initially concentrated on the 
abandonment of the British deterrent before turning, as 
Denis Healey and Sam Watson had done, to the question of 
-------------------- 
189. LPACR 1960, p 189. 
190. LPACR 1960, p 192-193. 
191. LPACR 1960, p 195. 
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the Western Alliance and NATO. He made it clear that 
possession of the bomb by Britain was not a matter of 
principle: "I have never taken the view that the 
decisions made originally by the Labour Government in 
1947 to manufacture our own atom bomb.. . were the kind of 
things which involved us in a matter of principle. "192 He 
did not spare the unilateralists, accusing them of 
cloaking their real intentions by not coming out and 
saying they were prepared to see Britain withdraw from 
NATO: "If you are a unilateralist on principle, you are 
driven to becoming a neutralist". The middle section of 
the speech outlined the platform's objections to the 
particular motions in detail. Finally he turned to the 
consequences of defeat and finished his speech with an 
extremely powerful challenge and a call to arms: 
The place to decide the leadership of this Party is 
not here but in the Parliamentary Party... It is 
perfectly reasonable to try to get rid of somebody 
... who you think is not a good leader. . . What would be wrong... and would not be forgiven, is if, in 
order to get rid of a man, you supported a policy in 
which you did not wholeheartedly believe... supposing 
all of us, like well-behaved sheep were to follow 
the policies of unilateralism and neutralism, what 
kind of an impression would that make upon the minds 
of the British people... What sort of people do they 
think we are? Do they think we can simply accept a 
decision of this kind? Do they think we can become 
overnight the pacifists, unilateralists and fellow 
travellers that other people are? 
He ended: 
I say this to you: we may lose the vote today and 
the result may deal this Party a grave blow. It may 
not be possible to prevent it, but I think there are 
many of us who will not accept that this blow need 
be mortal, who will not believe that such an end is 
inevitable. There are some of us, Mr Chairman, who 
will fight and fight and fight again to bring back 
sanity and honesty and dignity, so that our Party 
with its gipt past may retain its glory and its 
greatness. 
-------------------- 
192. LPACR 1960, p 197. 
193. LPACR 1960, p 201. 
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Assessments of the speech are generally agreed that it 
was an extraordinary political performance. At the time 
one journalist wrote: "The thing of transcending 
importance about Mr Gaitskell's speech at Scarborough was 
not that he was at last goaded to round on his critics 
but that he tore the paper from the crack: with an 
honesty and clarity that made the step irrevocable. He 
bared a deep division in the Party on a crucial issue of 
foreign policy and defence. He did not create the 
division: that was the work of others. His contribution 
was to force the Party to acknowledge it. ""194 Later 
Windlesham described the scene: "Going into the 
conference as a leader whose fitness for the job had been 
questioned not only by Party members who believed in a 
more vigorous style of traditional socialism than he did, 
but also by people whose aims were similar to his own, 
the voting indicated that his tour de force drew in most 
votes not already mandated. ""195 Williams was slightly 
more lyrical in his description: "As he finished 
exhausted, drenched in perspiration under the hot 
television lights like an actor after a major 
performance, he was greeted by cheers from nearly 
two-thirds of the delegates... The debate and vote at 
Scarborough transformed Gaitskell's position", in the 
19 morning the papers were "widely enthusiastic". 6 
After the singing of "For he's a jolly good fellow" the 
results of the votes were announced. Gaitskell lost the 
day. The joint NEC-TUC policy on defence was defeated by 
297,000 votes. The TGWU resolution No 60, which Gaitskell 
took to mean unilateral disarmament, was passed by just 
-------------------- 
194. Times, October 21 1960. 
195. Lord Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, Cape, London 1966, p 84. 
196. Williams 1979, p 612 and p 622. 
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43,000 votes. The AEU resolution No 33, in favour of 
which 79 other organisations withdrew their resolutions, 
was passed by 407,000 votes. 197 This last resolution, was 
the most straightforwardly unilateral. Yet as Dora 
Gaitskell described it "he smiled until he almost 
laughed" because the majorities against him were only a 
third of what had been predicted. 198 Significantly for 
the development of the CDS Gaitskell had been 
particularly effective in swinging Constituency Labour 
Parties. On the morning after the vote he met, still in 
his dressing gown, with John Harris and said that this 
morning he had started "planning operations at the grass 
roots to reverse the decision. " He also wrote a sketchy 
note of his "Objects: This year desperately good 
organisation needed. 11199 
Part of this organisation was the CDS, which had been 
planning its operations since the dark days of Easter. 
After Scarborough its painfully drafted manifesto had to 
be revised to include an opening section which read: "We 
are long standing members of the Labour Party who are 
convinced that our Movement cannot afford another 
Scarborough. Rank and file opinion must now assert itself 
in support of Hugh Gaitskell. ""200 
The analysis of the 1950s and early 1960s presented in 
the opening Chapters present the origins and background 
to the organisation and launch of the Campaign for 
Democratic Socialism. There are four main points that 
need to be drawn out from these years. 
-------------------- 
197. LPACR 1960, p 202. 
198. Williams 1979, p 613. 
199. Williams 1979, p 623. 
200. CDS Papers: A Manifesto addressed to the Labour Movement. 
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First, the precedent for internal Party organisations had 
been set by the Bevanites in the 1950s. Although 
predomiantly a Parliamentary grouping they had important 
links in the constituencies and foreshadowed at least two 
of the activities that CDS were to engage in, canvassing 
for votes to the constituency section of the NEC and 
circulation of model resolutions for the Party 
conference. 
Second, in the late 1950s the development of the 
Bevanites, and their successor Victory for Socialism, was 
accompanied by the growth of the single issue pressure 
group the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. This group 
was external to the Labour Party but foreshadowed CDS in 
the sense that its powerful advocacy of unilateralism was 
the main challenge the Campaign sought to match in its 
first year. 
Third, the electoral defeats of 1955 and 1959 underlined 
the need for a modernisation of the Labour Party 
following the experience of the Attlee governments. The 
divisions over the form this modernisation should take 
centred on the revisionist analysis of Tony Crosland. 
This in turn was the basis of the Clause Four reform 
launched by Gaitskell, against Crosland's advice, after 
the defeat in 1959. This philosophy and its critique of 
fundamentalist positions were to be ideological 
underpinning for the CDS Manifesto. 
Finally, the main element missing from Labour politics in 
the 1950s is an organisational expression of the 
revisionist ideology and which was loyal to the 
leadership of Gaitskell. Aside from the informal 
organisation attempted by Gaitskell in the House of 
Commons there was nothing in existence on the right of 
the Party to rival Tribune, the Brains Trust that held 
discussion meetings around the country or, later in the 
decade, the CND. In response to the cross currents of 
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these years and out of a desire both to defend the 
leadership and project the cause of revisionist 
modernisation such an organisation began forming in 1960. 
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Chapter 3, 
The Private Origins and Public Launch of the CDS. 
No organisation simply appears on the day on which the 
press release announcing its launch is issued. The tip of 
an iceberg of organisation peeks through the water. The 
rest is submerged and possibly purposely concealed. To 
achieve "planned spontaneity"' when the Campaign was 
actually launched the private origins of the CDS were 
concealed behind a carefully constructed facade. 
Windlesham, in his study of the CDS, 2 mentioned, without 
giving details, the existence of an informal group in 
London to which some of the early CDS organisers 
belonged. In fact, from 1954 a number of younger Labour 3 
-------------------- 
1. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of Meeting of Full Group, June 27 1960, point 7. 
2. Windlesham London 1966, chapter 4, The Springboard and Chapter 5, The Campaign. The CDS is 
used as a case study. 
3. Windlesham 1966 p 95, "In London some of the signatories of the February 3rd letter had been 
meeting for some years past with a group of oxford graduates' contemporaries who had graduated 
in the early 1950s. The most active regular participants were W. T. Rodgers; Michael 
Shanks.. . Dick Taverne. . . and 
Ivan Yates. " This is a slightly misleading view of the Group. 
Firstly these were by no means the only active participants, David Vaughan-Williams and Colin 
McIntyre were just as involved. Secondly the Group was not simply Oxford and had developed from 
its initial basis. Neither Patrick Seyd, Factionalism in the Labour Party, A case study of the 
CDS, Unpublished MPhil, University of Southampton 1968 nor Stephen Haseler The Gaitskellites, 
Cape, London 1969 mention the existence of the Group. 
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Party members, including candidates and councillors, had 
been meeting together in an informal debating society, 
known as "the Group". 4 Bill Rodgers reviewed the early 
years in his diary in 1957: "We started three years ago 
with about eighteen members of whom perhaps 6-8 generally 
attended. Now we are up to two dozen or so and the 
newcomers are more active. "5 Rodgers had organised the 
Group to ensure that some of his Oxford contemporaries 
did not lose track of politics. 6 It also meant that 
during his time at the Fabian Society, when he was acting 
in the role of a civil servant and making contacts around 
the country, 7 he could maintain a link with political 
discussions. 
Those who regularly attended meetings of the Group who 
went on to form the nucleus of the London CDS group were, 
Ivan Yates, Michael Shanks, Bill Rodgers and Dick 
Taverne. 8 Anthony Dumont, Bryan Magee, and Ronald 
Waterhouse who signed the Manifesto also attended these 
meetings. 
9 Other Group members who were then recruited 
into CDS included Gordon Borrie, Keith Kyle, Oleg 
Kerensky, Bruce Douglas-Mann and Conrad Dehn. 
10 Members 
who did not join CDS included David Donnison, Ivan 
Alexander, David Vaughan-Williams, David Wedgwood Benn, 
Ben Hooberman, ll Michael Summerskill and Donald Watt. 
12 
The break off into what Rodgers described as "real 
-------------------- 
4. Rodgers in interview with author. (Rodgers' wife used to call it "The Boys") 
5. Unpublished diary quoted in letter to Michael Summmerskill, January 18 1990. 
6. Bill Rodgers in a letter to Michael Summerskill, January 18 1990. 
7. Rodgers and Williams in interview with author 
8. Questionnaires on the Group, Rodgers to Summerskill January 18 1990 and Windlesham 1966 p 
95. 
9. Magee and Waterhouse interview with author. 
10. CDS Papers: A Manifesto Addressed to the Labour Movement and CDS Papers: Signatories File, 
see below. 
11. Questionnaires on the Group, Donnison, Alexander, Vaughan-Williams, Hooberman, Sumnerskill 
and Watt. 
12. Watt and Summerskill interviews with author. 
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politics"13 caused the disintegration of the Group. The 
last recorded meeting was February 15 1960 at Bryan 
Magee's flat. 14 
The last three meetings of the Group were the ones which 
were most important in terms of the CDS. These were held 
on January 21, February 1 and February 15 1960.15 The 
first took place at Ivan Yates' flat. 16 This meeting 
discussed three special manifestoes drafted by members of 
the Group; 17 Donald Watt's Industry in the National 
Interest, David Donnison's When we know what we want we 
shall know what to do and Dick Taverne's The Principle of 
Social Responsibility. 18 None of the participants 
remembers whether the plan was to publish a manifesto. 
19 
However the precedent for manifestoes was clearly set in 
these meetings of the Group. 
The meeting of February 1 took place just two days before 
the sending of a public letter of support to Hugh 
Gaitskell. Dick Taverne and Bill Rodgers, who along with 
Ivan Yates were organisers of the Group, 
20 also organised 
the sending of this letter. 
The letter of support was "almost the only 
non-Parliamentary expression of support for [Gaitskell] 
during this period. "21 In part the letter read: 
-------------------- 
13. Rodgers to Summerskill, January 23 1990. 
14. Questionnaires on the Group: Waterhouse and McIntyre, Waterhouse Papers: Notification of 
meeting and Rodgers to Summerskill, March 15 1990. 
15. Waterhouse Papers: Notification of meetings. 
16. Waterhouse Papers: Notification of meetings. 
17. Watt and Taverne interview with Author. Donnison letter to authur. 
18. Waterhouse Papers: Copies of the three Manifestoes. 
19. Donnison letter to author, December 12 1989, Taverne and Watt in interview with author. 
20. Rodgers interview with author. 
21. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 2. 
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It is not an easy time for the Labour Party and its 
members. But surely courage is needed if we are to 
put our affairs in order, however painful the 
process of self-examination and change may be. Most 
of all, we must avoid the bitterness and futility of 
attacks by Parliamentary colleagues and other 
prominent spokesmen on each other and the suggestion 
that your leadership of the Party is under review. 
We are bound to have disagreements. The signatories 
of this letter hold differing views about policy, 
and we are a democratic Party in which no one man's 
word is law. But to disagree is one thing; to divide 
and weaken the Party another. We regard your 
leadership as settle52and look to you to lead Labour 
back to power again. 
Rodgers' experience in organising the letter brought home 
to him the lack of co-ordination between the rank and 
file and the leadership. He believed that a majority of 
the Party supported Gaitskell but that their voices 
tended to be drowned out by the left: 
Discussions with [Taverne] and, with other 
signatories, confirmed the strong sense that more 
ought to be done to rally rank and file opinion: in 
addition, it was clear that the real support for 
Hugh Gaitskell within the Labour Movement was far 
greater than ever before. This view was also 
confirmed by my experience in the St. Marylebone 
Labour Party. It was traditionally a left-wing 
party, but organisation was capable, if not of 
producing a majority for Hugh Gaitskell, at least of 
producing a very considerable body of moderate 
opinion. The trouble was that for many reasons 
leadership from the right and centre was missing. 23 
There was a feeling that there was a great deal of 
support that simply needed to be "rallied". However the 
letter was not, as Windlesham described it, "an attempt 
to create a channel" of communication that "Gaitskellite 
sympathisers" could use to reach a wider audience. 
24 
-------------------- 
22. The complete text is reproduced in Windlesham 1966 p 96 and a copy is contained in the 
Waterhouse Papers: February 2 1960, Letter to Gaitskell. 
23. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS history p 3. 
24. Windtesham 1966 p 94. 
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Rodgers was experimenting with the letter, feeling the 
water, but so long as Gaitskell opposed organisation he 
did not take things further. 25 
In addition to Taverne and Rodgers, the letter was also 
signed by Gordon Borrie, Anthony Dumont, Ben Hooberman, 
Colin Jackson, Bryan Magee, Chritopher Rowland, Ronald 
Waterhouse who were all members of the Group, and Richard 
Everly, Maurice Foley, Ivor Richard and Dick Leonard who 
were broadly sympathetic to the CDS. Shirley Williams 
also signed the letter. 
Shirley Williams's signature on this letter and exclusion 
from the Group highlights a characteristic of the 
Gaitskellite organisations which was typical of the 
times. Williams was excluded from membership of the Group 
on grounds of her gender. 26 "The Group problem was that a 
number of wives and girlfriends were eligible on merit, 
but it was thought that, if they were invited, other less 
eligible wives and girlfriends would also want to come. 
We were strenous in wishing to maintain the quality and 
seriousness of the political discussion and not making it 
a social occasion. "27 The stress laid on ability is 
echoed by Alec Grant, later a signatory to the Manifesto, 
but never invited to join the Group, as Grant put it "I 
don't think I ever achieved the status". 
28 However it was 
not only about ability, there was a male ethos about the 
Group and to a lesser extent, about the CDS. 
For Shirley Williams the exclusion of women was as much 
to do with the Group's background in Oxbridge and the 
political threat that women might pose, as it was to 
considerations of standards: 
-------------------- 
25. CDS Papers: Rodgers' History of the CDS p 2. 
26. Williams in interview with author and Rodgers to Summerskill, January 18 1990. 
27. Rodgers to Summerskill, January 18 1990. 
28. Grant to Summerskitt, May 30 1990. 
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Bill didn't want women, but I was in a sense the 
bone of contention because I was the most senior in 
political terms. There were only a couple of women, 
Jean Donnison and Marigold Robins. Why should we 
make an exception for just one or two women? It 
complicates life. It means we can't meet at clubs. 29 
The kind of people who would have fought against 
this, the more radical people, were not members. It 
was always perceived to be somewhere between an 
Oxbridge club 38nd a serious political organisation. 
Shirley Williams felt she was excluded because she was 
seen as a political threat. Leaving aside the way that 
selection was applied on an individual basis to men, but 
on a gender basis to women, it is significant that the 
perception from those excluded from the Group was that it 
was Oxbridge and exclusive. These were similar criticisms 
to those levelled at the Hampstead Set by the left. 
It was an awareness of these criticisms that influenced 
the kind of people invited to sign the CDS Manifesto when 
it was finally prepared and it also influenced the 
decision to exclude the names of Crosland, Gordon Walker, 
Jay and Jenkins from the early CDS publicity. Overall, 
the Group established the precedent for the Manifesto, 
showed the limitations of letters to newspapers, 
illustrated the male/Oxbridge ethos of the CDS 
organisers, taught the organisers the limits of debating 
groups, separated the political members of the Group from 
the non-political and thereby provided a network to tap 
into for early CDS supporters and contacts. In these ways 
it was an important precursor to the CDS which has been 
neglected by earlier writers on the Campaign. 
31 
------------------- 
29. There is-no evidence among the Group papers that meetings were ever held in clubs. 
30. Williams in interview with author. 
31. Windlesham 1966 p 95 as quoted above is the only published mention of the Group. 
103 
The transition from the Group to the Campaign was 
actually smoother for the signatories than for the main 
organisers. For Rodgers, Taverne, Yates and Shanks the 
limitations of the debating society were obvious. The 
Group included people who did not share their political 
beliefs, for example David Donnison, Donald Watt and 
David Wedgwood Benn. 32 It included others who could not 
get involved in overt political action, like the civil 
servants David Lane and Ivor Lucas. 33 Moreover they 
realised that they were hardly capable of organising a 
grass roots revival from the drawing rooms of each 
others' flats and houses. 34 So the leap from organising 
monthly meetings and Christmas parties35 to attempting to 
mobilise the rank and file of the Labour Party was 
considerable. For less influential figures, 36 like Ronald 
Waterhouse, attendance at Group meetings flowed naturally 
into the supporting the Campaign: "These meetings, 
[January and February 1960], seem to have witnessed the 
birth of the Manifesto Group as it became. There was much 
correspondence about manifestoes in 1960. "37 That there 
was no actual link between the Manifesto of the CDS as 
such and the manifestoes discussed by the Group is clear 
from the content of the three Group manifestoes, 
38 that 
there was a link in continuity between attendance at 
Group meetings and membership of the CDS, was also clear 
for some of the participants. 
-------------------- 
32. Questionnaires on the Group, these three were at the time more left wing than the others. 
33. Questionnaires on the Group, Donnison and Watt. 
34. Questionnaires on the Group, Lucas and Lane. 
35. Waterhouse Papers: Invitations to parties. 
36. Influential in terms of the internal dynamics of the Group. 
37. Questionnaire on the Group, Waterhouse. 
38. Waterhouse Papers: Texts of the three manifestoes. 
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Gaitskell's setback on Clause 4 in March39 and the swing 
of conference votes to unilateralism over Easter produced 
a considerable crisis on the right of the Party. 40 It was 
reflected in some fairly desperate private talk and 
personal disillusionment with the Labour Party. Taverne 
recalls a conversation between himself and Bill Rodgers, 
which took place sometime between the sending of the 
letter of support to Gaitskell41 and the first meetings 
of the London CDS organisers: 42 "I remember going to a 
young Fabian conference in Wilton Park, travelling in the 
train with Bill and one of us said to the other... if the 
Labour Party goes on like this there is no point in 
belonging to it any more. Lets give it one last try, 
can't we organise something? "43 Given the subsequent 
careers of the two this was a more accurate predictor of 
Taverne's than of Rodgers' thinking. 44 However, even 
Crosland did not discount the possibility of the Party 
splitting. 45 
The depression was accompanied by a growing feeling that 
there was a need to organise something in the face of 
what was perceived to be the skilled organisation of the 
left, in the form of CND, Tribune and the organising of 
resolutions to the Party Conferences. The need to 
organise developed as a reaction to the perceived success 
of the left. 46 Whether there was any truth in Ian 
-------------------- 
39. NEC Minutes for March 16 1960 pp 21-22. 
40. See above, Chapter 2. 
41. February 2 1960. 
42. May 16 1960. 
43. CDS Witness Seminar Transcript and Taverne interview with author. 
44. Taverne resigned from the Labour Party in 1971 and fought a successful by-election. Rodgers 
stayed until 1981 and then found it very difficult to leave. If this conversation pre-dated the 
meeting with Crosalnd then it would represent their first discussion of the CDS. 
45. CDS Papers: Untitled Fite, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960. 
46. Witness Seminar Transcript, Magee, Donoughue, Rodgers and Taverne. 
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Mikardo's claim that the left in general was not well 
organised, 47 and Victory for Socialism was not 
efficiently run, 48is irrelevant as far as the CDS was 
concerned. The perception on the right of the Party, 
among those who organised the Campaign, was that they 
were competing with a skilled and well-organised 
left-wing. 49 They concluded that the only way to defeat 
such an organisation was to set up a rival. This was not 
based, as had been done in the past, on the Parliamentary 
Party, or the official channels of Transport House, but 
was to operate unofficially, through the Constituency 
Labour Parties. 
Windlesham gives the credit for the early phase of 
organisation mostly to Rodgers: "If Rodgers was the 
catalyst in the gathering process by which like-minded 
people in London and Oxford were drawn together to create 
the nucleus of an organisation, it was Crosland who had a 
similar role in the working-out of a commonly accepted 
policy. "50 In fact the process was more complicated than 
this. 51 Crosland was the link and the motivator for both 
the London and Oxford groups, while Rodgers convened one 
section of the London group and Walden had brought 
together the Oxford group. Crosland was really the 
organisational and the policy catalyst of the combined 
Oxford and London groups until first Pickstock and then 
Rodgers took up the day to day task of running the 
Campaign. 52 
-------------------- 
47. Witness Seminar Transcript, Seyd made this point, and Mikardo in interview with author. 
48. Mikardo in interview with author. 
49. Witness Seminar Transcript, Rodgers, Magee, Taverne and Donoughue. 
50. Windtesham 1966 p 98. 
51. Without access to the CDS Papers this would not have been immediately apparent. 
52. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of Meeting, June 27 1960. 
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The first group that was to form the CDS had been brought 
together by Brian Walden in Oxford: "In Oxford, a group 
within the university and the City Labour Party, was 
meeting because of their concern with the activities of 
CND supporters within the City Labour Party. "53 Brian 
Walden, "an ex-student of Nuffield and at the time 
tutor-trainee in the extra-mural department, " recruited 
Alderman Frank Pickstock for this anti-left group. 
On Wednesday May 11 the first discussion of a broader new 
group took place between Walden and Pickstock. While 
travelling together to North Staffordshire they discussed 
the state of the Party, "... and agreed that there was no 
future in it for us if the present inability to resist 
its lunatic left, pressure groups like CND, and its 
inability to adjust itself to the present day continued. " 
Rather than confining themselves to oxford they 
considered that "as a despairing effort" they should 
"sound out possibilities" of forming a "centre group to 
express the mass of moderate opinion. ""54 
On the same day there was a meeting in London between 
Gaitskell, Crosland, Jenkins and Gordon Walker. The 
discussion centred on how to deal with the defence 
question and the pessimism of the grass-roots Oxford 
people was reflected at the very top of the Party: 
Crosland said that if [Gaitskell] took this line how 
many would he carry into opposition? He could not 
hope for 100. [Perhaps 10] said [Gaitskell] who 
became very angry and rounded on the other 2 sharply 
and implied that I was a [fudger] of principle. 
[Crosland] said this would be like the ineffective 
right-wing breakaway in French party - purely 
intellectual with supporters like Tomney and 
Bellenger. 55 
-------------------- 
53. Patrick Seyd 1968 p 109, this is the only detail given of the Oxford Group. 
54. CDS Papers: Untitled File, typed note, undated and unsigned describing Pickstocks movements 
in May and June. 
55. Robert Pearce, (editor), Patrick Gordon-Walker, Potitical'Diaries 1932-1971,, Historians' 
Press, London 1991 p 2. 
107 
This was followed by a meeting with Philip Williams, Ron 
Owen56 and Tony Crosland in Nuffield College. 57 Walden 
sent Pickstock a detailed account of this meeting which 
makes it plain that the idea for a centre group had been 
Pickstock's. Crosland's reception of the idea was "wildly 
enthusiastic"58 and he informed Walden and the others 
about a London group that had been established. The 
London group, which was planning a meeting on June 27,59 
was described as "entirely middle-class in composition". 
Crosland invited the oxford people to come down to London 
and lay out their plans to a combined meeting of the two 
groups. 60 The new organisation, christened The New Group, 
would be enlarged on the basis of personal contacts. 
There would be no problem with finance; "Crosland 
guarantees all the money we need for a venture of this 
kind. "61 The organisation would be based on local groups 
established by personal contacts. "Emphatically this is 
going at first to be democratic centralism, there is 
going to be no bloody nonsense about constitutions and 
executive committee etc. We are all privates and generals 
at the same time. "62 
The idea of a "democratic centralist" organisation with 
local groups was dangerously like a party within a party, 
or indeed a new party. The depth of depression reached at 
-------------------- 
56. Owen had also been in the Extra-Mural department and was now a mature student at Queens 
College Oxford. He served on the Oxford City Council from 1952-1957, see Seyd 1968 p 109. 
57. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Typed Note, undated and unsigned describing Pickstock's 
movements in May and June, the date of this meeting was probably May 12 1960. Seyd 1968 p 110 
mentions a "meeting of Oxford people on May 14 and 15, " but there is no other record of this. 
58. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960 p 1. 
59. CDS Papers: Rodgers CDS History, the decision to hold a further meeting with an enlarged 
group was presumably taken at the first meeting of May 16. 
60. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock May 18 1960, The meeting that heard the 
Oxford plan was on June 26. 
61. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960. 
62. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960. 
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this stage of 1960 among the right-wing supporters of 
Gaitskell is made clear again in Crosland's reactions to 
Walden's proposals: 
Crosland appealed passionately that we go for Labour 
Party members, and Labour sympathisers. He did not 
discount the possibility that eventually the Labour 
Party would split, and then the role of the New 
Group would change, but for the moment he wanted us 
to do what you and I have already discussed, namely 
build ourselvýs up as a new given factor within the 
Labour Party. 
The picture Walden paints in this letter may partly have 
been a result of his tendency to over dramatise, as in 
"For the pioneers this is going to involve a complete 
sacrifice of personal interest, and advancement within 
the present Party", 64 but it is revealing just how far 
Crosland was prepared to take the logical consequences of 
Gaitskell's potential long term defeat on Clause Four and 
defence. 
The question of who the New Group was to be aimed at was 
discussed by the Oxford group at further meetings on May 
22 and May 2965 and the initial concentration on Labour 
Party members was not changed: "Our feeling", Williams 
wrote to Crosland, "was that the people we were aiming at 
were: (a) non-leftists and non-fudgers in the Labour 
Party; (b) those who have drifted out of the Party 
recently; (c) potential members deterred from joining by 
the Party's present state; (d) active trade unionists who 
play little part in politics in present conditions; (e) 
left-wing Liberals. 11 66 
-------------------- 
63. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960. 
64. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960. 
65. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Typed, unsigned and undated note discribing Pickstock's 
movements in May and June. 
66. CDS Papers: Origins File, Williams to Crosland undated, from content it must have been 
sometime in late April or early May 1960. 
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The motivation behind the organisation was made clear by 
Walden: "Above all else this is not going to be a wholly 
middle-class talking shop. We want no windy discussions 
on minute matters of policy, and we do want working 
class, no class, any class members, trade unionists, 
local councillors, GMC delegates, non-GMC delegates, ward 
members, non-ward members - the whole bloody lot. "67 
In London the equivalent role to Walden was played by 
Bill Rodgers. For Rodgers "the Campaign begins on a day 
in Easter week 1960. "68 Rodgers resigned as general 
secretary of the Fabian Society in January 1960 and took 
a job with the Consumers' Association. 69 Having made the 
decision to leave his job in the Fabian Society he felt 
"free to take a more public position" by organising a 
letter of support for Gaitskell. While he was still 
serving out his notice, 70 he arranged a meeting with Tony 
Crosland at The Two Chairmen pub in Dartmouth Street, 
across the road from the Fabians' headquarters. Rodgers's 
account of this meeting made plain the personal 
difficulties his plans for the CDS gave him: 
I said then that I felt personally in a dilemma. I 
had decided to leave full time politics and had in 
mind that I would not play a very active part at 
least until the next general election. On the other 
hand, it now seemed to me, in view of the Clause 
Four dispute, that this was really the time to rally 
more seriously than ever before people of like 
minds. I raised with Tony the whole question of 
liaison on the right in the light of our experience 
of the Clause Four dispute and of my letter to Hugh 
Gaitskell. 71 
-------------------- 
67. CDS Papers: Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960, emphasis as original. 
68. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 1, Witness Seminar Transcript and Rodgers in Interview 
with author, this quote, in roughly similar form, occurs in all three. 
69. He was sacked shortly after the publication of the Manifesto, by Caspar Brook the Director 
of the Consumers Association, who objected to his association with the Campaign, CDS Papers: 
Rodgers CDS History p 11. 
70. Shirley Williams replaced Rodgers at the Fabian Soceity so was mainly neutral during the 
active period of the CDS, Williams in interview with author. 
71. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 3. 
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Rodgers lamented the way that Tribune had succeeded in 
making left-wing policy appeal to young people by giving 
them a direct input into an organisation and allowing 
them to meet "leading Tribune figures socially". 72 This 
meant that there was "real cohesion on the left". 73 
Finally he told Crosland what he wanted to see happen: 
"Was it possible to get some sort of continuous liaison 
on the right from Hugh Gaitskell at the top, through 
Members of the Parliamentary Party, to candidates and key 
workers in the constituencies? "74 
In further discussions they decided to assemble a group 
in London to discuss what should be done. 75 Present at 
this meeting were representatives from inside and outside 
the House of Commons. 76 The non-parliamentarians included 
Dick Taverne, Rodgers's co-organiser of the February 3 
letter and co-organiser of the Group. There was also Ivan 
Yates, another leading light of the Group and the author 
of articles supportive of Gaitskell over Clause 4 in 
Reynolds News, 77 he was very active on the Steering 
Committee of CDS until he left to join the Observer in 
1961.78 Finally there was Michael Shanks, also a Group 
member, Industrial Editor of the Financial Times and 
author, in 1961, of the revisionist tract The Stagnant 
Society79 which sold 60,000 copies and was the first in a 
series of Penguin specials along the lines of "What's 
-------------------- 
72. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 3. 
73. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 4. 
74. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History File p 4. Neither Windlesham 1966 nor Seyd 1968 mention 
this meeting in detail, Haseter 1969 mentions it p 209 but only in passing. Crosland S. 1982, 
mentions it p 100 and quotes from Rodgers without giving the source as the CDS history. 
75. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 4, there is no minute of this very first meeting among 
the papers. 
76. Windlesham 1966, Seyd 1968 and Haseter 1969, were unaware of this meeting and the June 26 
meeting, they give the first meeting as the June 27. In fact by June 27 much of the planning 
had already been done. 
77. See above pp 44-45. 
78. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 13. 
79. The Stagnant Society, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1961. 
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wrong... 1,. 80 Shanks, in common with other CDS organisers 
had spent time in the United States81 and shared 
Rodgers's impatience with the lack of organisation on the 
right of the Labour Party. He became an active member of 
the Steering Committee and later the Editorial Committee 
of the CDS newsletter, Campaign. 82 
From the Commons came the four leading members of the 
Hampstead Set. Rodgers later offered his own verdict on 
the contributions of Douglas Jay and Roy Jenkins: 
"Douglas Jay, although always willing to help, didn't 
play a leading part. Roy Jenkins kept in continuous 
contact, was always very willing to help and served on 
Committees, but he was perhaps less close to us in the 
crucial months than some others. "83 Roy Jenkins 
suggested84 they also invited Denis Howell. Howell had 
been elected for Birmingham All Saints in 1955 but was 
defeated in 195985 and was therefore out of the House 
working in public relations. 86 He was seen as a 
considerable grass roots operator in the Birmingham area 
and became the main organiser for the Campaign among the 
trade unions and Constituency Labour Parties around the 
country. 87 The two key figures were Patrick Gordon Walker 
and Tony Crosland. Gordon Walker was supportive and kept 
Gaitskell informed of what was happening in the Campaign 
and in the liaison committee set up with the trade unions 
-------------------- 
80. John Barnes, "From Eden to Macmillan" in Ruling Performance, edited by Hennessy and 
Seldon, Blackwells Oxford 1987 p 105. 
81. After Oxford he was a lecturer of Economics in the USA. 
82. CDS Papers: Editorial Committee File. 
83. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 13. 
84. Rodgers in interview with author. 
85. Returned at by-election for Birmingham Small Heath March 1961, see below. 
86. Windlesham 1966 p 99, CDS Papers: Origins File, Howell to Rodgers, September 30 1960, 
headed paper. His company was simply called 'Denis Howell, Public Relations and was run from 
Birmingham. 
87. Windlesham 1966 p 95. 
112 
on the selection of Parliamentary candidates. 88 But it 
was Crosland who got the most deeply involved in the 
early phase of the Campaign. 
As discussed in the first two Chapters89, there was a 
general consensus amongst the CDS organisers, from 
Rodgers and Taverne down, that Crosland was the 
ideological inspiration. In the very early period he was 
also the link between the different groups and therefore 
the main inspiration. 90 This was reflected by Walden when 
he wrote the first outline plan for the Campaign in May 
1960: "The only policy the group will have is this... an 
acceptance of modern political, social and economic 
realities as exemplified in the writings of Crosland and 
Galbraith.  91 
Rodgers later described Crosland's effect on the early 
part of the Campaign: 
Throughout the period of preparation before the 
launching of the Campaign Tony Crosland's role was 
crucial. Not only did he give the intellectual lead 
reflected in the Manifesto: he also showed a 
single-mindedness of purpose and discipline which 
most of us had previously believed he had not 
possessed. It was he who kept us at it when we met, 
mainly at his flat, refusing, for example, to let us 
have a drink until we had done three hours solid 
work. He had the authority to keep us together and 
although he in no way dominated the group he gave it 
a lead without which much less would have been 
done. 92 
-------------------- 
88. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 8. 
89. See below pp 12-12 and pp 59-64. 
90. This applies up to the June 26 meeting. His role, other than helping with the 
drafting, declined thereafter. 
91. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock May 18 1960, this letter is the first 
recorded plan of how the CDS was going to develop and is contained in an untitled 
Fite in the 
CDS papers, it was not available to previous writers on the Campaign. 
92. CDS Paper: Rodgers' CDS History File, p 6. 
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Taverne echoed Rodgers's feelings about Crosland, "The 
person who I think contributed most after Bill [Rodgers] 
was Tony Crosland. At the meetings we went to he was the 
driving force. He would constantly say "Look, forget 
about all this talk about intellectualism. We are 
apparatchiks. 1193 
The pattern the CDS was to follow in its first phase was 
laid out in the letter Walden sent to Pickstock 
describing his first meeting with Crosland. Walden and 
Pickstock's thinking had developed further than the 
London group94 and Pickstock had the time to devote to 
the venture. 95 But the older Oxford Councillor was also 
seen as a suitable figure-head because he represented the 
grass roots of the Party: "Frank Pickstock was a great 
strength in all of this because he was deemed by all of 
us to be the real grass roots figure. He wasn't a very 
exceptional figure, he had been a station master in the 
1930s who got an adult scholarship to Oxford, but he was 
a very wise, likeable and greatly respected figure. "96 
Pickstock described his motives for joining up with this 
group in a letter to Rodgers in 1963: 
I suppose I had some local standing; I had also a 
lot of experience of organising; I had an office and 
a secretary; and lastly I was generally unknown 
except as a local politician and an adult educator 
with good trade union connections. I was therefore 
free of the label which the left had successfully 
placed on the right: intellectuals. If in fact the 
new organisation was damned and smeared by the left 
I had no political career to be sacrificed. Though I 
should have had some personal suffering, this was a 
small matter weighed against the issues at stake. 97 
-------------------- 
93. Witness Seminar Transcript. 
94. There is no written record in the Papers of a London Plan other than Rodgers comments to 
Crosland of April 1960. 
95. CDS Papers: Rodgers' GDS History p 10, Rodgers was still trying to make his job at the 
Consumer Association work out. 
96. Rodgers in interview with author. 
97. CDS Papers: Correspondence with F. V. Pickstock, Pickstock to Rodgers, July 3 1963. 
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He and Walden had met at the Extra-Mural Department at 
Oxford. Walden recognised the crucial role a figurehead 
like Pickstock could play in the conclusion of his letter 
to Pickstock: 
Crosland said tonight that he had not felt so happy 
for years. He believes passionately that all this 
can be done. Given the initial surge, he believes 
that the response will astound us all. He made 
mention of his own personal sense of loneliness 
until recently - just the thing you and I had 
discussed. With all my heart Frank, I beg you to 
take this over. Already in Oxford we have willing 
helpers - the same is true of London. 98 
The Oxford group met again on Sunday May 22 and commented 
on a draft of the Manifesto by Pickstock which was to be 
the basis of the launch, though the Manifesto went 
through approximately 20 more drafts before being 
published. 99 
On May 16 the London CDS organisers held their first 
meeting. 100 By this stage the Oxford group had developed 
a considerable plan. Philip Williams reported to Crosland 
the progress that had been made so far. 101 The options in 
this very early period were quite wide and the political 
situation was still confused. The underlying assumption 
was that whatever the outcome at Scarborough a group was 
needed for longer term organisational objectives. The 
discussions in Oxford concerned the nature of the local 
organisations. They discussed options: "(a) a "pilot" 
group in Oxford, to show it could be done; (b) a 
simultaneous launching in as many places as possible, 
after due preparation; (c) a start in Oxford and say two 
other places. "102 Williams also outlined the function 
-------------------- 
98. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock, May 18 1960. 
99. CDS Papers: Manifesto Text File contains 16 drafts, the Philip 'Williams Papers, at Nuffield 
College oxford, contain 4. 
100. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 5. 
101. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Williams to Crosland undated, between May 22 and June 26, 
probably earlier rather than later. 
102. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Williams to Crosland undated. 
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these local groups were to serve: "(a) to discuss policy 
questions without Marxist preconceptions (b) to support 
particular policies within DLPs and TUs (c) to influence 
the selection of Parliamentary and municipal 
candidates.  103 
The initial organisational framework was prepared by the 
Oxford group prior to the June 26 meeting. 104 This 
meeting adopted a committee and it is clear that in the 
early phase it was the Oxford team which made most of the 
running. This only really switched when Rodgers was 
sacked from the Consumer Association and was free to do a 
full time organisational job. Moreover the work in the 
trade unions which became a critical part of the 
Campaign's work in the key period October 1960 to October 
1961 was not clearly envisaged in the early phases. 
According to Seyd "Williams and Walden argued in terms of 
letters to The Times, but this was rejected by Pickstock 
as a typical academic response. It was Pickstock who 
proposed the production of a Manifesto expounding what 
the group meant by socialism... The first draft of the 
Manifesto was written by Pickstock as a basis for 
discussion, to be circulated amongst members of the 
Steering Committee. ""105 While it may well be possible 
that Williams and Walden had such limited objectives 
before the meeting with Crosland, they had both come 
round to Pickstock's view by May 22, over a month before 
the London meeting. 106 Therefore the first draft of the 
Manifesto was actually written before a Steering 
Committee was envisaged and completely rewritten for the 
-------------------- 
103. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Williams to Crosland undated. DLP either refers to District 
Labour Parties or is a typing error and should be CLP. 
104. The meeting on Sunday June 26 1960 was of the Thirteen only, the meeting on Monday 27 June 
1960 was a wider meeting of the group. 
105. Seyd 1968 p 112. 
106. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Walden to Pickstock May 18 1960, CDS Papers: Origins File, 
Williams to Crosland undated. 
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combined meeting of the people from London and Oxford 
which took place on June 26 and established the Steering 
Committee of thirteen. 107 The Oxford group presented a 
united front to this first meeting with the London 
group. 108 
On the day following the formation of the Steering 
Committee the first principal meeting of a larger group 
took place at the Princess of Wales, Dovehouse Street, 
Chelsea. 109 After the earlier meeting of the four members 
of the Group and the four MPs each had recruited others 
to come along. 110 Present at this meeting, in addition to 
the thirteen from the meeting the day before, ll- were 
Ronald Waterhouse, Oleg Kerensky, Anthony Dumont, Fred 
Jarvis, 112 Austin Albu, George Thomson, John Harris, 113 
Alec Grant, Julius Gould and Niall MacDermott. 114 
Pickstock could not attend the meeting115 so the job of 
proposing the drafting of a Manifesto was delegated to 
Ron Owen. 116 
This full meeting endorsed the decisions of the Steering 
Committee of the evening before. A Manifesto of 
approximately 600 words was to be prepared by the Oxford 
group and Crosland. This was to be circulated to 
"carefully selected individuals". It would be released to 
-------------------- 
107. CDS Papers: Manifesto Texts, First Draft. 
108. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History, p5 and Untitled File, unsigned note describing 
Pickstock's movements in May and June. 
109. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of first meeting. 
110. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 6. 
111. CDS Papers: Untitled File, unsigned note describing Pickstock's movements, states that 
Pickstock who could not come. 
112. Questionnaires on the Group, these four were members of the Group. 
113. Albu and Harris were close to Gaitskell. 
114. CDS 'Papers: Minutes File, hand signed and typewritten lists of those in attendance. 
115. CDS Papers: Untitled File, unsigned note describing Pickstock's movements in May and June. 
116. It could not as Seyd states, Seyd 1968 p 112, have been Pickstock because Pickstock did 
not attend; see note above and CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History p 6, states that it was Owen. 
It was as Windlesham 1966 stated, p 96. 
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the press and carry the name and address of Pickstock. 
Once the Manifesto was public the "spontaneous formation 
of groups would be mentioned. " Until this stage, which 
would be after the Party Conference, lists of supporters 
should be prepared and "planned spontaneity ought to be 
the aim in all arrangements, with the emphasis on 
117 
origin", 17 
Since Pickstock had not attended the meeting, Rodgers 
sent him an account of what had been agreed: 
There was unanimous approval for starting an 
organisation. I confess that this surprised me 
because I had expected more caution from the MPs. 
The only doubt was whether it might be regarded as a 
Party within a Party and come under a general 
proscription - or make it more difficult to deal 
with VFS, if this was necessary at any time. But it 
was thought that this could be avoided, especially 
as personalities would not be involved: in any case, 
some risk was worth running otherwise the right 
would remain unorganised and exposed. l 8 
He was also frank about the nature of the proposed 
spontaneous growth. "This spontaneous growth would, of 
course, result from your plans carefully laid in 
advance". 
119 
Throughout July the Manifesto was posted between Oxford 
and London. The evolution of the drafting illustrates the 
hypocrisy of the CDS. It was an organisation within the 
Labour Party but because it was supporting the leadership 
it did not see itself as adding to schism in the same way 
that left-wing organisations did. The first draft that 
had been written by Pickstock for consideration of the 
Oxford Group in May was rather bleak. It read in part: 
-------------------- 
117. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of first meeting, June 27 1960. 
118. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Rodgers to Pickstock, June 29 1960. 
119. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Rodgers to Pickstock, June 29 1960. 
118 
Many members of the Labour Party are dismayed that 
the broad purposes of the Party are being frustrated 
by the ceaseless activities of sects and pressure 
groups and feel the need for unity amongst those 
people, many of whom have given lifelong service to 
the movement, and who, whilst adhering to the 
central tradition of the British Labour Movement, 
recognise that its outlook and policies must be 
adapted to the economic, social realities of the 
present day. 
Such members are today finding it increasingly 
impossible to continue active work in the Party when 
minority groups, unrepresentative of the membership 
as a whole, use pressure group tactics to impose 
their will on the Party. The aim of the ......... is to form a platform on which the mass of the loyal 
members of the Labour Party may unite and act 
together to enable the Party to present to the 
nation a consistent and responsible policy in 
conformity with present day needs. 
This draft was commented on by Walden, Williams and 
Pickstock and revised at a further meeting on Sunday 29 
May. 120 After this meeting Crosland was invited to 
rewrite the Manifesto: "you seemed the obvious person to 
draft it! (to us anyway)""121 
The Manifesto went through an almost complete change 
before being presented to the meeting of June 26 1960.122 
The main subsequent stages in its evolution were for its 
presentation at meetings in July, August and September, 
and finally it was changed after the Scarborough vote 
itself. To illustrate the way the drafting evolved we can 
take what came to be the "ideological background 
paragraph. " This began as simply a call for action which 
was directed at specific targets and open about the form 
of re-organisation required. Key phrases are shown in 
bold: 123 
-------------------- 
120. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Typed, unsigned and undated note discribing Pickstock's 
movements inMay and June. 
121. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Williams to Crosland undated. 
122. CDS Papers: Manifesto Texts File. Philip Williams Papers: Manifesto texts. 
123. My emphasis. 
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We realise that we ourselves will be charged with 
being yet another sect. We are forced to act in this 
way unless we are content to let the central 
tradition of the Party to be destroyed by the 
doctrinaire, ideological Marxist doctrines which are 
being preached ceaselessly. We call upon Labour 
Party loyalists everywhere to join us in this 
effort, and to form groups in all local Labour 
organisations. The purpose of such groups will be to 
unite active and like minded people and enable them 
to act together against the irresponsible and 
disruptive activities of doctrinaire groups, many of 
them containing ex-members of the Communist Party 
whose Marxist-Leninist fervour remains undimmed. The 
members of the ....... regard it as of the highest importance that the responsible leadership of the 
Party, namely, the Parliamentary Party shall receive 
the support they need from the Party. We cannot 
expect the electorate to support the Party, when the 
Party itself gives its leade s so little loyalty as 
it does at the present time. 
Y24 
The specific request that groups form in "all local 
Labour organisations" was toned down as the drafting 
developed. The ideological background paragraph developed 
drastically and is in recognisable form by the fourth 
draft which pre-dates the June 27 meeting in London: 125 
By central tradition of the Party we mean a 
non-dogmatic practical socialism. Though the Labour 
Party has included many Marxists, its inspiration 
has been mainly drawn from trade union, 
non-conformist, christian socialist and radical 
sources. The narrow definition of socialism which is 
prevalent to-day is making it more and more 
difficult for many people to ally themselves with 
the Party. 126 
After three further revisions by the Williams, Crosland 
and Pickstock team it was presented to the July meeting 
of the Steering Committee in an almost identical form to 
the paragraph as finally printed: 
By the central tradition of the Party we mean a 
non-doctrinal, practical, humanitarian socialism -a 
creed of "conscience and reform" rather than of 
-------------------- 124. CDS Papers: Manifesto Texts File: First Draft. 
125. CDS Papers: Origins and Manifesto Text Files. 
126. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Fourth Draft by Frank Pickstock after further discussion. 
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class hatred. The British Labour Movement owes its 
inspiration to British radicals, trade unionists, 
non-conformists and Christian Socialists, not to 
Marx and Lenin. We oppose the narrow Marxist 
definition of socialism which is being insinuated as 
orthodox Party doctrine, not only because it repels 
a growing number of Labour sympathisers but, above 
all, because it dis? 5ts the Party's ethical, 
reformist heritage. 
From there orginally being numerous references to Marx or 
Marxism, these are the only ones that remained in the 
Mnaifesto as published. During the drafting process 
Pickstock tended to play a moderating role on Williams' 
and Crosland's overtly anti left-wing paragraphs. For 
example Crosland's response to Pickstock's fourth draft, 
the first to be seen outside Oxford, contained the 
following paragraph which was quickly deleted: 
We are appalled by the personal venom, directed 
especially against the Party's elected leaders, 
shown by some "socialists" who have forgotten the 
meaning of the word fraternity. A Party of snarling 
factions will neither win, no deserve, the 
confidence of the electorate. 
28 
However Pickstock's role should not be overstated, from 
his first draft almost nothing remained by the time of 
publication, from Crosland's first re-draft paragraphs 
3,4,6,7,8,12,13 and 14 formed the basis for the Manifesto 
as published. 
Full meetings also contributed to the drafting of the 
Manifesto. At the meeting on July 29 for instance, Albu, 
Shanks, Jay, Dumont, Yates, Owen, Grant, Taverne, 
Jenkins, Gould and Kerensky all recommended amendments, 
ranging from Dumont's "less bromide" and Owen's "Needs 
more punch" to Albu's "world government is waffle". 
129 
During the drafting of the Manifesto one of the members 
-------------------- 
127. CDS Papers: Signatories File, 7th draft discussed at London meeting 29 July 1960. 
128. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Fifth Draft, Crosland's in response to Fourth Draft 
by 
Pickstock. 
129. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Notes on discussion of draft manifesto, July 29 1960. 
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of the group, Niall Macdermott, 130 dropped out because he 
objected to the phrase in paragraph 10 of the 
pre-Scarborough draft that read: "we see the 
nationalisation of all the means of production, 
distribution and exchange as a dogma irrelevant to our 
real problems. " The sentence was dropped on the 
recommendation of Philip Williams131 so that the section 
on public ownership read; "Recognising that public and 
co-operative and private enterprise all have a part to 
play in the economy, we regard the public ownership of 
particular industries or services as a useful technique 
to be justified on its merits. " Which brought it directly 
into line with Gaitskell's position. 132 
The second full meeting of the organisers on July 29 
formally elected a Steering Committee comprising Rodgers, 
Walden, Yates, Howell, Taverne, Pickstock and Williams. 
Rodgers was to act as chair and Pickstock as secretary. 
The MPs were also present but did not stand for the 
Steering Committee. 133 After the July meeting the 
drafting continued throughout August and September, 
although the shape of the Manifesto remained broadly that 
of the fifth draft written by Crosland-134 
Sometime during August a possible list of ideal 
signatories was added to one of the copies being posted 
between Oxford and London. It read: Francis Place, 
William Lovett, Robert Owen, G. J. Holyoake, William 
Cooper, Henry George, William Morris, Robert Blatchford 
and Sidney Webb. On Crosland's copy the name Eduard 
Bernstein was added. On another copy Pickstock typed out 
composites of the ideal type of signatory: 
-------------------- 
130. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of meeting September 25 1960. 
131. CDS Papers: Manifesto File, Williams to Pickstock, undated. 
132. CDS Papers: Manifesto File A Manifesto Addressed to the Labour Movement, paragraph 11. 
133. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes Filte, Notes on meeting, Friday Juty 29 1960. 
134. CDS Papers: Manifesto File, Crosland's Fifth draft. 
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JAMES BROWN Alderman, Borough of Porthampton. J. P 
Leader of Porthampton Labour Group. 
Branch Secretary, Transport Labourers 
Union. Member of the Labour Party since 
1919. 
ERIC PIGGS Journalist. Labour Candidate at Pulham 
1955 and at Cowley 1959. 
President Ox ord Union 1953. Secretary 
NALSO 1954.155 
The meeting of the Steering Committee for August was held 
in Oxford which reflected Pickstock's central role at 
this stage. 136 The August meeting approved the final 
draft of the Manifesto subject to last minute changes, 
which in the end were made after Gaitskell's speech at 
Scarborough. The search for signatories really began in 
earnest after this August 28 meeting. 137 
Ideas for people to sign the Manifesto were collected in 
much the same way as members were proposed. Members of 
the group submitted lists of people to be approached. 
Other names, like Silvan Jones138 and CAB Pulham139 
were gleaned from letters written to the press. The 
procedure followed was straightforward and designed to 
minimise the danger of leaks to the press. The need for 
secrecy was stressed throughout. 
140 In the first instance 
the combined meeting of the group assembled on May 16 in 
London and the group assembled on May 22 in Oxford was 
organised by word of mouth through existing contacts. 
When it was decided to expand the number of signatories 
this was done in stages. Firstly a member of the Steering 
-------------------- 
135. CDS Papers: Manifesto File, Undated Manifesto. 
136. CDS Papers: Origins File, Pickstock to Rodgers, August 8 1960. 
137. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minutes of meetings. 
138. See Spectator, March 11 1960. 
139. Manchester Guardian, week before Scarborough, CDS Papers: Manifesto Texts File, Williams 
to Pickstock undated. 
140. CDS Papers: Signatories File, for example Pickstock to Matthews, August 29 or Waterhouse 
Papers, Pickstock to Waterhouse August 29 or CDS Papers: Origins File Parker to Rodgers, 
September 20 1960. 
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Committee would personally contact the target person. The 
people designated to contact the possible signatories 
were allocated as indicated in the list below. 14- When a 
link was made Pickstock was informed and he dispatched a 
copy of the Manifesto with a covering letter asking for 
support. 142 If there was no link but the target person 
was felt to be worth trying then a general letter was 
sent and followed up if necessary. 143 
This procedure was time consuming but despite some fears 
it ensured that no news of the Campaign leaked before 
Scarborough. 144 Rodgers was particularly important in 
helping to track people down; addresses were supplied 
from the Fabian Society files145 and as part of Rodgers' 
job at the Fabian Society he had travelled around the 
country, especially at elections, 146 thereby making many 
contacts. 147 
Of those designated to be contacted nothing further 
appeared concerning Peter Parker, J Madin, Alderman 
Swales, Ian Winterbottom, John Murray, Ross Wyld or AJ 
Champion. The assumption must be that either they did not 
want to take part or they were not contacted. Of those 
that were contacted the Steering Committee was reasonably 
successful in achieving the mix of grass roots supporters 
it required. The MPs in the original group were excluded 
-------------------- 
141. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock members of Steering Committee August 29 1960, 
undated list of people for each committee member to contact personally. 
142. CDS Papers: Signatories File, for example Pickstock to Rodgers, October 1 1960, "Bill 
Rodgers has informed me that you have agreed in principle to join us in signing a Manifesto to 
the Labour Movement. I am enclosing a final draft... ". 
143. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Jim (Conway) August 29 1960, "A small group of 
us who are very concerned about the way the Party is going have been discussing issuing a 
manifesto to try to rally the centre. 11 
144. CDS Papers: Manifesto Texts File Crosland to Pickstock with enclosure, Crosland includes a 
typewritten comment by "a very reliable friend" who commented : "I think your proposed 
time-table is mad. .. it's sure to teak into the press during the summer. " 
145. CDS Papers: Origins File Gladys (Fabian Society) to Rodgers, August 31 1960. 
146. Fabian Society Papers, A14/2 Rodgers to Vowles, May 19 1955, "The last week has been spent 
in Manchester, Widnes, Liverpool and York, mainly electioneering. 11 
147. Rodgers in Interview with author. 
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from the list of signatories. This was an early policy 
decision to ensure that the Campaign appeared as grass 
roots based as possible. 148 The journalists, Oleg 
Kerensky and Ivan Yates, also decided not to sign for 
professional reasons. 149 
There were those who although approached did not in the 
end sign the Manifesto. Harold Campbell who was assistant 
secretary of the Co-operative Party was personally 
contacted by Ivan Yates and invited to the September 26 
1960 meeting, he agreed to sign and submitted his 
biographical details but failed to confirm before 
publication of Manifesto. 150 Alderman Clowes was 
personally contacted by Frank Pickstock and invited to 
the meeting on September 26. However due to illness he 
could neither sign nor attend the meeting. 151 Mr EG 
Coles was suggested by the MP Austin Albu, and was 
written to by Pickstock who outlined the groups plans 
without mentioning the meeting. There is no reply from 
Coles in the files. 152 David Currie was personally 
contacted by Denis Howell and then written to by 
Pickstock. Currie refused to take part, replying that 
"there is no real alternative to a lead from the 
Parliamentary Party. ""153 Percy Morris was suggested by 
Pickstock himself, but replied in a "very queer letter" 
that he would have signed if the Manifesto had confined 
itself to domestic matters or the need for Party unity, 
but could not agree about defence. 
154 Alderman onions was 
-------------------- 
148. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of meeting June 27 1960, point 7. Minute of meeting on 
August 28 1960, Minutes File, Original List with note, undated 
149. CDS Papers: Minutes File, Original List with note, undated 
150. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Yates to Pickstock undated, List of Biographies, undated, 
invitation to meeting September 26 1960. 
151. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Clowes, September 20 1960, Eric Tams to 
Pickstock October 5 1960. 
152. CDS Papers: Signatories Fite, Albu to Pickstock, September 19 1960, Pickstock to Cole 
September 20 1960. 
153. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Currie, October 10 1960, Currie to Pickstock, 
October 17 1960. 
154. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Morris to Pickstock October 12 1960, Pickstock to Morris and 
to Rodgers October 13 1960. 
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personally contacted by Denis Howell, but cried off 
signing without giving a specific reason saying simply 
that "Denis Howell knew why. ""155 As has been noted the 
MPs and two of the journalists who took part in the first 
meeting did not sign the Manifesto, two others from the 
original group also did not appear on the final list. 
Julius Gould who attended the original group on June 27 
withdrew, stating that he had "good reasons", without 
being more specific but continued to support the 
Campaign. 156 Fred Jarvis. who was one of the Group and 
was contacted by Ivan Yates, submitted a biography, but 
later withdrew, it is unclear when or why. 157 
There were in the end twenty-six 
Brian Walden and Philip Williams 
Bill Rodgers, Michael Shanks and 
London group. 158 Then there were 
the first meeting of the Steerin, 
the meeting on June 26. 
signatories, Ron Owen, 
from the Oxford group, 
Dick Taverne from the 
those recruited after 
Committee who attended 
Jim Conway, who was suggested by Denis Howell, was a 
national organiser of the AEU, an early recruit from 
outside the group and one of the first important trade 
union figures. 
Harry Dickson, who was suggested by another of the 
signatories, Frank Price, agreed to sign but his 
confirmation arrived too late for inclusion in the 
Manifesto when it was first duplicated, he did however 
appear on the later printed editions. He was a chief whip 
15 
of the Labour group on Dundee City Council. 
9 
-------------------- 
155. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Onions to Pickstock, September 29 1960. 
156. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Gould to Pickstock, October 10 1960. 
157. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Yates to Pickstock, undated. 
158. The actual importance of the signatories should not be underestimated. Existing studies, 
Windlesham 1966, Seyd 1968 and Haseler 1969, made no attempt to describe those who signed the 
manifesto. The signatories were the basis of the Campaign's claim to be grass roots and not 
Hampstead Set. 
159. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Price to Pickstock, September 29 1960, Pickstock to Dixon, 
September 29 1960, Dixon to Pickstock, October 17 1960, Pickstock to Dixon, October 17 1960. 
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Anthony Dumont, who was a member of the Group and a 
figure who was generally known by the original organisers 
could have been personally contacted by any of them. He 
submitted lists of sympathisers and his biography and 
served as the Campaign's solicitor. He had been a 
candidate in 1959 and was a councillor in Paddington )-60 
Alec Grant had attended some meetings of the Group, but 
he was actually recruited for the first CDS meeting by 
Brian Walden whom he had known at university. 161 He took 
part in all the early meetings except the October 9 
meeting which he could not make because his plane from 
Israel was grounded in France for the day. He eventually 
got back to England and his confirmation arrived just in 
time to be included. He was an officer in the Finchley 
Constituency Labour Party. 162 
TH Hockton was personally contacted by Rodgers. He was 
invited to the first meeting and signed the Manifesto but 
seemed to play little part after that. He had been a 
Labour and Co-operative Party candidate in 1955 and 
1959.163 
David T Jones was personally contacted by Rodgers. A 
long-standing member of the Party and ex-MP, Rodgers 
wrote to Pickstock of him: "He isn't in the best of 
health but otherwise he is likely to be very 
helpful ... just count him 
in. 1'164 
---------------- 
160. CDS Papers: 
161. CDS Papers: 
162. CDS Papers: 
163. CDS Papers: 
164. CDS Papers: 
26 1960. 
Signatories File, 
CDS Questionaire, 
Grant to Pickstoc 
Signatories File, 
Signatories File, 
Dumont to Pickstock, September 20 and September 29 1960. 
Alec Grant. 
k, October 11 1960, Pickstock to Grant, October 13 1960. 
Pickstock to Hockton, September 26 1960. 
Rodgers to Pickstock, undated, Pickstock to Jones, September 
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Silvan Jones, as mentioned above, had written to the 
Spectator in support of Gaitskell. He was contacted by 
Rodgers and then received a letter from Pickstock. His 
reply carried a number of suggested amendments to the 
Manifesto, Pickstock replied appreciating the comments 
"and especially your willingness to agree even if they 
are not accepted... I had almost forgotten that political 
activity could be as happy as this. " Jones had been a 
candidate in 1959 and was chairman of Conway Constituency 
Labour Party-165 
Bryan Magee was a member of the Group and could have been 
personally contacted by any of the Steering Committee. 
Pickstock sent him a copy of the Manifesto to which he 
replied "I approve.. without reservation. " He had been a 
candidate in 1959 and at a by-election in 1960.166 
Gerry McQuade was contacted after writing to Tony 
Crosland and asking "Do you think it would be possible to 
launch a campaign against unilateral disarmament in 
opposition to CND". He was from Scunthorpe and had been a 
candidate in 1951.167 Rodgers invited him to the first 
meeting on June 27. He agreed to sign and offered 
"complete support"; 
168 at a later meeting he suggested 
the name Campaign for Democratic Socialism. 
169 
Dennis Matthews was contacted by Pickstock on the advice 
of Rodgers, and was a very early and strong supporter. 
170 
---- --------------- 
165. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Jones, September 26 1960, Jones to Pickstock, 
September 28 1960 and Pickstock to Jones September 29 1960. 
166. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Magee to Pickstock, September 29 1960. 
167. CDS Papers: Origins File, McQuade to Crosland, June 6 1960. 
168. CDS Papers: Signatories File, McQuade to Pickstock, September 30 1960. CDS Papers: Origins 
Fite, McQuade to Rodgers, September 22 1960. 
169. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History and Rodgers interview wih author. 
170. CDS Papers: Rodgers to Pickstock, October 1 1960, Pickstock to Matthews, September 29 
1960. 
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JH Matthews was personally contacted by Pickstock. He 
was an early contact in Southampton and wrote of his own 
feelings on the situation in the Party; "In their 
helplessness and fear people are falling back on a crude 
traditionalism and a sentimental pacifism. " He was a 
candidate in 1955 and 1959 and honourary treasurer of 
17 Leeds NW 1951-1959.1 
Kenneth May was personally contacted by Rodgers and 
replied to Pickstock with "wholehearted support. " He was 
a candidate in Tonbridge in 1959.172 
Ronald Parker was personally contacted by Rodgers but 
didn't attend the first meeting. However he replied 
immediately and agreed to the post-Scarborough revisions. 
Parker was a trade union divisional officer in the Iron 
and Steel Trade Confederation. 173 
Alderman Frank Price was personally contacted by Howell. 
Price in turn recommended Harry Dickson. 
174 
Vivan Ramsbottom was a councillor in Cambridge and was 
personally contacted by Pickstock. He signed but then 
played little further role. 
175 
Helen Walker was personally contacted by Howell. She was 
Co-operative Society director and former head of a 
national union. 
176 
-------------------- 
171. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Matthews, August 29 1960, Matthews to Pickstock 
August 31 1960. 
172. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to May, September 26 1960, May to Pickstock, 
September 27 1960. 
173. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Parker, September 26 1960, Parker to Pickstock, 
September 27 1960. CDS Papers: Origins File, Parker to Rodgers, September 14 and 20 1960. 
174. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Price, September 28 1960, Price to Pickstock 
September 29 1960. 
175. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Ramsbottom, October 1 1960, Ramsbottom to 
Pickstock, October 2 1960. 
176. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Walker, September 26 1960. 
129 
Ronald Waterhouse was a member of the Group and remembers 
being recruited by "friends and contemporaries". 177 He 
attended the first full meeting on June 27 1960, was 
invited to sign and agreed in early October. 178 He was 
later on the CDS Parliamentary candidate lists. 179 
Harry Waterman was personally contacted by Rodgers, 
accepted and signed the Manifesto without playing any 
major role. He was a candidate in 1955,1956 and 1959 and 
councillor on Leeds City Council. 180 
There was nothing particularly unique about the 
recruiting of grass roots signatories for manifestoes. 
The unilateralists also issued statements and had these 
signed by large numbers of rank and file members. In 
October 1960 the 'Conference Must Decide' group issued an 
'Appeal for Unity' which was signed by 183 Labour 
activists. 181 The following year a CND activist organised 
another leaflet called "This Way to Peace" which was 
signed by 60 rank and file members of the Labour 
Party. 182 
Aside from finalising the list of people to be invited to 
sign, 183 the August meeting discussed the plan for the 
launch itself. Each member was asked to submit an 
annotated list of names of people who were felt to be 
sound enough to receive the Manifesto. It was also to be 
issued to the press (with an invitation to a press 
conference to be held by Pickstock, Rodgers and Howell) 
-------------------- 
177. Questionnaire on CDS, Waterhouse. 
178. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Waterhouse to Pickstock, October 5 1960. 
179. See below on the selection of Parliamentary candidates. 
180. CDS Papers: Signatories File, Pickstock to Waterman, September 26 1960. 
181. Manchester Guardian, November 14 1960. 
182. Noel-Baker Papers: Correspondence 1959-1964,21124, Fletcher to Noel-Baker, November 28 
1961. 
183. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of meeting, August 28 1960, point 2: Signatures to the 
Manifesto. 
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and to all Labour MPs. In order that it should appear to 
be as spontaneous as possible it was duplicated rather 
than printed. A covering letter was included indicating 
that Alderman Pickstock would like to hear from 
supporters. 184 It was also decided to organise a national 
conference in January and to establish a permanent 
organisation. 185 
Rodgers and Pickstock remained as chairman and secretary 
with Taverne as treasurer. As such he was instructed to 
issue an appeal to original members for two hundred 
pounds and Crosland was asked to approach Jack Diamond 
for additional money. 186 By September Taverne had raised 
seventy five pounds187 which financed the postage of the 
first circulation of Manifestoes to the signatories and 
then to the press and the early lists of supporters. 188 
The crucial figure in financing the activity of CDS from 
the outset was Jack Diamond. Rodgers described Diamond's 
role in his CDS History as follows: 
I had known Jack for nine years and had worked 
closely with him when he was Treasurer of the Fabian 
Society. But he was not thought of in a political 
capacity: he was the technician - in particular the 
technician who knew how to raise money. 
As far as I can remember we did not consult him at 
all until after the Manifesto had been published. 
Certainly he was not approached to contribute 
towards the cost of publishing the Manifesto. We 
raised £200 from amongst the 25 or so people who had 
been responsible for launching it. However, he must 
have been approached as soon as the Manifesto was 
published and I think it was by Tony Crosland. From 
then on I was in close contact with him and he 
became the main organiser of funds not only for us 
but for any claimants amongst supporters of 
Hugh. . . Jack worked on the principle 
that if you 
---------------- 
184. CDS Papers: 
185. CDS Papers: 
186. CDS Papers: 
Finance. 
187. CDS Papers: 
188. CDS Papers: 
Origins File, 
Origins File, 
Origins File, 
Origins File, 
Origins File, 
Minute of meeting, August 28 1960, Point 3, Issue of Manifesto. 
Minute of meeting, August 28 1960, Point 5, Future Organisation. 
Minute of meeting, August 28 1960, Point 7, Officers and 
Pickstock to Rodgers, September 7 1960. 
Minute of meeting on September 25 1960. 
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wanted to raise a lot of money, and to do so 
quickly, you should go to the few people with a lot 
of money to spare... The key occasion was a dinner 
given by Charles Forte in the Cafe Royal early in 1961. Hugh was there and Jack, Patrick Gordon 
Walker, Fred Hayday and myself. There were I think 
no more that half a dozen of us but from this 
something over £5000 was raised. 89 
Diamond was consistent in his efforts on the Campaign's 
behalf. The initial donation which recorded in the 
accounts as £5500 was "from Jack Diamond" for the period 
December 1 1960 to December 31 1961.190 Expenditure was 
reduced in 1962 with Rodgers estimating it to be £2500 
and expecting the following year to be approximately the 
same. 191 The vast majority of these funds came through 
Jack Diamond. At the height of the Campaign's activity in 
1960-1961 income from sources other than Diamond amounted 
to £1652 out of a total income of £7153. Donations from 
other sources amounted to £868, in addition the sale of 
publications provided £134.192 The proportion derived 
from Jack Diamond, and in turn from business interests 
that were well disposed towards the Labour Party hardly 
reinforces the image of the CDS as a grass roots 
movement. These figures can put into perspective by 
comparing them with with figures from CND which had a 
total income of £14,367193 for the same period and the 
Fabian Society which had an income of some £10,000. 
Rodgers drafted a set of possible questions and answers 
for the press conference. This detailed brief read in 
part : 
Some possible key questions 
-------------------- 
189. CDS Papers: Rodgers' CDS History pp 14-16. 
190. CDS Papers: Office Administration, Revenue Account for the period December 1,1960 
-Decmeber 31 1961. 
191. CDS Papers: Editorial Committee, Rodgers to Dumont, May 23 1963. 
192. CDS Papers: Office Administration, Revenue Account for the period December 1 1960 to 
December 31 1961, Income Account. 
193. The Left in Britain, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Income and Expenditure 
Account for year ending December 31 1961, Reel Four, W3/12. 
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Q: Would you like to hear from Liberals? Is this a Manifesto for them as well? 
A: Only in so far as it encourages them to join the Labour Party. The Manifesto is addressed to the Labour Movement in which we have spent our political lives. We aren't looking outside and are certainly not interested in any nonsense about an alliance between the moderates in the Labour Party and Mr Grimond. 
Q: You say that you are rallying opinion as a first step and then ? 
A: At the moment we don't know. Preparing and 
getting out the Manifesto has been a considerable 
undertaking. We expect to have our hands very full dealing with the response. Clearly we would not want to waste the goodwill we had secured when there is a 
very important job ahead of all of us in the next 
year. But it is too early to say precisely what we 
shall do. 
Q: Some years ago the Bevanites were censured for 
being a Party within a Party. Aren't you setting out to be that? 
A: Not at all, on the contrary we believe that we 
represent the great majority194 of opinion within 
the Party... There certainly isn't anything 
conspiratorial about us. 
Q: How representative are you really? Aren't you 
the intellectuals again - London and Oxford? 
A: That isn't the conclusion that I would draw 
from the list of signatories. We are very varied in 
our interests and backgrounds. What we have in 
common is considerable service to the Labour 
Movement in one capacity or another - as 
Parliamentary candidates (two of us as MPs) and in 
local government, for example. We are a pretty good 
sample of what a constituency Labour Party looks 
like. 
Q: How much stress do you lay on Party unity? 
A: Of course we want unity - but not at the price 
of meaningless compromise and endless papering over 
of cracks... The left itself never moves towards the 
moderate centre or genuinely acccepts a compromise 
and works within it. There are deep differences on 
defence and they have to be thrashed out. We 
certainly have no time for those leaders who always 
endeavour to be facing both ways - or sit trembling 
on the fence, wondering where it would be safest to 
come down. 
-------------------- 
194. Emphasis as original. 
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Q: In fact, the purpose of this Manifesto is to 
support Mr Gaitskell? 
A: Not solely. We had no ideas that he would be in 
his present position when we began to prepare it. He 
doesn't know about the Manifesto; he may not think 
that our initiative is well-judged., Rgt of course we 
support him and what he stands for. 
As has been shown the reality of the background of the 
CDS wddas far removed from the way it was presented in 
this press conference. Especially interesting to note is 
the way the specific charge that "this is just the 
intellectuals again, London and Oxford", was feared and 
this reinforced the need to exclude the Hampstead Set MPs 
from the public face of the launch. 
Rodgers and Dickstock outlined the procedure they were 
going to follow in an exchange of letters through 
September. During this exchange the question arose of the 
possibility that Gaitskell might not be defeated at 
Scarborough, "I very much agree with you about the danger 
of being lulled back. And I was concerned at the 
suggestion that we might find it wiser to postpone 
publication. If we hesitate I'm sure that we won't pick 
up the threads again and all our work - yours especially 
- will be wasted. ""196 
The basic plan for the launch was worked out at the July 
meeting and then polished at the meeting on September 25. 
The full Manifesto was issued to the press with 
explanations of how the group came into existence and a 
contact address for those who wanted to give support. 
197 
The press conference was held in Room 15 at Caxton Hall 
on Tuesday October 18 at 3pm, 
198 with the release 
embargoed until midnight on the October 18.199 The room 
-------------------- 
195. CDS Papers: Origins File, Notes for press conference, October 18 1960. 
196. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Rodgers to Pickstock, September 28 1960. 
197. CDS Papers: To Lie With File, Notes on meeting of July 29 1960. 
198. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Pickstock to Manager Caxton Hall, the time was first set at 
12 
noon to 2pm but was changed on October 
10 to 2.30 to 4.30. 
199. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of the meeting, September 25 1960. 
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was booked under the name Labour Manifesto Group200 and 
the title Victory for Sanity was adopted in the short 
term. This was developed from Rodgers who had written 
across the top of his agenda for the September meeting of 
the Steering Committee: "Forces of Sanity". 201 A detailed 
press list was prepared and Rodgers used his experience 
at the Fabian Society to identify those journalists that 
"would bother". 202 Rather than leave it to chance the 
list was annotated and members of the Steering Committee 
were allocated people to contact. 203 
Ten days after the initial launch Pickstock204 drafted a 
progress report. It is probable that this report was 
meant for Gaitskell, as Howell and Rodgers met with the 
Party leader at about this time. 205 The initial mailing 
of the Manifesto was in duplicate form with 500 going out 
from Pickstock's office at the Oxford University Delegacy 
for Extra Mural Studies. 206 Each was dispatched with a 
postcard for response. 
207 The envelopes were addressed 
and the response dealt with by Pickstock's helpers and 
Philip Williams' students, including George Jones: 
"... much of the early going through letters, sorting them 
out, doing the card indexes, was done in [Williams] room 
by myself and a number of his research students. "208 The 
first round was sent to the press, Labour MPs and Peers, 
the National Executive Committee and Regional 
-------------------- 
200. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Pickstock to Manager Caxton Hall. 
201. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of meeting, September 25 1960. 
202. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Rodgers to Pickstock, September 30 1960. 
203. CDS Papers: origins File, Annotated press list. 
204. CDS Papers: Untitled File, A Manifesto to the Labour movement, Report, October 28 
1960, 
Pickstock frequently omitted the "Addressed from the title". 
205. CDS History: Rodgers' CDS History, p 8. 
206. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Report, October 28 1960. 
207. Waterhouse Papers: Postcard. CDS Papers: Finance, bill for printing 1,500 postcards. 
208. Witness Seminar Transcript. 
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Organisers. 209 At the September meeting of the Steering 
Committee it was decided that Taverne would try and 
obtain names and addresses from IRIS210 a violently 
anti-communist organisation working within the trade 
union movement, 211 and Pickstock agreed to see Allan 
Flanders to obtain the addresses of the Friends of 
Socialist Commentary. 
In addition to the possible questions and answers Rodgers 
drafted a statement with which he planned to open the 
news conference. His intention was to be economical with 
the truth as far as the press was concerned, "I don't 
want to be tied to a written statement -I don't think 
the press would like it - but this is what I would have 
in mind to say. As you will see, it is the truth, if not 
quite all of it. "212 Rodgers put the launch of the 
Campaign into the context of events since the General 
Election, claiming that it had been "universally accepted 
that considerable changes were required if Labour was to 
climb back to power again. But within three months this 
mood had evaporated", 
213 He highlighted the NEC's 
decision not to use the "Amplification of Aims" as an 
addition to the constitution but simply to publish it214 
as an indication of how far the Party had turned back on 
the need for reform. Throughout the period of preparation 
of the Campaign and in this statement for the launch, it 
was the Clause Four dispute, the need for reform and 
modernisation, which was central. 
215 Rodgers made plain 
in this statement that it was after the compromise on 
-------------------- 
209. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Report, October 28 1960. 
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211. Seyd 1968 p 115. 
212. CDS Papers: Untitled File, Rodgers to Pickstock, September 28 1960. 
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214. NEC Minutes July 13 1960. 
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for the launch of the campaign, but Haseler 1969 p 209 
concentrates alomst exclusively on unilateralism. 
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Clause Four that "a number of us in London began to talk 
together about what we could do. Not only had the 
proposal to modernise Clause 4 caused uproar; there was 
now the chance that the Party would go unilateralist. 
These seemed to us to be symptoms of a very dangerous 
trend.  216 
The press coverage that resulted from the conference was 
in the main favourable and either welcomed the initiative 
or reported the statements by the organisers 
uncritically. The tabloids made much of the launch. 
Victor Knight, in the Daily Mirror, 217 reported the 
Campaign in the desired way, "The call to support Mr 
Gaitskell was made in a manifesto issued by a group of 
Labour Party members, including Parliamentary candidates 
and Party officals". He stressed the value of the 
manifesto and quoted two paragraphs in full. The Daily 
Sketch, under the headline, "Stand and Fight", quoted 
directly from the organiser's statements and answers: 
Alderman Pickstock said, "We are the NCOs and the 
platoon commanders of the Party. We are after the 
people whom we think will stand and fight, " ... "We 
are the rank and file, " said Mr Rodgers... "There are 
no MPs on the list of signatories" said Mr Howell, 
"because this is a grass root organisation. " He said 
that Mr Gaitskell knew nothing before hand about the 
manifesto and agreed that it was a declaration of 
hostilities against Victory for Socialism, "Call us 
Victory for Sanity"... The sentiments it expresses 
and the people who have launched it are just those 
Mr Gaitskell will appeal to in the next four weeks. 
Mr Rodgers said, "We have to begin to do what we 
don't like to do - begin to fight. " 
-------------------- 
216. CDS Papers: Origins File, Basis of Statement, October 18 1960. 
217. Daily Mirror, October 19 1960. 
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The Times218 said the Manifesto was issued by a number of 
members of Constituency Labour Parties and then simply 
reprinted the bulk of it with no other comments. In 
contrast the Manchester Guardian219 gave the story front 
page coverage and in the longest article to appear the 
day after the launch reflected all the things the 
organisers hoped to put across at the news conference. 
Welcoming the initative the paper said that the Manifesto 
was: 
A positive move to rally the Labour Party behind the 
leadership of Mr Gaitskell... its instigators hinted 
that an organised group of moderates might emerge as 
an antidote to the Victory for Socialism pressure 
within the Party... Twenty-six rank and filers who 
describe themselves as "long standing members of the 
Labour Party"... Introducing the document yesterday, 
Mr W Rodgers, until recently general secretary of 
the Fabian Society, Alderman FV Pickstock, 
Vice-Chairman of the Oxford City Labour Group and a 
member of Mr Cousin's Transport and General Workers 
Union, and Mr Denis Howell, member for All Saints 
Birmingham until the last election, said the 
immediate object was to raise the morale of the 
moderates in the Party. "But we are not going pack 
up after today and go home, " said Mr Rodgers. 
Pressed on the question of organising in formal 
groups, he said, "We have not made any decisions not 
to organise. " It was clear that the authors of the 
manifesto considered that the Victory for Socialism 
group had had things its own way for long 
enough... "It was not a qestion of splitting the 
Labour Party", Mr Rodgers said, but of "rallying 
what we believe to be its central tradition"... He 
described supporters of the manifesto as the "hard 
centre". 
But the most positive reaction came from one of the 
organisers, Ivan Yates. Writing in Reynold News220 Yates 
warmly welcomed his own organisation: 
... this 
long overdue decision to counter the 
extremism of Victory for Socialism could go a long 
way to restore the balance of the Party. In three 
------------------- 
218. The-Limes, October 19 1960. 
219. Manchester Guardian, October 19 1960. 
220. Reynold News, October 23 1960. 
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days more than 200 people from all over the country have written or telephoned their support. They include constituency party chairmen, shop stewards, 
regional officers of trade unions. Their response 
makes clear that this is just what they've been 
waiting for. Incidentally the manifesto is 
brilliantly written in flowing sonorous 
language... It deserves to be widely read. Any of our 
readers interested in obtaining a copy shold write to Alderman FV Pickstock, 78 Sandfield Road, 
Oxford. 
The theme which emerged from the earlier meetings that 
set up the CDS, the Walden-Pickstock meeting of May 11221 
and the Rodgers-Crosland meeting of April 11,222 was of 
alienation from the way the Party was going, a feeling 
that this direction was somehow illegitimate. Their 
reaction to this was to assert the "central tradition" 
that they felt they represented. 
At the same time we were convinced that the voices 
which were mainly from the rank and file of the 
Party - against change and for unilateralism, for 
example - were not representative of the Party or 
even a majority in it, let alone the millions who 
had voted Labour. They were winning because they 
were loud, persistent and organised. The potential 
support for sanity was great but nothing was being 
done to rally it. The moderates underestimated their 
own strength; some were giving up active political 
work because they thought they stood alone. Even MPs 
had grown cautious in the face of what seemed to be 
unassailable and militant left-wing majorities in 
the constituencies. 
The newspapers picked up this theme in their coverage of 
the news conference. The Times writing of the Manifesto, 
quoted Rodgers, slightly polishing the draft version of 
the statement: "All of us working in constituencies were 
conscious that the voices raised were not rank and file 
voices at all. They were the 
and organised minority. "224 
voices of a loud, persistent 
-------------------- 
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The silent majority had to assert itself if the Party was 
not to perish, "We were not prepared - as long standing 
and responsible members of the Party - to see this. We 
decided to make some demonstration of our own. We 
discovered a very similar group in Oxford that had been 
convened by Alderman Pickstock and joined with them and 
one or two others including Mr Denis Howell. We agreed as 
a first step in our campaign to publish a Manifesto and 
rally support. We approached a number of active rank and 
file people in the Party and they agreed to sign. We 
didn't want to take a final decision until the Party 
conference but of course Scarborough settled it. "225 
Of course Scarborough did not settle it, it had already 
been decided to go ahead. In the short term Scarborough 
was a slight inconvenience as well as being an 
opportunity. Rodgers realised that defence was critical 
to the credibility of the Campaign but that this had to 
be balanced by not appearing to be the splitters. 226 The 
rest of the statement shows both working in combination: 
The Manifesto explains what we stand for. This is 
clearly not splitting the Party or introducing new 
divisions but rallying it round its own central 
tradition. Of course, we want unity - everyone does 
- but on whose terms? Time and time again there has 
been a compromise in response to the cry of unity: 
and time and time again the left has failed to 
respect it. One prominent member of the NEC now 
believes that unity consists of standing against Mr 
Gaitskell for the leadership. Someone else yesterday 
spoke of "a new statement of policy" on defence. 
What has either of these done to campaign for united 
support for the agreed policies and for Mr Gaitskell 
in the past? There are deep differences on defence 
that have to be thrashed out. We have had enough of 
those who face both ways. 
Some of those who speak of another compromise say 
that it is for the sake of the rank and file. But up 
to 70% of the constituency parties at Scarborough 
-------------------- 
225. CDS Papers: Origins File, Basis of Statement. 
226. CDS Papers: Origins File, Minute of November 6 1960 meeting, the point is stressed. 
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supported Mr Gaitskell and, as we know, very many of 
Mr Cousins' union do so also. The authors of this 
Manifesto are rank and file. We know that we speak 
for many who don't normally raise their voices - and 
other who have been drifting out of active politics 
in disgust at the antics of the left and contempt 
for the soft-centre. We are the - if you like - hard 
centre: we know that we have a majority of decent, 
thoughtful, loyal and long-service members on our 
side. ' 
The economy with the truth employed so effectively in the 
press conference statement extended beyond just the 
press. A full meeting with all the signatories, so 
painstakingly recruited, was to be held on October 9. 
Rodgers worried what these new people would make of the 
MPs presence at this grass roots movement: "I'm wondering 
a bit about the function of the MPs on the 9th. I'm not 
quite sure what they could contribute and what the 
newcomers may think of them. In public we are intending 
to deny that we have any contact. Some of the newcomers 
may be a little more scrupulous about the truth. Could we 
ask them in the afternoon instead? Perhaps you could talk 
to Tony - who I think should be present... It 
is Patrick 
G-W and Douglas Jay I am most concerned about. The 
difficulty applies less to Roy. "228 The mood of the 
organisers was however generally improving. This was 
partly because they were actually doing something, 
but 
also because the response they received was generally 
welcoming. As Pickstock put it to Matthews, "Our plot 
seems to be going well, and it looks as though 
it needs 
to. 229 
Rodgers was also optimistic, especially after the meeting 
of the signatories on October 9: "The more I 
hear the 
more it seems that the mood is exactly right 
for our 
Manifesto. More important, there is real support for an 
-------------------- 
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organisation and recognition that the battle must be 
joined and will have to be carried on for several years. 
Our meeting yesterday was far more solid than I expected: 
no backsliding, ""230 
The effect of the vote at Scarborough had been predicted, 
Gaitskell's speech had not. The defiance of the speech 
appealed to CDS organisers like Taverne who had never 
wanted to see a compromise on Clause 4: "It was 
deliberately not a Gaitskell fan club... it wasn't until 
Hugh Gaitskell's speech at Scarborough that we then said 
'of course now there is no question whatsoever, from now 
on the cause we believe in is personally identified with 
Gaitskell and the issue we must fight is now CND and 
unilateral disarmament because that is the issue we may 
be able to win. '"231 Williams reacted to the events of 
the conference directly; "It's all ghastly - but at least 
we shouldn't have to worry much now about 
momentum... After this week I am sure we ought to revise 
para 1 as well as 4 of the Manifesto if only for 
topicality. "232 After the inevitable re-drafting by 
Crosland and Pickstock the opening paragraph read: "We 
are long-standing members of the Labour Party who are 
convinced that our Movement cannot afford another 
Scarborough. Rank-and-file opinion must now assert itself 
in support of Hugh Gaitskell and of those Labour MPs - 
the great majority - who are determined to resist and 
then reverse the present disastrous trend towards 
unilateralism and neutralism. 233 
-------------------- 
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The press list as compiled by Rodgers was extensive. In 
addition to the list of those to be contacted personally, 
Rodgers listed forty-one other publications to send the 
Manifesto to, including the editor of Tribune and the 
Daily Worker. 234 Extending the mailing beyond the MPs and 
to the NEC to Regional Organisers was suggested at the 
end of September. 235 This gave Pickstock some 
organisational problems especially when Rodgers suggested 
adding Peers to the list. 236 The problem gives an insight 
into just how haphazard the early organisation was in 
many ways: "If we are to send to Labour Peers, Regional 
Organisers, N. E. C. members, T. U. leaders, etc., we ought 
to get someone getting the names and addresses out. I 
have not organised myself for that job, and could not 
manage it now. Is there any member of the group, or 
another sympathiser who could tackle it? "237 Somebody was 
obviously found for the job because the draft report 
shows that, "at the same time and in the following two 
days about 500 copies were sent to selected members of 
the Party all over the country, although there were some 
major gaps in our contacts, notably in Wales and 
Scotland. "i238 These gaps were partially filled by two 
initiatives. Rodgers organised a meeting with Scottish 
MPs to get lists of contacts in Scotland. Present at the 
meeting were Margaret Herbison, James McInnes, George 
Willis, Tom Steele, Tom Fraser, Bruce Millan, William 
Hamilton, George Lawson, Willie Ross, Williams Hannan, 
David Hannan and Margaret McCusket. 239 Of these MPs Will 
Hannan was to be helpful to the Campaign later on. 
240 For 
Wales the slack was partially taken up by the vigorous 
-------------------- 
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support of Silvan Jones241 who was sent "several 
hundreds" for distribution in Wales. 242 
After the first mailing and the considerable press 
coverage the response "was much greater than we had 
expected"243 and the duplicated Manifestoes were replaced 
by printed ones. The first 225 were dispatched from the 
Church Army Press on October 25, followed by 1750 on 
October 26 and a steady flow thereafter. 244 The breakdown 
of the first five hundred responses was estimated as 
follows: 
Local Party Officers 70 
Councillors and JPs 150 
T. U. Secretaries, etc 50 
Candidates and ex MPs 40 
Journalists, Lecturers etc 40 
Co-op Officers 10 
Unclassified Members 130 
Total, approx. 500 
Area Distribution 
London 100 
Home Counties 100 
South and S. W 30 
W Midlands 40 
E Midlands 40 
E Anglia 20 
Yorks 50 
North 20 
Lancs and Ches 80 
Wales and Mon 1010245 
Scotland 
The bulk of the letters in response to this early mailing 
went to Pickstock in Oxford. The names and addresses were 
transferred onto the index cards. Rodgers also received 
letters which reflected a range of reactions to the 
Manifesto. Peggy Crane, writing from Transport House, was 
------------------- 
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144 
disappointed that public ownership was played down and 
she feared that the group would not be "a centre group 
but a dedicated pro-Gaitskell one". 246 This was rather an 
exceptional view. Support was generally based on 
Gaitskell as leader. 247 Michael Pease, a member of forty 
years standing in the Party, not someone who was "young 
in the movement", wrote offering help and support. 248 The 
television interview Rodgers gave the day after the 
launch also produced responses. 249 Support came from 
within the NEC. From Eirene White who while welcoming the 
Manifesto was not optimistic of its chances: "My own 
feeling is that we shall have to split. I don't think we 
can go any longer with the Tribune crowd. But how to do 
this with least damage and how to cope with the organic 
connection with the unions, which slows up any line of 
action one might wish to take, is exceedingly difficult, 
unless Silverman and Co oblige by cutting themselves off 
and so relieve us of the job. "250 Letters sent to Rodgers 
through the Fabian Society were passed on251 and 
Gaitskell forwarded letters he received. 252 
To keep the momentum up and maintain contacts with the 
signatories a further meeting was arranged for November 6 
1960 and a statement On Unity was issued to the press on 
Wednesday 26 October 1960: 
The Manifesto which we published last week has 
brought a magnificent response. The spontaneous 
reaction of correspondents all over the country 
entitles us to express our views on the burning 
question of Party unity. 
---------------- 
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The charge has been made that Hugh Gaitskell's 
leadership is an obstacle to unity. But to the 
central mass of Labour supporters, his replacement 
under pressure would be a far worse obstacle to 
unity (let alone victory). We are convinced that if 
we were now to sacrifice Hugh Gaitskell, the trickle 
out of the Party would become a torrent - and still 
unity would not be achieved.... But unity will not be 
achieved by accepting terms dictated by a narrow and 
unrepresentative minority. The genuine unity we need 
must be based on terms acceptable to the great 
majority - to the 70 per cent of the constituency 
parties who supported the NEC's defence policy at 
Scarborough, and to the mass of Labour voters who 
are so frequently ignored. 
Peace within the Party requires far more mutual 
tolerance than the perpetual malcontents have shown 
for a long time. 
Signed W. T. Rodgers, D. Howell, F. V. Pickstock 
The meeting of November 6 1960 marked the end of the 
initial phase of the CDS. Rodgers had left the Consumers 
Association253 and was therefore free to take over the 
full time task of running what was quickly becoming a 
substantial campaign. 
254 At first he moved into a 
makeshift office in Yates' flat and then into a similar 
one in Taverne's, before finally the CDS itself took an 
office in Red Lion Street. 
255 The Steering Committee was 
confirmed but reduced to Rodgers (chairman), Taverne 
(treasurer), Pickstock (secretary), Howell, Williams and 
Yates. 256 This meeting also considered plans for the 
future. These were to be based on an organisation 
comprising supporters, local groups, regional groups and 
a "council to be constituted on a basis yet to be 
determined". 257 They decided to publish a regular 
newsletter to circulate among these supporters, to 
establish a panel of speakers to put forward their case, 
-------------------- 
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to sponsor resolutions to go before local parties and 
branches and run slates of candidates for party 
offices. 258 
The planning and launch of the CDS had been a 
"considerable undertaking"259 which was carried out with 
considerable skill. With the established expertise of 
Rodgers and Howell, 260 the organisational ability of 
Pickstock and the "willing helpers" at Oxford261 the 
initial period was carried off quite smoothly. The 
organisation was stretched at times but it came through. 
In the course of this activity a closeness and 
camaraderie was quickly built up. There are touches in 
the letters which reflect the mutual esteem the 
campaigners felt for each other and their dislike of 
their opponents. For instance, Pickstock writing to 
Rodgers in September 1960: "I am sorry to hear about your 
'flu and to know that your family too is down with it. So 
far as you are concerned, it is an ill wind that bodes no 
good. My first reaction to your draft statement and 
questions and answers is that I have nothing to add; both 
seem to me magnificant... I hope that you and your family 
soon recover. Your typing may be affected but flu does 
not appear to affect your clarity of thought. "262 Later 
Pickstock wrote to one of the signatories and offered his 
view of Crossman and Benn: "It looks as though they have 
been contorting themselves in the service of Party unity 
for so long they can no longer see a problem when it 
stares them in the face". 263 The solidarity between the 
CDS organisers was undoubtedly important in ensuring the 
speed and secrecy of the organising in the early period. 
-------------------- 
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The care taken with the preparation ensured that the 
launch of the CDS was extremely successful and this 
success carried the Campaign through much of its first 
year. 
The task that the original Steering Committee had set 
itself was to rally opinion in the Party behind the 
leadership by organising at grass roots level. 264 For 
some the primary purpose of this group was to be the 
defence of Gaitskell's leadership. 265 For others it was a 
more general need to rally the centre and right of the 
Party against the left and only became centred on 
Gaitskell after Scarborough. 266 All of the original group 
and those who joined through the summer of 1960 agreed 
that the best way to do this was to issue a Manifesto 
which outlined their view of socialism and the "central 
tradition" of the Labour Party. Their aim was to create 
"a new given factor in the Party" and from the time they 
moved into Red Lion Street they set about doing this. 
Their first priority was to reverse the vote for 
unilateralism and the key to this was a lobbying 
operation in the trade unions. 
-------------------- 
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Chapter 4: 
Reversing the Scarborough Votes. 
The period from the last meeting of the signatories in 
November 19601 until the end of the year was taken up 
with six main tasks: 2 
a) Establishing a properly equipped and staffed 
London office. 
b) Achieving a settled organisational structure by 
increasing the size of the Steering Committee, 
calling together a Council of regional 
representatives who will also be our agents in the 
country, and determining our relationship with MPs. 
c) Developing close and continuous liaison with 
other groups having a similar purpose e. g. MPs 
multilateral campaign, 3 trade unions, Socialist 
Commentary; 
d) Continuing to build up the directory of 
supporters by distributing the Manifesto, asking for 
replies and collecting names, especially from TU's. 
e) Encouraging sufficient press publicity to keep 
the Campaign in the news and to raise the morale of 
those supporters with whom we shall have little 
personal contact - and of other well-disposed 
people. 
1. CDS Papers: Minutes File, Meeting of November 6 1960. 
2. CDS Papers: Minutes File, The First Phase, SC 1: 18.11.60: WTR. There is also a copy of 
this in the Taverne Papers. 
3. Witness Seminar Transcript: Mayhew. The Socialist Campaign for Multilateral Disarmament 
organised the Multilateral Marathon and other similar events. 
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This chapter will be concerned with a detailed 
exploration of these activities as they related to the 
trade unions and the Constituency Labour Parties to 
assess the extent of the Campaign's influence on the 
successful reversal of the defence votes at Blackpool in 
1961. 
Previous writers on the Campaign have offered different 
assessments of the role of CDS in the reversing of the 
votes on defence that took place at Scarborough in 1960. 
Lord Windlesham concluded his study of the CDS with the 
contention that the CDS was not the decisive factor. 
"What then, was the role of CDS? It did not change the 
defence policy of the Labour Party. The policy was 
changed, as it had been made, by the union vote at the 
Party conference. "4 He identified three factors which 
were critical in the change, "the first was the 
leadership of Gaitskell... The second factor was the 
consistent support of the Parliamentary Party... the 
desire for unity was the third factor. "5 But he 
maintained that CDS, 
by analysing the power structure of the party, by 
identifying individuals with power at its grass 
roots and by effectively communicating to many of 
them the reasoned argument for Mr Gaitskell and his 
policy... played an important part in the reversal of 
an historic political decision. But the campaign was 
an agent and not a cause of change. 6 
Professor Haseler was in broad agreement with Lord 
Windlesham. He mentioned the role of the CDS in the 
decision in USDAW and the AEU7 and maintained that "their 
change of policy was not basically due to the 
organisational activity of CDS". 
8 "The contribution of 
-------------------- 
4. Windlesham 1966, p 143. 
5. Windlesham 1966, pp 143-145. 
6. Windlesham 1966, p 149. 
7. Discussed in detail below, pp 161-164. 
8. Haseter 1969, p 222. 
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the CDS was less obvious", than that of Gaitskell 
himself, "but nevertheless real". The fact that an 
organisation was at work in the Party at "grass roots 
level with attendant publicity and propaganda methods no 
doubt raised the morale of loyalist elements". 9 Haseler 
maintained that the Campaign was a significant factor, 
among others, in the reversal of the votes but it was not 
the decisive factor. 
Dr Seyd, generally less favourable to the CDS than 
Haseler, concluded that although the CDS was definitely 
active its role was insignificant in the overall picture: 
How much of the change of heart was due to CDS? I 
think the answer is little. The main cause of the 
policy change was Gaitskell's leadership... it is 
fair to claim that CDS created the conditions within 
the constituency parties that enabled moderate 
opinion to be roused, but it is doubtful if this was 
the case within trade union branches. 
The problem with all three accounts was that, because of 
the limited access to information about what the Campaign 
actually did, they failed to ask certain basic questions. 
These questions related to the possible assessments that 
could be put forward about the extent of the Campaign's 
influence on the voting at the Blackpool Conference in 
1961. Four possibilities present themselves: 
1) CDS was the decisive factor in the results in 
1961. 
2) CDS played a significant role but it was not the 
decisive factor. 
3) CDS had a role to play but it was not a 
significant factor in the unions' voting. 
4) CDS was irrelevant in the change of opinion in 
the unions. 
-------------------- 
9. Haseter 1969, p 226. 
10. Seyd 1968, pp 158-161. 
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These options force one to ask basic questions. Firstly, 
what would have constituted the CDS being a decisive 
factor? If the Campaign had personally lobbied each and 
every delegate to each and every trade union conference 
and persuaded a majority on each to vote for the official 
policy and against unilateralism, would this have 
constituted a decisive factor? If so, this the Campaign 
did not achieve, nor could it have expected to do so. As 
it was, from a standing start, it succeeded in lobbying 
all the important delegates in the critical medium sized 
unions that were needed for Gaitskell's victory. ll If 
decisive is taken to mean that the Campaign was the 
single most important factor in tipping the balance in 
unions then it would have had to have been more 
influential than Gaitskell's own campaign, the influence 
of the Parliamentary Party and the natural movement 
towards unity in the trade unions. Given that the bulk of 
the campaign's propaganda material was made up of the 
virtues of Gaitskell's leadership, the need for unity and 
the arguments of Policy for Peace it could hardly be seen 
independently to have been the most important factor. 
Therefore the first possible conclusion can be dismissed. 
In a similar respect the final option must also be 
dismissed because the existence of the Campaign and the 
level of activity described in this chapter prove that it 
must have had some influence. None of the commentators at 
the time or writers on the CDS since have claimed that it 
was irrelevant. 
We are therefore left with the two options which are 
differences of degree. The problem with assessing these 
options is one of comparison. No comparable organisation 
putting a case in support for the leadership, stressing 
the need for unity and backed by the bulk of the trade 
union leadership had existed before. We cannot compare 
-------------------- 
11. USDAW, AEU and NUR. 
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the efforts of CND in the period leading up to 
Scarborough because it was not operating in the same way 
and the external factors during the period of October 
1959 to October 1960 were very different from those of 
October 1960 to October 1961. Moreover, the operation of 
CND was better funded and it was not a solely Labour 
Party affair because it directed its campaigning to 
targets outside the Party in the general public. As the 
Campaign cannot be compared it must assessed in its own 
terms and judged by its actions. 
The three largest unions to switch illustrated the CDS in 
action. The CDS played a definite role in USDAW. This is 
agreed on by all the previous writers on the Campaign and 
borne out by the evidence. 12 The USDAW vote was followed 
by the AEU conference. The influence of CDS in the AEU is 
disputed. Seyd13 and Minkin14 give the credit for the 
vote at the executive to Bill Carron and his supporters. 
Windlesham15 and Haseler16 agree with this in general 
terms but also give credit to the CDS. As we shall see 
the dividing line between Jim Boyd and Jim Conway 
operating as AEU officials and them operating as 
supporters of the Campaign was rather thin. It was a 
combination of the AEU leadership's desire to change the 
vote and the Campaign's extensive lobbying and briefing 
which turned the AEU. It should be stressed therefore 
that it is not always possible to separate the influence 
of the individual officials and the influence of the 
collective Campaign. However, by combining a detailed 
examination of the actions of the Campaign in each union 
and the changes in constituency votes, this Chapter will 
attempt to assess the degree of CDS influence. It 
is 
-------------------- 
12. Seyd 1968, p 142, Haseler 1969, pp 221-222 and Windlesham 1966, p 
135. 
13. Seyd 1968, p 143. 
14. Minkin 1978, pp 190-191- 
15. Windlesham 1966, pp 121-122. 
16. Haseler 1969, pp 222-223. 
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important to keep the CDS in perspective as part of a 
combination of factors working towards unity and against 
unilateralism. 
In the Constituency Labour Parties the proportion that 
voted for the official defence policy at Scarborough and 
Blackpool has been debated. 17 Immediately after the 
Scarborough Conference Denis Healey claimed 80%18 of the 
Constituency Labour Parties for multilateralism. 19 The 
official CDS view was: 20 
Before Blackpool the views of the majority of trade 
unions were already known. Between them the unions 
opposing Policy for Peace commanded 1,400,000 votes 
at Conference. This means that the constituency 
Parties contributed fewer than 400,000 votes to the 
total, i. e., almost 60% of them supported the 
official policy. There is also evidence that some 
unilateral delegates, appointed at annual party 
meetings early in the year, broke the mandates given 
to them by parties which had later swung to 
multilateralism. The number of multilateral parties 
is now clearly more than even the vote would 
suggest. 
A later analysis claimed that rather than there being an 
increase in the number of multilateralist parties, this 
total decreased over the period: 
The total union vote at the 1960 Conference was 
5,573,000 while accounted union votes totalled 
5,560,000, leaving only 13,000 votes unaccounted 
for. Also unknown is the way the 8,000 votes of the 
Socialist Societies were cast. If one assumes of 
these 21,000 votes that 10,000 were cast both for 
-------------------- 
17. The actual size of the constituency vote in 1960 was 781,000 votes out of a total of 
6,381,000, for 1961 the vote was 868,000 out of a total of 6,282,000. ALL these figures are for 
the votes cast in the defence debate rather than the overall total possible conference votes. 
Williams 1962, p 308. 
18. Seyd 1968, p 152, claims this was a CDS claim, there is no record of the Campaign making 
such a claim and although Healey was well disposed towards the CDS he was not an active 
organiser. 
19. Williams 1962, p 306. 
20. CDS Papers: Philip Williams Nuffield, Correspondance File, undated draft What Happened at 
Blackpool The Facts on Record. This analysis was drafted by Philip Williams and based on 
preliminary research carried out for the Political Quarterly article which appeared in 1962. 
21. Campaign 10, November 1961. 
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and against, and 1,000 were cast as abstentions, then the estimated breakdown of CLP and Federation 
voting would be: 
For: 501,000 Against: 280,000 
Thus in 1960 65% of CLP and Federation votes were 
cast in favour of the official policy... The total 
union vote at the 1961 Conference was 5,384,000 and 
committed union votes total 5,376,000, leaving 8,000 
trade union votes unaccounted for. If one adds the 
8,000 unknown Socialist Societies votes, the total 
unknown votes of these two is 16,000. Again assuming 
that these unknown votes split 50: 50 then the 
estimated CLP and Federation voting would be 
For: 529,000 Against 341,000 
This shows an increase of 28,000 (6%) votes for the 
official defence policy, but an increase of 61,000 
(22%) against the policy. Only 60% of CLP and 
Federation votes were cast in favour of the official 
policy as compared with 65% in 1960.22 
There is actually little difference in the figures. The 
key figure in 1960 is the level of abstentions. In 1960 
this was 208,000 out of the total possible constituency 
party vote of 1,070,000 or 989,000 if one uses the votes 
cast for the constituency section of the NEC as a 
guide. 23 It is probable that the bulk of these 
abstentions came about because of Gaitskell's passionate 
speech. It is also likely that, as CDS claimed, some 
unilateralists broke their mandates to support the 
platform. Rather than stressing, as Seyd does, the fact 
that in 1961 the platform only held onto 60% as against 
65% in 1960, it should be stressed that 65% at 
Scarborough represented a remarkable achievement and to 
keep this to 60% in 1961 when only 20,000 votes out of 
1,012,000 failed to be cast in the defence debate was 
extraordinary. Moreover, Seyd's conclusion that "it would 
seem that within this section of the Labour Party CDS 
lost ground between 1960 and 1961" is false. 
24 The vote 
in 1960 was an artificial high point in which a 
proportion of the vote, impossible to estimate, was 
-------------------- 
22. Seyd 1968, pp 151-152. 
23. Williams 1962, p 308. 
24. Seyd 1968, p 152. 
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achieved not because of support for the leadership's 
policy but because of a desire to see Party unity. The 
increase in the unilateralist vote by 21,000 does not 
represent new votes but the return to the fold of 
previously committed unilateralists. The stability and 
increase in the multilateralist vote represented the 
holding of a high watermark. 
The extent to which the CDS was responsible for holding 
this high watermark is difficult to assess. The 
Campaign's own work in assessing the impact of its 
activity consisted of a questionnaire circulated to 148 
Constituency Labour Parties in which the Campaign was 
active. The findings of the survey were initially used by 
the CDS for its own information before Philip Williams 
pushed for publication: 
If no objection in principle [to publication], have 
you a view between an academic and a popular 
article? The advantages of the second are (1) that 
the academic journals are horribly slow (2) that of 
course it would get more immediate publicity. But 
the great advantage of academic publication is that 
one can then set out the evidence much more fully 
than a daily newspaper would want to do; and as a 
lot of people will want to discredit some of the 
conclusions, the less these rest on speculation and 
the more they are proved the better. 
The findings were used in the article published in 
Political Quarterly. There were five main conclusions: 
1. The sample includes less than a quarter of the 
Parties, more than a quarter of the votes (so they 
tend to be big parties)... The sample was two-thirds 
unilateral in 1960, evenly divided in 1961; this 
suggests it is rather leftish. Its NEC voting is 
pretty representative; those who do better than 
average are Castle, Greenwood, Mayhew, Gordon 
-------------------- 25. CDS Papers: Philip Williams Nuffield, Correspondance File, Williams to Rodgers December 3 
1961. The same letter contains a reference to David Hennessy, Later Lord Windlesham, who had 
started research on his book Communication and Political Power which featured a case study of 
the CDS: "And I've just heard from David Butler that he (Hennessy) thinks he has found out a 
lot of interesting information about where we get our funds from. I don't know who 
he's been 
talking to or what they have told him-or what can be done about it-but I thought you ought to 
know. (Also, less seriously, that when asked by one of us whether he was CND and he replied no, 
he was a Tory, the answer was "Oh, that's all right. " I see what was meant but 
it doesn't sound 
to me as if Mr H's bar conversations are doing us any good? ") 
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Walker. No prominent candidate does significantly 
worse than average except perhaps Wilson (this 
probably because of insufficiently precise information, of details). 
2. Votes on Defence. 
1960: parties 46 M, 86 U votes 95 M, 192 U 
1961 73 65 142 143 
If our tentative estimates of total CLP voting are 
right (and they may not be): then 
1. The non-sample parties were 9-5 in both years (no 
change, perhaps a slight tendency for Us to gain) 
2. The whole shift towards M came in the sample 
parties. In any event, in the sample three U parties 
in eight were won over (one M party in ten lost) 
nearly half of the rest of the Us could be won in 
future (by a generous interpretation of the 
comments) though we have not checked how many of 
ours might be lost again. 
3. Mandating 
Over three-quarters of the parties mandated both 
years. Most that didn't in 1960 were U; in 1961, M 
(but difference not significant. ) Two-thirds of the 
delegates mandated to vote against their own views 
in 1960 were M; two thirds of those in 1961 were U. 
(Suggests U gains in the 6 months before Conference 
in 1960 and M gains in this period 1961; as does 
no. 4) 
4. Dates delegates chosen (figures incomplete). 
Parties voting M both years not yet checked. U both 
years: 19 chose by April, 25 June or later. 
U 60, M 61 : 12 chose by April, 19 June or later 
But there is some evidence that (of parties voting U 
1960) in the spring three-quarters were still U by 
Conference nearly half had gone M. 
5. NEC Voting. 
The sample seems pretty representative (see under 
1). Contrary to our first impression, CDS candidates 
did not do much worse in U parties than the far left 
(Mikardo-Driberg-Davies) in M parties; though the 
"responsible left" (Castle-Greenwood) and "Soft 
centre" (Crossman-Wilson) did better than either. 
26 
The differences in the sample over the year were 
unrepresentative of the overall picture as there was a 
"swing towards us (CDS) in the sample (from minus 101 to 
plus 7)" and a "a small swing against us otherwise (from 
plus 201 to minus 173)". 
27 The sample also reflected the 
-------------------- 
26. CDS Papers: Philip Williams Nuffield, Correspondence File, CDS Sample of 1960 and 1961 
Labour Conference Voting pp 9-10. U: denotes unilateralist Party, M: denotes multilateralist 
Party 
27. CDS Papers: Philip Williams Nuffield, Correspondence File, CDS Sam le of 1960 and 1961 
Labour Conference Voting p 4. 
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geographical distribution of the Campaign. In a more 
general way this was the conclusion presented in the 
article published in Political Quarterly, in 1962. 
Williams was aware of the limitations and problems with 
the research and the picture in the Constituency Labour 
Parties was rather confused. However, it is clear from 
the evidence presented by Williams that where the CDS was 
active the multilateralist gains of 1960 were held or 
improved on, and the slippage of multilateralist parties 
back to unilateralist parties was reduced. 
In the period before the 1960 conference there was no 
organisation putting the multilateralist case in the 
constituencies. 28 The information that moderate and 
right-wing grass roots members received was through the 
activities of the leadership. In the period before the 
Blackpool Conference the CDS was, as will be shown, 
extremely active in putting the multilateralist case. 
Moreover, this complemented a personal campaign by 
Gaitskell himself. The CDS campaign was matched by 
left-wing and unilateralist organisations like Victory 
for Socialism and Conference Must Decide, as well as by 
CND. The activities of these organisations contributed to 
the desire for unity, and it should be stressed that for 
many who supported the leadership the activity of CDS was 
equally resented. Philip Williams summed up the effect of 
the bitter internal feud: 
The excesses of Gaitskell's opponents made his task 
much easier.. . Many unilateralists, being neither 
sectarian nor vicious, were also shocked by their 
colleagues who were. One of the former, an MP, wrote 
to Gaitskell deploring the attacks as "most unfair, 
irresponsible and sometimes pathological"; another, 
a T&GWU member, broke with CND because of its 
tactics within the Party; a third, a Co-operative 
councillor, felt "ashamed" at the Scarborough mood, 
a fourth, a Yorkshire teenager, who made the 
best-received speech at one conference session, said 
that Young socialists deplored the tone of the 
argument and the "unfounded and baseless suspicions" 
28. Although the TUC/NEC policy was circulated through offical channels. 
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of the leadership, and were "sick to death of the petty bickering". . . His [Gaitskell's] opponents never understood that many voters wisely judged a 
political leader not on policies (which may soon be 
out of date) but on character (which suggests his 
response to the unforeseen crisis). To such eople Gaitskell seemed "a lion beset by jackals". 2 
His position was further enhanced by Wilson's decision to 
challenge him for the leadership. Anthony Greenwood, a 
strong unilateralist, made the initial move by resigning 
from the Shadow Cabinet on October 14 to fight Gaitskell 
for the leadership. Once a contest was made inevitable 
"the left wanted the strongest possible candidate to 
oppose Gaitskell", 30 that meant Harold Wilson. 
The week that followed Greenwood's resignation witnessed 
what Crossman described as "the most elaborate fencing 
and manoeurvring I have experienced in the long and 
dreary history of the last nine years. "31 The result, 
after an extraordinary meeting between Wilson and 
Crossman on a sleeper at Euston station, 32 was 
Greenwood's withdrawal and Wilson running as an 
anti-unilateralist and unity candidate. 33 In the ballot 
Gaitskell defeated Wilson by 166 votes to 81 thereby 
consolidating Gaitskell's hold on the Parliamentary Party 
and effectively endorsing his defiance of Conference. 
Although the battle continued to be launched by the left 
this victory marked the beginning of Gaitskell's full 
recovery. His personal contribution to the victory at 
Blackpool was centred on his ability to appear 
increasingly as a unifying leader and to capitalise on 
the desire for an end to the internal battle. After 
Blackpool as the General Election drew closer this mood 
-------------------- 
29. Williams 1979, p 623. 
30. Williams 1979, p 624. 
31. Crossman 1983, entry for October 19 1960, p 884. 
32. Crossman 1983, entry for October 19 1960 p 886. 
33. Williams 1979, p 625. 
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for unity was further enhanced by his stance on the 
Common Market, although this produced many difficulties 
for his loyal allies on the defence issue. 
The other main contributory factor to the success on 
defence was the eclipse of CND. In April 1961 a Gallup 
Poll "found support for unilateralism down to lowest 
level, 19 percent of all voters and 28 per cent of Labour 
ones". 34 This was in part due to the increasingly 
desperate tactics employed by the break away Committee of 
100. The Aldermaston Marches, peaceful and supported by a 
cross section of groups, including many church figures, 
had gradually been replaced by sit down demonstrations 
and extreme rhetoric. This was picked up on and used 
against CND by groups like CDS. 35 
Alongside the activity in the constituency parties and 
factors external to the CDS, the Campaign concentrated on 
the trade unions. Rodgers first plan for the Campaign, 
quoted above, 36 made clear his awareness of the need to 
take careful notice of the unions. Traditionally the 
unions had resisted interference in their internal 
affairs by outside bodies so there was need for caution 
in how the lobbying was carried out. 37 Canvassing only 
started once the Campaign had established a network of 
supporters and the names of trade unionists to contact. 
-------------------- 
34. Williams 1979, p 640. 
35. There were other groups active against the unilateralists and one of these approached 
Rodgers in April 1961. Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Airforce wrote inviting Rodgers 
to a dinner to be held in May. The idea was to set up a cross party group to oppposes CND. 
Rodgers was reluctant to take part and he analsyed the position in the Labour Party, concluding 
"... I am not immediately convinced that this is the moment for a special effort. " CDS Papers: 
Campaign (General), Rodgers to Sir John Slessor, May 21 1962. 
36. See p 144. 
37. Witness Seminar Transcript, Seyd. For a discussion of the relationship between the Trade 
Unions and the Labour Party see Martin Harrison Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, 
George Allen, London 1960 pp 129-262, for more recent debates, Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook, 
(editors), Trade Unions and British Politics Longman, London 1982, pp 258-272 and pp 171-215 
and Andrew Taylor The Trade Unions and the Labour Party Croom Helm, London 1987 pp 288-298, 
which concentrates on the later period. 
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The objective of the lobbying operation in the unions was 
to reverse the Scarborough Vote. Specifically it was to 
maximise the majority for Policy for Peace, defeat the 
TGWU resolution and neutralise the AEU. To achieve these 
objectives the Campaign attempted to fill what the 
Campaign organisers saw as a vacuum in the defence 
debate: no one was putting the multilateralist case. They 
provided briefing and propaganda material, circulated 
approved amendments and resolutions and established 
contacts in all the major unions. 
The existing accounts of CDS activities in the unions 
either concentrate simply on the Big Six unions or give 
few details as to what the Campaign actually did. 38 Out 
of the seventy three unions listed by Hindall and 
Williams39 there is documentary evidence for CDS activity 
in twenty-six. 40 If these figures are broken down by size 
and position we see that CDS concentrated on the bigger 
unions and ones that were judged to be susceptible to 
pressure. They did not however exclude any union in which 
they had contacts. The objective was not just to win in 
1961, it was to produce the biggest majority possible. 
Tables 4.1 to 4.5 in the appendix to this chapter 
summarise the spread of CDS activity and show the size of 
the trade union voting. 
Before trying to establish the extent of the Campaign's 
influence on the successful results at Blackpool in 1961, 
it is necessary to establish what the Campaign actually 
did in each of the 26 unions in which it was active. In 
general the Campaign first established who it was 
necessary to contact in each trade union. These 
individuals were either approached directly or others 
-------------------- 
38. Windtesham 1966, pp 110-114, and Seyd 1969, pp 149-163. Windtesham concentrates on the Big 
Unions and gives no details, Seyd explores the CLPs and gives no details of the efforts in the 
Unions. 
39. Williams 1962, p 309. 
40. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File and Red File. 
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were encouraged to see them. In addition, small groups 
were assembled and the multilateralist case was put to 
these groups, either by local supporters or by the trade 
union organisers of the Campaign. According to the 
leading CDS organiser in this field, Denis Howell, it was 
not made explicit that the speakers were from the CDS but 
"everyone knew what was going on". 41 A similar technique 
was applied to the Constituency Labour Parties and "Tea 
Meetings" were organised at which small groups of 
activitists heard the multilateralists case. 42 
The most valuable group of unions who voted for the 
leadership in 1961 were those that actually changed sides 
between the two conferences, in the main doing so at 
their own delegate conferences held in May, June and July 
1961. Of these unions that changed sides the CDS was 
active in the AEU, USDAW, NUR, Foundry Workers, Vehicle 
Builders, Metal Mechanics and ASLEF. 43 These unions had a 
total block vote of 1,419,000.44 There is no recorded 
activity by the CDS in the Musicians, Electrotypers, 
Stove Grate Workers and Tailors and Garment Workers who 
also changed sides. But these unions had a total block 
vote of only 98,000.45 The CDS was active among all the 
numerically significant unions that swung. This does not 
of itself prove anything, it merely establishes that the 
Campaign's assessment of which unions were likely to 
reverse their votes was sound. But only two unions which 
remained unilateralist received comparable attention, the 
Boilermakers and the Sheet Metal Workers. 
46 
-------------------- 
41. Denis Howell in interview with author. 
42. Denis Howell in interview with author. 
43. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File and Brown File. 
44. Williams 1962, p 309. 
45. Williams 1962, p 309. 
46. Williams 1962, p 309, CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown and Red File, section on the 
Boilermakers and Sheet Metal Workers, both stayed unilateralist. 
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The armoury that the CDS employed in its campaign in the 
unions consisted of the quality of the multilateralist 
case, the major pressure for unity being exerted 
throughout the union movement and the organisational 
resources to get their message across. This message was 
based on the agreed joint TUC-NEC Policy for Peace, which 
advocated: 
Multilateral and comprehensive disarmament under 
international control ... accompanied by a steady increase in the authority and scope of the United 
Nations... Fresh negotiations on general disarmament 
with neutral countries taking part. Agreements to 
ban nuclear tests and stop the spread of atomic 
weapons. The establishment of a non-nuclear zone of 
controlled disarmament in Central Europe as a first 
step to disengagement... It may well be that within a 
few years western defence will not require America 
to have bases overseas. Meanwhile, as a loyal member 
of the alliance, Britain cannot oppose on principle 
the establishment of allied bases on her territory. 
But she must remain free to decide according to the 
circumstances of the case whether or not any 
particular project should be accepted and under what 
conditions... We seek the banning of all nuclear 
weapons everywhere. But the West cannot renounce 
nuclear weapons so long as the Communist bloc 
possesses them... Britain however should cease the 
attempt to remain an independent nuclear power, 
since this neither strengthens the alliance nor is 
it now a sensible use of our limited resource. 47 
This policy can be summarised as "an international 
multilateralist case, but a national unilateralist 
case. j148 
Copies of this policy were dispatched to unions along 
with the Campaign's own Ten Points on Defence and 
Disarmament which were: 
1) A unilaterally disarmed Britain would increase 
the possibility of war by encouraging an aggressor 
to believe he could win. This is what happened in 
the 1930s. 
-------------------- 
47. CDS Papers: CDS Handouts, Policy for Peace. 
48. See above, Chapter 2. 
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2) If all countries gave up their arms, or reduced them to a low level, none would be in a position to 
consider war. 
3) Disarmament can be negotiated by governments... No trade union would voluntarily surrender a position 
of strength before entering a negotiation. It is as silly for Britain to do so. 
4) If unilateralism is the best way to peace, why 
isn't Mr Khruschev a unilateralist? 
5) Would the world be safer and the chance of 
nuclear war more remote with the Germans armed with H-bombs and leading Western Europe? 
6) As for NATO, if Mr Khruschev and his British 
allies dislike it, why don't they set an example and 
renounce their own Warsaw Pact? 
7) In any case there is real hope of achieving 
all-round multilateral disarmament. 
8) The Arab-Asian bloc believes in disarmament only by negotiation. This applies to all the Commonwealth 
governments at the recent London Conference. If 
Britain went unilateralist we would not only let 
down the Western Alliance, we would desert the 
Commonwealth too. 
9) The Labour Party would betray the cause of 
solidarity amongst socialist working people 
throughout the democratic world. 
10) Ordinary men and women don't believe in it - as 
public opinion polls have shown. In recent 
Parliamentary by-elections they have voted firmly 
against it. IF LABOUR IS UNILATERALIST - THERE WILL 
NEVER BE A LABOUR GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE 
DECISION. 49 
Armed with these policy statements the CDS set out to 
spread the word in the trade unions. The largest union to 
switch was the AEU. 50 It was this union that had 
sponsored the most straightforwardly unilateralist motion 
at the 1960 conference, which had achieved the largest 
majority against the platform. 51 The first task for CDS 
was to establish who it was necessary to target within 
the union. The structure of the AEU was more complex than 
most unions and therefore at once more difficult and 
easier to lobby. More difficult because one body within 
the union could override the other, easier because the 
AEU could be made to be facing both ways. 52 
-------------------- 
49. CDS Papers: CDS Handouts, Ten Points on Defence and Disarmament. 
50. Williams 1962, p 309 and see Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in appendix. 
51. LPACR 1960, p 202. 
52. Minkin 1978, p 175. 
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The structure of the AEU was as follows: 
It had an elected National Committee as its national 
policy-making body, an elected Executive Council to 
govern the union and an elected Final Appeal Court 
to adjudicate on constitutionality. The membership 
directly elected, for limited terms of office, its 
President and General Secretary. And they also 
directly elected, annually, the delegation of union 
members to ý3 sent to the TUC and the Labour 
Conference. 
The CDS was helped considerably by the support of the 
union's President Bill Carron; Jim Boyd, a member of the 
executive council and one of the three National 
Organisers; and Jim Conway, who had signed the Manifesto. 
These highly placed officials operated within the union 
and supplied CDS with a list of the delegates to the 
National Committee, the TUC and the Labour Party 
Conference. The nature of the campaign to influence these 
delegates has never been described, although it has been 
mentioned: 
By early spring, with Gaitskell high and dry as 
Party leader, a new policy document agreed and the 
anti-unilateralist campaign gathering momentum, the 
chances of reversing the decision through National 
Committee looked better. But again the results of 
much hard organising were disappointing. Of the 
resolutions submitted for the National Council 
agenda, fourteen were explicitly unilateralist 
whilst only five were explicitly "anti". 54 
and 
The open hostility with which the contest had been 
conducted made it a comparatively easy matter for 
any diligent outsider to find out who the key men in 
the union were and what policies they supported.. In 
the application of pressure CDS never varied their 
technique. Avoiding large meetings where there were 
likely to be as many opponents as supporters, they 
sought out potential sympathisers either in small 
groups or individually and put the case for 
collective security and Mr Gaitskell's leadership. 
55 
--- 
53. 
-------- 
Minkin 
----- 
1978, 
--- 
p 
- 
176. 
54. Minkin 1978, p 190. 
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Neither account deals with the detailed actions of the 
Campaign. Rodgers obtained the delegate lists from Bill 
Carron and additional names were sent from Bill Webber. 56 
Rodgers and Howell then analysed the list to identify 
those delegates who needed to be contacted and sent 
briefing material. The analysis was done in columns 
labeled Patrick Gordon Walker, Jim Boyd and CDS from 
which a "picture" of each delegate was built. 57 It was a 
fairly rudimentary form of analysis, mainly just a tick 
or a "no" with occasional comments. 58 
The list identified 18 possible or definite supporters of 
the official defence policy and the approaches made to 
them. Of the 18, the 14 who were deemed to be "For" the 
official policy received Campaign, defence statements and 
a letter. 59 The four who were thought to be uncertain 
were assessed this way largely because of a lack of 
information or information from only one source which not 
could be confirmed. The unknowns were chased by Rodgers 
who tried to get more information about two of these, E 
Frow and W Jump, from James Hennessy who was in the 
AEU. 60 One of the delegates, a Mr Sharpe, presented a 
difficulty because he was a firm supporter of the 
-------------------- 
55. Windlesham 1966, pp 122-123. This passage is inaccurate in two respects. Firstly CDS 
varied its tactics with each union and each situation, secondly, CDS were not "outsiders" they 
had links within the union from the President downwards. 
56. Denis Howell in interview with author and CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, AEU Delegate 
List. 
57. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, AEU Delegate List annotated. 
58. see Table 4.4 in appendix, AEU Delegate List, annotated. 
59. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers did a mailing to the AEU supporters on March 30 
1961 enclosing "A short note of information and arguments on defence and a copy of the joint 
Labour Party-TUC policy statement". This was a follow up to the week before when copies of 
Campaign had been dispatched. They were sent to Jones of Merthyr Tydfil, Richards of Cwmbran, 
Butter of Coventry, Careless of Crewe, Smith of Consett, Aitken of Kilamarnock, Flowers of 
Dumbarton, Maley of Refrewshire, Shelton of Leicester, McColl of Glasgow, Calder of Kendal. At 
the same time Hooley of Chilwell was sent Ten points on defence and Campaign. In April Ramsden 
of Chapel Fields, Sharpe of Barton-on-Humber, were approached. Red File, Rodgers to Ramsden, 
April 13 1961. 
60. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Hennessy, March 27 1960. 
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official defence policy but had also supported the local 
unilateralist MP, Mallalieu. Rodgers utilised a 
signatory, 61 Gerry McQuade, to check out Sharpe. McQuade 
reported that Sharpe was sound. 62 
Earlier in 1961 Rodgers wrote to Shelton, who was on the 
AEU National Committee and marked on the list as a 
supporter of CDS: "Certainly in our experience there is a 
very wide spread feeling that the Scarborough Conference 
decision must be reversed, and that militant and 
unrepresentative minorities must not be allowed to drown 
the voice of men and women of goodwill and 
commonsense. "63 Shelton replied: 
This year I am the delegate for No. 17 Division along 
with G Butler from Coventry at National Committee. 
We are two new delegates replacing two who have been 
delegates for a number of years mainly because of 
their voting on the resolution on Unilateral 
Disarmament... I would like you to give me advice 
also names and address of AEU National Committee 
Delegates for this year's Conference. 4 
The letter concludes with the resolution submitted to the 
conference by Division 17 which illustrates the complex 
structure of the AEU: 
That this Divisional Committee requests National 
Committee to instruct Executive Council to ensure 
that the policy of our union shall be that Her 
Majesty's Government pursue at all levels the need 
for complete world disarmament of all destructive 
weapons but whilst the United Kingdom remain a 
-------------------- 
61. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Newer supporters were also used in this way. Colin 
Gray was asked to check Arnold, Red File, Rodgers to Gray, March 27 1961. Bob Wilton was asked 
to check up on Mr W Heaton of Dursety and Porter of Bridgewater. Red File, Rodgers to Wilton, 
March 28 1961. Rodgers checked with Mrs B Baxter on Hootey of Chilwell, Nottingham, Green of 
Mansfield and Spendlove of Carlton. After a little prompting Baxter reported on Spendlove that 
"He is a delegate to the AEU annual conference and a Mr Hadden who is an AEU official is 
prepared to vouch for him. Hadden is on your list of supporters. " Red File, Rodgers to Mrs 
Baxter, March 13 1961, Rodgers to Mrs Baxter, March 27 1961, Mrs Baxter to Rodgers, March 28 
1960. 
62. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to McQuade, March 27 1960. 
63. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Shelton to Rodgers, undated. 
64. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Shelton, March 3 1961. 
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member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation we continue to accept the responsibilities and duties incumbent in being a member of this organisation. 
Rodgers forwarded a copy of the resolution to Gaitskell 
and George Brown. 65 The Campaign's activity was 
concentrated on the delegates' voting on defence. 66 Once 
a delegate was established as being an opponent he 
received no material from CDS to ensure that the 
knowledge of outside interference were kept to a minimum. 
There were two categories of opponents in the AEU, the 
communists and the unilateralists. The fight against the 
communists had been prolonged within the union and they 
had concentrated support in certain areas. 67 Rodgers 
jotted down his prediction on the end of the National 
Committee list: 
FOR 14 PROBABLY FOR 4 POSSIBLY FOR 9 
CP AGAINST 14 PROBABLY AGAINST 9 
NO INFORMATION 268 
He was almost exactly right: "the unilateralist 
resolution was defeated by twenty-eight votes to twenty 
69 three with one abstention". 
Another large union that switched was USDAW, the shop and 
distribution workers organisation. The Annual Delegate 
Meeting of USDAW presented a complex problem for the CDS 
-------------------- 
65. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Note on House of Commons Note Paper, Gordon Walker was 
kept up to date on all these developments. Red File, Rodgers to Walker, March 30 1961. 
66. The Campaign got further involved in the internal workings of the AEU when Jim O'Hagen of 
the AEU North London District contacted Gordon Walker in July 1961 to try and enlist C'DS help 
in the election for President of the District. The area contained 36,000 members but in the 
election of 1960 only 2100 voted. O'Hagen recounted that he lost to Jones and found himself in 
a rather isolated position which he described to Gordon Walker: "I was a delegate to the London 
Labour Party Conference last weekend. We were mandated by the Commies who sit on the Political 
sub committee of the London North District Committee. They choose the delegates and make the 
resolutions. Its a farcical set up! On the actual District Committee acting on behalf of 34 
thousand engineers. There are 30 delegates. There is a regular attendance of 26. Twenty are 
party members, with 5 fellow traveller and yours truly. " See CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red 
File, O'Hagan to Gordon Walker July 15 1961, forwarded by Gordon Walker and CDS Papers: Trade 
Unions, Red File, O'Hagan to Gordon Walker, March 29 1962. 
67. Minkin 1978, pp 180. 
68. GDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, AEU National Committee Delegate list, back page. 
69. Minkin 1978, p 191. 
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because the General Secretary, Walter Padley, was 
sponsoring a compromise defence policy that he had worked 
out with Richard Crossman. 7° Padley asked the CDS 
supporters proposing the offical policy to withdraw it in 
favour of the compromise he was putting forward. 
[Palley] was not anxious that the official policy 
should be put to a vote and made an attempt to get 
the multilateralist resolution withdrawn by its 
mover, T Fyfe. As a supporter of CDS Fyfe, together 
with W Kemp, an area organiser in the union's 
Scottish division, turned to the Campaign for 
advice. The result was that Fyfe declined to 
withdraw, although after hearing Padley's speech he 
said he intended ýo vote for Padley's proposal as 
well as his own. 7 
CDS had a base of 40 supporters spread around the 
branches of USDAW, none of whom appeared on the list of 
the National Executive Committee delegates. 72 The CDS 
Whip in Aberdeenshire was S Davidson. 73 He informed 
Rodgers that Fyfe had moved the successful 
multilateralist resolution and that he himself had moved 
an amendment to the unilateralist resolution. In replying 
to Davidson Rodgers revealed that the CDS was supplying 
resolutions to Fyfe and Kemp, although these particular 
resolutions were sent after Conference, "I am enclosing a 
copy of resolutions which I sent to Mr. Fyfe and Mr. Kemp 
last Friday. "74 The consultation mentioned by Windlesham 
could have been with Kemp and Davidson - Davidson 
described Fyfe as a friend -75 or they may have 
telephoned Rodgers at the CDS Office. 76 All the main 
participants in this resolution were involved in the CDS. 
-------------------- 
70. On the Padtey-Crossman plan see Crossman 1981, entry for February 23 1961, pp 929-934 and p 
950 and Williams 1979 pp 643-644. 
71. Windtesham 1966, pp 134-135. 
72. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, List of USDAW supporters, handwritten, unsigned, 
undated. 
73. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Davidson to Rodgers, May 3 1961. 
74. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Davidson, May 8 1961. 
75. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Davidson to Rodgers, May 3 1961. 
76. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Kemp to Rodgers, February 22 1962. Rodgers and Kemp 
were certainty talking on the telephone about the 1962 Conference. 
169 
Seyd claimed that the CDS drafted the resolution although 
he gave no source for this claim. It is likely that the 
resolution was drafted by the Campaign but there is no 
documentary or oral evidence for this. 77 However, the CDS 
clearly intervened and stiffened the resolve of its 
supporters in USDAW to ensure that the official policy 
was passed. This in combination with the AEU vote started 
the bandwagon rolling as well as ensuring the maximum 
possible majority for the official policy. 
In February 1962 Rodgers wrote to Kemp asking about the 
situation in USDAW and telling him that Frank Nodes was 
coming to Scotland: "In the next two or three weeks I am 
hoping that we shall be able to send up to Scotland Mr 
Frank Nodes, a former Labour Party Agent, who did some 
very useful work for us in the TGWU last summer. There is 
a general feeling that we ought to try and do more in 
Scotland, particularly in the Lowlands, and I am sure 
that Frank is the man for the job. "78 Kemp replied from 
Aberdeen79 with an amendment to the unilateralist 
resolution No. 81 and asked Rodgers to get other branches 
to submit amendments. He also enclosed two copies of the 
agenda. 
The activity of the CDS in both the AEU and USDAW was 
limited but influential. The decision not to withdraw the 
official policy from the USDAW conference was important 
because it established a momentum for Policy for Peace. 
In the AEU the right-wing leadership made use of the 
Campaign's resources to help influence the different 
bodies and delegates concerned. 
-------------------- 
77. Seyd 1968, p 141, Seyd also states that George Lindgren was to be appointed a full time 
organiser in Scotland but was unable to do this and Denis Howell took the job with William 
Hannan working in Scotland. Again he gives no source for this information. Frank Nodes, see 
below, was also employed as a field organiser but there is no mention of the offer to Lingren 
in the Papers. 
78. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Kemp, January 5 1962. 
79. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Kemp to Rodgers, February 22 1962. 
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The CDS started from a very hopeful position in the NUR 
because the decision to mandate delegates to vote for 
unilateralism had been made by a majority of only one. 80 
As early as May 4 1961 Rodgers was being assured by Solly 
Pearce, editor of Leeds Weekly Citizen, that "the NUR is 
in the bag or will be when it meets. It is thought that 
about 27 of the 75 delegates can be described as left. "81 
Even with this information Rodgers sent out a mailing 
with a letter from a signatory to the manifesto, David T 
Jones, accompanied by the pamphlet Nuclear Disarmament, 
the official Policy for Peace and Ten Points on Defence 
and Disarmament. 82 The letter from Jones read: 
In the last General Election, in October 1959, I 
lost my seat in Parliament after fourteen years in 
the House of Commons. Since then I have been working 
for the British Transport Commission. 
But with a lifetime of activity in the Labour 
Movement behind me, I have not lost my interest in 
politics - or my deep concern for seeing a Labour 
Government in power again. Is is because of this, 
and my membership of the NUR since 1912, that I am 
writing to you now. 
Six months ago I was a signatory of a manifesto 
issued by long-standing members of the Labour Party 
which, amongst other things, declared support for 
Labour's traditional policy of collective security 
and multilateral disarmament. The great success of 
the manifesto led to the founding of the Campaign 
for Democratic Socialism with Lord Attlee as its 
President and pledged to work for the reversal of 
the Scarborough decision on defence. 
As I have reason to believe that you share my point 
of view, I would like to say, as one NUR member to 
another, that this year's Annual General Meeting at 
Edinburgh could have far reaching consequences for 
the Labour Party. The NUR was responsible for the 
resolution which brought the Party into existence. A 
vote now for unilateralism could mean a vote for its 
virtual extinction as a major political force. On 
-------------------- 
80. Witness Seminar Transcript, Rodgers. Confirmed in Williams 1979, p 593 and Wyatt in The 
Sunday Times, October 30 1960, see Windlesham 1966, p 139. 
81. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Pearce to Rodgers, May 4 1961. The Leeds Weekly 
Citizen was a consistent supporter of CDS. 
82. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, David T Jones to Delegates, May 26 1961. 
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the other hand, if our union firmly supports the 
official policy agreed between the Labour Party and the TUC, there is a real chance that Labour will 
after all win the next General Election. 
I am enclosing one or two items which may interest 
and help you when it comes to putting the case. I 
should be very glad to hear from you if you would like additional copies, or there is any further 
assistance I can give. 
Much as in the AEU, detailed lists of the delegates to 
the Annual General Meeting were compiled with notes as to 
the position of delegates on the defence issue. The lists 
for 1962 came from an MP, Popplewell. 83 There were 77 
delegates in all. The 44 delegates felt to be sound 
received briefing material and the letter from David T 
Jones. 84 There were a number of sources of information on 
the others. Patrick Gordon Walker, Poppleweil, the CDS 
itself and two others identified only by their initials, 
NK and CW. 85 Denis Howell and HB, possible Herbert 
Bowden, also made comments. 
The analysis of the NUR delegates followed a familiar 
pattern. Established contacts were asked to check the 
"soundness" of delegates and these were followed up 
accordingly. 86 Denis Howell was also active in this 
respect and forwarded his information to Rodgers at the 
London Office. 87 Occasionally they would not track the 
person down, and would base their assessments on discreet 
enquiry, for example, Bob Mitchell was asked to find out 
about Mr T Allen and replied: 88 
-------------------- 
83. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, List of delegates with note from Popplewell. See 
Appandix to this chapter, Table 4.5. 
84. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, NUR Delegate list, annotated. 
85. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, there is no other indication who these individuals 
were. 
86. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, For example, William Hannan the Scottish MP was sent the 
full list of delegates for comment, March 13 1961 and Robert Scarth was asked for his views on 
Mr Butler. Scarth replied that he was an ex-communist who was "believed to be sound 
generally. " Another MP, Robert Mitchell, was asked for his views on NUR delegates on March 13 
1961. 
87. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Metlors was a Communist, Benton and Denis Howell to 
Rodgers, March 21 1961. 
88. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Mitchell, March 13 1961. 
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He is not an active member of the Labour Party and 
plays no part locally... he is described as a 
constant critic and opposed to 'academics'. From our 
point of view I doubt whether he is reliable. I have 
not been able to find out his views on defence... 
With regard to Mr EB Cox my only contact in th 
Eastleigh constituency has never heard of him. 89 
Rodgers contacted Phyllis Stedman concerning Mr GW 
Wilson. Stedman replied, "I have had a word unofficially 
with an NUR branch secretary locally re. Wilson of 
Stanground and they do not know where he stands on 
defence, but he is a bit erratic at times. Hubert Turner 
is the local NUR EC member and he comes from that side of 
the city. Again I do not know how sound he is on defence 
but if you have any knowledge of him, he might be able to 
influence Wilson. 1190 
Labour Party officials also helped the Campaign, for 
example Rodgers asked Bill Gray91 the agent in Faversham 
for an opinion of Mr S Wimble. Gray replied, "He appears 
not to have any definite views for or against 
unilateralism, but would, in my opinion, be worth working 
on for our case. His branch is not "left" and I think in 
the end would support multilateralism. "92 
Patrick Gordon Walker forwarded an agenda for the NUR 
conference to Rodgers. 
93 As with McQuade, Rodgers 
-------------------- 
89. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Mitchell to Rodgers, March 16 1961. Another example 
of this in the NUR was over Adcock who Rodgers asked Bob Wilton to comment on. 
Brown File, 
Rodgers to Wilton, March 13 1961. Wilton replied, "The gentlemen is certainly not well known 
in the local party as he has never come to my notice. I would have been particularly 
interested as about five or six years ago a man of that name took over one of the 
best hotels 
here... I came into contact with him as he was a football referee, although 
he did very little 
here. This man suddenly left for a much smaller pub... and I seem to remember that subsequently 
he was in a Court case as a defendant. Unfortunately my football 
handbooks do not go back far 
enough to check the initials, but they look familiar. I doubt whether this 
is the man, but if 
he is care is needed. " Wilton to Rodgers, March 14 1961. 
90. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Stedman, March 13 1961, Stedman to Rodgers, 
undated. 
91. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Brown, March 13 1961. 
92. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Brown to Rodgers, March 27 1961. 
93. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Gordon Walker to Rodgers, April 12 1961. 
173 
utilised signatories to check up on people. He asked 
Kenneth May about the political views of NUR delegate TF 
Braithwaite. 94 At the same time he contacted John Cannon 
about JEH Wood of Bristol95 and Albert Smith and James 
Hennessy, of the AEU, 96 about the NUR in general, 
enclosing the list of NUR delegates and asking for 
comments. Rodgers also wrote to Roy Hattersley, "could 
you possibly let me know, in confidence, the views on 
defence of Mr F Hill... He is a member of the NUR and 
could turn out to be important. Any influence you can 
bring to bear on him will be very worthwhile. "97 
Before the move to Red Lion Street, when the London 
office was still running from Dick Taverne's flat at 
Charlebert Court, 98 Rodgers sent 14 letters to members of 
the NUR. 99 This was part of a much larger set of mailings 
which accompanied the first edition of Campaign. In part 
this letter read: 
As you may know, shortly after the Labour Party 
Conference at Scarborough, a number of long standing 
members of the Party published a manifesto addressed 
to the movement. This covered a wide range of policy 
but its immediate purpose was to pledge support to 
Mr Gaitskell in the fight for collective security 
and multilateral disarmament. 
Since then the manifesto has won wide support and 
the "Campaign for Democratic Socialism" has been 
launched to provide a rallying point for the 
majority of men and women of good will in the 
movement who want to see Labour united and on the 
road to power. In the coming months we shall have 
-------------------- 94. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to May, may 1 1961. 
95. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Cannon, May 1 1961, no reply in file. 
96. CDs Papers: Whips Conference November 17 1961, Hennessy was was a whip for the CDS in 
Manchester. 
97. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Hatterstey, May 1 1961. There is no reply 
in the file. 
98. CDS Papers: Rodger's CDS History, pp 9-10, Windlesham states that the headquarters at Red 
Lion Street were established on January 25 1961, however as correspondence was still be 
dispatched from the Charlebert address on the 30th it was some time after this. 
99. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Edgar of Illford, Barker of Hull, Slade of 
Swindon, Wakenshaw of Normanton, Cllr. Hill of Norfolk, Aid. Curry of Blyth, Hodgson of South 
Shieds, McKelvie of Romsey, Gould of Exeter, Anteney of Eastleigh, Devine of GaLsgow, Hards of 
Brighton, Moulder of Gloucester, Cousins of AyLesbry, January 13 1961. 
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two principal objects: one to help our supporters to 
come together in different parts of the country so 
that they will be able to put forward our views more 
effectively, and two to supply them with the 
arguments and information that they want. We shall 
be publishing monthly, for example, a broadsheet 
Campaign a copy of the first issue of which I 
enclose. 
I am writing now in the hope that you will feel 
prepared to support our Campaign in every way you 
can and that you may be able to help us by letting 
us have the names of other active members of the NUR 
- and also of individual members of the Party and 
other trade unions in your district. 
These three paragraphs became the basis for the "standard 
letter" of approach which was modified slightly for each 
union depending on its circumstances and allegiances, 100 
Despite this CDS activity the NUR failed to pass either 
Policy for Peace or a unilateralist resolution. The 
unilateralist resolution was defeated 39 votes to 37 and 
there was a tie on the multilateralist resolution which 
was declared not carried. 
101 Sidney Greene, the General 
Secretary of the NUR, cast 254,000 votes for the official 
policy on the basis of these votes. 
The smaller unions that switched presented smaller 
targets for the CDS to aim their propaganda at. The 
Amalgamated union of Foundry Workers had a conference 
vote of 45,000. Rodgers was sure that the leadership 
wanted these votes at Blackpool. 
102 The standard first 
contact was made with the same letter sent to the NUR 
contacts. The AFW conference was held on May 29.103 One 
of the Foundry workers, King, replied on May 22 
-------------------- 
100. See for example the NUGMW Letter below. 
101. Seyd 1968, p 145 and Windlesham 1966, pp 139-140. 
102. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, see for example Rodgers to Hennessy, May 1 1961. 
103. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown file, Rodgers to AFB supporters, April. 19 1961. 
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apologising for the delay and that he had to hang on to 
the agenda. He predicted a fight but in the end a victory 
at the Annual Delegate Conference by 37 to 23.104 Rodgers 
replied offering help: "If you would like literature to 
send to the delegates or would prefer us to do this, 
please let me know. ""105 The Foundry Workers duly 
switched. The following year Rodgers recontacted King, 
confirming that the Foundry men had switched and asking 
about the prospect for 1962.106 In addition to King, 
Rodgers also wrote to aRH Ward, who had been suggested 
by Jim Callaghan. Rodgers firstly congratulated him on 
his "fine work" in "reversing the union's previous 
support for unilateralism, " then asked him what position 
the union would take in 1962.107 Ward replied by 
telephone and gave Rodgers details of the position in the 
union. He mentioned that although the issue would be 
debated he was sure there would be no change, in fact an 
increased majority. He also let Rodgers know that there 
was unrest among "Scottish people" about Polaris bases 
and this might damage the position of the leadership. 
108 
Polaris was in fact a continuous problem for the Campaign 
and something that the leadership did not win on in 
either 1961 or 1962. 
One of the even smaller unions, the Vehicle Builders 
union, with 40,000 votes, were initially thought to be 
hopeless. 109 But contacts were still made and the letters 
duly dispatched before their conference of June 5-9 
1961.110 Of those contacted Musgrove replied with the 
-------------------- 
104. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to King, May 22 1961. 
105. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to King, May 24 1961. 
106. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to King February 7 1962. 
107. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Ward, July 7 1961 and February 6 1962. 
108. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Note of Telephone conversation, February 2 1962. 
109. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, List of Unions and Votes with notation by Rodgers: 
"Hopeless, Denis will have a go. " 
110. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Nicet of Andover, Donnelly of Kirkcaldy, 
Musgrave of Wakefield, Edwards of Cheshire and Councillor Cole of Croydon, April 
19 1961. 
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resolutions for Conference and commented: 
What we are trying to do is influence the delegates 
from this area and I am working to that end here, locally we have boycotted the Polaris march and our Local Trades Council also boycotted this after a bit 
of argument amongst theldtlegates so we are moving in the right direction. 1 
Musgrove became a whip for CDS in the Wakefield area. 112 
Another reply came from Edwards. He sent another copy of 
the resolutions for the conference and commented: "I 
shall make it my business to speak against the resolution 
I've marked with a cross. " Mr Cole also sent Rodgers an 
agenda; "I quite expect that they will still support the 
same line, but I doubt whether that is the view of the 
membership.  113 
Offers of help, as in the case of the Post Office 
Workers, came from sponsored MPs. Harry Gourlay the MP 
for Kirkcaldy forwarded Gordon Walker the names and 
addresses of the year's president RF Cogley and aSW 
Sissons. 114 Gourlay's branch of the Vehicle Workers also 
proposed a multilateralist resolution. 115 Gordon Walker 
forwarded this to Rodgers the next day with a note, "I 
think you might approach Sissons direct for names; but 
perhaps Hayday should approach the President. " Gordon 
Walker also forwarded a second note (included with the 
letter) which concerned the voting at the Brighton branch 
of the union, noting that "it is confidential". The vote 
was 140 for the Labour Party policy and 37 for the Frank 
Cousins policy. Walker goes on "incidentally, the 
multilateralist motion is a neat one. I think the Vehicle 
-------------------- 
111. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, 
112. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, 
Rodgers, January 3 and 25 1962. 
113. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, 
114. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, 
to Rodgers, May 10 1961. 
115. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, 
Builders Quarterly Journal, undated. Reso 
Musgrove to Rodgers, April 27 1961. 
Rodgers to Musgrove, January 23 1962, Musgrove to 
Cole to Rodgers, May 3 1961. 
Gourlay to Grodon Walker, May 9 1961, Gordon Walker 
Resolutions for Policy Conference, 1961, Vehicle 
tution 123-Kilmarnock. 
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Builders are certainly worth working on. " The resolution 
read: "We seek the banning of Nuclear Weapons everywhere, 
but the West cannot renounce Nuclear Weapons so long as 
the Communist bloc possess them. " 
Rodgers followed up with a letter to Sissons. 116 On May 
31 Rodgers' secretary wrote on his behalf to ask 
Pickstock to check up on the Oxford Branch of the Vehicle 
Builders to find out if "the delegates from the Oxford 
area are on the Campaign's side" and "if there is 
anything that can be done to help them at this late 
stage". 117 
Even on May 31, two days before Conference was due to 
open, Rodgers sent Edwards a "dozen copies of Ten Points 
on Defence and disarmament and set up a meeting between 
Harry Gourlay and Edwards. 118 Rodgers also sent leaflets 
to Boardman of Portsmouth for distribution at the 
conference. 119 
The Metal Mechanics Union held their conference in 
Birmingham and switched sides. Rodgers later described 
how Denis Howell persuaded the executive to switch votes 
over a pint of beer in a pub. 120 Howell himself later 
recalled that he visited the executive in the pub next 
door to their headquarters in Birmingham. He reminded 
them of their sons in National Service and asked them if 
they were going to send their sons into battle without 
the proper weapons, "they went back to their executive 
-------------------- 
116. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 'Brown File, Rodgers to Sissons, May 17 1961, no reply was filed. 
117. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers secretary to Pickstock, May 1 1960. 
118. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Edwards, May 31 1961. 
119. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Boardman, May 31 1961. On February 7 
1962, he wrote back to Boardman and asked him to brief CDS on the 1962 conference. The same 
letter with more specific questions was sent to Edwards. 
120. Witness Seminar Transcript, Rodgers. 
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meeting and voted against unilateralism. "121 Before this 
successful operation Rodgers had tried to check his 
contact through Albert Smith. 122 The contact was Mr JE 
Stirling and Rodgers had written, "they are a small 
union, but open to influence and we want their votes at 
Blackpool. " Similarly he had asked Hennessy to "see what 
you can do about" RW Preston, R Gromley and R Halliwell 
of the Metal Mechanics. 123 
In ASLEF, the conference was due to take place on May 30 
and Rodgers sent out the standard first mailing to his 
contacts in the union-124 Only one of those contacted 
replied in writing. This was Paterson who enclosed an 
agenda the day before the conference. One section of the 
letter described the way ASLEF operated: "The decision by 
the ASLEF at the Labour Party Conference last year to 
support unilateralism was taken by the EC (Executive 
Committee) I would say that our EC acts "right-wing" 
industrially and then appeases the "militants" by acting 
"left-wing" politically. However I know having attended a 
number of Labour Party conferences - the last in 1958 - 
that Mr Ray Gunter MP has a considerable influence both 
with my General Secretary Mr LJ Evans and our president 
Mr Jack Simons and if you can approach Mr Gunter he may 
be able to help in our interests. "125 Rodgers replied and 
asked for the voting figures of the conference which had 
supported the official policy. 
126 In February 1962, 
Rodgers recontacted Paterson and asked two questions: "11) 
-------------------- 
121. Denis Howell in interview with author. 
122. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Smith, May 1 1961. 
123. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Hennessy, May 1 1961. 
124. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to This letter was sent to Swift, Cllr 
Whittaker of Cambridge, Robert Ratcliffe of Ipswich, Doxey of Derbyshire, Paterson of Dundee, 
April 20 1961. 
125. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Patterson to Rodgers, June 13 1961. 
126. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Patterson, June 13 1961. 
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whether it will be possible under your rules to debate 
defence and 2) If it is debated what the likely outcome 
will be. "127 Paterson replied that the item voted on 
could not be "raised again for three years. "128 
The loyalist unions who supported the leadership in 1960 
and 1961 were obviously easier targets for the CDS. 
Although the Campaign still made the contacts and 
distributed the information in the same way as in hostile 
unions, the objective was to keep the unions in line and 
maximise the majorities rather than to win hearts and 
minds. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in the appendix to this chapter 
list those unions that voted multilateralist in 1960 and 
1961. Amongst these unions the CDS was active in NUGMW, 
NUM, Post Office Workers, Woodworkers, Agricultural 
Workers, TSSA, Boot and Shoe Workers, Building Trade 
Workers, Furniture Trade Operatives, National Union of 
Seamen, Plumber's Union, COHSE and the Patternmakers 
Union. These unions had a total block vote at Blackpool 
of 1,938,000.129 The CDS was not active in the Textile 
Factory Workers, Steelworkers, Tailors and Garment 
Workers, Dyers, Clerks, Bookbinders, Typographical 
Association, Bakers, Blastfurnacemen, Potters, Scottish 
Bakers, Colliery Overmen, Plasterers, Prudential Staff, 
NATKE, Shipwrights, Rossendale Boot and Shoe Operatives, 
Textile Workers, National League for the Deaf and the 
National Federation of the Builders. These unions had a 
total block vote at Blackpool of 580,161. 
Even among these loyal unions the detail of the approach 
varied depending on the view taken of the soundness of 
the recipients. To the Gaitskellite stronghold the 
-------------------- 
127. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Patterson, February 6 1962. 
128. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Patterson to Rodgers, February 16 1962. 
129. see Table 4.2 in appendix to this chapter. 
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National Union of General and Municipal Workers, 13° the 
Campaign could be direct: 
I am writing to you at the suggestion of Sir Thomas Williamson... We are not recruiting members but we have asked all those who support the manifesto to 
let us have their names and all these are being put into a directory of supporters. It is most important 
that it should be as complete as possible, both in 
terms of individual members of the Labour Party 
active in constituencies, and active trade 
unionists. I am writing now in the belief that you 
will be able to let me have confidentially a list of 
active people in yT district to whom we might make 
a direct approach. 
The NUGMW General Secretary was a keen CDS supporter and 
purchased 120 copies of Campaign each month for his head 
office. 132 In 1960 and 1961 the NUGMW was solidly behind 
the leadership. 
On January 23 and 24 eleven letters were dispatched to 
the NUM. The text was the same as the NUR letter quoted 
above. One of these letters was sent to the General 
Secretary of the Yorkshire Area, Mr F Collingworth. He 
replied: "Without wishing to discourage you or giving the 
impression of criticism, I would like to state that, 
contrary to what personal opinions I might have, I think 
it is not desirable, even though other Sections may be 
doing so, to continue to stir up controversy by 
publications of whatever kind they might be", 
133 But the 
NUM under the direction of Gaitskell's ally Sam Watson, 
supported the leadership in all the major defence votes; 
in fact the miners had been loyal supporters of Gaitskell 
since his time as Minister of State at Fuel and Power 
under Manny Shinwell. 134 
-------------------- 
134. This Union supported Gaitskell on Clause 4, see above, Chapter 2. 
131. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Wright, London District Secretary, 
Swindell, Lancashire District Secretay, Sterland, Yorkshire District Secretary, Yarwood 
Northern District Secretary, McLoughlin, Liverpot District Secretary and Crane, Southern 
District Secretary, January 13 1961. 
132. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Williamson to Rodgers, April 25 1961. 
133. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Collingworth to Rodgers, January 27 1961. 
134. Williams 1979, p 133. 
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The names and addresses of 88 contacts in the Post Office 
Workers Union were supplied by Ron Smith through Fred 
Hayday and then to Gordon Walker and the Campaign. 135 
Hayday noted that, "he advised that each of the contacts 
should be approached with a certain amount of 
discretion". The people on the list were contacted on 
February 23 with a slightly toned down version of the NUR 
letter. 136 The Post Office Workers became something of a 
CDS stronghold and were loyal to the leadership in 1960 
and 1961. The Finsbury district of the Post Office 
Workers, based at Mount Pleasant sorting office were the 
base for the campaign against Clive Jenkins' adoption as 
a Parliamentary candidate for the Finsbury 
constituency. 137 
In the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, 138 the 
contacts were limited but the reception was helpful. An 
early CDS supporter, Jack Richards, sent Rodgers139 names 
of people that he could contact in the ASW and warned him 
of Communist influence in the Mid-East District of ASW. 
Only three names were supplied and these received the 
standard initial letter on January 24.140 Later in the 
spring, sometime before the ASW onference, the Campaign 
received a request from the ASW to circulate branches 
with a reminder that amendments had to be received by 
April 17 for the Annual Delegate Conference: "As you will 
know, there are a number of resolutions on the 
preliminary Agenda on defence policy, but only one of 
-------------------- 
135. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Walker to Rodgers, January 12 1961. 
136. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Davies, February 23 1961. 
137. Witness Seminar Transcript, Donoughue. 
138. Associated Society of Woodworkers, ASW. 
139. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Richards to Rodgers, January 2 1961. 
140. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Dale of Irvine, Wood of Croydon and Lodd 
of Newcastle on Tyne, undated. 
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these firmly supports multilateral disarmament. Any 
amendments to the others to make them more representative 
of our point of view would be very welcome indeed. "1141 
In the National Union of Agricultural Workers a contact 
was made with a Hanson, who offered support and a 
donation. 142 Rodgers wrote to Mr Collinson asking if the 
union would like to place an order for Campaign, 143 but 
the General Secretary replied saying no. 144 This response 
and the one from the Yorkshire NUM were the most negative 
responses received during the trade union lobbying. 
Between January 16 and 23 twenty one letters were 
dispatched around the country to TSSA members. They 
carried the same text as the NUR letter reproduced 
above. 145 In response Bailey of Liverpool requested 
leaflets for his twenty collectors. 146 Bill Webber the 
General Secretary of TSSA, subscribed for a bulk order of 
50 copies of Campaign147 and was a significant factor in 
keeping the trade union in line-148 
The Building Trade Workers were another trade union that 
stuck by the Party leader. They received the standard 
first letter from CDS on April 19.149 Their conference 
-------------------- 
141. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Circular, two copies. 
142. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Hanson to Rodgers, February 6 1961. 
143. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Cotlinson, March 23 1961. 
144. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Cottinson to Rodgers April 27 1961. 
145. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Ms Kent of Glasgow, Haines of Plymouth, 
Ward of Barnehurst, Walker of Manchester, Howarth of Edgeware, Monday of Leeds, Paterson of 
Glasgow, Davies of N7, Powell of Caerphilly, Cllr Ms Patrick of Glasgow, Grayer of E12, Cllr 
Lucas of Bolton, Williams of Ashstead, Podmore of Newcastle, Reynolds of Surbiton, Cllr 
Etherington of Preston, Rose of Southampton, Baldock of Guildford, Sitting of Sattash, Bradley 
of Kettering, Brown of Caterham, January 16 1961. 
146. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Bailey to Rodgers, June 25 1961. 
147. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red Fite, Webber to Rodgers, May 15 1961. 
148. Denis Howell in interview with author. 
149. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Cllr Buchanan of Flakirk, Cllr Hanson of 
Airedale, JS Stewart of Edinburgh, AH Thorn of Vauxhall and Alden of Camberwell, April 19 
1961. In May Rodgers sent a general letter to A Loughton of Wandsworth. 
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was to take place on June 5-9 1961. Although Rodgers 
thought they were unilateralist in 1960, in fact 
Williams15° had this union down as being multilateralist 
in both years and later correspondence from Rodgers 
showed he had realised his mistake. 151 Rodgers wrote to 
five members of this union. 152 Only one of those to 
receive the April letter replied; this was Alend and he 
forwarded an agenda for the trade union's conference. 153 
Alend was recontacted about the 1962 vote. 
In terms of voting one of the most straight-forward 
Unions was the National Union of Seamen. Rodgers sent a 
standard letter to Brown of Dover. 154 On May 30 Rodgers 
heard from Brown that the union "National Executive had 
mandated our delegates, attending the Annual Conference, 
to support the joint Labour Party TUC statement on 
defence". Similarly the Patternmakers stayed loyal. 155 
The Boot and Shoes Operatives, 
156 COHSE, 157 Furniture 
Trade Operatives158 and Plumbing Trade Union159 contacted 
by Rodgers in April but none replied. They were all loyal 
unions and very small, so the effect of the CDS in 
keeping them in line is difficult to assess. The Painters 
-------------------- 
150. Williams 1962 p 309. 
151. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
152. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
Castleford, Stewart of Edinbur 
May 9 1961. 
153. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
154. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
155. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
of Birmingham, standard April 
Journal on May 1. 
156. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
157. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
April 17 1961. 
158. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
159. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, 
Brown File, 
Brown File, 
gh, Thorn of 
Brown File, 
Brown File, 
Brown File, 
17 Letters. 
Brown File, 
Brown File, 
Brown File, 
Brown File, 
Rodgers to Alden, February 7 1962. 
Rodgers to Cllr Buchannon of Falkirk, Cllr Hanson of 
SE11, April 19 1961. Rodgers to Loughton of SW18, 
Alden to Rodgers, April 29 1961. 
Rodgers to Brown, April 17 1961. 
Rodgers to JM Birkhead of Sheffield and Mr Chaundy 
Birkhead replied with extracts from the Societies 
Rodgers to Albert Smith, April 17 1961. 
Rodgers to Merritt (a contact of Denis Howell), 
Rodgers to Dennison, April 17 1961. 
Rodgers to Michael Prater, April 17 1961. 
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whose conference was held from 25 to 27 April 1961, also 
failed to reply and this was the only union to switch to 
unilateralist in 1962.160 
The task among those unions that were hostile to the 
official policy, but not obviously open to influence, was 
very different. After those unions that were felt to be 
open to influence were removed from the scene Rodgers 
acknowledged that the chances of changing the vote in the 
TGWU was remote but that nevertheless it was important 
for the message to get across. 161 To this end he 
recruited Frank Nodes, an ex-Labour Party agent, to 
campaign in the citadel of the enemy. Rodgers held a 
meeting with Frank Nodes in May 1961 and they agreed a 
course of action for the the TGWU. 
There were ten parts to the plan: 
1) Write to supporters in the TGWU, asking them to 
complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire read 
as follows: 
Has your branch voted on defence? Yes /No 
If it has, did it vote for or against unilatera]ýism? 
Has your branch a resolution down for the BDC? 
1 2 
Yes/No 
If it has, do you know its number on the agenda or 
what it says? 
Has your branch a delegate to the BDC? Yes/No 
If it has what is his name and address? 
Do you know his personal views on defence? 
If you do what are they? 
Do you know of any other delegates to the BDC? 
Yes/No 
If you do, can you give their names and addresses, 
branch names and/or numbers, and any information you 
have about the way their branches voted on defence 
and their own personal views? 
Do you know of any members of other trade unions who 
are definitely in sympathy with us? Yes/No. If you 
do, please give names and addresses and trade unions 
to which they belong: 
-------------------- 
160. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Harris of Ripon, April 17 1961 and 
Williams 1962 p309. 
161. CDS Papers: Rodgers CDS History, p 12. 
162. Biannual Delegate Conference. 
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If our Organiser wishes to visit you, when are you usually at home - on which days or evenings of the week? 
2) Arrange to visit supporters who are delegates 3) Form a group. 
4) Select a leader and a deputy leader. 
5) Select two or three resolutions on the agenda 
which are likely to split the C. P away from Conference. Preferably a resolution on Unity. 6) Composite our own resolutions. 
7) Call a meeting if possible prior to Conference of our own supporters and brief them on the tactics to be adopted. 
8) Certainly call together the leading speakers and 
work out the salient points that they must put to Conference. 
9) Call a group meeting at Conference the evening before the defence debate. I hope then to have a 
clear indica jQn of the feel of Conference - Review 
our tactics. 
The Transport Workers did not of course change sides but 
Rodgers was able nevertheless to help some of the 
moderates within the union. Support from within the TGWU, 
although limited, did exist. There were 76 listed 
supporters around the country, and some like HD Duff 
were active. 164 Duff urged Rodgers to take steps to 
"organise like-minded delegates in the next month or two. 
If you can put me in touch with any I should indeed be 
grateful. " Rodgers in replying forwarded a list of 
supporters and suggested Ten Points on Defence be sent 
round. 165 
In addition to Ten Points on Defence a circular was 
circulated with a recommended amendment. 166 Mr E Jones 
from the Power Workers Section of the TGWU wrote to 
Rodgers asking for help with his speech to Conference 
which was held in Morecambe on June 12 and 13.167 Rodgers 
was happy to supply Jones with a speech. The most 
-------------------- 
163. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers and Nodes, May 17 1961. 
164. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Duff to Rodgers, April 23 1961. 
165. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Duff, May 1 1961. 
166. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, TGWU Circular. 
167. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Jones to Rodgers May 17 1961. 
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effective passage of the speech read: 
Twenty five years ago we failed to arm quickly 
enough - and Hitler went to war because he thought 
he could get away with it. Let us learn that lesson. 
While one power is armed others must be if they want 
to defend themselves. We in the West have a 
defensive alliance in NATO. This was set up only 
because of the threat from the East after the Berlin 
blockade. And do not forget that it was set up by 
that great trade unionist Ernest Bevin. We need NATO 
as long as there is a threat of war. Mr Khruschev 
would like us to give it up. We will - on condition 
that h and his allies give up their own Warsaw 
. 
168 Pact 
This was one of a number of speeches Rodgers wrote for 
Transport Workers delegates. 169 One paragraph in a speech 
read: 
It has been said that there has been outside 
interference in the affairs of this union, that 
delegates who disagree with the General Secretary 
have been got at by some body or another. All I want 
to say is that I have certainly not been got at. No 
one has ever told me what to think and they aren't 
going to do so now. 
But in the main they were forthright presentations of the 
multilateralist case: 
Let us be quite clear about what is at stake. The 
question is this: should Britain stand alone in the 
world, without adequate defences and - in the long 
run, without allies - or should we do all we can to 
make sure that an enemy will hesitate to attack 
because he knows very well what the consequences 
will be? 
In June there was a slip in security when a letter from 
Frank Nodes to "one of the people in Birmingham" was 
handed to Frank Cousins who reported the matter to the 
NEC. 170 The leak provoked a general NEC enquiry into 
168. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers to Jones May 31 1961. 
169. CDS Papers : Untitled Red File, Transport Workers speeches, copies of eleven are on 
file. 
170. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File, Rodgers Secretary to Nodes, June 22 1961. 
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"organisations whose purpose inter alia is to influence 
organisations affiliated to the Labour Party. " The NEC 
raised three main questions: 
1. What are the conditions for membership of "The 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism"? 
2. Are the members organised in groups or branches 
throughout the country? 
3. In addition to publishing pamphlets etc., and 
holding public meetings, does "The Campaign for 
Democratic Socialism" nationally or through its 
branches make a direct approach to Labour Party 
local organisations and to trade union branches, 
with the purpose of seeking their support within 
their national organisation for the views of "The 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism"? 171 
Rodgers' reply was worthy of a career diplomat in its 
economy with the truth: 
... I am sure, 
incidentally, that you will not attach 
too much importance to press reports of our 
activities. Many of them have been mischievous and 
positively inaccurate and nearly all of them 
exaggerated and misleading. 
As to your three questions: 
1. The Campaign for Democratic Socialism has no 
members. We merely treat as supporters those members 
of the Labour Party - and only members of the Labour 
Party - who say they agree with the views set out 
in 
our original Manifesto. These are placed on our 
mailing list and receive Campaign regularly. 
2. Our supporters are not organised in groups or 
branches or in any other way. If they have organised 
themselves, it has been quite without our authority 
- but only two cases of this happening 
have been 
brought to our attention. 
3. We do not make any approach to local Labour Party 
organisations or to trade unions branches with a 
view to seeking their support. We have once 
circularised constituency parties-in January. This 
was to let them have a copy of the manifesto, many 
of them having asked for it, and to say that we 
would be happy to provile them with a speaker on 
defence if they wished. 
72 
171. CDS Papers: Enquiry File, AL Williams to Rodgers July 12 1961. 
172. CDS Papers: Enquiry File, Rodgers to Williams, July 19 1961. 
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At the same time Rodgers forwarded the reply to Gordon 
Walker and Callaghan. The covering letter to Callaghan 
read in part: 
I would be very grateful if you would let me know 
whether you think my letter meets the bill. The real 
question is how much information we should give. We 
are quite prepared to be helpful in so far as the 
greater part of what we have done cannot properly 
cause offence. On the other hand, to say little Taý 
leave less room for the awkward people to argue. 
Len Williams replied quoting the leaked letter that had 
fallen into the hands of Frank Cousins: 
When Mr Cousins wrote to the NEC he enclosed a copy 
of a letter on the notepaper of the "Campaign for 
Democratic Socialism" which he said had been 
addressed to a branch secretary of his union 
concerning the resolution it had on the union's 
Conference agenda, which was signed by Frank Nodes, 
who described himself as Organiser, T. U Section... I 
mention this because of your answer to my question 
No. 3, and this point is sure to be raised when I 
make my repllX to the National Executive 
Committee. 
Rodgers replied denying that Nodes had authority from CDS 
to act on the Campaign's behalf or that the Campaign had 
a "Organiser trade unions" section, Denis Howell later 
described Nodes as a mysterious figure from the ETU and 
was not "quite sure where his funds came from". 175 Yet 
Rodgers portrayed Nodes as an ordinary member of the TGWU 
who came along to the Campaign and asked for briefing 
material. 176 As is shown by the plan, worked out for 
Nodes by Rodgers, the link between the CDS and Nodes was 
actually rather more formal than Rodger implied. Early in 
1962 it became even more formal when Nodes was paid 
expenses by the Campaign to report on the situation in 
Scotland. 177 
-------------------- 
173. CDS Papers: Enquiry File, Rodgers to Gordon Walker and Callaghan, July 18 1961. 
174. CDS Papers: Enquiry File, Williams to Rodgers, July 24 1961. 
175. Denis Howell in interview with author. 
176. CDS Papers: Enquiry File, Rodgers to Williams, July 26 1961. 
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In another unilateralist union the Boilermakers Union, 
which had 61,000 votes at Conference and voted 
unilateralist in 1960 and 1961, there were again some 
contacts. 178 Rodgers sent the standard opening contact 
letter to Lee of Enfield179 who returned an agenda, also 
to Rignall of Hammersmith who replied: 
I feel very much with you that we must make our 
presence felt in the trade unions. Here we find a 
tremendous apathy, but feel that we must rouse 
people to action... I belong to LONDON NO3 BRANCH of 
the boilermakers union, and we almost unanimously 
rejected nuclear disarmament... This branch is one of 
the best in the society and the secretary who fought 
the issue with me is a delegate to the annual 
Conference. He is Mr A Tallboy... no doubt he could 
be given some ammunition because he is a fearless 
fighter and a sound Labour man. In the meantime I 
will try and get a copy of the agenda for the annual 
Conference... Further to the boilermakers, I feel 
that Ted Hill is the danger man, and that he has 
built a load of yes men around him. We may have to 
oppose his men at the next election. I myself mean 
to fight for a seat on the London Executive later in 
the year. I would like to meet you at some point 
because unless we win the unions we cannot win the 
partyg0I wish you well and will do all I can to help 
you. 
Rodgers repliedl81 thanking Rignall and asking him for a 
full list of delegates so that they could all be 
contacted. Rignall forwarded the list of delegates. 
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The Boilermakers remained unilateralist but "certainly 
the multilateralists put up a very good fight". 
183 
Rodgers wrote again in February 1962 but there is no 
-------------------- 
177. CDS Papers: Untitled File, containing details of Norman Selwyn and Frank Node's 
association with the Campaign. Between January 9 1962 and March 
27 1962, Nodes travelled a 
total of 4716 miles and ran up expenses of £263.13.2. 
178. Williams 19 
179. CDS Papers: 
180. CDS Papers: 
181. CDS Papers: 
182. CDS Papers: 
183. COS Papers: 
62 p 309. 
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Rodgers to Enfield, April 19 1961. 
Rignall to Rodgers, May 23 1961. 
Rodgers to Rignall, May 1 1961. 
Rignall to Rodgers, May 7 1961. 
Rodgers to Rignall, June 9 1961. 
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reply from Rignall. 184 
In addition Rodgers was supplied information from Cliff 
Tucker. 185 Tucker was helping a Mr Baker who was going to 
make the speech in favour of multilateralism at the 
Boilermakers conference: "I am now enclosing a copy of 
the official statement on defence Policy for Peace, 
something on Polaris, a copy of an interview which John 
Freeman had with Hugh Gaitskell, reprinted in the News of 
the World, and a short pamphlet published by the British 
Atlantic Committee called Nuclear Disarmament. "186 Mr 
Rignall also suggested Mr Tallboy to contact and Rodgers 
forwarded Ten Points on Defence. 187 Tallboy reported to 
his branch and was instructed to request more copies. 188 
Tucker was contacted by Rodgers again in February 1962189 
to see if he could get in touch with Mr Baker to renew 
the challenge to the Boilermakers' unilateralism, which 
Tucker agreed to do. 190 He called the Campaign office and 
said that Baker was prepared to have a go and would get 
his branch to move an amendment to the union's defence 
resolution. 191 Rodgers forwarded amendments to the 
resolution through Tucker with a copy of the letter to 
Donoughue. 192 Donoughue later briefed Rodgers on the 
Baker position: "... Apparently Fred Baker was pleased 
with them (the amendments), particularly because they 
-------------------- 
184. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Rignall, February 7 1962. 
185. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Tucker, May 5 1961 and Tucker to Rodgers 
May 9 1961. 
186. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Burke of Harrow, Redrup of Watford, 
Hughes of SE7, Stevens of Bexley Heath, Stirling of Consett, Cllr G Dixon of Redcar, Molyneuux 
of Wirral, Arnold of Belfast, he introduced the Campaign and supplied unspecified briefing 
material. May 9 1961. 
187. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Tallboy May 1 1961. 
188. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Tallboy to Rodgers May 20 1961. 
189. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Tucker February 7 1961. 
190. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Tucker to Rodgers, February 8 1962. 
191. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Note of Telephone Conversation undated. 
192. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to Tucker March 20. 
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were simple enough for the lads to handle, while still 
turning it into a straight multilateralist 
resolution. 193 However, the Boilermakers remained 
unilateralist. 
The Campaign materially effected the outcome in the small 
Sheetmetal Workers Union, but unfortunately a year too 
late. Although they had a few contacts in the union these 
were given whatever help they needed. 194 The main contact 
was Hardie who sent Rodgers a long reply to a standard 
first letter-195 The Sheet Metal Workers cast 30,000 
votes at Scarborough and did not hold a conference in 
1961 so the decision as to how to vote in 1961 was made 
by the union's NEC: "It is difficult of course to 
influence the NEC, but what I am doing is to indicate in 
the enclosed current Journal those members whose 
influence is extremely powerful, and who are known to be 
anti-unilateralist. "196 Rodgers recontacted him in 1962 
and according to Hardie: "At our Biennial Conference just 
concluded, I was successful in killing a unilateralist 
composite from our powerful London/Midlands/Belfast C/P 
Bloc. I regret very much to say that our NEC put forward 
no opposition, as of course they should have done in view 
of union Policy. I was the only speaker against, and I 
had prepared my reply on the CDS leaflet Ten Points on 
Defence. You personally will no doubt be pleased to know 
that it had a tremendous impact on our delegates, so much 
so that when I left the rostrum I had no doubt of the 
result. "197 
-------------------- 
193. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Donoughue to Rodgers March 22 1962. 
194. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Rodgers to WA Robinson of Islington, Liverpool and 
J Sanders of Portsmouth May 9 1961. These names had been passed on by Jack Hardie of 
Southanpton. Rodgers to Hardies April 19 1961. 
195. CDS Papers: Rodgers to Hardie, April 19 1961. Rodgers also contacted Sanders fo 
Portsmouth and Robinson of Liverpool. Both names were given by Hardie. May 9 1961. 
196. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Hardie to Rodgers, April 29 1961. 
197. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File, Hardie to Rodgers, July 15 1962. 
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The nature of the Campaign's activity in the unions as 
described above illustrates that previous writers have 
formulated the basic question in the wrong way. If one 
asks "Did CDS change the defence policy of the Labour 
Party? " the answer is bound to be no. If one asks "What 
role did the CDS play in changing the Labour Party's 
defence policy? " then the answer is: the role of the 
multilateralist lobbying, press and publicity office. 
Finally if you then ask "Was this role significant? " the 
answer would have to be that in key unions and in 
motivating the moderates in the constituency parties, the 
influence of CDS was significant but was never the 
decisive factor because it cannot be viewed in isolation 
from the policies that it was advocating and the leader 
it was supporting. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.1: Unions that voted multilateralist in 1960198 
Union 
1) NUGMW 
2) NUM 
3) Post Office Workers 
4) Woodworkers 
201 5) Textile Factory 
6) Agricultural Workers 
7) Steelworkers 
8) TSSA 
9) Boot and Shoe Workers 
10) Building Trade Workers 
11) Dyers 202 12) Painters 
13) Clerks 
14) Furniture Trade Op. 
15) Bookbinders 
16) Seamen 
17) Typographical Association 
18) Plumbers 
19) Bakers 
20) Blastfurnacemen 
21) Potters 
22) Scottish Bakers 
23) Colliery Overmen 
24) Plasterers 
25) COHSE 
26) Patternmakers 
27) Prudential Staff 
28) NATKE 
29) Shipwrights 
30) Rossendale Boot and Shoe 
31) Textile Workers 
32) Nat League of the Blind 
33) Nat Fed of Builders 
34) Iron Fitters 
Total 
Vote CDS Activity199 Pro/Anti Response to CDS200 650,000 Yes Pro 
642,000 Yes Neutral 
160,000 Yes Pro 
119,000 Yes Pro 
113,161 No - 100,000 Yes Anti 
91,000 No - 74,000 Yes Pro 
70,000 Yes Unknown 
70,000 Yes Pro 
50,000 No - 44,000 Yes Unknown 
41,000 No - 28,000 Yes Unknown 
27,000 No - 25,000 Yes Neutral 
25,000 No - 25,000 Yes Unknown 
19,000 No - 
17,000 No - 16,000 No - 15,000 No - 15,000 No - 13,000 No - 12,000 Yes Unknown 
12,000 Yes Pro 
9,000 No - 6,000 No - 
6,000 No - 
5,000 No - 
4,000 No - 
3,000 No - 
2,000 No - 
1,000 No - 
2,484,161 
Table 4.2: Unions that voted multilateralist in 1961 
Union Vote CDS Activity Pro/Anti CDS 
1) AEU 705,000 Yes Pro 
2) NUGMW 650,000 Yes Pro 
3) NUM 584,000 Yes Neutral 
4) USDAW 27,000 Yes Pro 
5) NUR 254,000 Yes Pro 
6) Post Office Workers 160,000 Yes Pro 
7) Woodworkers 203 123,000 Yes Pro 8) Textile Factory 112,161 No - 
9) Agricultural Workers 100,000 Yes Anti 
10) Steelworkers 98,000 No - 
11) Tailors and Garment 82,000 No - 
12) TSSA 72,000 Yes Pro 
13) Boot and Shoe Workers 70,000 Yes Unknown 
14) Building Trade Workers 70,000 Yes Pro 
198. Figures based on voting for Policy for Peace. 
199. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Red File and Brown File, this indicates any detectable CDS 
activity. 
200. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown File and Red File, this indicates any clear response in 
correspondence between the Unions and the CDS. 
201. CDS Papers: Patrick Seyd/Frank Pickstock Papers: Trade Unions Votes. More accurate figure 
that that given in Williams 1962. 
202. Williams 1962 p 309, the only union to switch from multilateralist to unilateralist. 
203. CDS Papers: Patrick Seyd/Frank Pickstock Papers: Trade Unions Votes. More accurate figure 
that that given in Williams 1962. 
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15) Vehicle Builders 52,000 Yes Pro 
16) Dyers 50,000 No - 17) Foundry Workers 42,000 Yes Pro 
18) Clerks 41,000 No - 19) Metal Mechanics 35,000 Yes Pro 
20) Furniture Trade Op. 35,000 Yes Unknown 
21) ASLEF 31,000 Yes Pro 
22) Bookbinders 27,000 No - 23) Seamen 25,000 Yes Neutral 
24) Typographical Ass. 25,000 No - 25) Plumbers 25,000 Yes Unknown 
26) Bakers 21,000 No - 27) Blastfurnacemen 17,000 No - 
28) Potters 16,000 No - 
29) Scottish Bakers 15,000 No - 30) Colliery Overmen 15,000 No - 
31) Plasterers 13,000 No - 
32) COHSE 12,000 Yes Unknown 
33) Patternmakers 12,000 Yes Pro 
34) Musicians 10,000 No - 
35) Prudential Staff 9,000 No - 
36) NATKE 6,000 No - 
37) Shipwrights 6,000 No - 
40) Rossendale Boot 5,000 No - 
41) Textile Workers 4,000 No - 
42) Nat Lea of the Blind 3,000 No - 
43) Electricians 3,000 No - 
44) Stove Grate 2,000 No - 
45) Nat Fed of Builders 2,000 No - 
46) Four Unions with 
1 , 000 votes 4,000 - - Tot al 4,035,161 
Table 4.3: Unions Voting Unilateralist in 1960 
Union Vote CDS Activity Pro/Anti CDS 
1) T&GWU 1,000,000 Yes Pro 
2) ETU 140,000 No - 
3) Public Employees 100,000 No - 
4) Boilermakers 61,000 Yes Pro 
5) NATSOPA 41,000 No - 
6) Sheetmetal Workers 30,000 Yes Pro 
7) Draughtsmen 25,000 No - 
8) Construction Engineer s 19,000 No - 
9) Fire Brigades Union 18,000 No - 
10) Scottish House 16,000 No - 
11) London Typog Society 12,000 No - 
12) Lithog. Artists 10,000 No - 
13) Chemical Workers 6,000 No - 
14) Tobacco Workers 4,000 No - 
15) ASSET 4,000 No - 
16) Life Assurance Worke rs 3,000 No - 
17) Blacksmiths 3,000 No - 
18) Shale Miners 2,000 No - 
19) Scottish Painters 2,000 No - 
20) Cinema Technicans 1,000 No - 
21) Packing Case Makers 1,000 No - 
Total 1,498,000 
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Table 4.4: CDS Activity in the AEU. 
Delegates Comments 
E Ormonde JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
N Young JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
JW Brown JB: CP, Against. 
D Martin JB: CP, Against. 
E Leslie JB: CP, Against. 
J Dalziel JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
D McColl CDS: Supporter, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
J Maley JB: Tick, CDS: Supporter, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
H Flowers JB: Tick, CDS: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
Wm Aitken JB: Tick, JB: Tick, Campa ign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
G Arnold PGW: Cross, CDS: CNg05 
J Cellini Probably Against. 
204. CDS Papers: Red File, AEU Delegate List, Annotated, Undated. 
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H Robson PGW: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements. 
E SMith JB: Tick, Campajog, Defence Statements and Letter. 
W Fleming No information 
D W Calder PGW: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
K Carwell PGW: Unitateratist. 
J Ramsden JB: Tick, PGW: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
W Jump CDS: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
K Slater CDS: Tick, Campaign, Ofence Statements and Letter. 
J W Tocher CP, No information. 
E Frow CDS: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
B Sharpe JB: Tick, PGW: Tick?, CDS: Tick (Supported Mallatieu as MP), Campaign, 
Defence, Statements and Letter. 
L Johnson JB: Tick, PGW: Unilateralist. 
E Hancock PGW: Unilateralist 
H Howarth PGW: 'Unilateralist, CP? 
K Hooley JB: Tick, PGW: Tick?, CDS: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
S Carless JB: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
J Kelly JB: CP. 
J Leigh JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
W J Daniel JB: CP. 
R A Etheridge JB: CP, CDS: CP. 
G Butter JB: Tick, CDS: Tick?, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
W C Shelton JB: Tick, PGW: Tick, CDS: Tick (supporter), Campaign, Defence Statements 
and Letter. 
D B Richards JB: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
D M Jones JB: Tick, Campaign, Defence Statements and Letter. 
W Heaton PGW: Tick, CDS: Tick? Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
L J Porter JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
S Escott JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
F C Prentice JB: Tick, PGW: Unilateralist. 
A Harvey JB: Tick, PGW: Unilateralist. 
C Dunnett JB: Tick, PGW: Unilateralist. 
W H Bailey JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
D Knott JB: Tick, Ten Points on Defence & Polaris. 
K Graham JB: CP 
A Calow JB: CP 
W Rawlinson JB: CP 
L Smith JB: CP 
T Roycraft JB: CP 
G T Bridges JB: CP 
L Doust JB: CP 
R Vines JB: CP 
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T able 4.5: CDS Activity in National Union of Railwaymen. 
Delegates and Branch 
J Robb, Keith. 
A Williamson, Dundee 
DH Penmah, Edinburgh No 5 
J Grant, Wishaw 
WC Allan, Glasgow No 5 
W Adamson, Glasgow No 5 
F Knapp, Kilmarnock No 2 
A Meekley, Carlisle No 8 
M Hailes, Newcastle No 2 
JR Curry, Blyth No 1 
W Wood, Shildon No 2 
WR Coiling, Faverdale 
W Mitchell, W Hartlepool 
J Hair, Carlisle No 3 
EA Savage, York No 7 
JS Metcalf Leeds No 5 
W Robinson Preston No I 
S Elliott, Hull No 1 
205. Not marked in usual 
CW: OK, PGW: OK, DTJ. 
CW: OK, CDS: For, PGW:? DTJ. 
CW: OK, CDS: For, PGW:? DTJ. 
CW: OK, CDS: For, PGW:? DTJ. 
C'W:? PGW:? DTJ 
CW: OK, CDS: For, DTJ. 
CW:? CDS: OK. 
CW: OK, CDS: OK. 
CW: OK DH: OK, DTJ. 
CW: OK, CDS: OK, DTJ. 
Comments 
CW: OK, DTJ. 
CW: No 
CW: OK, DTJ. 
CW: OK, DTJ. 
PGW: UniLateralist. 
CW: No, CDS: No. 
CW: No, CDS: No. 
CW: OK, DTJ. 
way, put underlined with broken green line which indicates stance. 
206. Marker with a black box. 
207. Although marked with black box which indicated "No Information" 
Tocher was marked CP on 
the far right of the table with no indication who thought so. 
208. CDS Papers: Trade Unions, Brown Fite, Annotated List of NUR Delegates. 
One Master and two 
copies with different notes are combined in the table 
below. 
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H Turnbull, Normanton 
H Foster, Manningham 
F Wilkinson, Blackburn 
JP Woodward, Pendlebury 
G Walmsley, Manchester 
H Bleakham, Ardwick 
L Roberts, Stockport No 3 
GCB Davies, Warrington 
EJ Webb, Lincoln No 1 
TB Blenkiron, Doncaster No 1 
W Uttley, Staveley Town 
F Hill, Sheffield No 1 
T Roberts, Garston No 1 
AWB Green, Shirebrook 
T Birch, Liverpool No 5 
GW Wilson, Peterborough No 2 
W Spendlove, Colwick Junction 
FC Horobin, Newcastle 
DW Green, Crewe No 2 
JW Roberts, Bala 
WH Seale, Derby No 10 
CW Patterson, Buxton 
HJ Fordham, Norwich No 1 
TS Selby, Kettering 
A Russell, Wolverhampton No 1 
AH Jones, Solihull 
ES Mellors, Birmingham No 5 
HL Self, Ipswich No 1 
SG Adcock, Gloucester No 2 
EW Workman, Seven Jct. No 1 
FS Gowen, Swansea No 1 
A Impey, Cardiff No 6 
FE Winniatt, Aberdare No 3 
AD Buglar, Barry No 4 
CG Cousins, Quainton 
CC Galvin, Hornsey No 1 
WH Willden, East Ham 
WC Coles, Forest Gate 
EW Bowers, Bethnal Green 
H Mundy, Kings Cross No 2 
FG Franklin, Kentish Town 
WEJ Kirkby, Paddington No 2 
RH Trench, Neasden No 1 
WT Fitch, Covent Garden 
WJ Sheppard, Earls Court 
BV Coiling, Clapham Jct. 
DF Everson, Deptford 
TJ Leonard, West Eating 
T Evans, Reading No 2 
F Tilley, Swindon No 1 
JEH Wood, Bristol No 8 
SR Mills, Croydon No 1 
SG Wimble, Faversham 
TF Braithwaite, Tonbridge 
EB Cox, Eastleigh No 3 
T Allen, S'hampton No 5 
HJ Frost, Taunton No 1 
H Gould, Exeter No 1 
W Adams, Plymouth No 1 
CW: OK, CDS: OK, DTJ. 
CW: OK, CDS: OK, DTJ. 
Nothing Known. 
CW: No, CDS: No 
CW: No, CDS: No. 
CW:? DH: says mandated against, CDS: OK. 
CW:? CDS: Unitateralist opposed to G. 
CW:? PGW:? DH: Against. 
CW: No, PGW: Against. 
CW: OK, CDS: OK, DTJ. 
CW:? Unilateralist. 
CW: OK, CDS: OK, DTJ. 
CW:? SF: Probably not ok, 
CW: OK, DTJ. 
CDS: Special Check. 209 
CW:? SF: Probably OK. CDSZ1lpecial 
CDS: A Bit erratic, PGW:? 
CW: OK, CDS: Possib'ly OK, DTJ. 
CW:? Unilateralist. 
CW: No, DH: OK, HB: No. 
CW: OK, DTJ. 
CW: OK, PGW: Maybe OK, DTJ. 
CW: OK, DH: OK, HB: OK, DTJ. 
HB: OK, PGW: Uncommitted. 
HB:? PGW:? 
HB: OK, DH: OK, DTJ. 
HB: OK, DH: OK, DTJ. 
HB: OK, DH: OK, DTJ. 
HB:? PGW: Unilateralist: ex: CP. 
HB: OK, DTJ, CDS: No trace in party. 
HB: OK, DTJ. 
HB: OK, DTJ. 
HB: OK, DTJ. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
JB: No, CDS: Unilateralist. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
JB: 0K, DTJ. 
JB:? PGW:? 
JB:? PGW:? 
JB: 0K. 
JB:? 
JB: OK, CDS: OK, DTJ. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
JB: No. 
JB: No. 
JB: No. 
JB: No, CDS: No. 
HB: OK, WTR: No 
JB: No. 
JB: 0K, DTJ. 
JB: 0K, DTJ. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
JB: No, CDS: Against. 
JB: 0K, CDS: Worth working on, DTJ. 
JB: OK, CDS: Unilateratist. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
JB:?, CDS: doubtful. 
JB: OK, DH: OK, Mandated. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
JB: OK, DTJ. 
Key: 
Against: Opposed to Policy for Peace 
CDS: Camnainn for Democratic Socialism 
CP: Communist Party 
CW: Unknown 
DH: Denis Howell 
DTJ: David T Jones 
For: In favour of Policy for Peace 
-------------------- 
209. Sent Ten Points on Defence & Polaris but not Jones letter. 
210. Sent Ten Points on Defence & Polaris but not Jones letter. 
Check. 210 
211. Also marker "Literature" which could have meant dispatching 
defence literature. In the 
margin is a black "U" which could indicate Wilson was seen as 
being unilateralist. 
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HB: Unknown, possibly Herbert Bowden 
ND: Unknown 
PGW: Patrick Gordon Walker 
SF: Unknown 
Unknown: Voting intention not known. 
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Chapter 5: 
The Campaign in the Constituencies. 
In parallel to the battle over the defence vote the CDS 
was active in the Constituency Labour Parties. The 
purpose of this activity was fourfold. First, to maximise 
the vote in favour of the official defence policy at the 
Blackpool Conference of 1961. Second, to improve the 
votes for friendly candidates in the constituency 
elections to the National Executive Committee, which had, 
since the early 1950s, been dominated by the left. Third, 
to motivate supporters of the Campaign to take part in 
the selection of Parliamentary candidates. Finally, the 
Campaign's general objective of educating the Labour 
Party in the ideas of revisionism and modernisation 
needed support from rank and file members. 
To achieve these objectives the Campaign set out to 
establish a national network of supporters. The initial 
publicity for the launch of the CDS Manifesto quickly 
lead to the compiling of a card index of supporters 
around the country. The most committed of these became 
constituency "Whips" responsible for organising other 
like-minded individuals and for disseminating the 
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propaganda of the Campaign. An inner group of these Whips 
became Regional Representatives responsible for reporting 
on a group of constituencies. 
In April 1961 Rodgers drafted a memorandum to Regional 
Representatives about Organisation in the Constituenciesl 
in which he summed up the activity of the first six 
months of the Campaign: 
From the beginning of the Campaign it was clear that in the time available - effectively six months - it was impossible to organise in all constituencies. It 
was hoped that in the great majority we would have 
one or more supporters who would take a personal initiative on the basis of Campaign and confidential 
circular letters. But we could not hope to have 
closer contact, even once removed, with all of these 
supporters, or to receive regular reports. In 
practice, CDS probably has supporters in 400 
constituencies and this should rise to 500 by the 
end of May, which must be our target 
organisationally. 
A measure of the support2 for CDS after the launch was 
given in the first issues of Campaign, the official CDS 
newsletter. In the first three editions the number of 
offers of support were presented in a box accompanied by 
the words "Up and Up, We have now received... separate 
offers of support from key Party workers. " The figures 
given were 2373 in February 1961,2751 in March 1961, 
2856 in April 1961 and 3011 in May 1961.3 The last 
figures published in Campaign were accompanied by a 
breakdown of who the CDS were: 
Over a third of them hold office in constituency 
organisations many of these serving in local 
government. Altogether almost half of all supporters 
are Aldermen and Councillors. Several hundred are 
-------------------- 
1. CDS Papers: Organisation in the Constituencies, Rodgers, April 6 1961. 
2. A comparative figure would be for the Fabian Society, although there was considerable 
overlap in membership and CDS people were only asked to "support" the Campaign not to "join". 
The Campaign actually received more offers of support than the Fabian Society had members: In 
1960 the Fabians had 2586 members and in 1961 2711. Fabian Society Annual Report, July 1960 to 
June 1961, p 2. 
3. Campaign 2-5. 
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JPs. Over two hundred have been Parliamentary 
Candidates and there are nearly as many Young 
Socialists. 
At least a third are active trade unionists and 
several hundred hold trade union office. All major 
unions are represented and all but a few of the 
minor ones. 
The breakdown of this support across the country was not 
uniform and tended to be concentrated in urban areas. An 
analysis of the geographical location of 15634 CDS 
supporters illustrates this. 5 The main centres of CDS 
activity among this part of the CDS supporters were- 
Birmingham (53), Birkenhead (42), Bristol (51), Cambridge 
(29). Glasgow (85). Kent (69). Leeds (111), London 
(146) ,6 Manchester (90). Nottingham (28), oxford (49) and 
Sheffield (41). 7 Some of these main centres established a 
formal organisation. In Glasgow, Birkenhead and Leeds the 
organisation duplicated that of a Constituency Labour 
Party with Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen, Whips, Press Officers 
and Women's sections. 8 In these main centres the 
situation varied, but as a general rule support for the 
Campaign was at it peak in the spring and summer of 1961. 
Given the rather conservative nature of Labour's 
Constituency Labour Parties it was at times extremely 
difficult to mobilise the "silent majority". Janosik's 
study, Constituency Labour Parties in Britain, was based 
on research in the period 1962-1963, and revealed a 
-------------------- 
4. This figure is based on an analysis of the details of supporters of the CDS contained in the 
CDS Papers File, "Supporters", it is not a representative sample but it includes over half the 
supporters of the Campaign. 
5. See Table 5.1, in the appendix to this chapter. 
6. Including Battersea (42). 
7. CDS. Papers: Supporters Lists File, assorted lists of supporters for the period from the 
launch up to November 1961. The numbers in brackets are the numbers of supporters 
in each 
constituency given in this file. 
8. CDS Papers: Supporters Lists File, Howell to Rodgers, undated for Glasgow details: Chairman: 
Alex Cameron, Joint Secretaries John Urhart, John Smith and Mrs Clayton, Agents for each 
Constituency. Howell to Rodgers, undated for Birkenhead details: Chairman: Richard Kimberley, 
Vice-Chairmen: John Davis and Stuart Robinson, Women's Section Dorothy Tomlinson and Press 
Officer: Walter Smith. Solly Pearce to Rodgers, undated for Leeds details: Organiser: Denis 
Matthews, Yorks Organiser: Harry Waterman, Divisional Whips for each constituency, trade 
unions: Alfred Smith. 
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number of the problems that the Campaign came up against 
from the outset of its activity in the constituencies in 
1961. A majority of constituencies surveyed by Janosik 
were lead by individuals favouring a more left-wing 
policy, 9 especially on nationalisation. 10 The problem for 
the Campaign was not so much the predominance of the left 
as the ingrained nature of the character of Constituency 
Labour Parties, which tended to be dominated by a 
particular policy view: 
Moderate or left-wing opinion so completely 
dominated some constituency parties that opposition 
to the prevailing view was abortive. Even though 
minority opinions were freely expressed they were 
seldom accepted... Under these circumstances there is 
justification for the belief that parties with a 
narrow range of policy views might unwittingly 
discourage those with divergent oýinions from 
becoming active in Party affairs. 1 
The task was to motivate the rank and file supporters of 
the leadership to become active in "party affairs". 
In early 1961 Rodgers requested assessments of the 
situation in a number of the main centres. In Sheffield, 
Denis Matthews12 sent him a report of a meeting of CDS 
organisers. Of the Sheffield divisions Park, Brightside 
and Attercliffe were all supporting the unilateralists 
but did not "play an effective role in the [city's] 
party". In Hallam and Hillsborough the parties and the 
Trades and Labour council were unilateralist. The only 
multilateralist stronghold was the City Council Group but 
they were not participating in "party activity". The most 
-------------------- 
9. Edward G. Janosik, Constituency Labour Parties in Britain, Pall Mall Press 
1968, p 29, 
states that 54% favoured a move slightly or sharply to the 
left and 46% favoured the status quo 
or a move to the right. 
10. Janosik 1968 p 31. 
11. Janosik 1968 p 103. 
12. A signatory to the Manifesto. 
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active CDS supporters in the area were Councillor Roy 
Hattersley and Councillor Sharpe. Matthews' advice to the 
Sheffield organisers was direct and practical: 
When we started those present seemed disheartened 
and hesitant to counter-organise in the party. If 
they will do this, I should guess that they are in a 
position to transform the party. Their trade union 
contacts are poor and they will need help with this. 
We ought to arrange meetings of Sheffield MP's and 
get them to help in (a) Getting the Council Labour 
Group, especially the influential senior men, to 
take part in party activity. (b) Getting the help of 
friendly TU Leaders to get them ýo send their men 
to attend GMC and TCMP meetings. l 
He also recommended that the Campaign should get a 
friendly speaker (Denis Healey was suggested) and that 
the CDS should help them with the cost of a "better 
central meeting place" because they were planning to meet 
at the home of an active multilateralist. Similar reports 
were filed from Coventry, Oxford, Surrey, Cambridge, 
Norwich, Greater Liverpool, Peterborough and Southampton. 
The meeting in Nottingham was small but "there was every 
prospect here of things being done". 
14 In Coventry the 
convener was Robert Scarth and he was confident that he 
could muster one hundred supporters. Whips were appointed 
for all the city constituencies and Rodgers stressed the 
importance of the general objective of motivating the 
rank and file. 
15 
In Oxford, 16 Peterborough17 and Southamptonl8 the basis 
existed for good organisation. Pickstock was chairman and 
secretary in Oxford and they organised quickly 
to act as 
a caucus in local politics. Phyllis Stedman and 
her 
-------------------- 
13. CDS Papers: Regional 
14. CDS Papers: Regional 
15. CDS Papers: Regional 
16. CDS Papers: Regional 
17. CDS Papers: Regional 
18. GDS Papers: Regional 
Conferences, 
Conferences, 
Conferences, 
Conferences, 
Conferences, 
Conferences, 
Denis 
Report 
Report 
Report 
Report 
Report 
4atthews' report on Sheffield, April 23 1961. 
on Rodgers, March 10 1960. 
from Frank Pickstock, January 24 1961. 
from Frank Pickstock, January 3 1961. 
by Rodgers, December 10 1960. 
by Rodgers, December 21 1960. 
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husband, friends of Hugh Gaitskell, organised in 
Peterborough. Bob Mitchell and Alderman Matthews declared 
their readiness to look after constituencies throughout 
Hampshire. Less promising areas were Kent19 and rural 
Surrey and Sussex, because the spread of the 
constituencies made coverage more difficult. Problems 
were encountered in Norwich20 where there was a local 
truce between the unilateralists and the 
multilateralists, and Cambridge21 where the group trying 
to organise in the county was not highly rated by 
Rodgers. However within the university a considerable CDS 
group did develop. One of the most complex situations 
existed in Liverpool: 
The Exchange and Scotland divisions appear to be all 
right. Exchange is not without its problems but 
Bessie (Braddock) and her agent seem to have the 
measure of them: Scotland is ruled by David Logan in 
the tradition of T. P. O'Connor. Two others, Walton 
and Garston, are run by the Trots. There are small 
opposition groups but very much in the minority (and 
remember here that threats of physical violence are 
frequently used). Toxteth was Trot but appears to be 
coming over and certainly needs to be worked up. 
Kirkdale - difficult because of the docks dispute is 
fairly evenly balanced but there seems to be some 
Co-op influence, which means Howell James, a strong 
anti-Gaitskellite. This leaves Wavertree, where 
there is a small party run by a middle class 
unilateralist (unusual for Liverpool); Edgehill, 
which probably needs attention; and West Derby, the 
Braddocks' own Party, which they hold together, 
although not without a fight. 
22 
In Liverpool, where the "battle has long been joined", 
the Campaign could only complement the activities of 
those already fighting. In other places the best tactic 
was to keep the role of the Campaign secret; for example 
Mrs P Savage wrote to Rodgers in October 1963 discussing 
the selection of Parliamentary candidates: 
-------------------- 
19. CDS Papers: Regional Conferences, Kenneth May to Rodgers, December 27 1961. 
20. CDS Papers: Regional Conferences, Report from Rodgers, December 12 1960. 
21. CDS Papers: Regional Conferences, Report by Rodgers, December 12 1960. 
22. CDS Papers: Regional Conferences, Unsigned, undated report. 
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We never publicise the fact that we are connected 
with CDS, feeling that we can exert more influence in a quieter way, than by being known to belong to a "splinter group" as it's so misguidedly called by 
the Tory press! 2 
Having established an elementary network, partly through 
personal contacts given by the original signatories and 
partly through the publicity associated with the launch, 
the practice of sending out circulars was established. 
Different circulars were sent to different supporters of 
the Campaign. To the Regional Representatives24 detailed 
and frank briefings were offered. 25 For others, who 
supported the Campaign but did not become really 
involved, copies of Campaign and other propaganda 
material were dispatched. These contained only 
superficial information about the Campaign which tended 
to play down its factional nature and stress the 
importance of unity. 
After the publication of the Manifesto the first circular 
was the generalised statement On Unit . 
26 This was 
circulated to those who had responded to the press 
coverage of the launch. This was followed by the first 
regular briefing circular on November 24 1960.27 The 
initial theme of the Campaign was stressed, the 
importance of the Manifesto underlined and the impression 
that the Campaign was simply a reaction to events was 
reinforced. This letter also identified the officers of 
the CDS: 
-------------------- 
23. GDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Mrs P Savage to Rodgers, October 
13 1963. 
24. CDs Papers: Organisation 
to 'Regional Representatives' 
'Whips Conference'. 
25. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs 
26. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs 
Pickstock. 
in the Constituencies. circular by Rodgers April 6 1961, refers 
but by November 1961 Rodgers was inviting the same people to a 
File, for example Circular of March 10 1961. 
File, On Unity undated and signed by Rodgers, Howell and 
27. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs, Howell et at to Friends, November 24 1960. 
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We have therefore decided to set up a London office just as soon as we can. This will be in charge of W. T. Rodgers, who is Chairman of our Campaign 
Committee. Frank Pickstock will be Honorary 
Secretary... Denis Howell is taking on special 
responsibility for keeping in touch with our 
supporters throughout the country and Dick Taverne 
will be Honorary Treasurer. 
These remained the main public face of the Campaign until 
the reorganisations of 1963 by which time all but Frank 
Pickstock were in the House of Commons. 28 
On Unity was followed on December 9 1960 with Must 
Conference Decide? 29 This contained the first mention of 
organising in the constituencies. The circular advocated 
opposition to the "pressure being put on a number of 
Constituency Labour Parties to pass resolutions which 
assert that the Parliamentary Labour Party should 'abide 
by' Conference decisions". The circular advised that 
these resolutions could be opposed on the grounds that 
many of those now advocating "obedience to Conference 
decisions" had in the past opposed Conference votes of 
which they did not approve, that the Parliamentary Party 
was "independent of Conference" and that MPs were elected 
on a mandate to uphold "collective security". The object 
was to give the multilateralists in the constituencies 
ammunition to fire at the "other side". 
Information, propaganda, encouragement and ideas 
continued to flow from the Red Lion Street office 
throughout 1961 and 1962.30 At times the advice would be 
specific, particularly in the form of resolutions for the 
Party Conference. Model resolutions were offered on 
defence: 
-------------------- 
28. See below on the CDS and by-elections, pp 233-235. The early decision to minimise the 
involvement of MPs in the public face of the CDS was adhered to except when speakers were 
required. The reorganisation of 1963 was prompted because the organisers were uneasy about 
the 
way their grass root movement was now run predominately by newly elected 
MPs. To reduce this 
appearance the original officers were replaced by Bernard Donoughue and 
Anthony Dumont. 
29. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs, Must Conference Decide December 9 1960, unsigned. 
30. Specific instances are explored below. 
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This organisation recognising that Britain should 
remain a member of NATO and that the western 
alliance should not renounce nuclear weapons while 
the Russians retain theirs, urges the Labour Party 
to intensify its efforts to bring about all-round 
multilateral disarmament. 
Resolutions continued to be issued until the 1963 
conference when a full list was circulated containing 
resolutions on defence, domestic and international 
affairs. A typical CDS resolution on domestic policy was 
the resolution on housing: 
Conference recognises that Labour's response to the 
housing problem must be flexible and sensitive to 
different needs. Believing this to be possible only 
on the basis of local information and co-operation, 
Conference calls upon the next Labour Government to 
require all major housing authorities to submit a 
phased ten year housing plan which shall provide 
for: 
a) a separate dwelling for each family; 
b) the replacement or modernisation of all 
sub-standard dwellings. 
c) meeting the needs of all classes of society 
whether this be for rented dwellings, 
co-operative housing associations, or owner 
occupation; 
d) improvements in the design of dwellings and 
their physical environment. 
The circulars were also a convenient way of getting 
action on specific events that the CDS felt needed a 
response. An example of this was over the ETU case. The 
ETU had been Communist-dominated since 1956 and the 
battle for control of the Union reached its height in 
June 1961 when the High Court found Communist leaders 
guilty of ballot rigging. 
33 In September 1961 new 
elections were held in the Union and there was a "broad 
-------------------- 
31. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs, Circular Letter, January 11 1961. 
32. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs, Resolutions for 1963 Party Conference, undated. 
33. Minkin 1978 pp 112-114 
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front liberal-democratic 'revolution' in the Union". 34 
Rodgers' circular of September 1961 was devoted to the 
ETU and ended with an appeal. 
We have been asked by supporters in the ETU to ask 
you to do all that you can to make the appropriate 
name known in yourocality and encourage members of the union to vote. -5D 
This appeal was backed up by a short piece in Campaign 
outlining the facts of the case and calling for vigilance 
against the Communist Party. 36 
With the apparatus in place the Campaign could organise a 
quick response to events and the network was employed in 
a number of instances to put one side of an argument that 
otherwise might not have been put. Rodgers' relentless 
energy sometimes generated schemes that the other members 
of the Committee held back from. This was so in November 
1961 when Rodgers circulated 64 "key supporters" with the 
text of a letter he wanted to send to Arthur Greenwood 
and Barbara Castle. The idea came out of a conversation 
between Rodgers and Dai Jones; 37 they wanted to write to 
the defeated candidates for leader and deputy leader38 
and ask them to declare publicly their loyalty to 
Gaitskell. The proposed letter read: 
We the undersigned are deeply disturbed by signs 
that the rift in the Labour Party is widening 
instead of closing. The recent by-elections show 
that it is demoralising our supporters and 
discouraging the electorate. Yet a section of the 
Party still acts as if it were more interested in 
changing the leadership of the Opposition than in 
turning out the Tory Government. 
-------------------- 
34. Minkin 1978 p 111 
35. Underlining in the original. 
36. Campaign 8, August-September 1961. 
37. CDS Papers: Greenwood/Castle letter, Rodgers to Jones, November 15 1961. 
38. Butler 1986 p 143. Gaitskett defeated Greenwood by 171 votes to 59 and George Brown 
defeated Castle by 169 votes to 56. 
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We believe that the greatest contribution the 
spokesmen of the responsible left could now make to 
our common cause would be to declare their full 
support for the Party leadership and their 
determination to work unreservedly with their 
colleagues to win the next General Election. 
Will you make such a declaration in order to heal 
the breach and bring Labour back to power? If so you 
may be sure of a warm 5gsponse and a new beginning 
on the part of us all. 
The letter would have come from Dai Jones rather than 
from the CDS itself and Rodgers was specific about the 
way to present the letter to the press. 
In order not to give the impression that you had 
taken on the whole burden of getting the signatures 
- which might raise doubts - you might like to call 
in three or four people and refgK to them, if 
necessary, as your accomplices. 
The scheme was hatched on November 11, the letters were 
prepared at the CDS office the following week and by 
November 21 there were forty-six replies. Although 
everything was ready the scheme was killed off by the 
Campaign Committee at the beginning of December. Rodgers 
reluctantly accepted the "majority opinion". A 
contributory factor was opposition from Gaitskell to the 
proposed letter. 41 Jones was therefore informed that he 
could not send the letter out. 
42 The episode illustrated 
the extent to which the CDS machine had become very well 
oiled. It also showed that although Rodgers was given a 
great deal of freedom in the running of the Campaign, the 
CDS was by no means completely under his control. 
The instance of Carlisle Cathedral was a more successful 
operation for Rodgers and illustrated what he felt was 
one of the main objections that the left had about the 
-------------------- 
39. CDS Papers: Greenwood/Castle Letter, 46 signed copies on file. 
40. CDS Papers: Greenwood/Castle Letter, Rodgers to Jones, November 15 1961. 
41. CDS Papers: Philip Williams (Nuffield), Rodgers to Williams, November 16 1961. 
42. CDS Papers: Greenwood/Castle Letter, Rodgers to Jones, December 6 1961. 
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existence of CDS - that it was for the left to organise 
because the right had the organisation in the form of the 
Party administration. 43 It also showed that with a 
national organisation the right could respond even in 
constituencies where there were no actual CDS 
supporters. 44 On January 17 1961 the Carlisle CND group 
organised a meeting in the "precincts" of Carlisle 
Cathedral that was addressed by the unilateralist MPs 
Konni Zilliacus and Harold Davies. Rodgers, seeing a 
report in a newspaper, wrote to the Canon Holtby, who had 
also addressed the meeting and criticised Gaitskell, 
requesting the same facilities be granted to the 
multilateralists. 45 After an exchange of acidic letters 
the Dean, to whom the matter had been referred, refused 
to allow the Cathedral to be used by a political party. 
Rodgers refuted this and said he simply wanted two Labour 
MPs to put the case for multilateralism and that if the 
Dean refused then he would have to make the 
correspondence public. 
46 The correspondence was released 
on February 15 and Rodgers was pleased that the CND had 
been matched. 
47 The postscript to the episode was the 
offer by the local CND of a joint meeting. Rodgers lined 
up Alan Fitch to speak but the local group failed to 
organise the event and in the end no multilateralist 
meeting was held in Carlisle. 
48 
Keeping CDS supporters in touch and trying to match CND 
organisationally were aspects of CDS activity that could 
be described as "practical politics". The other side to 
the conflict with the left and indeed the conflict with 
the Conservatives was winning the ideological argument. 
-------------------- 
43. Bill Rodgers in interview with author. 
44. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Rodgers to Fitch, May 19 1961. 
45. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Rodgers to Canon Holtby, January 18 1961. 
46. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Rodgers to Dean, February 13 1961. 
47. Bill Rodgers in interview with author. 
48. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Roberts to Rodgers, May 17 1961, Rodgers to Roberts, 
May 19 and 
Rodgers to Fitch May 19 and May 23 1961. 
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The main weapons the CDS employed to get its ideology 
across were Campaign and the contributions supporters 
made to the revisionist journal Socialist Commentary. 
The idea of a newsletter emerged from the early planning 
discussions. Tony Crosland, Philip Williams and Bill 
Rodgers worked out the details in November and December 
1960. 
As Tony will have told you, we want to produce the first issue of "Campaign" - which is what the 
newsletter is to be called - on or about ist January. It will deal mainly with defence and the 
constitutional question. 
It is easier at the moment to visualise what it may look like than to describe it. There is general 
agreement that there should be as many short pieces 
as possible, including quotations from friends and 
enemies. The one point in principle raised was 
whether we should limit ourselves to replying to the 
left or whether we should try to be anti-Tory at the 
same time. This was resolved by agreeing that our 
anti-Toryism should be implicit but that it should 
be reinforced by, for example, quotations from the 
speeches of the people we were running for the 
NEC. 49 
Responsibility for producing Campaign was with the 
Campaign Committee, from January 1961 until the end of 
the year, when the organisation was revised and the 
Organisation Sub-Committee took over responsibility. 
In July 1962 the organisation was again revised with the 
creation of an Executive Committee5Ö and finally in April 
1963, as part of a general re-organisation, an Editorial 
Committee was establishede51 The personnel on these 
different committees was fairly consistent. In addition 
-------------------- 
49. CDS Papers: Editorial Committee, Rodgers to Williams, November 25 1960. 
50. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, 'Future Organisation and Activities. ' undated memoranda 
for Campaign Council by Rodgers. 
51. CDS Papers: To tie with Minutes, 'Reorganisation' minute of joint meeting of the Executive 
Committee and the Campaign Council, April 17 1963. 
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existence of CDS - that it was for the left to organise 
because the right had the organisation in the form of the 
Party administration. 43 It also showed that with a 
national organisation the right could respond even in 
constituencies where there were no actual CDS 
supporters. 44 On January 17 1961 the Carlisle CND group 
organised a meeting in the "precincts" of Carlisle 
Cathedral that was addressed by the unilateralist MPs 
Konni Zilliacus and Harold Davies. Rodgers, seeing a 
report in a newspaper, wrote to the Canon Holtby, who had 
also addressed the meeting and criticised Gaitskell, 
requesting the same facilities be granted to the 
multilateralists. 45 After an exchange of acidic letters 
the Dean, to whom the matter had been referred, refused 
to allow the Cathedral to be used by a political party. 
Rodgers refuted this and said he simply wanted two Labour 
MPs to put the case for multilateralism and that if the 
Dean refused then he would have to make the 
correspondence public. 
46 The correspondence was released 
on February 15 and Rodgers was pleased that the CND had 
been matched. 47 The postscript to the episode was the 
offer by the local CND of a joint meeting. Rodgers lined 
up Alan Fitch to speak but the local group failed to 
organise the event and in the end no multilateralist 
meeting was held in Carlisle. 
48 
Keeping CDS supporters in touch and trying to match CND 
organisationally were aspects of CDS activity that could 
be described as "practical politics". The other side to 
the conflict with the left and indeed the conflict with 
the Conservatives was winning the ideological argument. 
-------------------- 
43. Bill Rodgers in interview with author. 
44. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Rodgers to Fitch, May 19 1961. 
45. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Rodgers to Canon Holtby, January 18 1961. 
46. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Rodgers to Dean, February 13 1961. 
47. Bitt Rodgers in interview with author. 
48. CDS Papers: Carlisle, Roberts to Rodgers, May 17 1961, Rodgers to 
Roberts, May 19 and 
Rodgers to Fitch May 19 and May 23 1961. 
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The main weapons the CDS employed to get its ideology 
across were Campaign and the contributions supporters 
made to the revisionist journal Socialist Commentary. 
The idea of a newsletter emerged from the early planning 
discussions. Tony Crosland, Philip Williams and Bill 
Rodgers worked out the details in November and December 
1960. 
As Tony will have told you, we want to produce the 
first issue of "Campaign" - which is what the 
newsletter is to be called - on or about 1st 
January. It will deal mainly with defence and the 
constitutional question. 
It is easier at the moment to visualise what it may 
look like than to describe it. There is general 
agreement that there should be as many short pieces 
as possible, including quotations from friends and 
enemies. The one point in principle raised was 
whether we should limit ourselves to replying to the 
left or whether we should try to be anti-Tory at the 
same time. This was resolved by agreeing that our 
anti-Toryism should be implicit but that it should 
be reinforced by, for example, quotations from the 
spee hes of the people we were running for the 
NEC. 9 
Responsibility for producing campaign was with the 
Campaign Committee, from January 1961 until the end of 
the year, when the organisation was revised and the 
Organisation Sub-Committee took over responsibility. 
In July 1962 the organisation was again revised with the 
creation of an Executive Committee50 and finally in April 
1963, as part of a general re-organisation, an Editorial 
Committee was established. 
51 The personnel on these 
different committees was fairly consistent. In addition 
-------------------- 
49. CDS Papers: Editorial Committee, Rodgers to Williams, November 25 1960. 
50. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, 'Future Organisation and Activities. ' undated memoranda 
for Campaign Council by Rodgers. 
51. CDS Papers: To lie with Minutes, 'Reorganisation' minute of joint meeting of the Executive 
Committee and the Campaign Council, April 17 1963. 
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to the officers of the Campaign a number of MPs and 
supporters contributed. These included Tony Crosland, Tom 
Bradley, Patrick Gordon Walker and Roy Jenkins. Non-MPs 
who did much of the writing included Tony King, Philip 
Williams, Michael Shanks, David Marquand, Bernard 
Donoughue and Anthony Dumont. Rita Hinden, the editor of 
Socialist Commentary was also active on the committee and 
other members of the editorial board of Socialist 
Commentary also wrote for Campaign, including Allan 
Flanders and Anne Godwin. 52 
The content of Campaign as it emerged over 1961 was to 
develop as the task of the CDS developed. The objective 
of Campaign was clear to Rodgers: 
We then provided briefing, in a sense we tried to 
match Tribune. Tribune every week always telling the 
activists in the constituency parties which motions 
they should be putting down - which issues they 
should be advancing, a marvellously effective 
campaign and in our very mode5ate way we produced 
Campaign from February 1961. 
The first twelve issues were dominated by the defence 
issue. Only one article appeared that was critical of the 
Conservatives; 54 in contrast each issue contained attacks 
on the left. The favoured targets of the CDS writers were 
Frank Cousins, 55 instances of Labour Party bodies 
rejecting CND56 and, after May 1962 a series of articles 
57 highlighting the increasing extremism of CND. However 
-------------------- 
52. in October 1963 it was proposed to publish the names of all the contributors to Campaign in 
a special last edition. In addition to those already mentioned the list of contributors 
included J Richardson, Ivan Yates, Alan Fox, Douglas Jay, Uwe Kitzinger, David Saunders, George 
Jones, Peter Putzer, John Vaisey, Evan Luard, JB Cullingworth and David Shapiro. CDS Papers: 
Campaign Letters (consent to publication), undated list. 
53. Witness Seminar Transcript, Rodgers. 
54. Campaign 8, August-September 1961, 'Selwyn Lloyd's Wage Pause'. 
55. For example, Campaign 1, January 1961, Campaign 2, February 1961, Campaign 
3, March 1961. 
56. For example, Campaign 3, April 4 1961 and Campaign 5, May 1961. 
57. For example, Campaign 17, June 1962 and Campaign 28, July 1963. 
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the tone of Campaign was never predominantly negative, 
indeed a great deal of space was devoted to getting the 
CDS case across. 58 
The overall impression that Campaign tried to convey was 
of a responsible organisation concerned with broad policy 
issues and defending the leadership against irresponsible 
elements on the left of the Party. There were frequent 
quotations from Gaitskell59 and other multilateralists on 
the defence issue. These were accompanied by analysis of 
world events60 not directly concerned with the defence 
issue. On all of these issues the writers took positions 
which were in broad agreement with the front bench of the 
Party and, over for example the controversy surrounding 
the treatment of communist prisoners held by the Greek 
government, the paper used the issue to attack the left. 
Defence-related issues tended to follow the run of events 
and offer the Campaign's opinions. Up to the Blackpool 
Conference the articles which did not directly attack CND 
were concerned with putting across the official policy. 
After Blackpool the defence issue became centred on the 
negotiations that lead to the Test Ban Treaty61. In these 
articles and in an article advocating the surrendering of 
the British independent nuclear deterrent, 62 the Campaign 
took a markedly anti-nuclear line to emphasise the 
genuine nature of the multilateralist commitment to 
disarmament. The article attacking the deterrent opened 
with a sharp attack on Macmillan's policy: 
-------------------- 
58. Of particular interest on the defence issue are the front page articles of Campaign 2, 
February 1961 and Campaign 3, March 1961. 
59. Campaign 1, January 1961, Campaign 2, February 1961, Campaign 7, July 1961, Campaign 16, 
April 1962 and Campaignl8, July 1962. There was also a special edition to mark Gaitskell's 
death (Campaign 24, March 1963) with a photograph of the Labour leader on the front page, the 
only photograph ever to appear in Campaign. 
60. Campaign 8, August-September 1961, 'The Berlin Crisis'. Campaign 9, September-October 1961, 
'Crisis at the UN'. Campaign 21, November 1962, 'Cuba'. Campaign 22, December 
1962. Campaign 
26, May-June 1963, 'Greek Prisoners'. 'China and India' Campaign 32, January 1964, Campaign 34, 
March 1964 and Campaign 35, April-May 1964, 'Cyprus'. 
61. Campaign 14, March 1962. Campaign 15, April 1962, Campaign 16, May 1962, Campaign 20, 
October 1962. Campaign 22, December 1962. Campaign 28, August-September 1962. 
62. Campaign 23, January 1963, 'Neither Skybott nor Polaris' 
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In spite of Macmillan's doubletalk, the Nassau 
conference between him and President Kennedy marked the final, humiliating collapse of the defence 
policy which the Tory Government has followed for 
nearly three years. Since the spring of 1960, the 
British deterrent... has been independent in name 
only. The failure of Blue Streak showed that a 
country of Britain's size cannot afford to remain an independent nuclear power in any meaningful sense, 
without an intolerable strain on its resources. But 
the Tories refused to face reality. They clung to 
the myth of the independent deterrent, and hoped to 
prolong the life of Britain's ageing force of 
V-Bombers by buying Skybolt missiles from the United 
States. 
Another main element in Cambaian 
and by-elections. The 196263 and 
was analysis 
196364 local 
of local 
government 
elections received attention; the main emphasis in 1962 
was on the importance of the contests as an indication of 
the country's mood after an extended period of 
Conservative rule and Campaign claimed the excellent 
results of 1963 were the basis for a General Election 
victory. As the General Election neared, attacks on the 
Tory Government and the Liberal Party were stepped up. 
From November 1962 to July 1963 each edition contained an 
attack on the Conservative Government. Taken together 
they were a concerted critique of the Macmillan years, 
ranging from the Government's economic65 and social 
policies66 to the appointment of Lord Halisham as 
Minister for the North East, 67 culminating in a 
6$ "Macmillan must go" front page in July 1963. 
-------------------- 
63. Campaign 16, May 1962, importance of Municipal Elections'. and Campaign 17, June 1962, 'The 
Results'. 
64. Campaign 26, May-June 1963, 'Labour in Asecendent'. 
65. Campaign 23, January 1963, Campaign 25, April 1963, 'Mandling's first budget'. 
66. Campaign 26, May-June 1963, 'The Social Services'. 
67. Campaign 24, March 1963. 
68. Campaign 27. 
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Preparation for the General Election also inspired a 
series of articles on Labour's domestic programme, which 
chimed in with the general critique of the Conservative 
Governments being put forward by the Labour Party, but 
offered the Campaign's particular, if not very 
distinctive, view. These articles characteristically 
centred on the official Party policy statement Signposts 
for the Sixties. This was analysed in a series of five 
articles from September 1961 through to March 1962.69 
Three quotations from these articles give the flavour of 
Campaign's view of Signposts for the Sixties: 
Britain's great political issues are no longer 
massive unemployment and widespread poverty... If 
Britain had a government which realised that we are 
in the midst of a scientific revolution, and which 
was prepared to harness this and to plan to expand 
our national wealth the British people could have 
both more money in their pockets and better social 
services... Commitment to the doctrinaire theory of 
state-monopoly nationalisation of whole industries 
is abandoned. 70 
Signposts for the Sixties is a timely attack on 
complacency7 Tnd the current laissez-faire 
philosophy. 
So a new and sweeping redistribution of income 
through the budget, by taxation and social 
expenditure, must be Labour's main weapon for 
achieving its primary aim of greater social 
justice. 2 
The underlying assumption was that increased economic 
growth would enable a Labour Government to improve social 
services and education. The Campaign's attitude was 
classic and mainstream Labour thinking of the early 
1960s. The extent to which the policy document endorsed 
-------------------- 
69. Campaign 9, September-October 1961- Campaign 14, March 1962. 
70. Campaign 9, September-October 1961. 
71. Campaign 12, January 1962. 
72. Campaign 13, February 1962. 
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the objectives of the CDS is striking. There was little 
in Signposts for the Sixties that was not in line with 
general revisionist principles. 
The objective of Campaign was limited. It was not 
designed to take on Tribune, which as a long established 
Labour weekly had a wide circulation, and it was beyond 
the resources of the Campaign to produce anything as 
ambitious. It was designed to be the internal newsletter 
of the CDS and as such it provided a great deal of useful 
information and analysis. 
Communicating with the supporters through Campaign was 
complemented by getting the supporters together. National 
and regional meetings of CDS supporters were held from 
January 196173 and supplemented by a series of under-25 
Conferences and special one-off meetings. There were four 
Whips conferences held between November 1961 and May 
1963. The objective of these conferences was to discuss 
organisation and policy. 74 Attendance varied from a high 
point of 95 in 1961 to a low of 33 in 1963.75 The first 
"Whips Conference" took place in Caxton Hall, London on 
November 11 1961. It was attended by "100 key 
supporters": 
We discussed the lessons of the last year and the 
problems now ahead. In particular, it was 
unanimously agreed that a great effort must be made 
on the constituency section of the NEC and to make 
sure thaý6good Parliamentary candidates are 
adopted. 
As well as being forums for discussion and briefing the 
meetings allowed the supporters of the Campaign to come 
into contact with each other. The only other occasions 
-------------------- 
73. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, Notice of Rally at Caxton Hall, January 1961. 
74. CDS Papers: Whips Conference, May 26 1962, Circular invitation, May 1 1962. 
75. CDS Papers: Whips Conference, November 11 1961 and May 23 1963, Attendence lists. 
76. CDS Papers: Whips Conference, November 11 1961, Rodgers to WH Doxey, November 16 1961. 
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for national gatherings were at the Party Conferences 
when the officers of the Campaign would make themselves 
available: 
During the period of the Blackpool Conference Denis 
Howell, Frank Pickstock and I will be staying at the 
Crescent Hotel, North Promenade. We would be very 
pleased if you were to contact us there. This 
applies to other supporters of CDS to whom you might like to pass our address. We hope that we shall be 
able to arrange an informal social gathering of 
supporters during the week. 7 7 
The social side of the Campaign extended for the inner 
circle to the continuation of the parties organised 
through the late 1950s for the Group. Informal parties 
were held in July 1962 and June 1963 and attended by 26 
and 36 CDS members respectively. 78 A further social 
gathering was held in April 1963 after the official 
gathering of Labour Party members and candidates. About 
20 CDS candidates and supporters gathered at Rodgers' 
house. 79 The social nucleus of CDS continued after the 
official close of the Campaign in the 1963 dining club. 80 
The schools for under-25s were rather more serious 
affairs. The first of these took place in April 1962. The 
two day school was directed by Dick Taverne with Brian 
Walden, Tyrell Burgess and Alan Day as speakers. 
81 This 
was followed up in January 1963 by a one-day school 
boldly entitled "Creating the New Society", addressed by 
Tom Bradley on "The Role of Trade Unions" and Tony 
Crosland on his book "The Conservative Enemy". This 
school was directed by Brian Walden and attended by 73 
young Labour supporters. Tony Crosland was a considerable 
-------------------- 
77. CDS Papers: CDS Hand-outs, Circular, September 15 1961. 
78. CDS Papers: CDS Party 1962, note on attendance undated and CDS Party 1963, note on 
attendance undated. 
79. CDS Papers: Candidates, April 20, Attendence List, undated. 
80. Susan Crosland 1982, p 123, Rodgers and Taverne interview with author. 
81. CDS Papers: Weekend School April 13/14 1962. 
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success, with many people assuring Rodgers that they 
would attend again if they could be sure that Crosland 
was to speak. 82 One of the leading members of CDS at 
Cambridge University reviewed the school in a letter to 
Rodgers: "Bradley was good but pedestrian in the morning. 
Crosland was provocative, rude, arrogant, brilliant, 
witty and outspoken. "83 A further School was held in 
January 1964, this time directed by Bernard Donoughue 
with Jeremy Bray and Guy Barnett. It was well attended 
and was again considered a success. 84 
The CDS established in a relatively short time a national 
network of contacts which met in conferences and had a 
closer central group who were based in London. The 
Campaign decided that it would use its Constituency Party 
network to try and influence the voting for constituency 
section of the National Executive Party. A brief was 
prepared for circulation to the Regional Representatives. 
After outlining the details of the voting procedure and 
the composition of the NEC, it then suggested five things 
that the Whips could do: 
1. Discover NOW the date of the meeting of your 
General Management Committee when the decision on 
which candidates to support will be taken; 
2. Ensure well in advance that there will be a good 
attendance of delegates and ensure on the day that 
they attend; 
3. Let these delegates know about the candidates so 
they may be able to judge who best to support; 
4. Acquaint yourself with the procedure to be 
followed at the meeting so that you can take steps 
to see that candidates are fairly considered; 
5. Allocate responsibility for putting forward names 
and getting them seconded so that your GMC has t em 
all before it. DO NOT LEAVE ANYTHING TO CHANCE. 
89 
-------------------- 
82. CDS Papers: Under 25s Conference January 1963, Rodgers to Crosland, January 7 1963. 
83. CDS Papers: Under 25s General Correspondence, Walston to Rodgers, January 
7 1963. 
84. CDS Papers: Under 25s School, January 4 1964. 
85. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, "Voting for the National Executive Committee, 
" undated. 
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The brief went on to outline the different procedures 
used by the local parties in deciding who to mandate 
their Annual Conference delegates to vote for. This 
detailed brief was accompanied by the CDS slate of 
candidates and notes on their virtues. In 1962 this 
concentrated on four candidates. The CDS slate was 
composed of Jim Callaghan, described as "outstanding 
amongst existing members", 86 and Denis Healey, Chris 
Mayhew and Patrick Gordon Walker as candidates who had 
won "substantial support" in the past. Ian Mikardo and 
Tom Driberg were singled out as members of the NEC who 
least deserved support. 
There was a minor improvement in the votes for right-wing 
candidates during the CDS years, but the overall 
domination of this section of the NEC was not affected. 
Chart 5.1 shows the extent of this domination in terms of 
the candidates actually elected. The only non left-wing 
candidates that feature in the figures are Tony Benn and 
Jim Callaghan. The other places were taken by the old 
Bevanite MPs, Barbara Castle, Harold Wilson, Arthur 
Greenwood, Dick Crossman, Tom Driberg and Ian Mikardo. If 
the figures for the top twelve places are taken, as in 
Chart 5.2, then an increase of approximately a third was 
achieved in right-wing votes for 1962 and 1963. Only Jim 
Callaghan and Denis Healey managed to improve their 
standing and the hold of the left on the constituency 
section of the NEC was not affected. Aside from Callaghan 
the only significant newcomer to the section was Tony 
Benn and although Benn was not at this time a left-winger 
neither was he a candidate endorsed by the CDS. 
-------------------- 
86. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, "National Executive 
Committee: Annual Ballot 1962,1' 
undated. 
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NEC Elections 
Constituency Section 
Chart 5.1 
Millions 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
I 
0 
195 9 1960 1961 196 2 1963 1964 
Left 3.613 4.244 4.128 4.755 3.289 2.809 
Callaghan 0.606 0.53 0.528 0.562 0.524 
Benn 0.566 0.613 0.725 0.639 
Year 
Benn Iýl Callaghan Left 
Candidates elected 
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NEC Elections 
Constituency Section 
Chart 5.2 
Millions 
7- 
6 
5 
4 
2 
1 
0 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Left 4.19 4.795 4.573 4.054 3.733 3.326 
Right 1.405 1.185 0.985 1.296 1.844 1.609 
Year 
Right Left 
Figures are for the top 12 candidates 
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Prior to the success at Blackpool the Campaign faced a 
crisis about its future. From the outset the long term 
objectives of modernising the Labour Party in line with 
the aims of revisionism and the short term task of 
overturning the vote on unilateralism had been pursued in 
tandem. The emphasis though had been on the defence 
issue. The debate inside the Campaign Committee centred 
on a paper presented by Rodgers in July 1961: 87 
The future strategy of CDS should therefore be 
considered in the context of (i) the original 
purpose of the Manifesto and the broad mood it 
reflected; (ii) the current political situation 
insofar as this is different from two years ago; and 
(iii) the special position that CDS now finds itself 
in as a result of its achievements and the 
reputation it has acquired. 88 
Aside from the need to increase the number of whips and 
concentrate on developing publicity for official Labour 
Party policy, Rodgers was prepared to consider ending 
public activity and turning the CDS into a Think Tank. 
The Campaign would have closed its headquarters and 
stopped publishing Campaign but the links between the 
individuals would have been maintained and the main 
organisers would have come together again if a situation 
similar to that of 1960 occurred again. This point of the 
document sums up the central problem that the CDS never 
really overcame: 
An end to public activities would not mean the 
dispersal of records or losing contact with key 
workers. In the event of a crisis, supporters could 
be quickly circularised; and confidential advice 
could continue to be given on voting for the NEC and 
resolutions for Conference. The existing 
arrangements for Parliamentary Candidates could be 
maintained. When necessary, the present officers of 
the Campaign... could act together in a personal 
capacity to convene a meeting or issue a directive. 
In general, the personal contacts between the 
87. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, Minutes of Campaign Committee, July 17 1961. 
88. CDS Papers: To Lie with Minutes, The Future of the Campaign, Point 3. 
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Officers and many of the key CDS supporters are such 
that advice could be sought from them directly when it was needed. In practice, the public suspension of 
the Campaign would not end our present work, 
although it would reduce its scale. 
The influence of younger members of the Campaign like 
Bernard Donoughue, 89 and the desire of the more radical 
right wingers, like Tony Crosland, to keep the 
ideological battle going, led to the rejection of this 
plan and the decision to continue the Campaign. However 
from the vote at Blackpool onwards much of the 
organisational impetus for the Campaign was removed. The 
co-ordination of a national loyalist organisation, 
through regular circulars and other activity, needed a 
focus if it was not to simply merge with the general 
activity of the Party. Once the defence vote was achieved 
the focus was reduced. The necessity for a campaign was 
effectively removed. What continued, although at times 
very dynamic and useful, was increasingly just a network 
of like-minded people trying to influence the direction 
of the Labour Party. However the impetus that had been 
built since the launch was such that those closest to the 
Campaign decided that there was progress to be made 
across a broad front. Individuals like Bernard Donoughue, 
who came into the CDS later in 1961 felt they were 
joining a vigorous Campaign9° but from this July meeting 
onwards the nature of the Campaign was different. On a 
personal level, with Bill Rodgers, Dick Taverne and Denis 
Howell elected to the House of Commons the amount of 
time 
spent on running the Campaign was gradually reduced. 
Rodgers became increasingly concerned with influencing 
the selection of Parliamentary candidates. 
-------------------- 
89. Bernard Donoughue in interview with author. 
90. David Marquand and Bernard Donoughue in interview with author, 
witness Seminar Transcript, 
Bernard Donoughue. 
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The ability of an internal party group like CDS to 
influence the selection of Parliamentary candidates was 
very limited. 91 Each Constituency Labour Party was 
technically an independent part of the Labour Party with 
other affiliated organisations like trade unions and the 
Socialist Societies attached to it as the local entity. 
Candidates were nominated by these organisations or 
sponsored in the case of trade unions. Sponsorship could 
be an important consideration in circumstances when the 
local Party was short of money, and trade unions could 
increase their number of delegates to the local party at 
the time of selections and thereby swamp a meeting. 
Labour Party headquarters maintained two lists of 
candidates which were circulated to the local parties, an 
A list of candidates sponsored by trade unions and aB 
list of unsponsored candidates. However any Labour Party 
member could attempt to gain adoption as a candidate. 
Eric Shaw, in his study Discipline and Discord in the 
Labour Party, discussed the way in which attempts to 
control the selection of Parliamentary candidates had 
developed in the 1950s. 92 Shaw was primarily concerned 
with the power of the NEC in placing candidates and the 
potential influence of the party organisation. External 
influence could be exerted on constituencies at the 
initial stage when the timing of the selection was fixed, 
when the short list of candidates was being drawn-up and 
even at the time of the selection conference. The 
Regional Organiser could influence things at each stage 
of these proceedings and as a last resort the NEC could 
withhold approval of the candidates after selection. This 
last procedure was rarely used. 
93 The period in which the 
CDS was active in this field was described by Shaw as 
"the high point of central control". 
-------------------- 
91. Jim Cattermole and David Marquand interview with author. 
92. Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party, 
Manchester University Press 1988, pp 
90-93. 
93. Shaw 1988 pp 96-100. 
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In the early 1960s -a time of acute intra-party 
strife - some regional officials do appear to have 
become unusually embroiled in factional activities. 
During these years regular meetings of an informal 
Committee, consisting of the Party Leader, the Chief 
Whip, Bill Rodgers, the secretary of the right-wing 
ginger group the Campaign for Democratic Socialism 
and other influential figures met regularly to 
secure the selection of right-wing candidates for 
winnable constituencies. This relied upon the 
co-operation of at least some Regional Organisers; 
indeed Seyd suggests that Gaitskell's private 
Militia, the CDS, received help from no less that 
seven out of twelve organisers. 94 
The position of CDS as both an independent and a loyalist 
organisation made the relationship between the Campaign 
and the Regional Organisers a sensitive issue. The scope 
for Organisers materially to effect the outcome of 
selections was limited, although, as Shaw put it, 
"between overt manipulation and absolute neutrality lay 
sufficient territory to allow organisers if they so chose 
to exert a significant degree of influence". 
95 The seven 
named by Seyd were Donald Alger, John Anson, Jim 
Cattermole, Ron Hayward, Jim Raisin, Len Sims and Reg 
Wallis. 96 
The Labour Party Organiser most overtly supportive of the 
CDS was undoubtedly Jim Cattermole in the East Midlands 
region. He took an active view of his role in the 
Parliamentary selections in his area and helped when he 
could with "sound" or CDS candidates. 
97 His role was 
valued by Rodgers; he was one of the "key supporters" 
consulted in August 1961 when the future of the Campaign 
was under review, 
98 and he also helped in getting 
resolutions for the Party Conference adopted by 
-------------------- 
94. Shaw 1988 p 114. 
95. Shaw 1988 p 108. 
96. Seyd 1968 p 197. 
97. Bill Rodgers and Jim Cattermote interview with author. 
98. CDS Papers: Labour Party Organisers, Rodgers to Cattermole, 
August 24 1961. 
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constituencies in his area. 99 Donald Alger was also in 
sympathy with the Campaign in general and Rodgers in 
particular but he seems to have operated in a less overt 
way than Cattermole, preferring to go through MPs like 
Gordon Walker rather than straight to the Campaign. 
Alger, the Northern Area organiser, supplied Patrick 
Gordon Walker with a complete list of the selections that 
were due in his region and this was passed on to 
Rodgers. 100 However his personal regard for Rodgers was 
clear in their correspondence over Rodgers' prospects for 
adoption at the by-election at Stockton. Alger offered 
advice but also stressed that Regional Organisers could 
not use "their influence to get a person nominated". 101 
The position with Alger was further complicated when his 
wife wrote to Rodgers asking for help with finding a 
candidate for their local party at Hexham; Rodgers 
replied recommending Edward Pearce. 102 John Anson, the 
Yorkshire Area Organiser, also supplied lists of 
candidates through Gordon Walker and seems to have been 
generally well disposed towards the Campaign. 103 In 
contrast Len Sims, who also supplied the information, did 
so with a marked reluctance: 
I have been holding back on Parliamentary selection 
conferences in the hope that our internal 
difficulties would be resolved and candidates chosen 
for their ability as candidates rather than for 
being "pro" or "anti". 
However he was broadly sympathetic to the Campaign. Reg 
Wallis was asked to supply comments on lists of trade 
union delegates to the Blackpool Conference. 
104 There is 
no evidence in the CDS Papers that Ron Hayward was 
-------------------- 
99. CDS Papers: Labour Party Organisers, Rodgers to Cattermole, May 9 1961. 
100. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Alger to Gordon Walker, May 
5 1961. 
101. CDS Papers: Labour Party Organisers, Rodgers to Alger, December 
6 1961 and Alger to 
Rodgers, December 12 1961. 
102. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Rodgers to Mrs 
D Alger, July 21 1961. 
103. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Anson to Gordon 
Walker, April 27 1961. 
104. CDS Papers: Labour Party Organisers, Gordon Walker to Reg 
Wallis, March 16 1961. 
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involved and he has denied any involvement, 105 but 
Rodgers and Cattermole maintain that his role in the 
early 1960s was very different from his subsequently 
careful career. 106 
The relationship between CDS and the central 
organisation, especially the National Agent's Department, 
was complex. The Colne Valley by-election is probably the 
best example of the complexity of this relationship and 
the limitations of the Campaign's activity in the 
selection of Parliamentary candidates. The by-election 
contains all the main elements; it was held in what was 
then a safe Labour seat, there were plenty of candidates, 
the local CDS contact was very active and the liaison 
committee with the Chief Whip and the trade unions was 
involved. The by-election was occasioned by the death of 
the sitting MP, Will Hall, in October 1962.107 Florence 
Price, a very active local Party member and CDS 
supporter, immediately contacted Rodgers. 
I wonder if you could suggest to me a few names of 
people whom you would recommend for consideration? 
If you could suggest some former members who are at 
present out of Parliament but would be prepared to 
return, I think that might be preferable - as we 
shall be up against a very strong Liberal candidate 
who halo ursed the constituency for something like 6 
years. 
Rodgers' first thoughts were Ian Winterbottom, who had 
been MP for Nottingham Central from 1950-1955, and 
Shirley Williams, who had contested three seats in the 
past. In his reply to Price he pushed Williams 
harder 
than Winterbotton. 
-------------------- 
105. Shaw 1988 p 331. 
106. Jim Cattermole and Bit Rodgers in interview with author. 
107. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Price to Rodgers, 
October 15 1962. 
108. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Price to Rodgers, 
October 15 1962. 
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She is an old friend of mine and in the opinion of 
many people outstanding amongst the younger women in 
the Labour Party. I know that she would make a first 
rate candidate an 0sshe would 
be a great asset in the 
House of Commons. 
A week later he contacted Winterbottom and Williams and 
asked them to get in touch with Price. 110 After the NEC 
set the date for the special meeting of the local Party, 
Price asked Rodgers for more help with possible 
candidates. lll In response Rodgers offered the names of 
Harry Waterman and Dick Leonard, he also offered some 
practical help. 
It may be that I will be able to give you some 
advice after your meeting this Sunday. If you cared 
to let me have the names of anyone who was mentioned 
there I could probably1indicate to you whether they 
are worthy of support. 2 
Florence Price met all the people Rodgers put forward and 
decided to back Ian Winterbottom. 113 In fact Winterbottom 
emerged as the official candidate. This was decided at a 
meeting of the liaison committee that tried to 
co-ordinate the activity of the leadership and the CDS in 
candidate selections, this meeting was held on November 
6. 
Meeting consisting of Patrick Gordon Walker, the 
Chief Whip, Fred Hayday, Denis Howell and I to 
discuss Colne Valley, agreeing that Ian Winterbottom 
was the right choice but noting also that Mrs Price 
had shorn interest in Dick Leonard as a second 
string. 14 
---------------- 
109. CDS Papers: 
110. CDS Papers: 
and Rodgers to W 
111. CDS Papers: 
112. CDS Papers: 
113. CDS Papers: 
114. CDS Papers: 
Parliamentary Candidates 
Parliamentary Candidates 
illiams October 24 1962. 
Parliamentary Candidates 
Parliamentary Candidates 
Parliamentary Candidates 
Parliamentary Candidates 
(General), 
(General), 
(General), 
(General), 
(General), 
(General), 
Rodgers to Price, October 16 1962. 
Rodgers to Winterbottom October 24 1962 
Price to Rodgers, October 18 1962. 
Rodgers to Price, October 25 1962. 
Price to Rodgers, November 2 1962. 
Rodgers to Gaitskell, December 5 1962. 
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Three weeks later George Brown informed Rodgers that 
Merlyn Rees was the official candidate. 115 The problem 
was that although Winterbottom was generally favoured 
there were worries that he was too old116 and George 
Brown had not been present at the earlier meetings. Brown 
had been appointed chairman of the NEC Organisation 
Committee, responsible for selections, in March 1962 "in 
a deliberate move to step up the importance of the post 
and place the Party machine more firmly at the service of 
the Parliamentary leadership" and along with the National 
Agent's Department was taking a keen interest in 
selections. 117 In the three weeks between the meeting of 
the secret liaison committee and Brown's bombshell, the 
CDS was active in pushing Winterbottom as Rodgers saw him 
as the choice of the leadership. The objective was to 
support Winterbottom while not deterring others who the 
Campaign supported from entering the contest. If 
possible, although this could create difficulties for 
Rodgers, to have a completely "sound" list. Specific help 
that could be given was limited. Co-ordination, through 
Fred Hayday, of the lobbying of the only Union that was 
strong locally, the textile workers, was one thing 
Rodgers could do. Price supplied the lists of local Union 
activists and Hayday contacted them for information and 
to encourage nominations. 118 
The main left-wing candidate for the seat, Pat Duffy, was 
also busy lobbying for organisations to nominate him. By 
the time of the special meeting he had been nominated by 
seven organisations. At the beginning of this meeting the 
Regional Organiser, John Anson, announced that two of the 
local branches who had submitted nominations had done so 
without informing their memberships. The secretary of the 
-------------------- 
115. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Rodgers to Gaitskell, December 5 1962. 
116. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Rodgers to Bowden, November 8 1962. 
117. Shaw 1988 p 98. 
118. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Rodgers to Hayday, November 8 1962. 
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branch had simply filled in the form. The two branches 
that had acted in this way had both nominated Duffy. The 
meeting was in uproar and Anson's intervention, designed 
to discredit Duffy, backfired badly. Price sent Rodgers a 
full account of the meeting and detailed the left's 
response to Anson's announcement: 
Attacks were made on John Hare - he was too old - on 
Roy Hattersley - he was the regional office blue 
eyed boy and had ambitions to become MP for all 
Yorkshire - but the real fury came at the end for 
Winterbottom. He was a company director and a 
gentlemen farmer, so we couldn't possibly ask 
working class socialists to support him; his 
membership of a trade union was simply to put 
himself right with the rules in order that he could 
stand as a Labour candidate: people educated at 
public schools were not socialists and the final 
blow was "People don't vote for a chap just because 
he sits up straight on a horse! " Winterbottom's long 
service to the Labour movement was put to the 
meeting, his undoubted ability and success when he 
was in the Ho se - but to no avail. He was defeated 
by one vote. 1y9 
Price's response was to try and force his inclusion on 
the ballot at the following Sunday's meeting. The short 
list included Dick Leonard and Merlyn Rees. Price's final 
efforts to get Winterbottom on to the short list were 
blocked by Sara Barker, the National Agent, because the 
local executive had agreed the short list and the 
leadership's choice, Rees, was already on it. 
120 When the 
selection meeting finally took place Merlyn Rees put up a 
good fight against Duffy but Dick Leonard's performance 
was reported by Price to have been was disappointing. The 
voting in the first ballot was Bishop 2, Duffy 66, Haire 
12121, Leonard 1 and Rees 52, in the second it was Duffy 
69 and Rees 63. Price was naturally very disappointed and 
decided to dedicate herself to "getting the left-wing 
-------------------- 
119. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Price to Rodgers, 
November 28 1962. 
120. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Price to 
Rodgers, December 12 1962. 
121. A local candidate. 
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element voted off the Executive Committee". 122 The Colne 
Valley by-election was won by Duffy, but the seat was 
eventually lost at the 1966 General Election. 
The events illustrate the difficulties the CDS faced when 
dealing with George Brown. There had been problems 
earlier in the year when Brown "took Bradley out of 
Bristol without warning or consultation". 123 Brown's 
action over Colne Valley angered Rodgers sufficiently for 
him take the unusual step of sending a full account 
directly to Gaitskell. 
The answer clearly is and Denis Howell and I agreed 
on this with George on Monday - that liaison must take place at a very early stage. Miss Price was 
quick off the mark and we were ready to help her at 
once. Experience has told us that it is essential to 
move at once in a case like this. In future Denis 
will consult with George at the beginning. This 
ought to avoid this sort of muddle... I understand 
that Sara Barker is irritated with us over Colne 
Valley. I don't believe she has any reason to be but 
frankly if she devoted more attention to the 
Lancashire seats the dividends could be great. 124 
Gaitskell replied: 
As you say, there is no doubt about the source of 
the trouble which is inadequate liaison sufficiently 
early on. I spoke yesterday to Patrick Gordon Walker 
and the Chief Whip about this and I think more 
satisfactory arrangements will now be made. 
However the story also shows the ambiguous role CDS was 
playing in the selection procedure. It had no official 
position as an organ of the Labour Party, which was part 
of the reason for the conflict with the National 
Agent, 125 yet it was operating in support of the 
leadership and had direct contact with the Chief Whip and 
-------------------- 
122. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Price to Rodgers, December 11 1962. 
123. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Rodgers to Gordon Walker, March 16 1962. 
124. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates (General), Rodgers to Gaitskell, December 5 1962. 
125. Shaw 1988 p 114. 
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other high officials. It was not supposed to be 
Gaitskell's private army, yet it was only Gaitskell's 
intervention that prevented Sara Barker from pressing for 
a full enquiry into the Campaign's activity - an enquiry 
that might have exposed the direct links between the 
Campaign and the leadership. 126 As is clear from Rodgers' 
letter this caused considerable frustration. 
The selection battle in Salford illustrated the role the 
trade unions could play, although here as in Colne Valley 
the apparatus does not seem to have worked particularly 
well. The local CDS activist was Sam Goldberg and he 
reported to Rodgers: 
NUGMW - this is where you can help. They have about 
3,000 levy paying members in Salford, but only pay 
fees for about 300 so they are only entitled to 3 
delegates instead of 30 or more. Bill Anson is their 
local full-time man and assures me that if they will 
pay their fees for more delegates, he will ensure 
that they are appointed and properly briefed. I told 
him I would see what I could do through Reg Wallis 
(with whom I have discussed this problem of under 
affiliation in the past)... Swindell [District 
Secretary] was very sore when they didn't get 
Warrington, despite a large number of NUGMW 
delegates and is now reluctant to pay up, on the 
other hand their last annual conference passed a 
resolution that they ought to affiliate their full 
strength locally. If you can do anything through 
NUGMW Head Office it could be invaluable. But on no 
account must it be known that its anything to do 
with Gaitskell, CDS or you, it must appear to be a 
decision by the District Secretary. 127 
In the event there was no increase in the delegation from 
the General Workers Union but an increase in the AEU 
delegation which supported the eventual winner of the 
seat, Stan Orme. 
128 
-------------------- 
126. Shaw 1988 p 114 and Seyd 1968 pp 209-210. 
127. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Goldberg to Rodgers, November 
14 1962. 
128. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Goldberg to Rodgers, 
November 14 1962. 
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A more successful operation was launched against the 
left-wing nominated candidate for the Pollok constituency 
in Glasgow, John Mack Smith. Will Hannan MP, one of the 
most active CDS supporters in Scotland, sent Rodgers a 
six page report on the situation in Glasgow in January 
1963.129 He concluded the section on John Mack Smith 
("Not to be confused with our John Smith"): 
This man is a member of the Clerical and 
Administrative Union. I am informed that the NEC of 
the Union has already threatened the Political 
Committee with disbandment because of the disruptive 
tactics. Mack Smith was, and may be still is, a 
council member in Glasgow. 
Rodgers passed on the report to Denis Howell who was a 
member of the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union. 
Howell met with the Union's President David Currie and 
together they organised action against Mack Smith. 
The National Executive have ordered the Glasgow 
Political Committee of our Union to disband and have 
made it known through the Union Head Office circular 
that the body is entirely unauthorised. At their 
meeting this week the National Committee [of the 
C&AWU] sent a letter to the NEC of the Labour Party, 
drawing their attention to the fact that Mr John 
Mack Smith who has been nominated by a branch of our 
Union for the Pollok division, was in fact not an 
authorised candidate and that in accordance with the 
rule of the Union, the branch who had nominated had 
no authority to do so. 
130 
Mack Smith lost the nomination and a local candidate, 
Alex Garrow, was eventually adopted. It was one of the 
most straightforwardly successful operations mounted by 
the Campaign. 
An area in which CDS had some success and was a 
by-product of Rodgers particular attachment to younger 
politically active people was the encouragement of 
younger candidates. In June 1963 Campaign made a feature 
-------------------- 
129. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Hannan to Rodgers January 
11 1963. 
130. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates General, Howell to Rodgers, January 
30 1963. 
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of the younger looking Party, although it did not as Seyd 
claimed maintain that it was "its moderate socialism" 
which was instrumental in "encouraging young people into 
the Labour Party. ""131 The article highlighted some of the 
younger CDS candidates and concluded that "this is an 
encouraging trend. A younger-looking Labour Party can 
make a more convincing claim to lead the country in the 
second half of the twentieth century. "132 The objective 
of the revisionists was to counter act the more trendy 
left-wing politics of the time. From the launch of CDS, 
when Philip Williams used research students to mail out 
the manifesto, a group of young activists had been 
involved with CDS. 
A number of those active in the "Counterblast" youth 
section of the Campaign became Parliamentary candidates 
through "the good offices of Bill Rodgers" and CDS. 
George Jones, who as a research student at Nuffield had 
helped with the initial mailings became the Parliamentary 
candidate at Kidderminster. He in turn supplied Rodgers 
with the names of other young hopefuls including Robert 
Skidelsky, Tom Nossiter, Harold Lind, Edward Pearce, John 
Gyford and Colin Pepworth. 133 Another leading light of 
the Counterblast group, David Saunders, was adopted as 
candidate in Peterborough. The chairman of Counterblast, 
Stephen Haseler was still under twenty-one and so was too 
young for adoption as a candidate-134 
The motivation behind the CDS Campaign over selections 
operated on different levels, a point stressed by both 
Shaw and Seyd. Firstly there was the straightforward 
anti-left motivation, keeping ex-communists and 
unilateralists out of the Parliamentary Party. Second 
-------------------- 
131. Seyd 1968 p 207. 
132. Campaign 26. May-June 1963. 
133. CDS Papers: Possible Parliamentary Candidates, 
Jones to Rodgers, November 11 1961. 
134. CDS Papers: Possible Parliamentary Candidates, 
Rodgers to Haseter, August 8 1962. 
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there was the positive objective of trying to get "sound" 
candidates selected. The nature of a candidate's 
"soundness" reflected the broader aims of the Campaign, 
the aim of modernisation and revisionism in domestic 
policy, as well as the candidate's stance on the defence 
issue. 
The Campaign was successful in the by-elections that were 
held during its active life. Denis Howell was the first 
to win a seat. He had been MP for Birmingham All Saints 
between 1955 and 1959 and secured the nomination for the 
Small Heath by-election in March 1961. His nomination had 
little to do with the direct involvement of CDS but was a 
tribute to his network of local contacts. 135 Dick Taverne 
won the by-election at Lincoln in March 1962. Hugh 
Gaitskell suggested Taverne to the retiring member 
Geoffrey de Freitas, a keen CDS supporter and he in turn 
helped Taverne with introductions in the constituency: 136 
I received a telephone call one day from John 
Harris, who was Gaitskell's aide at the time, asking 
me whether I was still interested in standing for 
Parliament... Gaitskell suggested me for the seat for 
two reasons; firstly, he was keen to see leading 
younger figures of CDS brought into Parliament and 
Bill Rodgers and myself were the two most obvious 
candidates. Secondly, it was thought I would be a 
suitable horse for the Lincoln course... The fact 
that I was an officer of CDS personally recommended 
to Geoffrey by Hugh Gaitskell and duly selected for 
the seat later created a myth about my selection 
conference... It is firmly believed by some, and has 
been reported in the New Statesman, that my election 
was somehow "rigged" and that I was foisted as a 
right-ginger on an unwilling left-wing local 
party. 
-------------------- 
135. Rodgers interview with author. The impression in underlined by the work Howell 
did for CDS 
in the local area. 
136. Taverne interview with author. 
137. Dick Taverne, The Future of the Left. Lincoln and After, Cape, London 
1974, p 26. 
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For a short time after news of the by-election was 
announced there was a conflict between Rodgers and 
Taverne who both had designs on the seat. However Rodgers 
withdrew in favour of Taverne. In turn Taverne received 
the aid of the local CDS whip, Ken Rawding, who helped 
get a nomination from a ward. The short list at Lincoln 
was solely CDS or sound candidates, Terry Boston, Neil 
Macdermott and Arthur Bottomley and all these candidates 
eventually found their own seats. Taverne with the help 
of De Freitas and as the youngest candidate was duly 
selected and won the by-election. 138 So even if the 
selection conference was not actually fixed, the local 
Party was offered a choice between right-wing candidates, 
all of whom were choices of the leadership and the CDS, 
and for the left in the local Party this amounted to the 
fixing of the selection. One man walked out of the 
selection meeting. 139 
At the other by-elections held during the active life of 
the CDS, other supporters of the Campaign were elected: 
Niall Macdermott at Derby North; Tom Bradley at Leicester 
North-East; Joel Barnett at Dorset South, Merlyn Rees at 
Leeds South, Will Howie at Luton and Terry Boston at 
Faversham. Tam Dalyell, who spoke on CDS platforms was 
also returned for West Lothian in the period. Thus of the 
27 by-elections won or held by Labour, which took place 
from Denis Howell's victory onwards, ten were won by CDS 
candidates. 
The campaign's experience in influencing selections led 
to an article in Campaign which advocated the reform of 
the selection process: 
The case for a thorough-going reform of the methods 
by which candidates are put forward is strong. One 
object would be to improve the list of sponsored 
names available. The trade unions ought 
to be in a 
138. Taverne 1974 p 28. 
139. See John Ramsden and Chris Cook, BY-Elections in British Politics, 
Macmillan, London 1973. 
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position to maintain their representation in the 
Parliamentary Party. But it is no secret that, with a few notable exceptions, the calibre of available 
union candidates is low. Many excellent young 
officials prefer to stick to industrial work that 
yields both satisfaction and security. 
But in the absence of reform it is the duty of the National Executive Committee to follow vigilantly the selection of all candidates and be prepared to 
use its veto. This does not mean a rigid screening to eliminate all non-conforming views. But if, after 
careful investigation a candidate is found to be 
unsuitable there should be no hesitation in refusing 
to endorse him. Some will resent firmness on the 
NEC's part. But thoughtful Labour Party members will 
reflect that it is not asking much to expect 
Parliamentary candidates to be worthy 
standard-bearers of democratic socialism. 140 
Criticism of the candidate selection procedure also came 
from the left of the Party. After Ian Mikardo's 
experience in Reading and Poplar he wrote a pamphlet 
criticising the process. Mikardo felt that the process by 
which the candidates were selected was "too short, too 
casual and too superficial to ensure that most times the 
best nominee will be chosen". 141 
Rodgers' method of assessing the suitability or otherwise 
of candidates was developed in the period before the 
General Election. He described his technique to Anthony 
King: 
I have been looking into the question raised the 
other day about the likely views of new Labour 
Members of Parliament... As I mention in my short 
paper it is very difficult to know precisely where 
people stand. Accordingly, to get the proportions I 
have invented a rather elaborate scheme by which I 
gave people points for soundness. My proportions 
were not based on a strict allocation of individuals 
to categories but on a proportion of points. 
142 
-------------------- 
140. Campaign 14. March 1962. 
141. He quotes from the pamphlet in Ian Mikardo, Back-Bencher, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 
1989, p 170. 
142. CDS Papers: Parliamentary Candidates, Rodgers to King, May 12 1964. 
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The complete analysis which Rodgers forwarded to Tony 
King summed up the extent of the Campaign's achievement: 
1) Labour held seats: in proportion of 2-1 sound to 
unsound. 
2) Tory Majorities of up to 2,500: in proportion of 
4-1 sound to unsound. 
3) Tory Majorities of 2,500-5,000: sound and unsound 
about equally divided. 
At the least favourable 30% of all newcomers will be 
unsound and the most favourable 25% of the newcomers 
will be unsound. Of all this 30%, however, half are 
likely to be reliable on run-of-mill occasions. On 
the other hand, the remaining 15% ought to be 
regarded as hard core dissentients who cannot be 
relied upon on any occasions and may take an actiXe 
part in organising opposition to the leadership. 
Charts 5.3-5.7, in the appendix to this chapter, 
summarise Bill Rodgers' findings. Chart 5.3 shows the 
number of candidates selected in seats with a Tory 
majority over Labour of under 2,500, using Rodgers' 
classification system. In these seats 25 candidates were 
found to be sound as far as the Campaign was concerned 
and of these 9 were felt to be CDS candidates. All 9 of 
the CDS candidates were elected and 12 of the sound 
candidates also won seats. Chart 5.4 shows the proportion 
of candidates selected in seats with a Tory majority over 
Labour of between 2500 and 5000 votes and including the 
Liberal seat, Bolton West, which went to Labour in 
1964.144 In these seats 11 candidates were found to be 
sound and 2 were felt to be CDS candidates. In the 
election 5 sound candidates and 1 sound CDS candidate 
were elected. Chart 5.5 shows the proportion of 
candidates selected in safe Labour seats with retiring 
members. None of these seats were lost and 13 sound 
candidates were elected, of whom 3 were CDS candidates. 
Chart 5.6 shows the proportion of the sound candidates 
in 
------------------- 
143. CDS Papers: 
iCDS 
Hand-outs, Possible Labour Winners, cover page, undated. 
144. The other Liberal seat to fall to Labour was Huddersfield. 
In addition the Labour seat 
Caithness and Sunderland was won by the Liberals and the 
Conservatives won five seats from 
Labour, including Patrick Gordon Walker's seat at Smethwick. 
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each of the first three charts that were CDS. Out of a 
total of 51 sound candidates identified by Rodgers in 
these seats, 14 were felt to be close to the Campaign. 
Finally, Chart 5.7 shows the breakdown of the new intake 
of Labour MPs in the 61 seats Labour won at the 1964 
General Election. They are dominated by sound candidates, 
and of these 25 sound candidates, 11 were marked by 
Rodgers as CDS. 
Combining these figures with the successful election of 
CDS candidates in by-elections from 1961 onwards, one can 
estimate that 35 Labour MPs acceptable to the CDS found 
seats in the House during the lifetime of the Campaign. 
If one includes the 14 candidates marked down as soundish 
and broadly acceptable to the Campaign then this amounts 
to 49 Labour MPs. If one adds to this the 43 of the 45 
MPs who signed the letter of support to the campaign in 
1961 and were re-elected in 1964,145 then an estimate of 
the Parliamentary strength of the CDS in 1964 would be 
approximately 90 out of a total Parliamentary Party after 
the 1964 election of 317. This group of MPs can be 
tentatively characterised as a core which in alliance 
with the centre of the Party substantially outnumbered 
the left. 146 
The bare figures conceal a number of disparities. The 
actual influence of the Campaign was not equal in each of 
the selections, nor is it possible to quantify the 
significance of this influence. However, it is possible 
to conclude that by actively promoting candidates and 
informing them of coming selections, the CDS helped 
launch the Parliamentary careers of a substantial number 
of sound MPs. This achievement was possible because of 
-------------------- 
145. Hase'ler 1969 p 217. 
146. As late as 1971 Tony Benn characterised the pro-Community 
MPs as '1CDS" and felt they had a 
majority in the PLP. In an entry in his diary 
for Wednesday November 10 1971 he wrote, "It 
means that the Bill Rodgers' CDS group have got a majority 
in the PLP and that is something one 
will have to accept. " Tony Benn, Office without 
Power Diaries 1968-1972, Hutchinson, London 
1988, p 384. 
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the co-operation of the leadership and the acquiescence 
or active support of a number of key Regional Organisers. 
It was also due to the energy and resourcefulness of the 
CDS organisers. 
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5.3: CDS Classification Chart 
Candidates selected for seats with a 
Tory majority over Labour of >2,500 
30 
25 
20 
15 
Sound 
T ^- Soundish 
10 
s 
ýi Not Very Sound 
Not Sound 
5 
Not Known 
0 
Candidates 
Sound 
Soundish 
Not Very Sound 
Not Sound 
Not Known 
Source: CDS Papers: Parliamentary 
Candidates (Red File) Undated reports 
by Bill Rodgers. 
25 
4 
6 
9 
2 
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Chart 5.4: CDS Classification 
Candidates selected for seats with 
Tory majority over Labour of 2500-5000 
M Sound 
`20 Soundish 6 
LJ Not Very Sound 
4 
Not Sound 
Special 2 
= Not Known 
Candidates 
Sound 
Soundish 
Not Very Sound 
Not Sound 
Special 
Not Known 
Source: CDS Papers: Parliamentary 
Candidates (Red File) Undated reports 
by gill Rodgers. 
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Chart 5.5: Classification Candidates in Labour held seats with 
retiring members. 
14 
12 
10 
8 
Sound 
Soundish 4 
Not Very Sound 
Not Sound 2 
Very Unsound 
0 
Sound 
Soundish 
Not Very Sound 
Not Sound 
Very Unsound 
Source: CDS Papers: Parliamentary 
Candidates (Red File), Undated Reports 
by Bill Rodgers. 
13 
3 
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Candidates 
Chart 5.6: CDS Classification The proportion of "Sound" candidates 
classified as "Sound CDS". 
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Chart 5.7: CDS Classification 
New MPs elected in 1964 
30 
25 
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Soundish 15 
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Not Sound 10 
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Unknown 
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Source: As Chart 5.1 and Times Guide 
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Chapter 6: 
Europe, Wilson and the end of the Campaign. 
As the defence issue declined in importance the Campaign 
became increasingly dominated by the internal party 
battles over the selection of Parliamentary candidates. 
However, events in the wider political world began to 
impinge on the CDS - indeed to raise questions about its 
future. 
The most important of these was the European issue, which 
came to the centre of the political stage in July 1961 
when Macmillan launched Britain's bid for entry to the 
European Economic Community. ' Gaitskell's initial 
handling of the issue provided few problems for his 
friends, he had approved a compromise which accepted the 
principle of membership providing the conditions of entry 
2 
guaranteed various national interests. However, signs of 
unrest were soon apparent. 
-------------------- 
1. Macmillan's application to join the Community was made 
in July 1961 and negotiations went on 
from that date. In March Britain applied to join E. C. S. C. and Euroatom. 
From then until 
September the pace of talks accelerated. Common Market and Commonwealth, 
A new survey by The 
Times. The Times Publishing Company, London 1962 pp 3-4. 
2. Williams 1979 p 706 and Crossman 1981, entry for June 14 1961, pp 
951-952. 
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The first dissent came from Roy Jenkins. In response to 
the conditions which Harold Wilson laid out in the House 
of Commons as being acceptable to the Labour Party, he 
resigned from the front bench. 3 This also allowed one of 
the keenest Europeans greater scope to speak freely on 
Europe - "the first but not the last time he put his 
European commitment before his career". 4 Despite the 
powerful advocacy of close friends like Jenkins, 
Gaitskell, while continuing to state his belief in 
European Unity and keeping a well-balanced tone to his 
statements on the particular merits of the Community, 
turned increasingly against the bid for entry. The 
conditions that Macmillan was going to place on Britain's 
entry seemed to Gaitskell to undermine the position of 
the Commonwealth. Moreover, the prospect of another huge 
split in the Labour Party, so soon after the one over 
defence, had the likelihood of ending Labour's bid for 
electoral victory. The anticipation of another five years 
in frustrating opposition must have weighed heavily with 
the "government minded" Gaitskell5 but many of the 
emotional arguments of the anti-marketeers chimed with 
Gaitskell's instincts. 
The consequence, in the autumn of 1962, was a markedly 
anti-Community broadcast, followed by Gaitskell's second 
most famous speech to Conference. Although he tried to 
reconcile his friends to his volte face there was little 
time for fences to be mended. What all the CDS organisers 
agreed on, even in the depths of the Common Market 
controversy, was that Gaitskell's position was 
unassailable. Within three months of the conference 
-------------------- 
3. Williams 1979 p 706. 
4. John Campbell, Roy Jenkins A bio ra , Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1983 p 50. 
5. Williams 1979 pp 777-778. 
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speech Gaitskell was dead. His death and the election of 
the Harold Wilson marked the beginning of final scene in 
the story of the CDS. 
The place of the European conflict in the internal 
politics of the Labour Party was not a straightforward 
one. It did not fit into the left-right divide as this 
had expressed itself over the defence issue and over the 
debates about the future of public ownership. The essence 
of the Common Market issue was the nature of Britain's 
relationship with the rest of the world. If the 
Conservative Government was successful in bringing 
Britain into the European Community the place of Britain 
in relation to the Commonwealth and the "special 
relationship" with the United States would be questioned. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Bevanite disputes of the 
1950s had often centred on defence and foreign policy 
issues - most notably German rearmament. But these were 
only part of a much broader foreign policy debate 
concerning Britain's post-imperial role in the world. The 
left's attitude to these questions tended to be coloured 
by an anti-American perspective, while the right of the 
Party, and Gaitskell in particular, nurtured a strong 
Atlanticist prejudice. 
6 The motivation behind both 
positions was the search for Britain's elusive "role". 
However there was a notable difference between the 
generals of the rival factions and the soldiers. Both 
Bevan7 and Gaitskell shared a residual belief in 
Britain's global responsibilities, especially where the 
Commonwealth was concerned. This presented Gaitskell with 
problems when his younger colleagues, like Roy Jenkins, 
increasingly came to see Britain's future as lying with 
closer links to the Community. 
-------------------- 
6. See below pp 75-76. 
7. Foot 1975 p 575. 
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The detailed developments of European integration through 
the stages of the Council of Europe, the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the Treaty of Rome establishing 
the European Economic Community of the Six, 8 created a 
number of difficult problems for British politicians. 
There were three main dimensions to the debate. The 
peculiarity of Britain's post-war position (comprising 
the sterling area as an economic unit; the Commonwealth 
as a political entity and the "special relationship" with 
the United States) had to be counterbalanced with the 
role of Britain as a European power. In turn the conflict 
between Britain as a European power and as a world power 
created a number of difficulties. Given the other roles 
the UK was called on to play, what would its real 
commitment to the Community be? From a European 
perspective the suspicion arose that a United Kingdom 
only partially committed to the Community would not be 
able to play a positive role. On the other hand the 
dynamic being created on the Continent forced British 
statesmen to ask themselves if they could afford not to 
join the Community. 9 
This led naturally into the second main problem - the 
form the association of nations should take. Many in the 
Labour Party saw the "capitalist" association represented 
by the Treaty of Rome as an external force that might 
prevent a future Labour Government planning the British 
economy. 10 The counter-argument was that only if the 
progressive force of the British Labour Party was present 
in the institutions of the Community would it develop 
-------------------- 
8. For the development of the European Community see, William Diebold, The Schuman Plan, 
Praeger, New York, 1959, Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History, Macmillan, 
London 1980 and Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 
Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1990. 
9. See David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled British Policy And World Power in the 20th Century 
Longmans, London 1991, for a synthesis of the developing role of Britain in the 20th Century, 
especially Chapter 8, "Circles 1955-1970" pp 202-226. 
10. For the debate on the Community inside the Labour Party see LJ Robbins, The Reluctant 
Party: Labour and the EEC 1961-1975, GW and A Hesketh, London 1979. 
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along lines in tune with democratic socialism. Related to 
this was the effect that the EEC would have on existing 
trading patterns. The pro-marketeers maintained that 
entry would open up the markets of Europe and, so long as 
safeguards were built in, this would not adversely effect 
the Commonwealth. The anti-marketeers believed that the 
gains in European markets would not offset the losses in 
the Commonwealth markets. 
The Labour Party faced these complex questions which the 
European Community poised through a period in which it 
was dealing with and then recovering from deep divisions 
over Clause Four and unilateralism. There was no hard and 
fast correlation that could predict on which side of the 
European debate the protagonists in these other debates 
would fall. Those on the left tended to be anti-European 
but those who came from an ILP background tended to be in 
favour of the Community as an international 
organisation. 
11 Among the Gaitskellites the 
pro-marketeers were a majority but there was an effective 
minority of anti-marketeers, including the leading 
figures Douglas Jay and Denis Healey. In the overall 
Parliamentary Party there was a majority of 
anti-marketeers. Stephen Haseler estimated the position 
of "revisionist" MPs as dividing roughly 75% pro-Common 
Market and 25% anti-Common Market. 
12 The opinions of MPs 
who declared support for the CDS is shown in Table 6.1 in 
the Appendix to this Chapter. 
In the wider Party, opposition to the Community was 
widespread. As Uwe Kitzinger, an early CDS supporter and 
advocate of British entry to the Community, stated, the 
EEC created a series of problems: 
-------------------- 
11. Bert Oram in interview with author. 
12. Haseler 1969 pp 228. 
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As freedom of movement clashes with xenophobia, so the problem of supranationalism touches the deeper 
suspicions against the outside world. In defence 
Britain has long abandoned independence; in 
economics, a country as heavily dependent on the 
rest of the world can only ever be master of its own fate to a very limited degree; but the formal merger 
of decision-making procedures, the absence of a formal veto on proposals by a body on which the 
British government is not itself formally 
represented, go against the grain even of many who in most other 19rounds would like to see Britain join the Community 
For the Labour Party the way these feelings were 
expressed reflected the underlying characteristics of the 
Movement. Janosik found that among his sample of leading 
members of Constituency Labour Parties in 1963 "three out 
of four respondents were either strongly or moderately 
opposed to the idea of entry, while less than one 
respondent in five gave moderate or strong support". 14 
The reasons the respondents gave for opposing entry 
tended to reflect the main issues in the wider debate: 
To most respondents, France and Germany were 
dominating the Market and would continue to do so. 
De Gaulle and Adenauer were not admired by CLP 
leaders, who considered them old, inflexible and 
very conservative. The Treaty of Rome was, by its 
phraseology a "capitalist device" since it assumed 
the existence of competitive economies in the member 
states. British membership in EEC would make 
achieving socialism in Britain more difficult, and 
would prevent a British government from directing 
industry to areas of persistent unemployment. 
Although a number of respondents referred to the 
fact that both De Gaulle and Adenauer were Roman 
Catholic and attributed the conservatism of both men 
to their common religious persuasion, only one, an 
MP, viewed the whole Common Market proposal as a 
"Catholic Plot". He noted that President Kennedy, 
also a Roman Catholic, was urging British entry into 
EEC, and concluded his comment by saying 
meaningfully: "It is called the Treaty of Rome, you 
know, and we all know what is in Rome. " The general 
impression gathered was that Labour Party members 
in 
-------------------- 
13. Uwe Kitzinger The Challenge of the Common Market, Basil Blackwell, oxford 
1961 pp 150-151. 
14. Janosik 1968 p 42. 
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general objected to the ideology of the Treaty of Rome, to its supra-national implications, 
lgnd 
to the 
nations and the leaders who concluded it. 
The Labour Party was divided in more or less the opposite 
way to the divisions created over the defence issue, with 
the moderate trade union MPs and the leader this time 
siding with those suspicious of the Community. Unlike the 
defence issue, when the leader could count on an 
overwhelming majority in the Parliamentary Party, if 
Gaitskell had come out in favour of the Common Market he 
would have faced a battle with all sections of the Party: 
the Parliamentary Party, the trade unions and the 
Constituency Labour Parties. On the other hand if he came 
out against the Common Market he risked alienating his 
more loyal supporters. One of the CDS organisers 
maintained later that Gaitskell's stance on Europe was 
primarily designed to unify the Party. 16 
Gaitskell's own view on the Community was based on an 
acceptance of underlying inspiration for the European 
movement tempered by a deep suspicion of the implications 
for Britain if she joined. This view manifested itself 
most clearly in a profound concern about the precise 
terms of entry: 
From the start not only the opposition but the 
Government as well were not in favour of "going in 
and trying to get the best possible terms" but only 
for "going in if certain conditions were 
fulfilled"... we certainly took the conditions very 
seriously and always meant to stand by them. There 
were two reasons for this attitude. First, I myself 
and my leading colleagues all happened to believe 
and still believe that the arguments of principle 
were fairly evenly balanced for and against and that 
the balance would be tipped in favour of our entry 
only if our conditions were fulfilled. Secondly, 
this policy of making our final judgement depend on 
conditions was the only one which could have been 
accepted by the Party as a whole. If I had urged 
unconditional entry (thus going further than 
the 
-------------------- 
15. Janosik 1968, p 42. 
16. Denis Howell in interview with author. 
253 
Government) there would have been bitter opposition from a minority which was basically hostile to our 
entry. If I had urged opposition whatever the terms 
this would also have been bitterly opposed... In 
either case, there would have been a major split in the Party, which, following the great dispute oil defence would have been fatal to our prospects. 
The conditions Gaitskell outlined for membership were 
guarantees for British agriculture; a fair deal for the 
E. F. T. A. partners; ability to plan economic policy and 
the safeguarding of the Commonwealth. In a broadcast in 
May 1962 Gaitskell actually leaned a little towards the 
Community. In a well balanced account that summed up the 
arguments on both sides, stressing the 50-50 nature of 
the economic argument, he put the political argument in 
fairly positive tones: 
You hear people speaking as though if we go into the 
Common Market, on the basis of the Treaty of Rome, 
that this is the end as far as an independent 
Britain is concerned. That we're finished, we are 
going to be sucked up in a tunnel of giant 
capitalist, Catholic conspiracy, our lives dominated 
by Adenauer and de Gaulle, unable to conduct any 
independent foreign policy at all. Now frankly 18this 
is rubbish on the basis of the Treaty of Rome. 
Having dismissed the gloomy picture he went on to make 
the case that without Britain and its Commonwealth links, 
the Community would be a much more introverted 
organisation: 
If we go in and make it a kind of link between the 
Commonwealth and Europe, and if Europe were also to 
adopt the kind of modern attitude that I think we 
should be adopting, that would be a tremendous step 
forward. And I'll go further than that, if we don't 
go in, if we stay out, you might get a very tightly 
formed state in Europe with high tariffs, inward 
looking, rather reactionary, and conservative and 
nationalistic in its attitude. If we can prevent 
that by going in I think we've certainly done a good 
job. l 
-------------------- 
17. Williams 1979 p 705. Quoting Gaitskett's letter to Kennedy. 
18. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence File, Hugh Gaitskell, 
A Party Political Broadcast 
on behalf of the Labour Party , May 
8 1962, Transcription from broadcast. 
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Between May and September 1962 the details of the 
conditions became known and Gaitskell's position hardened 
against the Common Market. From the strict neutrality of 
his early stance, through his mildly positive broadcast 
in May, he now came out clearly against the conditions as 
negotiated by the Macmillan Government. In another 
political broadcast in September 1962 he stated: 
There is a case for entry. And it's like this: if we don't get in there is a possibility that the six 
countries will form themselves into a European 
State, and there is a danger that this state's 
policy could be reactionary, nationalistic and 
possibly dangerous to peace as well. And the idea is 
that if we go in, we could prevent that. We might be 
able to persuade the Six and the others to let in 
the rest of Western Europe, Scandinavian States, and 
Austria and Switzerland. We might have a loose 
association which would be outward-looking, in 
favour of low tariffs, progressive in its foreign 
policy and its home policy, anxious to help 
under-developed countries, supporting the United 
Nations. This would be certainly a force for good in 
the world, and it would be a great ideal. But what 
is really involved in this is building a bridge 
between the Commonwealth and Europe; and we cannot 
do that if we destroy the Commonwealth by our entry. 
And if by our entry we are committed to European 
Federation or anything of that kind, we do destroy 
the Commonwealth. And if by our entry the economic 
damage to the Commonwealth countries is so serious 
the links are all broken, and the Commonwealth fades 2 out, we cannot do it either. 
0 
Most of the organisers of the CDS watched Gaitskell's 
progress with trepidation. Their views on the Community 
were made clear in the initial manifesto which covered 
Europe in paragraph 12: 
We favour two radical changes in Britain's relations 
with the outside world. First, as a matter of 
conscience as well as of policy, we urge a great new 
-------------------- 
19. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Hugh Gaitskell, A Party Political Broadcast on 
behalf of the Labour Party , May 
8 1962, Transcription from broadcast. 
20. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Hugh Gaitskell The Common Market-Text of a 
television broadcast September 21 1962 reproduced in This Week Volume 4, Number 30, September 
27 1962, p 158a. 
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effort to share our prosperity with the 
under-developed countries of Asia and Africa. 
Secondly, we are convinced Europeans, certain that 
Britain's destines are inextricably bound up with 
those of a resurgent and united Europe. 
The first public comment by the Campaign after 
Macmillan's approach to join appeared in Campaign in July 
1961. Stressing that the most important thing was for the 
Labour Party to remain united, it set out to refute the 
charges of the anti-marketeers. In marked contrast to 
Gaitskell's line which was consistently to state that the 
economic argument was 50-50,22 Campaign rejected the 
notion that entry would mean higher food prices and an 
invasion of Italian workers and concluded: "Indeed from 
an economic point of view it is scarcely open to question 
that Britain would benefit from membership. "23 This 
pro-market line was kept up in subsequent editions. Small 
pieces were published with quotations from leading Party 
figures in favour of the common Market. 
24 These were 
followed up with two large articles "Common Market 
Facts", Campaign 14, March 1962 and "The Common Market, 
More Arguments Refuted" Campaign 16, May 1962. Both were 
in the style of questions and answers and dealt with the 
familiar set of objections to the Community. However, 
with the conference approaching, the tone of the articles 
became more positive. In "Socialists and the Common 
Market"25 the case for a socialist justification for 
entry was made: 
There are few greater illusions than the view that 
an isolated Britain would be a socialist Britain. 
Our national record is that of only two effective 
-------------------- 
21. CDS Papers: Manifesto Texts File, A Manifesto Addressed to the Labour 
Movement, Paragraph 
12. 
22. Williams 1979 p 713. 
23. Campaign 7, July 1961, "Labour and the Common Market" unsigned 
but probably written by Tony 
King. 
24. Campaign 8, August- September 1961, "Opinions on the Common Market" 
from Lord Morrison and 
Bill Carron. Campaign 11, December 1961, "More Common Market Views" 
from Sir Alan Birch and Roy 
Jenkins. 
25. Campaign 18, July 1962. 
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left-wing governments in the 62 years of this 
century. And an inward-looking re-orientation would 
encourage the conservative and not the progressive forces in Britain. Those who are most suspicious of foreigners are most nervous of change. 
This was followed by a forthright attack on the 
possibilities of the Commonwealth being an effective 
world force. The stance of the Campaign was clearly 
pro-European. Until Gaitskell's second broadcast, in 
September 1962, the neutrality of the Labour leader 
produced few problems for the loyalist Campaign. 
Gaitskell was persuaded against the Community primarily 
because of the conditions of entry that Heath had 
negotiated. However the pro-marketeers had not helped 
their case by arranging a meeting between Gaitskell and 
"the father of the European idea", Jean Monnet. Gaitskell 
interrogated Monnet about the effect of tariffs on 
particular Commonwealth countries and was unimpressed by 
Monnet's answers. Finally Monnet protested, "You must 
have faith" to which Gaitskell replied "I don't believe 
in faith, I believe in reason and you have not shown me 
any. 26 
After the September broadcast and even more so after the 
conference speech the paths of the leader and the 
Campaign were seen to diverge. The Executive Committee of 
the CDS wrote to Hugh Gaitskell asking the leader to 
maintain neutrality on the European issue: "The 
maintenance of the official benevolence of the Party 
towards the Common Market will give time for those of us 
who are for, as well as those who are against, 
to 
crystallise problems and opinions in the coming months 
in 
a fairly amicable spirit. "27 Gaitskell replied 
that he 
did not "think anything in your letter was 
inconsistent 
with the statement of the Commonwealth 
Labour leaders"; 
he went on to re-state the view he 
had expressed in his 
-------------------- 
26. Williams 1979 p 708 and Campbell 1983 p 71. 
27. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Pickstock to Gaitskell, 
September 21 1962. 
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broadcast, that it was necessary to go in to prevent 
undesirable developments in Europe but that Britain 
should only go in on the best possible terms. He went on: 
At the same time, we have all along insisted that 
certain conditions must be fulfilled. Perhaps the 
most important of these is the safeguarding of our ties with the Commonwealth. I do not see how anybody 
can possibly believe that this condition is 
fulfilled by the terms so far negotiated and set out in the White Paper... It is, of course, possible to 
argue that the condition should not be laid down but 
it has been laid down not only by us but by the 
Government as well... From all this I think you will 
see that you have no reason to fear that we shall 
take and out an out anti-Common Market line. Our 
attitude will be precisely the same as it has been 
in the last fortnight - simply that the terms as at 
present negotiate ý8are not good enough and we must 
have better ones. 
The assurance given by Gaitskell that he would not take 
an "out and out anti-Common Market line" was to be flatly 
contradicted by his conference speech. At the same time 
as Pickstock wrote to Gaitskell he made the Campaign's 
views clear in similar letters to George Brown, Denis 
Healey and Herbert Bowden, the Chief Whip. 29 Gaitskell's 
letter did not quieten the anxiety of Rodgers and on 
September 25 he circulated a letter to key supporters 
stating the problem presented to the Campaign by 
Gaitskell's change of stance: 
As we see it, the position is that the leadership of 
the Party has given the impression both within the 
Party and to the general public that Labour is now 
flatly against entry to the Common Market. 
It is not simply a question of insisting on adequate 
terms; we all want the best terms Britain can get. 
The danger is in saying that the Commonwealth is the 
supreme consideration and implying that Britain 
really has little in common with Europe. Labour's 
position may not have been stated in precisely 
this 
way but equally Hugh Gaitskell has expressed no 
-------------------- 
28. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Gaitskell to Pickstock, undated copy. 
29. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Pickstock to George-Brown, 
September 21 1962, a 
note on this letter indicates that letters were sent to 
Healey and Bowden. 
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positive sympathies at all towards Europe. Everyone believes that he has come down off the fence against the Common Market. 
This means that within the next few days everything must be done to persuade the leadership of the Party that there is a very substantial body of most loyal 
supporters who would regard a firm commitment 
against entry to the Common Market as a disaster. We do not ask Labour to declare unequivocally in favour 
of the Common Market. What we must do is redress the balance against the anti-Common Marketeers and try 
and bring Labour back to a balanced position again. If this is not achieved by next week's debate we believe that the consequences for the Labour Party 
could be far reaching. 
The letter also gave an insight into Rodgers' personal 
view of the Common Market debate: 
If I may add an entirely personal point, I think 
that I was less committed than some other members of 
the CDS Committee to entry to the Common Market. 
Certainly there were a number of us who were 
particularly reluctant that the Campaign should come 
out firmly on that side. 
However, the events of the last few 
greatly disturbed us all. I confess 
personally only a cautious Supporte: 
entry I now feel personally obliged 
initiative on the side of those who 
go in. 
days have 
that from being 
r of Britain's 
to take a public 
want Britain to 
This point was echoed in the letters Rodgers dispatched 
to supporters of CDS on the NEC on September 26, asking 
them to try and get a resolution for Conference that 
expressed "that for Labour the best solution could still 
31 be terms which enable Britain to join", 
The CDS was feeling considerable disquiet about 
Gaitskell's position even before the leader's speech on 
the Common Market on October 3 1962. After this speech 
the organisation was left in something approaching chaos. 
-------------------- 
30. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Rodgers, September 25 1962. 
31. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Rodgers to Braddock, Gordon Walker, 
Mulley, 
Callaghan and White, September 26 1962. 
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The point of a loyalist Campaign is that it favours unity 
of the Party behind the elected leader. Although the 
organisers were keen to stress their independence from 
Gaitskell when he differed from them over Europe, 32 until 
this point they effectively deployed their loyalty over 
defence to capitalise on the general feeling of unity and 
they had campaigned actively for candidates who supported 
the leadership and indeed were endorsed by the Chief 
Whip. What happened at Brighton, and particularly the way 
it happened, undermined this position and forced the CDS 
to try and develop a more independent identity. 
Gaitskell's speech was an exceptionally powerful 
mastering of the debate on the Community which through 
its combination of rational argument and emotional tone 
stunned or delighted many in the hall. In the weeks after 
Conference a critical difference emerged among the CDS 
between those who had actually been in the hall and those 
who read the speech afterwards. 
33 The strident 
anti-market tone was especially shocking because, just 
before the conference Gaitskell had met two CDS trade 
unionists, Hayday and Webber, and had assured them "Don't 
worry, wait till you hear what I say. I intend to speak 
to my friends. "34 The centre of Gaitskell's case was 
rather contradictory. He insisted that the debate had to 
be based on the facts, especially the economic facts, 
35 
but the most effective passages in his speech were pure 
emotion, for example in discussing the prospects for a 
Federal Europe: 
We must be clear about this: it does mean, 
if this 
is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent 
European state. I make no apology for repeating it. 
It means the end of a thousand years of history. 
You 
-------------------- 
32. See Rodgers' replies to Mcquade, Biggar and Smith below. 
33. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence: Rodgers to Smith, October 
15 1962 and Williams to 
Rodgers, October 10 1962. 
34. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Rodgers to Williams, 
October 10 1962. 
35. LPACR p 155, "I say this to start with, because I 
do not think the level of argument in the 
Press has been all that high ... I also prefer 
to rely on facts. " 
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may say, "Let it end, " but my goodness, it is a decision that needs a little care and thought. And it does mean the end of the Commonwealth. How can 
one seriously suppose that if the mother country, the centre of the Commonwealth, is a province of Europe (which is what Federation means) it could 
continue to exist as the mother country of a series 
of independent nations? It is sheer nonsense. 36 
Gaitskell also foresaw the extension of majority voting 
from economic to political issues and the faster pace of 
integration. He finished his speech by laying out the 
terms that he thought would be acceptable: 
If we carry the Commonwealth with us, safeguarded, 
flourishing, prosperous, if we could safeguard our 
agriculture, and our E. F. T. A. friends were all in 
it, if we were secure in our employment policy, and 
if we were able to maintain our independent foreign 
policy and yet have this wider looser association 
with Europe, it would indeed be a great ideal. But 
if this should not prove to be possible; if the Six 
will not give it to us; if the British Government 
will not even ask for it, then we must stand firm by 
what we believe, for the sake of Britain and the 
World; and we shall not flinch from our duty if that 
moment comes. 
37 
Douglas Jay described the effect of the speech from the 
point of view of an anti-marketeer: "It was unique among 
all the political speeches I ever heard; not merely the 
finest, but in a class apart, even from Gaitskell's Suez 
speeches. It can only be described as an intellectual 
massacre. Nobody had anything else to say. For its 
uniqueness rested in its ring of truth. "38 In the hail 
the ovation was "unparalleled", 
39 although Rodgers stayed 
firmly in his place. Gaitskell united the Party behind 
his leadership in a single speech. However in the process 
he left many of his friends confused and angry. Anthony 
-------------------- 
36. LPACR 1962 p 159. 
37. LPACR 1962 p 166. 
38. Jay 1980 p 286. 
39. LPACR 1962 p 166. 
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Howard, writing in the New Statesman, saw Brighton as "as 
ruthless a power struggle as has been seen for a long 
time in a British political party". 40 If Gaitskell was 
talking to his friends then he was trying to persuade 
them that they were wrong, just as he had tried to 
persuade the left by force of rational argument that they 
were wrong on Clause 4 and defence. But the way in which 
he did it raised a number of questions. Anthony Howard 
described the impact on the pro-marketeers: 
Why did the Labour Party leader decide to go as far 
- sparing the feelings of none of his former 
associates in the process? There is some evidence 
that at first he may not quite have realised how 
intransigent the opposition of his former friends 
would turn out to be. But once he realised this he 
clearly made his decision that if they could not be 
shaken they must be destroyed... The proof of it was 
to be seen in the well-known faces which could be 
noticed primly sitting down on the ex-officio 
benches as the rest of the Conference rose to give 
Hugh Gaitskell the greatest ovation of his career. 
Men like Jack Diamond and Bill Rodgers (Roy Jenkins 
had the sense to stand up and make a brave shot at 
making the best of it) certainly look9j angry; but 
they also looked beaten and betrayed. 
The response to the disquiet expressed by the CDS about 
Gaitskell's attitude to the Community was mixed. From the 
NEC Jim Callaghan replied saying that he would take 
Rodgers' views into account but that "the present terms 
for entry are not good enough and I could not 
conscientiously vote for them". 
42 In response to his 
circular letter David Saunders43 and Keith Hindle44 
wrote in supporting Rodgers. Hindle analysed the effect 
of Gaitskell's change of position on CDS: "CDS will never 
feel the same personal loyalty to Gaitskell again but 
there is no justification for indulging in bitter 
-------------------- 
40. New Statesmen, October 5 1962, p 438. 
41. New Statesmen October 5 1962, p 438. 
42. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Callaghan to Rodgers, September 
27 1962. 
43. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Saunders to Rodgers, October 
1 1962. 
44. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Hindle to Rodgers, October 
10 1962. 
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recrimination ... We may need Gaitskell's leadership again 
some time - indeed we need him now, for who else? " A view 
shared by Philip Williams: "If we are going to stay in 
the Party, Hugh Gaitskell is still not just the best 
leader we have but the only one in sight. ""45 
But not all the CDS supporters took this line, Gerry 
McQuade, a signatory to the Manifesto, could not 
countenance a break with the leader: 
I regret the impression has been created that CDS is 
aligned against the leadership on this issue. I feel 
that the statement which the NEC is to submit to 
Conference is one which should command wide support 
and I am writing to Hugh Gaitskell to this effect. 
While I have much in common with the general outlook 
of CDS on policy I had never anticipated that we 
would find ourselves aligned against the leadership 
on a major issue and I regret therefore that I feel 
compellgo to withdraw my support from CDS for this 
reason. 
Another wrote in similar vein, "I am not happy about the 
way CDS is handling the Common Market. CDS was formed to 
get more united support for a democraticially appointed 
leader - in this case Gaitskell... But quite apart from 
the merits of this question, it seems to me that the CDS 
are in danger of creating just the kind of split which we 
set out to repair. 147 John Grieve Smith wrote to Rodgers 
expressing even more marked disquiet about the direction 
of the Campaign: 
Like most of your supporters, that I know, we did 
not join CDS because we agreed in detail with the 
Manifesto but because we felt it was vital for the 
right and centre of the Party to regain its 
traditional ascendancy over the left. We regarded 
the organising work and its publicity on the defence 
question as its most important tasks... There seems 
to be a danger that in the constituencies at any 
rate CDS is fixing its support in say the most 
right-wing 5% of the Party as opposed to the 60% 
in 
-------------------- 
45. CDS Papers: Envelope CDS '63, '64, '65, Williams to Rodgers, October 
8 1962. 
46. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, McQuade to Rodgers September 
30 1962. 
47. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Biggar to Rodgers, October 
31 1962. 
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the centre and right wings. To take my own case: everybody I know regards me as well on the right of the party, but I am beginning to feel a fanatical left winger compared 
48ith 
those who came to your last London meeting. 
However support came in for Rodgers' views from some of 
the key CDS people: Harry Waterman, 49 a signatory and 
whip; Bob Mitchell, who helped with candidate 
selections; 50 Kenneth May, a signatory and whip; 51 Tom 
Fyfe, the mover of the CDS resolution at the USDAW 
conference52 as well as Pickstock and Howell. The Oxford 
people were more cautious. According to Williams, Walden, 
King and Sharprio were less outraged by the speech, 
partly because they had not been there: 
I'm worried by the difference between the reaction 
to Brighton of all of you who were there and some 
who were not (David Shapiro, Brian Walden, myself 
and from a recent letter almost certainly Tony King 
too). Obviously I don't like the line Gaitskell is 
taking and obviously it might face us with a not 
very pleasant choice in the future. I can quite see 
that a passionate enthusiast for the Market might 
now feel he had to leave the party. But if we don't 
intend to go that far, then surely our reaction has 
to be governed by prospects for the 9ýture rather 
than resentment about the last week. 
After the conference Gaitskell acknowledged the 
considerable misquiet amongst his CDS supporters by 
meeting them in private. This took place on October 21 
1962 at Bill Rodgers' house. He made plain in this 
meeting that he had never seen himself as a 
pro-European. 54 As late as July 1962, however, he was 
-------------------- 
48. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Rodgers to Smith, October 15 1962. 
49. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Waterman to Rodgers, September 29 1962. 
50. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Mitchell to Rodgers, September 27 1962. 
51. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, May to Rodgers, October 11 1962. 
52. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Fyfe to Rodgers, September 26 1962, Fyfe wrote: 
"I was so disgusted by Hugh Gaitskell's speech (which to me smacked of unconvincing 
expediency) 
that I almost wrote to him at the time -I wish I had. " 
53. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Williams to Rodgers, October 
8 1962. 
54. Williams 1979 p 702, there is no record of this meeting in the CDS 
Papers. 
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prepared to give a similar led against the left on the 
European issue as he had successfully done on 
unilateralism. 55 But once the detailed terms were known 
he felt duty bound to oppose entry because the Government 
was behaving in a "shabby" way56 and was prepared to 
enter on any terms. 57 He made plain that he thought the 
Common Market "had nothing to do with the basic 
principles for which CDS stood". He regarded the matter 
as "A bore and nuisance and it always had been... As the 
evening wore on, he showed increasing signs of weariness. 
A number of those present thought this reflected his 
regret that he'd been forced to take the stand on an 
issue about which he cared little. "58 
Once he had taken the stand, as Jenkins acknowledged, his 
old friends discovered that when opposing Gaitskell 
rather than supporting him, what had seemed like courage 
became stubbornness: 
I inevitably felt a little more sympathy with those 
who had differed from him in the past! Courage could 
be interpreted as inflexibility and an aggressive 
respect for rationality as a tendency to equate 
little points and big ones. Yet, by and large, he 
appeared just as impressive as a temporary opponent 
as he had so long done as an ally and leader. . . Nor 
did this difference make close personal 
relationships with him impossible. At first I 
thought it would, but that was under the shock of a 
sudden break in a long habit of agreement. But then 
he made it clear that he was still faithful to his 
old rule of the primacy of private relations. For 
the last few weeks of his activ99life we were back 
on terms of closest friendship. 
-------------------- 
55. Williams 1979 p 712. 
56. Williams 1979 p 728. 
57. Williams 1979 p 728. 
58. S Crosland 1983 p 111. 
59. J Campbell, Roy Jenkins: A biography, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London 1983 p 72. 
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Hugh Gaitskell died of lupus erythematosus on January 18 
1963. He was fifty-six years old and had lead the Labour 
Party for just y dover seven rather turbulent years. The 
fact that he had only been admitted to hospital on 
December 8 1962 made the shock of his sudden death even 
more profound. His biographer summed up the impact: 
To those who had worked closely with Gaitskell the 
loss went deep, like the unexpected and premature death of a parent. For a generation of 
politically-minded people, most of whom had not known him personally - teachers, journalists, trade 
unionists, civil servants - an inspiration wt out 
of public life which has yet to be renewed. 
Although his death had a major impact, Gaitskell's 
leadership of the Labour Party had not been conspicuously 
successful in terms of the Party itself. He had led it 
through a series of highly damaging and public disputes 
that could arguably have been avoided by a more 
"political" leader. Compromises like the Crossman-Padley 
plan on defence were rejected in favour of confrontations 
and a bitter personal atmosphere pervaded the Party for 
much of the period. However it was perhaps this feature 
of Gaitskell's leadership, this lack of the more 
"slippery" aspects of Labour leadership, that made him 
appeal to a broad cross section of people outside the 
Party. For younger members of the Party, who had 
supported his leadership, the loss of Gaitskell was a 
stunning blow. 61 For the organisers of the CDS the shock 
was both personal and political. As has been stressed, 
even the disagreement over the Community had not reduced 
the extent to which for the Campaign there was no leader 
but Gaitskell. 
As Susan Crosland bluntly stated: "As is the custom, 
before Hugh Gaitskell's body was cold others were moving 
into positions to determine who would succeed him. 
"62 
-------------------- 
60. Williams 1979 p 763. 
61. Bernard Donoughue, George Jones, Michael Summerskill and Nicholas Cox 
in interview with 
author all made this point forcefully. 
62. Susan Crosland 1982 p 115. 
There were wo, [meetings to discuss the 
succession] 
t3 
an initial one in Jack Diamond's flat, but the elaborate analysis of who we should back was at Tony Crosland's flat at Bolton Gardens... what happened there was that there was a lot of analysis of the candidates. George Brown had certain 
weaknesses which could be regarded very seriously. That Jim Callaghan was inexperienced and some said shallow. And that Harold Wilson won't put a foot 
wrong, win us the next elections but would then run the party into the ground, and nobody supported 
Harold, but the votes were divided between those who backed Callaghan which certainly included Tony 
Crosland, George Thomson and yourself [indicates 
Jay] and those who felt that in the end there was 
only one person of real calibre whatever his faults 
and that was George Brown and that was really the 
rest of us. 64 
Since he had fought Gaitskell in 1960, the left had only 
one possible candidate: Harold Wilson. There seems to 
have been some muted discussion of Wilson's candidature 
among the CDS organisers. Dick Taverne later recalled: 
When [Gaitskell] was in the Middlesex I rang my 
brother-in-law who was a medical student in the 
Middlesex. I said, "I hope you're looking after my 
leader. " He said, "Well, I hope he is going to be 
alright. " I said, "Good God are you being serious. " 
"Yes he is very seriously ill. " And he said it's 
going to be touch and go whether he survives. I 
remember ringing up Bill [Rodgers] and saying "What 
the hell do we do if he dies? " We both then agreed 
that we weren't exactly necessarily sure that we 
would vote for George Brown but that we might even 
feel that Harold Wilson was the only alternative and 
in fact Tony Howard wrote an article about it 
because he got wind of it, saying that some of the 
young CDS people are even thinking about electing 
Harold Wilson. 05 
A similar story was recalled by David Marquand: 
-------------------- 
63. New Statesman, February 1 1963, "The Making of a Premier", Anthony Howard, gives 
the dates 
as January 21 and 22 1963. Howard's articles formed the 
basis for Anthony Howard and Richard 
West, The Making of the Prime Minister, Cape, London 1965. 
64. Witness'eminar Transcript, Taverne. 
65. Witness Seminar Transcript, Taverne. 
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I have it so strongly in my mind that I think it 
must be true: a lunch I had with Bill in the House 
of Commons dining room and it was just before 
Gaitskell died and indeed before he was even ill. 
And I am almost certain that I said in the curious 
way you sometimes do: "Just suppose Hugh was to fall 
under this fatal bus, what would happen ?" And Bill, 
I am 95% convinced, said jo me: "Well of course it 
would have to be Harold. " 6 
Anthony Howard actually wrote: "At least one prominent 
member of the right-wing CDS is on record as saying in a 
first shock reaction to Mr Gaitskell's illness: 'I 
suppose there's nothing for it - if anything happens to 
Hugh, it'll just have to be Harold '11.67 However, once the 
meetings were arranged and the Gaitskellites began to get 
over the shock of the leader's death, the more senior MPs 
asserted their influence. The discussions produced a 
split. Crosland, Thomson and Jay felt that they could not 
back George Brown as potential Prime Minister, but most 
of the group decided to back Gaitskell's deputy. Some did 
it with little initial enthusiasm but out of a sense of 
loyalty: "I met Bill immediately after, or very soon 
after, that key meeting and Bill said to me 'our problem 
is that it seems that our campaign slogan would be: 
Better George drunk than Harold sober "'. 
68 The split 
among the CDS group was the first real division: "For the 
highly professional CDS, which until then had always 
known that it was going somewhere together, even if it 
was never quite sure where exactly it was, this was 
perhaps the first moment of palpable failure. "69 
The way loyalty to George Brown was manifested 
tended to 
alienate the more independently minded Gaitskellites. 
The 
tactics used by the Brown supporters were characterised 
by Crossman: 
-------------------- 
66. Witness Seminar Transcript, Marquand. 
67. New Statesmen, "Labour's Duet at the Top", February 
8 1963, p 174. 
68. Witness Seminar Transcript, Donoughue. 
69. New Statesman, February 1 1963. 
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The Callaghan candidature was precipitated by the 
strong-arm methods of the Brownites, combined with the agonised awareness of some of Gaitskell's 
closest friends that, if Harold Wilson was an odious 
and impossiW man, George Brown was plain impossible. 
These "strong-arm" methods included "some crude 
appeals... made to honour, some fairly rough 
threats... issued that men would lose their Shadow jobs 
and chance of office if they voted wrong". 71 
The basis of the Brown campaign was the sense that the 
followers of Gaitskell had a duty to follow the choice of 
the majority of the group. Crosland described this as 
"gang mentality", 72 but it was a natural extension of the 
solidarity that had made the CDS so successful; the 
problem was that the unifying element, Gaitskell's 
leadership, was now removed. The effect of Gaitskell's 
death and the split at the top of the Gaitskellite group 
over the succession had its effect at the grass roots of 
the Campaign. Some like George Jones expressed their 
disillusionment: 
One felt at the bottom that "is this what it was all 
for? " Many people started to think that perhaps the 
whole point of the thing had been to get Dick and 
Bill and Denis and the others into Parliament. 
Because we knew the lei was still there and Wilson 
was seen as our enemy. 
The resolution of the leadership issue74 with Wilson's 
victory presented the CDS with its most serious internal 
crisis since its launch: 
-------------------- 
70. Crossman 1981, entry for February 8 1963, p 969. 
71. Crossman 1981, entry for February 8 1963, p 970. 
72. Susan Crosland 1982 p 116. 
73. Witness Seminar Transcript, Jones. 
74. Callaghan was eliminated on the first ballot and 
Wilson beat George Brown on the second by 
133 votes to 103, Butter 1986 p 143. 
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In keeping with what we had achieved, and in keeping 
with what we anticipated at that time to be the 
likely election date, when Hugh died early in 1963 
it did make a great deal of difference. We said and 
we meant it, in Campaign, I remember the discussion 
we had about it and Philip Williams wrote the piece 
saying that we welcomed Harold Wilson's election and 
we put everything behind us and we were very gpxious 
that we should win the election under Harold. 
The stance the Campaign took was the only really viable 
one. If they had come out against Wilson's leadership 
they would been repudiating all the talk of loyalty that 
had been directed at the left. The piece which appeared 
in Campaign76 in March 1963 is worth quoting in full 
because it illustrates the consistency represented by the 
attitude adopted to the new leader: 
The Parliamentary Labour Party has elected the new 
leader in an open and democratic way which has 
enhanced the Party's standing in the country and 
must have aroused the secret envy of many of our 
opponents. Whatever our personal preferences may 
have been all members of CDS accept without 
recrimination the decision of a body in whose 
judgement we have always had confidence. We 
congratulate Harold Wilson on his election, and 
welcome his endorsement of Hugh Gaitskell's 
policies, his repudiation of neutralism and his 
clear statement that the next Labour Government will 
make its own decisions based on its own assessment 
of the country's needs. 
No CDS supporter will quarrel with these principles 
or object if a different voice makes them acceptable 
to some sections of the Party. We are delighted 
that 
George Brown is deputy leader and that James 
Callaghan returns to the National Executive. And 
in 
the striking fact that all three candidates were 
committed by past acts or present statements 
to Hugh 
Gaitskell's policies and principles we see the 
best 
proof of the transformation his 
leadership wrought. 
He leaves behind a Party united, self-confident, 
fit 
and eager to govern. 
75. Witness Seminar Transcript, Rodgers. 
76. Campaign 24, March 1963. 
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In private the discussions over how to deal with the new 
leader produced more uncertainty. In the main the MPs, 
especially Tony Crosland and Roy Jenkins, were unwilling 
to deal with Wilson. Those outside the House of Commons 
took rather a different view. Philip Williams wrote to 
Tony Crosland about his feelings about an approach to 
Wilson: 
Of course it will be a distasteful operation... I'd 
be very sorry, but not too surprised if you or some 
others dropped out of politics now; but if you stay 
in you have to take the world as it is and not as 
we'd like it to be (as we have so often said to the 
left). This is not only my view but that of every 
CDS non-MP I've spoken to... Bernard Donoughue... and 
(I'm told) David Marquand. 77 
The danger which Williams saw was that the CDS would be 
isolated by being seen as an "anti-leadership group" 
which was "sulking in corners, rancorous at losing, 
interpreting everything HW does in the worst possible 
light and waiting for a chance to unseat him". 78 He 
continued to urge a meeting even though Rodgers was 
discouraging. In March he laid out the three things 
Rodgers should say to Wilson: 
(1) an assurance that you aren't going to oppose for 
the sake of opposition and that CDS wants as much as 
ever to win the next election; HW must be wondering 
how far he can afford to go in alienating the left 
and whether his old enemies will support him against 
any new ones he makes; if your answer is yes you 
strengthen the likelihood he will move right. 
(2) a warning that there would be some policies you 
might feel obliged to oppose? If you are going to 
have a tough talk with GB, why not also HW? 
(3) if you do see him as a group, haven't you more 
chance of impressing him with a solidarity of which 
he may at the moment be somewhat sceptical and 
therefore of strengthening your hand with him? 
79 
-------------------- 
77. Susan Crosland 1982 p 117. 
78. CDS Papers: Philip Williams (Nuffield), Williams to 
Rodgers, February 28 1963. 
79. CDS Papers: Philip Williams (Nuffield), Williams to 
Rodgers, March 2 1963. 
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Frank Pickstock shared Williams' view that an approach to 
Wilson would be beneficial. He advocated a meeting 
similar in style to the meeting between CDS supporters 
and Gaitskell which had taken place after Gaitskell's 
Common Market speech. He felt that "Whether Harold would 
agree and whether it would achieve our purpose of 
establishing a relationship... is another matter". 80 
Rodgers, in his replies to Pickstock and Williams, made 
clear that Jenkins and Crosland were not prepared to make 
an approach. He favoured a social invitation from Jenkins 
to Wilson but "Roy was... quite unprepared to do this and 
even adamant about not attending any such meeting which 
had been contrived". 81 To Pickstock he pointed out that 
"in the case of Hugh there was a fundamental relationship 
of confidence" but with Wilson "it is quite a different 
matter. "82 That the CDS made no approach towards Wilson 
was made rather irrelevant when Wilson called for the 
winding up of all internal groups. In response Victory 
for Socialism dropped hints that it would wind up if CDS 
agreed to do so. 83 Rodgers speculated that this could go 
as far as a further enquiry by the NEC. In the event an 
informal meeting took place between Ray Gunter, the 
National Agent, and Frank Pickstock and Denis Howell. A 
note prepared prior to the meeting outlined the line 
Pickstock intended to take. The objective was to stress 
the extent to which the CDS was dedicated to Party unity 
and would work with the leadership, to leave Ray Gunter 
with the final impression that "Our price is Tribune" and 
"We want HW's views from HW himself". 
84 In the event CDS 
did not close but it did gradually scale down its level 
of activity. 
-------------------- 
80. CDS Papers: Correspondence with F. V. Pickstock, Pickstock to Rodgers, March 
10 1963. 
81. CDS Papers: Philip Williams (Nuffield), Rodgers to Williams, March 5 1963. 
82. CDS Papers: Correspondence with F. V. Pickstock, Rodgers to Pickstock, March 
13 1963. 
83. CDS Papers: Correspondence with F. V. Pickstock, Rodgers to Pickstock, April 
10 1963. 
84. CDS Papers: Editorial Committee, Undated notes for meeting. 
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Wilson's attitude to CDS was conditioned by the 
impression that had been created by both sides in the 
defence debate that the Campaign had been even better 
organised than it really was. This combined with the 
place of Rodgers and others in supporting George Brown 
made them suspect in Wilson's eyes. This suspicion led to 
the early blocking of CDS MPs in the new Wilson 
leadership. Dick Taverne was the subject of such 
suspicion as the following exchange between Crossman and 
Wilson illustrates: 
"But shouldn't you train up one of these bright new men to be your P. P. S.? " I asked. "Which one? " Harold 
said, looking at me sharply. I thought rather desperately and said, "Dick Taverne is voting for 
you in the second ballot. " "But what reason have I 
to think he is trustworthy? " Harold said sharply. "Oh, no reason at all, but what reasons have you to think him untrustworthy? " "I don't give people jobs if I don't know whether they are trustworthy, " he 
said. 
Wilson's distrust of those who had been involved in CDS 
was not dissipated over the years. In 1969 after the 
death of Stephen Swingler the Minister of State at the 
D. H. S. S., Wilson and Crossman discussed who should 
succeed him. 
When I was asked whom I wanted I said, "Roy 
Hattersley, of course". Harold said, "You can't have 
him, partly because Barbara can't do without him and 
partly because he is disloyal and belongs to the 
wrong side. I must have the political balance kept. 
We must have another left-winger, and Reg Freeson is 
on the left. " "Well", I said, "I must consider 
competence and Roy Hattersley and Dick Taverne, both 
of whom I know are CDS, are the only two. " Harold 
said "Oh, do be serious, that's impossible... "85 
Further discussion ensued and Crossman still did not want 
Freeson. The second discussion produced a remarkable 
exchange between Wilson and Crossman: 
-------------------- 
85. Richard Crossman The Crossman Diaries Selections from the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister 
1964-1970, Book Club Associates, London 1979 p 511. Entry for Wednesday February 19 1969. 
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He had further reports. Roy Hattersley had made 
three disloyal remarks recently and we couldn't 
promote him. What about other people? "Well", I 
said, "do a few remarks matter? " We cast around and 
I suggested Dick Taverne. He said "Have you lost all 
your political antennae that you fail to remember 
what our loyalties are? Dick Taverne, he is a 
silken, treacherous member of the CDS group, he is 
most unpopular in the Parliamentary Party. If you 
have him it will be a betrayal of all we stand for. 
I am amazed at your forgetting. " I said, "It's not I 
who have forgotten, Harold. I think these young men 
have forgotten their past. I know Roy Hattersley is 
no more loyal to Roy Jenkins than he is to you. He 
is just an able young man on the way up and I think 
Dick Taverne has rather more loyalty and decency 
about him. He is a loyal Jenkins supporter but he is 
not going to be disloyal to you in his job for me. " 
Then Harold said, "It's out of the question. " 
"Look", I said, "can I perhaps move David Ennals 
from Health? " "Yes", said Harold, "you can, and put 
somebody else into the Health side in his place. 
What about Shirley Williams? " I said, "Shirley 
Williams is much more CDS than Roy Hattersley or 
Dick Taverne. " "But she is a woman, it would suit 
you. Shirley Williams, that's a good idea. " I don't 
know what to think-W6 
Other members of CDS were luckier than Dick Taverne and 
Bernard Donoughue in particular managed to escape his 
past in Harold Wilson's eyes. 
87 However the general 
atmosphere of the Party was no longer particularly 
conducive to the activity of the Campaign. As has 
been 
shown in the previous Chapter, 1963 was a year of 
continued activity by the Campaign but with a number of 
important changes in the organisational framework. In 
part these changes were needed to maintain 
the facade of 
a grass roots organisation and partly because 
the 
election of Wilson had raised questions about 
the future 
role of the Campaign. Another factor was 
Rodgers 
consideration of his own position. 
In April 1963 he wrote 
to Williams revealing that: 
-------------------- 
86. Crossman 1979 p 513, entry for February 20 1969. 
87. Donoughue was initially employed by Wilson to monitor opinion 
polls before being appointed 
a Senior Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister. 
See Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister, Cape, 
London 1987 p1 and p 78. 
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During the week following Harold's election and after Patrick's [Gordon Walker] apparent defection, 
I came to the decision that I wished to give up 
running CDS. I feel that I am doing too much and 
would also like to give more time to the House. In 
addition, as you will fully appreciate, there are 
many family reasons for trying to get financial 
stability. It is not, I should say, that CDS takes 
much time - or that I can be relieved of anything 
that I do - but it is a responsibility which I must 
constantly bear in mind and makes demands out of all 
proportion to the time it takes. 
I mentioned this conclusion to Tony and John Diamond 
as I was discussing the future with them generally. 
They pressed me to delay a final decision for a 
fortnight, which in any case I intended to do 
because I wished to discuss the whole matter with 
you first. As it turned out I felt after a week's 
reflection that I could not really give up CDS now 
when it was bound to be misunderstood and when there 
had to be at least one fixed point in a rapidly 
changing situation. 88 
Although Rodgers and Howell remained active in the CDS, 
especially in the selection of Parliamentary candidates, 
a restructuring that took into account the changed 
circumstances became inevitable. The critical meeting 
took place in April 1963. The MPs Rodgers, Howell and 
Taverne were replaced as the officers of the Campaign by 
non-MPs, Bernard Donoughue and Anthony Dumont. 
89 Another 
consideration which became clear at the time of the 
Common Market debate was the problem that the MPs faced 
as officers of a pressure group if it opposed the policy 
of the leader. Williams made this point to Rodgers: "It 
seems to me we ought to say that we claim the same rights 
as other minorities to express our views but have no 
intention of using differences over major policy as cover 
------------------- 
88. CDS Papers: 
' 
Correspondence with F. V. Pickstock, Rodgers to Pickstock, April 
1 1963. 
89. Seyd 1968 p 218. Seyd states that: "A joint meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the 
Campaign Council in March 1963 voiced its disapproval of the 
dominance of MPs amongst the 
Officers, the Executive Committee and the Campaign Council. " Given 
Rodgers' views expressed in 
his letter to Pickstock and the general recognition of the need 
for a change, the relative 
importance of the "disapproval" should be noted, in 
fact, the MPs seem to 'have shared the 
general view rather than there being a split. 
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for undermining the leadership. This will no doubt be a 
lot harder for you who are in the House when the 
legislation comes Up. 1190 Rodgers continued to run the 
Campaign but his public position was that of editor of 
Campaign. 91 In a sense this change in formal 
representation marked the end of the CDS as originally 
conceived. This was reflected in June when Rodgers wrote 
to Pickstock outlining his intention to "dictate a fairly 
full account of CDS from its beginnings... we all have a 
duty to posterity - if that doesn't sound too pompous - 
to make sure that the story of the CDS is sufficiently 
complete for future historians to draw up". 92 
The feeling at the end of 1963, following the Profumo 
scandal and the generally difficult year for the 
Government, was that the election would come in early 
1964. Crossman recorded in his diary his feeling that the 
Government would "find it better to go to the country 
quickly in March or April rather than taking the risk of 
waiting until July or August". 93 The Campaign was 
certainly expecting this and the committee planned to 
close down the office at Red Lion Street in June 1964.94 
The telephone was disconnected and Oliver Walston was 
responsible for collecting any remaining messages for the 
Campaign. There was considerable difficulty getting rid 
of the office and this was not finally done until the 
middle of 1965.95 After the General Election took place 
-------------------- 
90. CDS Papers: Common Market Correspondence, Williams to Rodgers, October 8 1962. 
91. Seyd 1968 p 218. 
92. CDS Papers: Correspondence with FV Pickstock, Rodgers to Pickstock, June 28 1963. The 
Campaign did not have to wait long for attention from historians. In October 1963 Stephen 
Haseter wrote to Rodgers requesting access to the CDS files for a proposed thesis on the Labour 
Party in the 1959-1964 period. After consulting Philip Williams, Tony Crosland and Denis Howell 
Rodgers reluctantly declined Haseter's request. Editorial Committee, Haseler to Rodgers, 
undated, Rodgers to Haseler, November 6 1963. 
93. Crossman 1981, entry for December 19 1963, p 1044. 
94. CDS Papers: Envelope CDS '63 '64 '65, Untitled notification of running down the Red Lion 
Street office. 
95. CDS Papers: Envelope CDS '63 '64' '65, Untitled notification of running down the Red Lion 
Street office and variuos correspondence between Rodgers and Dumont concerning disposal of the 
property at Red Lion Street. 
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in October an announcement was sent to the press that the 
CDS had wound up and this was followed by a formal letter 
to CDS supporters: 
You may have seen the announcement that the Campaign 
for Democratic Socialism has now closed down. We 
could not let the occasion pass, however, without 
writing a final letter to all our supporters. 
It is just four years since the publication of our 
Manifesto and its immediate success led to the 
founding of CDS. We first wrote to many of our 
supporters from the address - Frank Pickstock's - that we are writing from now: our office at Red Lion 
Street has already been closed. A great deal has 
happened during these years. 
At the time when CDS was launched it looked doubtful 
whether the Labour Party would ever win power again. 
The party was deeply divided and seemed unable to 
find a sense of direction. There was strong 
resistance to modernisation and a militant minority 
appeared to be gaining control. It was the task of 
CDS to help to rally the rank-and-file in the 
constituencies and trade unions and create the 
climate of opinion in which a General Election could 
be won. 
Now, sooner than we dared hope, Labour is the 
government of the country with the biggest swing to 
any party since 1945. First under the leadership of 
Hugh Gaitskell and latterly under Harold Wilson, 
Labour regained its momentum as a party fit to 
govern. Unity has been achieved and in Parliament 
and in the country we are setting out to ensure a 
long and memorable period of office. 
We would like to thank you for your support over the 
years. In particular through Campaign we have tried 
to meet your needs and to keep in touch with 
rank-and-file opinion throughout the country. 
Although CDS is closing down, many friendships 
forged in difficult times will survive. We should 
have preferred to write a personal letter to many 
hundreds amongst our supporters with whom we have 
had the closest contact but you will understand the 
difficulty of this. We shall always be glad to hear 
from you. 
Yours sincerely 
Frank Pickstock (Chairman) 
Bernard Donoughue (SecretarX) 
Anthony Dumont (Treasurer)9 
--- --- - ----- ---- 
96. CDS Papers: Enevelope '63 '64 '65, Pickstock et at to Colleague, 
December 1965, after the 
inevitable redrafting by Philip Williams on a draft of November 
25 1964. 
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Appendix 
Table 6.1: The views of CDS MPs on the Common Market. 
Pro-Market Anti-Market Undecided 
W. Ainsley G Barnett J Boydon 
A Albu W Blyton J Callaghan 
C Bence T Dalyell P Wells 
G Chetwyn H Gaitsketl J Cronin 
T Bradley P Gordon Walker W Hannan 
J Bray D Healey H Hayman 
W Hannan D Jay J H Hoy 
D Chapman H Hughes T Crosland 
J McCann R Prentice 
G de Fretis G Rogers 
J Diamond 
D Donnelly 
A Fitch 
E Fletcher 
D Foot 
M Lloyd-George 
D Ginsburg 
C Grey 
D Howell 
S Irving 
G Jeger 
R Jenkins 
H King 
E L Mattalieu 
R Mason 
F Mutley 
R Paget 
G Reynolds 
G Strauss 
D Taverne 
G Thomson 
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Conclusion 
The two central concerns of the CDS were the long term 
objective of modernising the Labour Party so that it 
could win power, and the short term objective of 
reversing the 1960 defence votes at Blackpool in 1961 to 
save the leadership of Hugh Gaitskell. Both had their 
roots in the battles of the 1950s. The experiences of the 
Parliamentary supporters of Gaitskell in the 1950s led 
them to form an initial, tentative, revisionist 
organisation. 1 This could not continue once Gaitskell was 
elected leader. In contrast the rank and file did not 
feel the need to organise to the same extent, because the 
leadership controlled the Party through the block vote 
system2 at Party Conferences and through the exercise of 
democratic centralism. 
3 This situation altered in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s when the leadership lost 
control of the block vote. 
4 The Party was then brought to 
a crisis by the reaction to Gaitskell's unsuccessful 
-------------------- 
1. See below pp 65-66. 
2. Minkin 1978 pp 3-33 and below p 23. 
3. Shaw 1988 pp 31-51. 
4. Minkin 1978 p 273 and below pp 84-97. 
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attempt to reform Clause Four of the Party constitution. 
The failure of the Parliamentary supporters of Gaitskell 
to come to his aid during this crisis inspired some rank 
and file members of the Party to organise in support of 
the policies Gaitskell was advocating - to become the 
organisational expression of revisionist ideology. They 
found an instant response from the leading revisionist 
MPs and, together, a group of non-Parliamentary and 
Parliamentary revisionists planned the launch of a new 
pressure group. 5 The objective of this group was the 
modernisation of the Labour Party. Rodgers described this 
process: 
A small group of friends, all long standing members 
of the Labour Party met to consider what they could 
do to reverse what they saw to be a steady slide to 
disaster. They believed that they were more 
representative of majority opinion within the Party 
than the shrill voices sometimes raised in its name. 
They saw that winning power and getting into 
government was the only ultimate justification for a 
political party worthy of the name. They were 
concerned that the fundamentalist principles of the 
Party could be given a modern setting which would 
make it attractive to the electorate. 6 
Initially it was the objective of modernising the Party 
which predominated. Despite the reservations many 
revisionists felt about Gaitskell's tactics on Clause 
Four, they all believed that the underlying objective was 
right. The other element in the initial formulation of 
the CDS was that its activity was not contingent on 
loyalty to Gaitskell's leadership. In their initial long 
term objectives the CDS was unsuccessful. 
It was unsuccessful because the defence issue, which 
overtook the Campaign, was intrinsically tied to the 
leadership of Hugh Gaitskell. The events at Scarborough 
-------------------- 
5. See above pp 105-117. 
6. CDS Papers: Envelope CDS '63 '64 '65, Draft article for final post-election edition of 
Campaign by Rodgers, undated. 
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in 1960 transformed Gaitskell's position. His speech made 
the dominant issue loyalty to the Party and by extension, 
unity.? In order to support the leader over defence the 
CDS became wedded to ideas of loyalty and unity which 
meant that as a campaign for the revision of Labour's 
basic ideological orientation it had limited room for 
manoeuvre if the leader should disagree with the 
Campaign's definition of the modernising ideology or if 
the leadership was lost. The dichotomy between loyalty to 
a body of ideas - revisionism - and loyalty to a leader 
who supported those ideas ultimately spelled the end of 
the Campaign. First the leader disagreed with a majority 
of the CDS over the European Community and then, with the 
Campaign having survived the disagreement for want of an 
alternative leader, Hugh Gaitskell died. In the final 
analysis loyalty to the leader was a necessary condition 
for a campaign dedicated, as Gerry Macquade thought the 
CDS should have been, to the support of Hugh Gaitskell, 
but it was not a necessary feature of a campaign 
dedicated to a body of ideas. However the loyalty 
fixation of the CDS extended beyond just the leadership. 
The objective was to have a Labour Government, preferably 
one which would follow revisionist lines in policy, but, 
so long as the defence policy was sound, virtually any 
form of Labour Government would do. Once this was 
achieved in 1964 there was little reason for the Campaign 
to continue. 
If the government did not follow the policies they 
believed in, the leading figures in the CDS were not, 
unlike their counterparts on the left, prepared 
to 
languish on the backbenches preaching the one true 
faith. 
Moreover, Roy Jenkins emerged during the Wilson 
Government as the leading revisionist and Jenkins 
did not 
have a killer instinct. As he acknowledged 
in his 
autobiography, "[I] lacked at least one of 
the essential 
-------------------- 
7. See above p 94-95. 
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ingredients of a capacity to seize power. I may have 
avoided doing too much stooping, but I also missed 
conquering.  
The essence of revisionism was that the Labour Party 
needed power to put its principles into practice. It 
needed to win - and the best way of winning was to 
modernise the Labour Party - but what this meant in 
practice was pragmatism. The best way to exercise 
influence was from inside government. While the leading 
revisionists were in government they had by implication 
to accept the dictates of power, which were based on 
loyalty to the leadership. They could not therefore 
continue to fight a factional battle for the policy 
orientation they favoured, and the initiative slipped 
back to the left in the constituency parties. The battles 
which were eventually fought, and the organisations which 
continued to operate9 concerned the issue of British 
entry into European Community. That this replaced 
multilateralism as the central issue of principle for the 
revisionist right made the outcome of renewed factional 
organisation in the mid-1970s more problematic for their 
future in the Party because Europe in the 1970s was not 
an issue that they were ever likely to prevail on in the 
Labour Party, in contrast opposing unilateralism in 1960 
was something that could be, and was, won. In both cases 
the underlying issue was a patriotic attachment to 
Britain's world role. In the case of unilateralism the 
CDS was supporting the contention of Nye Bevan, at the 
1957 Conference, that unilateralism would involve the 
breaking of international agreements without consultation 
and would thereby sabotage Britain's role in the world. 
In the case of the Community, a key argument of the 
anti-marketeers, and of Gaitskell himself, was that 
joining the Community would undermine the Commonwealth 
--------------- 
8. Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, Macmillan, London 1991, p 622. 
9. Like the Labour Committee for Europe. 
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and reduce Britain's capacity to act as a world power. In 
both cases the stance that was seen as supporting a world 
role ultimately won in the Labour Party. 
The Government which Harold Wilson formed in October 1964 
was a masterly balancing of interests. Inheriting a 
shadow cabinet still dominated by former supporters of 
Gaitskell, Wilson had only limited room for manoeuvre, 
but used it effectively. Within the Cabinet Wilson was 
faced by Callaghanl° and Brown, 11 his two opponents in 
the leadership contest and numbers two and three in the 
Government. The leading revisionist MPs also found places 
in the Government: Tony Crosland12 went to the DEA as 
George Brown's number 2; Roy Jenkins13 went to the 
Ministry of Aviation; Douglas Jay14 went to the Board of 
Trade, Patrick Gordon Walker15 went to the Foreign 
Office, Jack Diamond became Chief Secretary and Herbert 
Bowden was made Lord President. Further down the 
ministerial batting order, the CDS continued to be 
represented: Bill Rodgers and Maurice Foley were 
Under-Secretaries at the DEA; Niall Macdermott was 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury; Denis Howell was 
Under-Secretary at Education and Science and Chris Mayhew 
became minister for the Navy. Later, Dick Taverne, Austen 
Albu, Edmund Dell, Jim Boyden and Roy Hattersley all 
found places in the administration. While this did not 
preclude factional activity, it did minimise the danger 
of such action. 
-------------------- 
10. Callaghan was Chancellor from October 16 1964 to November 30 1967 and Home Secretary from 
then until the election in 1970. 
11. Brown was First Secretary at the DEA from October 16 1964 to August 11 1966 and Foreign 
Secretary until March 6 1968 when he resigned. 
12. Crosland was Minister of State at the DEA October 20 1964 to January 27 1965 and then 
Secretary of State for Education and Minister for Local Government and Regional Planning. 
13. Jenkins went from Aviation to the Home Office in December 1965 and then became Chancellor 
in November 1967. 
14. Jay stayed at the Board of Trade until August 1967 when he was sacked 
for his position on 
the Community. 
15. Gordon Walker lost his seat in 1964 but Wilson appointed him Foreign Secretary anyway. He 
could not sustain this position after losing the Leyton by-election. He was eventually returned 
in 1966 and was Minister without Portfolio. 
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Even before George Brown's emotional resignation from the 
Government the leadership of the scattered GDS group had 
moved to Roy Jenkins. 16 From the late 1960s onwards the 
future of the revisionists, who increasingly styled 
themselves as social democrats, became wedded to the 
European issue. 
The experience of the Wilson Government and the left-wing 
backlash which followed itl7 in the early 1970s, left the 
already scattered CDS rather stranded. In some ways the 
early 1970s were a re-run of the 1950s, except that the 
"floor" of Conference achieved many more victories over 
the "platform". In response to the political polarisation 
of much of the membership there were calls to revive 
right-wing organisation. However, when Dick Taverne faced 
his de-selection, after defying the whip to vote for 
British entry to the EEC, 18 many of the old campaigners 
held back from openly helping the Democratic Labour Party 
which Taverne launched to fight and win the resulting 
by-election-19 For others the record of the Wilson 
Government needed to be defended and the community was 
not the central issue. For these revisionists the future 
could still lie with the Labour Party. 
20 From the time of 
the vote for entry to the community on October 28 1971, 
when 69 Labour MPs voted with the Heath Government, the 
paths between those whose primary cause had become the 
Community and those who shared Gaitskell's exasperation 
with the subject, increasingly diverged. 
-------------------- 
16. George Brown gave his reasons for resigning as the "Presidential" style of 
government 
introduced by Harold Wilson. George Brown In My Way Penguin, Harmondsworth, 
1972 p 161. 
17. Minkin 1978 p 336. 
18. Taverne 1974 p 64. 
19. Ramsden and Jay, in Cook and Ramsden, 1973 p 279 state that 
Roy Jenkins tried in vain to 
persuade Taverne not to force a by-election, but many were well 
disposed. Bill Rodgers' wife 
went to Lincoln to help Taverne, but Rodgers himself 
felt the move was premature. Rodgers 
interview with author. 
20. This position was exemplified by Tony Crosland and his 
book Socialism Now, Cape, London 
1974. 
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The Labour Party was perhaps saved from immediate 
division by the unexpected electoral victory of 1974.21 
Once again Wilson had to blend the warring factions into 
a Government and the leading social democrats continued 
their ministerial careers. In marked contrast to the 
1964-1970 Government when only the Labour Committee for 
Europe had been active, the 1974-1979 Governments saw the 
formation of the Manifesto Group of MPs in 1974, the 
grass roots Social Democratic Alliance, run by the former 
chairman of the CDS student wing Stephen Haseler, in 
1975, and finally Bill Rodgers back in the chair of a 
right-wing pressure group in the Campaign for Labour 
Victory in 1977.22 
The crisis on the right of the Party, already compounded 
by Jenkins' resignation from the deputy leadership in 
1972, was made worse by his resignation from the 
Government. Having been offered the job of President of 
the European Commission in January 1976 he had held on to 
fight for the Party leadership before eventually going to 
Brussels in 1977.23 Tony Crosland, although he had split 
with many of his old colleagues over the European issue, 
was still seen as a potential leader. His tragically 
early death in 1977 again left the social democrats 
leaderless. The 1979 defeat of the Callaghan Government 
precipitated a further leftward swing in the Labour 
Party, particularly in the make-up of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. An indication of this change was the fact 
that not a single MP of the 1979 intake joined the 
right-wing Manifesto Group in the House of Commons. 
Despite the efforts of the Campaign for Labour Victory, 
there was no "unilateralist" issue to fight on, and no 
leader to give unqualified support to. There was no logic 
-------------------- 
21. Williams and Witliams, Labour's Decline and the Social Democrats Fall, Macmillan 1989 p 
104. 
22. This activity was in part a reaction to the organisation of the left of the Labour Party. A 
full account of this grass roots organisation is contained in Patrick Seyd, The Rise and Fall 
of the Labour Left, Macmillan Education, London 1987. 
23. Roy Jenkins, European Diary 1977-1981, Collins, London pp 2-6. 
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to the events of the early 1980s that would have brought 
the remnants of the CDS group back into a powerful 
position in the Labour Party. Perhaps the last hope was 
the election of Denis Healey as leader. With the choice 
of Michael Foot as leader, most of the old CDS organisers 
still active in British politics finally gave up the 
battle for the Labour Party and left to establish the 
SDP. 
The idea that there was a consistent development from the 
factionalism of the CDS to the succession of the SDP is 
mistaken. 24 Not only were the political circumstances 
radically different by 1981, the nature of the CDS and 
the context in which it campaigned was also profoundly 
changed. The CDS was an emotional bond between some of 
those who set up the SDP and it was a precedent for 
action when the CLV was established. But the CDS was an 
overtly loyalist Labour Party organisation and it 
operated by motivating those elements in the Labour Party 
who naturally favoured unity behind the elected leader. 25 
The extent of the Campaign's failure to maintain this 
motivation and have a permanent impact on the Party was 
finally illustrated by the division of 1981. This failure 
was tied into the nature of support for the Campaign. The 
support which the 1960 Manifesto tapped into was 
substantial but it was also conditional. It was 
conditional on the particular circumstances of the early 
1960s and the threat these circumstances poised to the 
future prospects of the Labour Party for those active in 
the Labour Party. For many it was also conditional on the 
-------------------- 
24. Williams and Williams 1989 sets out to give this impression. 
25. Although things might have been very different if Gaitskell had been defeated on the 
defence issue in 1961 and forced to resign the leadership. Some of the GaitskeLlites 
contemplated leaving politics if Gaitskell were defeated, see above pp 105-108. It is unlikely 
that a major realignment of the centre-Left would have taken place in 1961, but many would have 
questioned their futures in the Parliamentary Labour Party. Without this core of revisionist 
MPs it is arguable that the swing to the left of the 1960s and 1970s would have been faster and 
gone further. This exercise in counter-factual history is unprovable, but the existence of a 
solid group of moderate MPs in the House of Commons in the 1960s and 1970s significantly slowed 
the rise of the left. 
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leadership of Hugh Gaitskell. In contrast the 
circumstances of 1981 found a majority of activists 
inside the Labour Party supportive of the policies that 
the social democrats found most disagreeable - withdrawal 
from the Community, unilateralism and reform of the Party 
constitution to elect the leader by an electoral college. 
The constituency that the the social democrats needed to 
rally in 1981 was largely outside the Labour Party. 
What then did the CDS achieve? The positive promotion of 
candidates for Parliamentary selections influenced the 
shape of the PLP in the Wilson years. The CDS was one of 
a number of factors that helped in the adoption of these 
MPs, not least being the candidates' own abilities, but 
the CDS was an important factor in a number of key 
selections, especially in the by-elections held between 
1961 and 1964.26 This organising had a knock-on effect in 
the 1966 General Election, although the CDS had closed 
down by this time and the politics of the Labour Party 
had been altered by the constraints of power. Moreover, 
with the swing to the left of the trade unions, like the 
TGWU in the 1950s, and the activity of CND and VFS, the 
CDS effectively put the alternative case and organised 
against the increasing dominance of Labour Constituency 
Parties by the left. Once the CDS had stopped organising 
the way was open for the left to organise unopposed at 
grass-roots level, which in turn came to alter the 
structure of the Party at national level. 
What was supposed to be the secondary consideration of 
the Campaign effectively became its most significant 
contribution. This contribution was such that the CDS 
rallied the rank and file, which, in combination with 
the 
Policy for Peace and the leadership of Hugh Gaitskell, 
materially affected the outcome of the defence votes at 
Blackpool in 196127 and saved Gaitskell's leadership. By 
-------------------- 
26. See above pp 234-235. 
27. See Chapter 4. 
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challenging the left-wing monopoly in the constituencies 
and taking the fight to the trade unions, it succeeded in 
motivating the rank and file supporters of Gaitskell's 
leadership and of his defence policy. It achieved this in 
a remarkably short-time and with considerable 
professionalism. As an extPnsi nn of +-I, o no1-TT,, rv 
established to lobby on defence, the CDS was also 
successful in operating as a clearing house for 
prospective Parliamentary candidates. In fact its 
campaigning in these two fields was actually more 
successful than the equivalent Bevanite activity of the 
1950s or the CND campaign in the 1960s. As Bill Rodgers 
summed it up: 
There was a great deal of hard-work, many risks 
taken, harsh words written and spoken, abuse and 
misrepresentation to put up with. It was often 
exhausting and sometimes hurtful. But the object was 
always clear - to see the Labour Party, acting in 
its democratic socialist tradition, modernised and 
united, back again as the Government of Britain. 28 
The reputation of this short lived organisation lived on 
into the 1970s, at least among its opponents. Harold 
Wilson was recorded by Tony Benn in his diary for July 
1971 making the following boast: 
I don't know, I may just give up the Party 
leadership, they can stuff it as far as I am 
concerned. I pay out of my own pocket £15,000 a year 
to be Party leader. I finance my own office. I have 
got an overdraft with my bank. All the money from my 
memoirs has gone. I don't know why I go on. But I'll 
smash CDS (the Campaign for Democratic Socialism) 
before I go. 29 
High praise seven years after the CDS had liquidated 
itself. 
-------------------- 
28. CDS Papers: Envelope marked CDS 1963,1964,1965, Draft article for final post-election 
edition of Campaign by Rodgers, undated. 
29. Benn 1988, entry for Tuesday July 20 1971, p 359. 
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